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SUMMARY 
This is the first study of official relations between South Africa and Australia as 
conducted through resident High Commissions or Embassies. It reaches the conclusion 
that, though neither country loomed large on the other's scale of priorities, the relation-
ship was at the outset perceived to be of greater value to Australia than to South Af-
rica. It was initiated by the Australian government in 1945 as was the airlink which 
connected the two countries in 1952. Then flown by propeller-driven aircraft, the air 
route led to the expansion of Australian territory when the United Kingdom transferred 
to Australia sovereignty over the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean, eight 
hours flying time from Perth and an essential refuelling stop en route to Southern Af-
nca. 
The first Australian High Commissioner, Sir George Knowles, arrived in South 
Africa in August 1946. The Smuts government did not attach much value to the rela-
tionship. Pleading shortage of staff, and to the embarrassment of the Australian gov-
ernment, it had not reciprocated with its own appointment by the time of its fall in May 
1948. On assuming office the following month the new Prime Minister, Dr Malan 
responded positively to an Australian reminder about the lack of a South African High 
Commissioner. Dr P.R. Viljoen was appointed to the position and arrived in Canberra 
in June 1949. The relationship lacked substance and for relatively lengthy periods in 
the 1950s the High Commissioner's post was left vacant on both sides. 
The Australian government had proposed the establishment of relations on 
grounds inter alia that members of the British Commonwealth should be informed 
about each other's attitudes, policies and problems in the work of the United Nations. 
Yet it was the United Nations, particularly its composition, which subjected the rela-
tionship to its greatest strains. 
In focusing on the role and functions of individual diplomats the study throws 
light on what the profession or occupation of diplomacy encompassed at the time. Also 
canvassed is the development of the South African and Australian Departments of 
External Affairs from their beginnings to the early 1960s. 
Summary 
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PREFACE 
W.R. Louis, the historian of international trusteeship, said of his book 
Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the decolonization of the British Empire, 1 
'Surely one of the greatest pleasures of historical research is the opportunity to discuss 
one's work in progress with friends and colleagues'. A teacher at the University of 
Texas, he considered the 'treasure trove of colleagues' there to be a 'major advantage'. 
For one such as myself, employed in a non-academic occupation, who nonetheless 
hoped to produce something of scholarly value, the lack of such opportunities was a 
drawback. 
This study was a solitary pursuit - no doubt a strange confession about the 
examination of an occupation characterised by the gregariousness of its practitioners. 
Diplomacy involves people, people, and yet more people, all interacting busily with 
each other. Without people, there can be no diplomacy. It is a human occupation. As 
the Assistant Director of the United States Foreign Service Institute put it fifty years 
ago, 'the world is populated by people, and ... it is primarily with the ideas, sentiments, 
anxieties, resentments, aspirations, fiustrations, and basic ways of thinking, feeling and 
behaving of these people that our diplomacy must deal'.2 Paradoxically, though, aca-
demics often treat diplomacy as if it falls within the ambit of Noel Annan's observation: 
'Social scientists have depersonalised acres of human experience so that history 
resembles a ranch on which herds move, driven they know not why by impersonal for-
ces, munching their way across the prairie'. 3 It is time to reintroduce the human factor 
into studies of diplomacy. To a limited extent I attempt to do so here along the lines of 
what K.P. Jones calls the 'biographical approach' to foreign policy. 4 
What inspired the study in the first place was the award for doctoral studies of 
the University of South Africa's Chancellor's Club Scholarship. That was in respect of 
my MA dissertation, The 1943 General Election (1987), which was prepared, as was 
this thesis, under the atgis of the university's History Department. My thanks in that 
regard to Professor J.P. Brits who was also a midwife for my MA. 
I Oxford, 1977, Preface, p. viii. 
2 F.S. Hopkins. 'The Foreign Service Institute Today'. A copy of this paper dated 6 December 1948 is 
on BTS 24/2, Vol. 2. A condensed version appeared in The New York Times Magazine of 5 December 
1948 (pp. 32-33) under the title 'Career Classroom'. The quote is from the magazine, p. 32. 'Basic 
ways of thinking' was rendered as 'basic thinking' in the unpublished version. 
3 N. Annan, Introduction to Isaiah Berlin, Personal Impressions (London, 1980), p. xiii. 
4 K.P. Jones, U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941 (Santa Barbara, Ca., 1981), p. x. 
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On account of unforeseen circumstances the registered topic underwent a 
metamorphosis while the research was in progress. If it had not been for my situation 
when I commenced the study, I would most likely have chosen a topic in the field of 
South African domestic politics, possibly another election. After all, there is nothing 
about my MA except indirectly one or two references in the acknowledgments to 
betray me as a foreign service officer. 5 On the other hand, unlike some who research 
similar topics for their MAs and PhDs, drawing perhaps on the same research for 
both, 6 I enjoyed the benefit of tackling two vastly different and quite unrelated sub-
jects. In part this is my answer to Burridge Spies's question 'What determines the his-
torian's decision to study a particular aspect of the past?'7 
Apart from the Chancellor's Club Scholarship, for which students do not apply, 
the study was self-funded. I did not apply for financial assistance and none was offered. 
The study is in no sense an official one. It does not reflect the official point of view 
either in Australia or South Africa, or if it does that is entirely coincidental, and both 
the direction it took as well as its conclusions are entirely my own. If, as A.JP. Taylor 
was reputed to be fond of saying, 'history is a version of events', 8 this is my version, or 
at least my approach to diplomatic relations. There are and will be others. 
Lacking face-to-face contact with scholars versed in the academic and theo- . 
retical side of diplomacy, not to mention with sources possessing first-hand knowledge 
of the matters I refer to, I fell back on correspondence. That proved most rewarding 
and I should like to record my thanks to the people whose written responses to my of-
ten importunate, and possibly from their point of view inconvenient, requests for 
information or comment helped relieve the solitariness of the pursuit. Their letters and 
5 See, eg., J.P. Brits, Op die vooraand van apartheid: Die rassevraagstuk en die blanke politiek in 
Suid-Afrika, 1939-1948 (Pretoria, 1994), p. xi and 'Apartheid en die politieke grondsverskuiwing van 
1948', Historia, Vol. 38, No. 1, May 1993, p. 77. 
6 For example, A.J. Fick and P.W.A. Mulder. Fick's MA and D.Litt et Phil at UNISA dealt with the 
South African Dominion Party, ie., Die ontstaan van die Dominiumparty van Suid-Afrika (Unpub-
lished MA dissertation, 1973) and Die Dominiumparty van Suid-Afrika 1934-1948 (Unpublished 
D.Litt et Phil. thesis, 1979). Apart from their dates, the titles of P.W.A. Mulder's MA and D.Phil 
theses differ by only one word ie., Die Suid-Afrikaanse Staatsinligtingsdiens, 1936-1975, met 
Besondere Beklemtoning van sy Binnelandse Doelste/linge en Funksies (MA thesis, University of 
Potchefstroom, 1975) and Die Suid-Afrikaanse Staatsinligtingsdiens, 1936-1977, met Besondere 
Bek/emtoning van sy Buitelandse Doelstellinge en Funksies (D.Phil. thesis, University of Potchef-
stroom, 1977). (Underlining added.) Their lengths differ considerably. The MA is 213 pages; 
excluding appendices, the PhD is 534 pages. To some extent the MA was incorporated in the PhD. 
7 S.B. Spies, The Historian's Net (Pretoria), 1981, p. 5. 
8 A. Sisman,A.J.P. Taylor: A Biography (London, 1994 (1995)), p. 400. 
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Preface 
e-mail messages were among the worthwhile aspects of the study. They are not to 
blame for the use to which I put the information they supplied. 
In Australia 
Ms Lisa Gates (Canberra); H. Gilchrist (Canberra), Dr C. Howard (Melbourne), Dr 
W.J. Hudson (Canberra); Dr B. Kennedy (Melbourne); M.J.S. Knowles (Canberra), 
Prof A.W. Martin (Canberra); Dr Joan Rydon (Melbourne); Ms Moira Smythe 
(Canberra); Dr Hugh Stretton (Adelaide); Prof C.M. Tatz (Sydney); RA. Woolcott 
(Canberra) 
In South Africa 
RF. Botha (Pretoria); A.M. Hamilton (Somerset West); A.J. Oxley (Pretoria); Dr J.P. 
Rourke (Cape Town); D.B. Sole (Cape Town); C.F.G. von Hirschberg (Cape Town) 
In the United Kingdom 
Sir Brian Barder (London) 
In the United States 
the late Dr E.M. Rhoodie (Atlanta, Ga.) 
Special thanks to 
Mr Martin Boswell of the South African Embassy (now High Commission) in Can-
berra for information about the South African official residence in that city; 
Mr Mervyn Knowles for supplying me with cinematic footage of the South African 
State funeral accorded his father Sir George Knowles, Australia's first High Commis-
sioner to South Africa, as well as of the 16 mm film he shot during the fifteen months 
he spent in this country. The Australian Film and Sound Archive converted the 16mm 
colour film to video and Mr Knowles provided a written commentary on the scenes 
depicted; 
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Ms Sylvia Mackay for the copies of article material and other items held by the Na-
tional Library of Australia, as well as the press reports and books that she sent me, and 
for acting as my liaison of the first instance inter alia with the Australian Archives and 
the Historical Records Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; 
Prof AW. Martin, the Menzies biographer, for the inscribed copies of Volume 1 of 
Robert Menzies: A Life (Carlton, Vic., 1993) and of Dark and Hurrying Days: Men-
zies' 1941 Diary (Canberra, 1993) which he co-edited; 
Dr Janet Phillips (nee Robertson) for the inscribed copy of her book Liberalism in 
South Africa 1948-1963 (Oxford, 1971); 
Dr J.M. Siracusa, Reader in Diplomacy at the University of Queensland, who gener-
ously donated essential texts including Cadogan's Diaries and W.J. Hudson's Billy 
Hughes in Paris and Australia in the League of Nations; 
Ms Moira Smythe, now of the Historical Documents Branch of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, who supplied me with voluminous quantities of 
relevant documents, especially over the past year; 
The diplomatic bags section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which 
permitted Ms Smythe to send the documents to me in the bag; 
Ms Ann Tothill for helping me comprehend the intricacies of the word processing 
programme with which I wrote the thesis and for other assistance in the world of 
cyberspace. 
The advice and assistance of archival staff was indispensable: 
Australian Archives, Mitchell, ACT, Australia 
Ms Anita Brake, Ms June Chick, Ms Angela Greig, Ms Gillian M. Redmond, Ms 
Moira Smythe [until January 1995], J~hn Pepper, Ms Deanne Zeller 
XIV 
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Historical Documents Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Canberra, ACT, Australia 
Chris Taylor, Ms Moira Smythe [from January 1995] 
South African Archives, Pretoria 
Ms Laetitia Coetzee 
'Tussenbewaar', Union Buildings, Pretoria 
Martin Meintjes, Pieter Human and Leon Jordaan; and C.J. (Neels) Muller of the offi-
cial history project. 
I am also glad to have the opportunity to say how much I enjoyed working in 
the National Library of Australia. I count the time I spent in its reading and newspaper 
rooms among the highlights of my four year five month stay in Canberra. That the 
reading room was open on Saturdays and Sunday afternoons and the newspaper room 
all day on Saturdays was most helpful. 
On the technical side, I wrote the thesis with two personal computers - an 
Amstrad 2386/65, 20 MHz and a Compaq Contura 3/20 Notebook, 20 MHz, using the 
programmes Word for Windows 2 and Microsoft Windows 3 .1. I printed it on an IBM 
4019E laser printer, the basic five page per minute model. Such are the advances in 
computer technology that the equipment and programmes, acquired in 1990 and 1992, 
are now somewhat antediluvian or worse. After all, 'computer hardware' is said to be 
'guaranteed to become obsolete within five years ofpurchase'.9 
On that basis the equipment, word processing programme (yvordStar 3.3) and 
footnote programme10 with which I prepared my MA eight years ago were quite primi-
tive. So was the disk operating system - CP/M - of the Kaypro II computer on which I 
commenced that dissertation before switching to an IBM PC. At three minutes per 
page, printing time on a daisy-wheel printer consumed some twenty-two hours spread 
over a week. Including pauses for paper refills, my IBM printer disposed of the present 
work in some four-and-a-half hours. If upgraded it could process ten pages per minute. 
9 S. Weinstein, 'MBAs Via the Internet: Too Soon?', International Herald Tribune, 30 May 1995. 
1° Footnote, Pro/Tern Software, Inc., Walnut Creek, California, 1984. 
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A hold-out against technology, Shelby Foote, author of the massive The Civil 
War: A Narrative, provides a contrast. He is said to savour 'the autumnal pleasure of 
writing with a dip pen - not even a fountain pen' and 'sees the digital age as a 
"nightmare. There's no telling what's going to come of this. Maybe a new kind of lit-
erature," he says. "And it ain't gonna be my kind".'11 A.J.P. Taylor was another who 
claimed his equipment influenced his style: 'With a pen you write words. With a 
typewriter you write sentences. With an electric typewriter ... you write paragraphs. In 
military terms: bow and arrow, musket, machine gun. '12 
I used dBase III Plus to record information about my collections of Australian 
archival documents and of Australian newspaper reports. The programme enables the 
user to design a form into which required data can be fed - names, dates etc. - thence 
to sort the entries by category. There is also provision for brief comment. More 
recently, it came in handy for tabulating the activities of members of the South African 
High Commission in the 1940s and 1950s from information given in the Canberra 
Diary section of The Canberra Times. 
I prepared the statistical tables in Chapter Eight by feeding data into a Micro-
soft Excel spreadsheet. The calculate and sort facilities of Word for Windows 2 were 
also useful. 
That some of my interlocutors in Australia and elsewhere were on that other 
marvel of the computer age, e-mail (CompuServe or Internet), helped speed the com-
munications process. The Australian Archives and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) came online during the final year of the study. 
Shelby Foote called his monumental work 'my rock and my companion through 
two decades'. 13 I feel the same about this thesis though it was completed within a more 
modest time-frame. 
F.D. Tothill 
PRETORIA 
November 1995 
11 Newsweek, 27 February 1995. 
12 Sisman,A.J.P. Taylor, p. 361. 
13 S. Foote. The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol. 3, Red River toAppomatox (New York, 1974), p. 1065. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A generation after one-time South African Ambassador S.F. du Toit wrote that 
'Foreign service and diplomacy are terms which are either surrounded in mystery or 
looked upon with too much deference by the public', 1 there is still 'a serious gap 
between the popular image of diplomacy and the reality'. 2 If they think about it at all, 
many white South Africans perceive foreign service to be a glamorous and well"'.'paid 
profession revolving around luxury cars, palatial residences and socialising with the 
elite at cocktail parties3 but are hard put to say what it is that foreign service officers, 
known colloquially as diplomats,4 actually do. 
Citizens of other countries have the same difficulty. In 1956 R.G. Casey, then 
Australia's Minister of External Affairs, sought to inform the 'average Australian' of the 
country's foreign service. 'The diplomatic officer of today', he wrote, 'has little time for 
cocktail parties and old-world elegance. His is a practical, down-to-earth, hard-
working job'. 5 The 'average Australian' remained uninformed and unimpressed. Three 
decades later a retired permanent head of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
was lamenting that the 'popular perception of Foreign Affairs being devoted to social 
pursuits of doubtful value, calling for very little by way of actual work, remains alive 
and flourishing'. 6 At least one of his predecessors was of the same opinion.7 
Even that paragon of British diplomacy, Sir Nicholas Henderson, encountered 
similar misconceptions: 'I have found much mystification on the subject and no little 
misrepresentation. An Ambassador, as I have learnt, is apt to be subjected to 
alternating currents of awe and hostility, curiosity and contempt; and like some strange 
creature who has escaped from a zoo he is rarely handled as a normal human being. 
1 Home and Abroad, Cape Town, 1969, p. 171. Presumably he was not aware that Lord Strang, one 
time British Permanent Under-Secretary of State (PUS) at the Foreign Office, had already used that 
title for his memoirs, published in 1956. Despite the usual disclaimer, Du Toit seems to have been the 
principal model for the Ambassador in Andre P. Brink's Afrikaans-language novel of that name, ie. 
Die Ambassadeur. Cape Town, 1963. D.B. Sole, letter, 30 June 1994. 
2 Z.S. Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982), p. 30. 
3 On this aspect, see E. Clark, Corps Diplomatique (London, 1973), pp. 100-01. See also my article 
'Practising Diplomacy: A Working Diplomat's View', World Review (Australia), Vol. 29, No. 1, 
March 1990, pp. 20-28. For a popular Australian view of the early 1960s, see A. Reid, 'What 
diplomats do to Canberra', The Bulletin (Australia), 5 April 1961, pp. 7-10. 
4 More correctly, if pompously, diplomatists. 
5 R.G. Casey, 'Modem Diplomat Is Hard Worker', The Canberra Times, 26 September 1956. 
6 P.G.F. Henderson, Privilege and Pleasure (North Ryde, NSW, 1986), p. 134. 
7 Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt (Sydney, 1972), p. 315. 
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Yet this is what he must remain if he is to discharge adequately his calling of go-
between. '8 
A measure of public confusion is inevitable because foreign servtce officers 
themselves like to project an air of elitism besides propagating the view that they are 
engaged in the mysteries, their own role being akin to that of vestal virgins.9 That fol-
lows in the tradition of Sir Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office in the early years 
of the present century who 'rather looked down on Secretaries of State than up to 
them and regarded Foreign Office clerks as the really important people'. 10 Perhaps this 
lends perspective to G.M. Young's 'casual insult'11 that 'the greater part of what passes 
for diplomatic history is little more than the record of what one clerk said to another 
clerk', 12 as does Steiner's observation: 
Had these remarkable clercs not taken so exalted a view of their 
mysteries, had they not gone so far in insulating themselves from 
the community at large, the arts of diplomacy would not have been 
so drastically discredited when the lights went out in Europe. 13 
South African newspaper practice of referring to members of sports teams pur-
suing their sports abroad as 'Ambassadors' or 'Envoys' compounds the confusion. 
Besides, it is based on a misunderstanding: diplomats represent their governments in 
the first instance and only indirectly their countries. 14 In the years of his illustrious 
8 N. Henderson, Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969-1982 (London, 1994 ), p. 1. 
9 G. Moorhouse, The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today (London, 1977), pp. 46-47, gives a useful 
account of the foreign service mystique. 
lO Quoted by Z.S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge 1969), p. 
x. That feeling may have contributed to the insubordination and insolence he displayed to the Foreign 
Secretary in the last quarter of 1914 which is said to have prevented his promotion to the Permanent 
Under-Secretaryship at that time. E.T. Corp, 'Sir Eyre Crowe and the administration of the Foreign 
Office, 1906-1914', The Historical Journal, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1979, p. 453, fn. 69. However, he 
became PUS in 1921. 
11 RA. Jones, The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914 (Gerrards Cross, Buckinghamshire, 1983), 
p. 1. 
12 G.K. Clark, ed., G.M. Young, Portrait of an Age: Victorian England (London 1977 (1936)), p. 110. 
B.D. Tennyson's Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic History (Washington, DC, 
1982) puts one in mind of this. A recent view of Young's 'dictum' is that it 'is as dated as 
Chamberlain's umbrella'. D.C. Watt et al, 'What is Diplomatic History?', History Today, Vol. 35, July 
1985, p. 35. 
13 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. x. 
14 A South African official wrote in October 1995: 'Overseas, a diplomat's duty does not require [him] 
to defend the policies of whichever government is currently in power, but to explain the entire reality 
of the whole, complicated rainbow nation. Diplomats represent their country, not some narrow 
political agenda'. The Star (Johannesburg), 23 October 1995. (Letter: E.J. Joubert, 'South Africa's 
diplomats far from being party lapdogs'). This view is uninformed. After all, governments do not pay 
diplomats inflated salaries just to have them follow their own agendas. 
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international career the golfer Gary Player was probably South Africa's best-known 
'Ambassador' of that type and before him that other champion golfer, Bobby Locke. 
South African universities, at least their administrations, know little more than 
members of the public about the nuts and bolts of the country's inter-governmental 
relations and of the foreign service created to manage them. The present writer was a 
South African Ambassador on three occasions: to the European Office of the United 
Nations (1975-80), to Argentina (1980-84) and to Australia (1988-92) for a total of 
thirteen years. Yet when listing his occupation on the form registering him for this 
degree, the best the University of South Africa (UNISA) could come up with was 
'Technical Worker (Other)' and that against the background of long experience with a 
great variety of occupations of its students! 15 
Among the limited number of those who have heard of them, there is a 
tendency to assume that the wisdom of the writers of the classic texts, the Abraham de 
Wiqueforts, Francois de Calliereses, Ernest Satows and Harold Nicolsons, some of 
whose works are still in print, 16 is relevant to modern conditions. Steiner is one who 
believes so.17 It often is but the later twentieth century has produced circumstances 
those writers never dreamed of While the required personal attributes they identify 
may not in theory have changed since the 17th century, the nature of the work and the 
standing of the workers has. G. McDermott, a former Minister in the Foreign Office 
with ambassadorial status, lists among 'the kinds of attitude which will prove positively 
unhelpful', harkening back to 'Harold Nicolson and Lord Strang and talk about the 
eternal verities of diplomacy and some inflexible form of apparatus'. 18 That is not to 
say, however, that intelligent reading of their works will not prove instructive. 
15 A 1994 profile of registered students indicates that 1358 or 1.08 per cent enjoy this listing. 
Presumably very few are foreign service officers. A list of occupations recognised by the university is 
given in Instructions for completing the beige registration Form for 1995, UNISA P. 1781 (B), pp. 
21-22. See also UNJSA News, Vol. 21, No. 4, Sept-Dec 1994, p. 1. ('We are growing, growing, 
growing ... ') 
16 A. de Wiquefort, L'ambassadeur et sesfonctions (1679); F. de Callieres, De la Manier de Negocier 
avec /es Souverains (1716); E. Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (1917); and H. Nicolson, The 
Evolution of Diplomatic Method (1954); Diplomacy, (1939) and other tex1s. See also G.A. Craig, 'On 
the Nature of Diplomatic History: The Relevance of Some Old Books' in P.G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: 
New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (London, 1979), pp. 21-42 and M. Keens-Soper, 
'Franc;;ois de Callieres and diplomatic theory', The Historical Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1973, pp. 485-
508. 
17 Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, p. 31. 
18 G. McDermott, The New Diplomacy and its Apparatus (London, 1973), p. 183. 
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The politician Blaar Coetzee gave this account of his duties as South African 
Ambassador to Italy for six months in 1972-73, a post to which he was appointed 
when he was replaced as Minister of Community Development and of Public Works in 
a cabinet reshuffle: 
I slowly had to discover what exactly the work of an ambassador 
is, and I still don't know what the work of an ambassador is. All I 
know is that he has very, very little to do. He has great difficulty in 
keeping himself occupied. You have correspondence and you 
make at the most one or two visits a day. For the rest of the day 
you read newspapers and try to keep yourself informed. 19 
There are different ways of looking at this. On the one hand it is, and was at the 
time, grist to the mill of those, usually journalists and opposition politicians, who for 
their own purposes criticise the appointment of government-supporting politicians to 
diplomatic posts. On the other, if Coetzee was accurately reported and if he was giving 
a true account of his average day, the Department of Foreign Affairs, particularly its 
permanent head, could be held at fault for not briefing him on what was expected. But 
that would be to overlook the awe in which white South African public servants of the 
time held their country's politicians, especially former cabinet ministers. Even to hint 
that a man on whom the Prime Ministerial choice had fallen was somehow deficient 
because he needed to be briefed about his new tasks (and by public servants at that) 
would smack of Iese majeste. 20 There again Coetzee could have asked to be briefed. 
White South Africa was not alone in appointing ill-suited politicians to 
diplomatic posts. Almost forty years after the event, J.K. Waller recorded having told 
his External Affairs Minister, R.G. Casey, in 1952 that the Australian High Commis-
sioner in London, T.W. White, a former cabinet minister, was not capable of handling a 
crisis and that if one arose he would go to White's wife, Ivy, a daughter of Australia's 
second Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, and ask her to explain it to her husband! ('Casey 
made some comment which indicated that he well understood the position. ')21 
19 D.J. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannes-
burg, 1984), p. 270, footnote 126, quoting Rapport, 1April1973. 
20 There's a hint of this in the senior ANC Minister's description of South African civil servants as 
'obsequious'. Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 12 June 1994. (Hogarth's column.) 
21 J.K. Waller, A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories (Nathan, Qld., 1990), p. 25. White had been a 
candidate for the Prime Ministership in April 1939. P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: 
The making of Australian foreign policy 1901-1949 (Melbourne, 1983), p. 122. 
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Diplomacy is a nebulous occupation and those familiar with it can sympathise 
with Coetzee's predicament. An adviser to a former leader of the Australian Labor 
Party, now (1995) Governor-General of Australia,22 called Foreign Affairs 'a bullshit 
portfolio' in relation to domestic ones23 and the truth of that is self-evident. Paul 
Hasluck, himself a Governor-General of Australia, contrasted his own experience as an 
official in the war-time Australian Department of External Affairs with his earlier 
occupation of newspaper sub-editor: 
In an old-fashioned newspaper office I had been accustomed to 
being given a defined job, having my own job to do, and getting 
down to it at once in order to meet a rigid deadline. One never 
thought of doing someone else's work and one was never uncertain 
about what to do on one's own. 24 
The view expressed by an Italian diplomat is complementary: 'The thing today is to 
find a justification. With most people's jobs you can see what they do; there's someth-
ing tangible at the end of it. With diplomacy, mostly there is not. '25 It is also impossible 
to calculate a diplomat's value. If 'relations with another country are bad, would they 
have been even worse if the diplomat had not been active?'26 
Perhaps Coetzee would have benefited from the views of a later British Ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union, Sir Rodric Braithwaite: 
being an ambassador primarily involves managing communica-
tions between your country and their country . . . To do that effec-
tively you need to know a very large number of people and you 
need to be talking to a very large number of people all the time in 
order to have an idea of what's going on, both what events are 
happening and what people's moods are, because you have to be 
able to tell your government: the mood in this country is good or 
bad or whatever it is or people are getting nervous or rebellious or 
whatever. . . . Cocktail parties are very useful from that point of 
view ... because you can get round [and] meet a lot of people fairly 
regularly and very quickly. 27 
22 William George Hayden. Australian Labor follows the American spelling. 
23 J. Stubbs, Hayden (Melbourne, 1990), p. 272. 
24 P.M.C. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-1947 (Melbourne, 1980), p. 
5. 
25Quoted by Clark, C01ps Diplomatique, p. 15. 
26 Ibid., p. 14. 
27 Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary, BBC World Service Radio Programme, 15 May 1994. (These-
cond of a series of three broadcast on 8, 15 and 22 May. Put together to mark the 500th anniversary of 
the beginnings of modern diplomacy, the programme is further evidence of the on-going fascination 
with this subject.) Former Australian diplomat Alan Renouf gives an account of a normal working day 
in The Champagne Trail: Experiences of a Diplomat (Melbourne, 1980), pp. 147-49. 
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Of course, the role of a British Ambassador is not identical to that of a small country's 
representative. Individual circumstances need to be taken into account. The Australian 
Henderson's experience of the 'diplomatic social round' was that it provided 'an 
opportunity to talk to people whom it might otherwise be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to see' thereby enabling information 'to be extracted from, and business to 
be done' with them. 28 
In 1995 a South African journalist reproached the newly restructured 
Department of Foreign Affairs: 
South Africa no longer needs a bunch of well-paid lizards, 
spending their time on an endless round of cocktail parties and 
social events, trying to sell an ideology or merely doing a 'rah-rah, 
apartheid is dead' routine. It needs people with solid expertise and 
knowledge of, among other things, how business operates, where 
to find markets for exports, how to authoritatively advise people 
wishing to invest capital and how to promote trade. 29 
That is known as commercial diplomacy and there is nothing new about it. The 
prospect of commercial diplomacy lay behind the establishment of the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs (then External Affairs) in the first place. General 
Hertzog told the House of Assembly in 1932 that the department's role was 'to 
facilitate and assist the operation connected with the offices of the trades 
commissioners'.3° Complaints about perceived South African inadequacy in the field of 
commercial diplomacy are also not new. In 1947, apparently 'finding themselves at a 
disadvantage in the struggle for Continental markets', South African businessmen were 
complaining about inadequate commercial representation at the country's nuss1ons 
abroad and of having to appeal to British Legations for assistance. 31 
For decades the British have focussed their diplomacy on the promotion of 
exports.32 United States diplomacy is now doing the same.33 Indeed, commercial 
28 Henderson, Privilege and Pleasure, pp. 134-35. See also Lord Strang, The Diplomatic Career 
(London, 1962), pp. 17-18. 
29 B. Cameron, 'Let's have no more lizards lounging on cocktail circuit', 'Business Report', The 
Star/Pretoria News, 23 May 1995. 
30 HA Deb., Vol. 15, 10 April 1930, Cols. 3018-19. 
31 AA, A4231/2, Pretoria 1-91 1947, No. 9/47, 20 January 1947. 
32 There may be an element of pandering to domestic political opinion in this. See Clark, Corps 
Dip/omatique, p. 15. 
33 See D.E. Sanger, 'How Washington Inc. Makes a Sale', The New York Times, Section 3, Business, 
19 February 1995 and 'USA, Inc.', Newsweek, Vol. CXXV, No. 10, 6 March 1995, pp. 10-17. 
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diplomacy extends much further back than the twentieth century. When Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert was Minister of Finance and Trade in seventeenth century France, 
'Ambassadors were instructed to do everything within their power to foster French 
commerce'. 
The Levant trade was regarded as of such special value that the 
ambassador to the Porte [ie. to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire] 
was often appointed, not by the Foreign Secretary, but by the 
Minister of Finance and Trade. He was expected, before leaving 
France, to consult with the Chamber of Commerce at Marseilles 
and to pay full attention to their demands and recommendations. 34 
On the analogy of Geoffrey Blainey's 'Three Cheers view ofhistory',35 and con-
nected to the perceptions of a glamorous and well-paid profession, there is in Australia 
and South Africa what might be called a Three Cheers or gung-ho view of diplomacy 
and its practitioners. Lost sight of, certainly attention is not drawn to it, is the dark side 
of divorce, alcoholism and even suicide. 36 The strains on family life are severe and the 
children of foreign service parents are not infrequently sacrificed to career exigencies. 37 
While some do, not many foreign service children care to follow their fathers (or their 
mothers these days) into the profession. An anonymous Australian put it this way in 
the 1950s: 
No one ever seems to think of the disadvantages of diplomatic life. 
A diplomat gives up his country, his friends and his opportunities 
for other employment. He moves his home continually ... he and 
his family are plagued with illness in tropical posts., he has to 
spend a great amount of time at boring social functions and in 
addition his children's education is a constant worry. 38 
34 H. Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, n.d. (1954)), p.59. 
35 A patriotic notion of the past - meaning in effect that Australia was seen as 'a success'. G. Blainey, 
'Drawing Up a Balance Sheet of Our History', Quadrant, Vol. XXXVII, No. 298, July-August 1993, p. 
11. He points out that the Three Cheers view has been displaced in some circles, including official 
ones, by the Black Armband view which emphasises Australia's shortcomings rather than its 
achievements. 
36 Alcohol is more freely available to foreign service officers and at a lower price than in practically 
any occupation. Unusually for a South African journalist, Francois Lotter, diplomatic correspondent of 
the newspaper Beeld (Johannesburg), acknowledged the dark side in his article 'Uncertainty about 
diplomats must be cleared up'. Beeld, 16 November 1994. (Original in Afrikaans). Yet he displayed 
the usual ignorance of what it is diplomats actually do besides commencing with a relatively lengthy 
and not entirely facetious description of the common perception of the diplomatic life. 
37 See Clark, Corps Diplomatique, p. 98. 
38 The Canberra Times, 17 October 1958, letter ('Observer'). Katy Rhoodie refers to this aspect in 
Agter 'n Marmerskans (Johannesburg, 1982), p. 11. 
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Bruce Lockhart, a consular officer who did not stay the course, referred to the 
'meanness of what is, in effect, a belittling and narrow existence'.39 More recently, a 
foreign diplomat told a BBC interviewer: 
You get used to a country and then you make friends there. It 
becomes your society. And then suddenly you are transferred, and 
all that is gone. Suddenly. So you have so many lives. Short lives. 
I worked in seven or eight posts and [it is] as if I've lived seven or 
eight lives and then that is finished. That is the sad side of diplo-
matic life ... 40 
The appointment of so-called high fliers, especially in Australia, to head other 
public service departments may seem to compensate for such aspects. But most career 
officers are not high fliers. The retired Australian diplomat, Francis Stuart, put it well: 
I spent 40 years in my profession: I played no prominent part in 
the diplomatic world myself but I often watched those who did 
from close at hand, and I had access to much information: I sup-
pose I could use a term common at international conferences to 
describe my role in public affairs - I had Observer Status.41 
The best such people can expect after forty years of foreign service is a fund of 
memories they would be hard put to match in other occupations and a rather better 
pension than that payable to teachers. (See Chapter Two.) In Britain and Australia 
their pensions are indexed against inflation, which is low there~ in South Africa they are 
not and it is not. Alan Renouf s thirty-six year career took him to the top of Australia's 
foreign service - at various times he was Ambassador to France and to the United 
States and Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Therefore, he reached the pinnacle of his 
profession. Yet he said in his memoirs that 'the advantages of the diplomatic life are 
much outweighed by the disadvantages'. 42 If so high a flier is of that opinion, where 
does it leave the rest? 
At least initially, what may have attracted them to foreign service was the pros-
pect of living a good part of their lives in relatively affluent circumstances abroad - the 
upside - interspersed with periods of service at head office - viewed by many as the 
downside and described by a retired South African Ambassador, J.B. Mills during one 
39 R.H. Bruce Lockhart, Retreat from Glory (New York, 1934), p. 84. See also Clark, Corps Diplo-
matique, pp. 91-93. 
40 Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary, 15 May 1994. 
41 F. Stuart, Towards coming-of-age: A foreign service odyssey (Nathan, Qld., 1990 (1989)), p. i. 
42 Renouf, The Champagne Trail, p. 153. 
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of his three terms of short duration at head office in a thirty-seven year career as 'a 
study in ritual humiliation',43 an aphorism as valid as the day it was made. On the other 
hand, what was said in response to the plaintive letter quoted on the previous page is 
applicable also to South African diplomats: 'It is well known that our diplomats tend to 
be in a rather morose frame of mind when they first return for a period of duty in these 
backwoods'. 44 
During the second of his three head office postings the same J.B. Mills pre-
pared a Public Service Commission (PSC) recruiting memorandum which, in treating 
of foreign service work abroad, identified three of its core aspects. 45 Even today, if all 
three are not present whoever is doing whatever abroad is not engaging in diplomacy 
as it is traditionally conceived. The diplomat, Mills said, 'Must at all times strive to 
build up friendly connections with the people of the country concerned, not only with 
officials but also with prominent representatives of business, intellectual and social 
circles, and so conduct himself as to encourage friendly feelings towards his country.' 
That side of the work was known as 'Representation'. Then, the diplomat was 'the 
defender of the interests of his own nationals in the country concerned. He must see to 
it that they are not unjustly treated, and should in cases of difficulty serve as an 
intermediary between them and the local authorities'. That was 'Consular' work. Lastly, 
there was the 'Political' side in terms of which 'he is the eyes and ears of his 
Government in the country in which he is stationed. A large portion of his time, 
especially when he reaches senior status, will be spent in preparing economic and 
political reports so that his Government may be kept promptly and fully informed of 
local developments'. 
A few years later these core concepts were rendered succinctly in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations: 
The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in: 
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State; 
43 A remark reported to the \\Titer around the time it was made. Mills was Ambassador to Australia 
from 1971 to 1977, succeeding J.K. Uys. After retiring in 1983 he settled in Australia and became an 
Australian citizen. 
44 The Canberra Times, 21October1958, letter ('Hill-Billy'). See also Clark, Corps Diplomatique, p. 
99. 
45 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 3, 'The South African Foreign Service', 1955. This of course is applicable to what 
is called 'bilateral' diplomacy which has to some extent been overtaken by 'multilateral' diplomacy or 
that attaching to the work of international organisations. 
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(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending 
State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by interna-
tional law; 
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; 
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments 
in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of 
the sending State; 
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the 
receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scien-
tific relations. 46 
Although it is an occupation which obliges those engaged in it to spend an 
inordinate amount of time in the company of people 'for whom, in the ordinary course 
of events, they would have very little time',47 foreign service, is perhaps also the only 
career where quite junior officers associate on a footing of equality with leading citi-
zens of the countries where they are stationed. That may be part of its attraction. 
Bruce Lockhart writes interestingly on this aspect. 48 A.A. Roberts, then South African 
High Commissioner to Canada, said this of H.H. Woodward, 49 a member of his staff, 
on the latter's return to Pretoria after a fourteen year absence: 
Shortly before he left he went on a long canoeing trip through wild 
country with five well-known men, including Tony Lovink, the 
Dutch Ambassador to Ottawa, 50 Omond Solandt, one of the great-
est scientists produced by Canada, and Eric Morse, the Organizing 
Secretary of the Federation of Canadian Clubs. These three are 
men of high standing whom I know well and whose opinion I 
value. Each independently spoke to me about Woodward. They 
were high in their praise of his readiness to shoulder more than his 
share of the burdens, his quiet and unassuming good humour and 
cheerfulness in trying circumstances and his good companionship . 
... These ... were all ... people who appear to be among Wood-
ward's friends ... 51 
Even more than associating with them on an equal footing, the best officers can 
become confidants and unofficial advisers to a receiving country's political leaders, 
thereby exercising in effect a domestic political role. That perforce is veiled. The his-
tory of diplomacy has many examples to show of it including Papal Nuncios in 
46 Art. 3(1). See UN Doc. A/Conf. 20/13, 16 April 1961, pp. 2-3. P. Cahier analyses the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention in his article 'Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations', International 
Conciliation, No. 571, January 1969, pp. 5-40. 
47 J.D.B. Miller, The Shape of Diplomacy (Canberra, 1963), p. 1. (Inaugural lecture, 17 September 
1963.) 
48 Bruce Lockhart, Retreat from Glory, Book Two, pp. 45-162. 
49 High Commissioner and Ambassador to Australia 1961-1964. 
50 Dutch Ambassador to Australia during AM. Hamilton's term there. 
51 BTS, Woodward, Vol. 2, Roberts/Forsyth, 13 September 1951. 
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Catholic countries where the Nuncio is ex-officio Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. Some 
British Ambassadors have been particularly influential, 52 as have American Ambassa-
dors where the receiving country was an American client. At the United Nations some 
Ambassadors (Permanent Representatives) are influential far beyond the size and 
importance of their countries. A few South Africans, notably AM. Hamilton in 
Australia between 1957 and 1961, have been on an intimate footing with the head of 
government, but in Hamilton's case there is no evidence that he counselled Menzies on 
domestic political matters. 
The converse is that the people with whom foreign service officers associate 
abroad tend to believe that they are influential in their own societies which is hardly the 
case, at least not in a democratic country and certainly not South African or Australian 
career officers on a home posting. (Thus Mills's 'study in ritual humiliation'.) When one 
of his South African interlocutors, Laurence Gandar, Editor of the Rand Daily Mail, 
asked him to put in writing what he had expounded verbally before his return to 
Australia in January 1959, Hugh Gilchrist, who had acted as Australian High 
Commissioner to South Africa from July 1957, was obliged to backtrack. His 
reluctance is apparent: 
it would perhaps be inappropriate for me, at this stage and from 
this distance, to formulate in writing a personal recipe for solving 
some of South Africa's major domestic problems. 
You will appreciate, I am sure, that for an Australian in an official 
position to send out such a formulation incurs the risk of pro-
voking the criticism from, someone, sooner or later, that Australia 
is interfering in a purely South African matter, even if my interest 
were admitted to be motivated by the best of feelings towards the 
Union.53 
Later that year another of Gilchrist's South African interlocutors, J.P. Duminy, the 
Principal of the University of Cape Town, wrote that the battle for the open universi-
ties had been lost. He ended on a personal note: 
52 Sir William Clark, the British High Commissioner in South Africa at the beginning of the Second 
World War, was one. A.J. van Wyk sketches his role in bringing South Africa into the war in Vy/ 
Dae: Oorlogskrisis van 1939 - 'n spanningsverhaal uit SA se geskiedenis (Cape Town, 1985), pp. 107, 
121-22. For background on Clark see N. Hillmer, 'A British High Commissioner for Canada, 1927-
28', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. I, No. 3, May 1973, pp. 352-53. 
53 AA, Al838/l, 201/112, Pt. 3, Gilchrist/Gandar, 18 March 1959 and Gandar/Gilchrist, 27 February 
1959. 
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I must stop for the present. We had the pleasure of entertaining Sir 
Macfarlane and Lady Burnet here at Glenara a few weeks ago; 
their visit was a most thrilling and rewarding one. Give our 
regards to the MacDermotts [sic] and the Hamiltons. We miss 
Libby and you, but like your successor (the Davises) very much. 
They are coming to dinner with us tomorrow. We are also glad to 
have Lionel Phillips as a friend. What are you doing about Tommy 
Boydell?54 
A copy of the Gandar letter, Gilchrist's reply and an extract from the Duminy letter 
were placed on a departmental file. 55 The department approved the Gandar 
correspondence and passed it to the High Commission in Cape Town shortly 
afterwards 'as background to any informal conversations which you may have with 
Gandar or other South Africans on this general subject'. 56 
Then there is the collegial aspect. If not most, as Hambloch says, then many 
diplomats have met before and 'usually find one or two acquaintances among their 
foreign colleagues at a new post'.57 B.G. Fourie was one such for C.T. Moodie, 
Australian Ambassador to South Africa in the early 1970s: 'I had been received most 
cordially by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. B. Fourie, who remembered me from 
days at the UN in New York in 1950 and spoke with great goodwill of number of the 
Australians whom he had dealt with at the UN. He was obviously pleased to get 
messages of goodwill from Shann and Hill, which he reciprocated.'58 For David Kelly 
that was one of the advantages of the old diplomacy: 'these men spoke the same 
language ... they shared a common code of behaviour, a common training, and because 
they got to know each other well both at their posts and when they met again in other 
54 For biographical details of Duminy see Dictionary of South African Biography, Vol. 5, (1987), pp. 
211-12. Sir Macfarlane Burnet, a \irologist, was, with the British immunologist, Sir Peter Medawar, 
joint winner of the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1960. The Australian Encyclopaedia, Vol. Two 
(Sydney, 1983 (1925-26)), p. 128; J. Shaw, ed., Collins Australian Encyclopaedia (Sydney, 1984), pp. 
105-06. He was also Australian of the year in 1960. Burnet and his wife were visiting South Africa at 
the invitation of the Department of Health. AA, Al838/2, 201/10/10/1, Pt. 1, I. 4555, 13 March 1959. 
Burnet maintained a high public profile in Australia in the 1950s on, for example, relaxing the White 
Australia policy, and the connection between smoking and lung cancer. MacDermot and Hamilton 
were respectively the Canadian and South African High Commissioners to Australia, the former 
having previously been High Commissioner in South Africa. Gilchrist's successor was Phillips not 
Davis, who was on a higher level. Boydell's third visit to Australia had already run into trouble and 
was on the point of being aborted. (See Chapter Five.) 
55 AA, Al838/l, 201/2/5, Pt. 7, Gilchrist/Dex1er, 4 June 1959. Duminy's letter was dated 24 May 
1959. De>..1er commented that its apartheid aspect made 'very depressing reading'. 
56 AA, Al838/l, 201/1/2, Pt. 3, Hill/Australian High Commission, Cape Town, 1 April 1959. 
57 E. Hambloch, British Consul: .~1emories of Thirty Years' Service in Europe and Brazil (London, 
1938), p. 130. See also D. Kelly, The Hungry Sheep (London, 1955), p. 41. 
58 AA, A9241/l, 201/1, Pt. 1, C.T. Moodie, 'Record of conversation with Prime Minister and Acting 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. BJ. Vorster, on 27 September, 1972', p. 3, para. 12. 
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appointments, they developed a kind of common opinion about Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Ambassadors who were tricky and unreliable'. 59 
Harold Nicolson and Eric Clark both cite de Callieres to the effect that an 
incoming Ambassador should cultivate his colleagues in the diplomatic corps: 'Since 
the whole diplomatic body labours to the same end, namely to discover what is hap-
pening, there arises a certain freemasonry of diplomacy, by which one colleague 
informs another of coming events which a lucky chance has enabled him to discern. '60 
Any serving Ambassador will confirm that this is good advice. In 1959 the diplomatic 
corps in South Africa numbered around ninety-five spread over twenty-one missions. 
The corps' small size was found to make 'for informality in ordinary diplomatic con-
tacts'. 61 Australian diplomats in South Africa enjoyed the additional advantage of oper-
ating under the Commonwealth umbrella. O.L. Davis, High Commissioner/Ambas-
sador from 1959 to 1962, was instructed to keep in close touch with his United 
Kingdom and Canadian colleagues and 'speak frankly with them in confidence'.62 The 
record shows that he did. In fact, the British High Commissioner/ Ambassador, Sir John 
Maud, was probably his best source. 
What the anonymous reviewer said of science is true of diplomacy: 'Perhaps the 
easiest way to show clearly how science works is through biographies'. 63 There exist a 
multitude of British biographical or autobiographical works which give a flavour of 
what foreign service was about for British diplomats at a given time. 64 Of a recent one 
(1994) a reviewer wrote: 'Sir Nicholas has brilliantly revealed [in his own words] 
"what members of the Foreign Service do in their lives abroad in the modern age - the 
59 Kelly, The Hungry Sheep, p. 41. 
60 Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p. 68 and Clark, Corps Diplomatique, p. 18. They 
would have drawn the quotation from H. Whyte's 1919 translation of de Callieres. This was 
republished in 1963 by the University of Notre Dame Press under the title On the manner of 
negotiating with princes; on the Uses of Diplomacy; the Choice of Ministers and Envoys; and the 
Personal Qualities necessary for Success in Missions abroad. A form of the quotation appears at p. 
113. It is, however, omitted from the more recent and definitive H.M.A. Keens-Soper & K. W. 
Schweizer edition Fran9ois de Callieres: The Art of Diplomacy. New York, 1983. The editors of this 
claim (p. 53) that Whyte 'not only omitted entire chapters and rearranged the sequence of others, he 
also suppressed portions of the text and inserted material of his own'. That was presumably how the 
quotation came into being which does not, of course, invalidate the point made. 
61 AA, AA, Al838/1, 1348/5, 'Post Report: South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) February 1959', 
'pp. 3-4. 
62 AA, Al838/2, 201111/1, Pt. 3, Casey/Davis, 29 May 1959. Gilchrist drafted this letter. 
63 
'Post Prospero', The Economist, Vol. 331, Number 7864, 21 May 1994, p. 93. 
64 Informative ones are David Kelly's The Ruling Few: or the Human Background to Diplomacy 
(London, 1952) and Humphrey Trevelyan's Diplomatic Channels (London, 1973). See Appendix II 
for a further listing. 
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obligations, responsibilities and hazards that are incurred as well as the much-publi-
cised glitter". '65 There are also many works which illuminate the evolution and work-
ings of the Foreign Office,66 so much so that, ironically, South Africans know more, or 
at least have the opportunity to know more, about the Foreign Office and some of its 
luminaries such as Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir William Tyrrell than they do about their 
own Department of External Affairs and its officials. Australians too have not been 
loath to record their personal roles in the conduct of their country's foreign relations 
along the lines perhaps of what Hasluck said of his memoirs up to the age of thirty-
five, that if he had not written them 'the record would have disappeared with the going 
down of the sun'.67 
For one reason or another, possibly to do in part with the long time ruling 
political party's sensitivity towards public servants or former public servants writing for 
publication, retired South African foreign service officers maintain a degree of reti-
cence which their retired British colleagues would find surprising. That may also say 
something about the type of South African once preferred for foreign service - white 
males who were already in the Public Service - who reached memoir-writing age in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. An element of self-censorship may also be part of the South 
African public service culture. In a way, it is regrettable that these retired officials are 
not impelled to follow Hasluck's example. Ordinarily, it may not seem important that 
knowledge of their experiences should vanish with their passing. But that may well be 
so in circumstances where the South Africa they represented is as 'gone with the wind' 
as ever was the Old South immortalised in Margaret Mitchell's novel and the 1939 
movie of that name. To them is applicable Canadian historian Carl Berger's 'dictum', 
viz., 'our knowledge of the outcome makes it difficult to enter into the minds of men 
65 D. Cannadine, 'What Ambassadors Are For: Memoirs of a conspicuously stylish and brilliant 
diplomat', The New York Times Book Review, 2 April 1995, p. 12. Review of Sir Nicholas Henderson's 
Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969-1982. London, 1994. The fragment quoted appears at 
p. 9. The book was also published in the United States (North Pomfret, Vt.) in 1995. 66 See Appendix II for examples. This is, of course, not to say that there do not exist in languages 
other than English a considerable volume of published material about other countries' foreign services 
and foreign service officers. A fine study in English of the pre-First World War German foreign 
service is Lamar Cecil's The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914. Princeton, 1976. Also in 
English in respect of the French Foreign Office is M. Hayne's article 'Change and Continuity in The 
Structure and Practices of the Quai d'Orsay, 1871-1898', The Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1991, pp. 61-76. 
67 P.M.C. Hasluck, Mucking About: An autobiography (Melbourne, 1977), p. 287. For the benefit of 
South African readers, Hasluck, the son of Salvation Army parents, was at one time or another a 
newspaper sub-editor, temporary Foreign Service officer, history lecturer, Cabinet Minister (including 
External Affairs) and Governor-General of Australia. 
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who lived in another age and who did not know that they worked in vain for a cause 
that would never be realized'.68 
That is not to say some of them did not give thought to the matter. In October 
1958 P.R. Killen recorded W.C. Naude's hope that the experiences of the pioneer 
generation of foreign service officers could be preserved. Naude was then acting as 
head of department in the absence abroad of the permanent head, G.P. Jooste: 
the men who joined the Department in its early pioneering days, 
are beginning to reach retiring age - some have already retired, 
and others are within a few years of doing so. It seemed to him 
that a great deal of material concerning the early days of the 
Department is locked up in the memories of these men - and might 
be lost forever unless some attempt is made to have it put in 
writing. 
Naude contemplated circularising the officers concerned and 'asking them to commit to 
writing their memories of Departmental incidents' which could then be collated and 
preserved 'for posterity in some suitable form'. Such material 'would be valuable in 
building up an esprit de corps among new entrants to the service'. 69 Nothing came of 
that but shortly thereafter, in belated response to a request received earlier that year 
from the editor of the Nasionale Pers Ensiklopedie van Suid-Afrika (Encyclopa!dia of 
South Africa),70 a fourteen page outline of the history of the department was drawn up 
focussing particularly on the department's expansion from the time of its creation in 
192 7. 71 Missions were asked for their comments. 72 
In 1964 missions were sent three pages of 'Highlights from the History of 
South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs'. Presumably in accordance with Naude's 
earlier feeling that such material would foster esprit de corps among new entrants, the 
covering circular held that younger officials would particularly benefit by reading it. 73 
Some years later the department supplied Nasionale Pers with the list of representa-
68 C. Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the ideas of Canadian imperialism 1867-1914 (Toronto, 
1970), p. 6. 
69 BTS, 4/1/14, Vol. 1, Killen/Dunn, 7 October 1958. 
70 BTS, 4/1/14, Vol. 1, Potgieter/SEA, 4 February 1958; also Potgieter/Naude, 19 January 1959. 
(Originals in Afrikaans.) 
71 
'Die Geskiedenis van die Departement van Buitelandse Sake', December 1958. 
72 BTS, 91/8/1, Vol. 10, Circular Minute A.2of1959, 20 January 1959. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
73 BTS, 4/1/14, Vol. 1, Unnumbered circular minute, 31 August 1964. Inasmuch as both this 
memorandum and the 1958 one were entirely lacking in personal interest, their entertainment value 
was minimal and few officials could have derived any inspiration from them. 
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tives that the foreign editor of Die Burger, J.J.J. Scholtz, appended to the thirteen page 
entry on Foreign Affairs he contributed to the Standard Encyclopcedia of Southern 
Africa, 74 besides checking the entry for accuracy. This gave the bare bones of the his-
tory of South Africa's international relations rather along the lines of the 'Three Cheers' 
view adverted to above and it lacked those personal details which breath life into 
institutional histories. 
Testifying to continuing personal and official interest in the subject, and on the 
suggestion of a retired official, D.B. Sole (who had someone else in mind), at a 
departmental gathering in Cape Town in February 1990, the one-time head of the 
UNISA History Department, Professor (emeritus) C.J.F. Muller, was commissioned to 
write a departmental history. On Professor Muller's death in late 1992, two historians 
and two political scientists, including his daughter Marie Eloise of the Political Science 
department at UNISA, were appointed to continue the work. 75 This was still in 
progress in mid-1995. 
As in the case of Czarist and Soviet Russia, the foreign policy objectives of the 
old and the new South Africa will have their areas of coincidence. Even so, Hedley 
Bull's point is apposite: 'A country's interests or objectives in foreign policy are not 
objective and permanent, but are simply what they are perceived to be by the ruling 
groups at any one time. '76 Before South Africa's April 1994 election ANC foreign pol-
icy spokesmen were calling for the foreign service, considered a country's window on 
the outside world, better to reflect the composition of South Africa's population. 77 
President Mandela has often done so since the election. By its nature a Department of 
Foreign Affairs lends itself to 'affirmative action'. As a first step, a comprehensive 
merger was initiated in late 1994, early 1995 between the personnel of the existing 
department, the ANC's Department of International Affairs, and the Departments of 
Foreign Affairs of the so-called TBVC states.78 The Public Service Commission called 
the product 'essentially a new department' as indeed it was, dependent only peripherally 
on the old one's conventions and traditions. 
74 (Cape Town, 1971), pp. 617-31. 
75 The historians were Ors A.J. van Wyk, formerly of the UNISA History Department, and F.J. 
Nothling of that department. 
76 H. Bull, 'International Relations as an Academic Pursuit', Australian Outlook, Vol. 26, No. 3, 
December 1972, p. 260. 
77 See, eg., the section 'The Diplomatic Service' in the ANC's policy document Foreign Policy in a 
Democratic South Africa, December 1994. 
78 Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. 
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As a further step, the Minister for the Public Service announced after consulta-
tions with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in late July 1995 that all departmental posts 
would be advertised 'to ensure that candidates that will apply will not only be drawn 
from the public service (including the TBVC state public services), but also from out-
side the service'.79 (Italics added.) Not all serving officials will be reappointed inter 
alia because the mergers have drawn into the department many more personnel than 
there were posts. In such ways most of those who managed the ancien regime's for-
eign policy are following it into oblivion, a development which makes them, the 
department they served as well as the foreign policy they managed, legitimate fields of 
study. 8° For at least two years before the announcement there was already an exodus 
of white diplomats from the department, a popular route being premature voluntary 
retirement at the request of the individual officer. 
A similar process is under way in the public service at large. 81 Hence the pre-
vious pattern of public service development since Union is being repeated but at an 
accelerated rate. The preserve of English-speaking white males in 1910, the public 
service was gradually Afrikanerised as the century developed, in part in terms of Na-
tional Party policy, until on the eve of the ANC's accession to office (1994) it was 
more than 90 per cent Afrikaans-speaking. Pursuant to the new measures, black people 
are on their way to exercising a degree of preponderance in public service managerial 
positions similar to that enjoyed by Afrikaners until recently and in much less time than 
it took the latter. 
The aforementioned D.B. Sole is the exception to the reticent South African 
foreign service officer. Choosing not to publish his 'let-it-all-hang-out' testimony -
"This Above All": Reminiscences of a South African Diplomat - based on forty years 
of letters to his parents and other family members, 82 he presented photocopies of the 
manuscript inter alia to the Africa Institute, the South Africa Foundation83 and the 
79 
'Press statement by Dr Zola Skweyiya, Minister for the Public Service and Administration, on the 
restructuring of the Department of Foreign Affairs', 25 July 1995. See ia. The Pretoria News, 27 July 
1995. It seems what he had in mind were managerial posts only. 
80 As legitimate as would be studies of White Algeria, the Confederate States of America and Ancient 
Greece and Rome. 
81 See, eg., Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 6 August 1995, Business Times. (S. Lli11sche, 'Silent coup 
changes the public sector's face'.) 
82 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 24 November 1991. 
83 The Foundation seems to have supplied photocopies to foreigners on demand. Then a Federal 
Public Servant in Western Australia, J. Elsegood told the writer that he saw the manuscript referred to 
in the Foundation's newsletter, applied for a copy and in due course received one through the mail. 
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South African Institute of International Affairs. The Africa Institute copy came to the 
attention of Dr A.J. van Wyk, formerly of the History Department at the University of 
South Africa, who published an article about it in The Pretoria News of 6 November 
1991, thereby triggering considerable publicity in other newspapers. The Sunday Times 
(Johannesburg), for example, published excerpts from the Reminiscences in three con-
secutive editions - 10, 17 and 24 November 1991. 
Lengthy, detailed and quite uninhibited judging by the extracts he quotes, Sole's 
family correspondence, in effect and immediacy akin to contemporary diary entries, is 
of considerable significance. Inventing a new category of political role-player, that of 
'ethnic agent in place', G.R. Berridge put Sole among English-speaking South African 
public servants whose supposed devotion to the British connection worked against the 
interests of the National Party government of the day. 84 Although to this writer it is 
ridiculous that Sole should be the target of such a charge, on the basis of some of the 
extract!? quoted in his memoirs, it seems not unlikely that his seniors, if they had known 
what he was doing, would have been horrified by the nature of the information he was 
conveying more or less weekly to his parents by means of the public mails! Apart from 
Sole, the handful of former South African diplomats who have written (and published) 
memoirs have either been political appointees who had carved out a career for 
themselves in other fields before entering foreign service, 85 or else they were heads of 
department. 86 Sole, a career official, was never a head of department. 87 
Testifying to his training as an historian, to the excellence of his principal pri-
mary source and of his memory, not to mention his intellect, his unpublished work far 
outstrips the others in interest not to mention as an historical source. Even in its 
84 G.R. Berridge, 'The Ethnic "Agent in Place": English-speaking Civil Servants and Nationalist 
South Africa, 1948-57', Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1989, pp. 261-62. 
85 Such as AL. Geyer (Vier Jaar in Highveld: Diplomatieke ervarings - soms sander dorings - as Hoe 
Kommissaris in Londen 1950-1954. Cape Town, 1969); Leif Egeland (Bridges of Understanding: A 
personal record in teaching, law, politics and diplomacy. Cape Town/Pretoria, 1977); S.F. du Toit 
(Home and Abroad. Cape Town, 1969); and W.C. du Plessis (Die Goue Draad: 'Op die Trekpad van 
'n Nasie'. Johannesburg, 1970 and 'n Mens vir die Mens. Johannesburg, 1972). Du Plessis had been an 
official for twenty-one years. He was also the first head of the Department of Information (1961-63) 
then Administrator of South West Africa. All of these books, as do the two referred to in the next 
footnote, suffer from the South African publishing weakness of having no index. 
86 G.P. Jooste (Diensherineringe. Johannesburg, 1977) and B.G. Fourie (Brandpunte: Agler die 
skerms met Suid-Afrika se bekendste diplomaat. Cape Town, 1991). 
87 He was an Under-Secretary and Deputy-Secretary in Pretoria from 1962 to 1968. His last two posts 
before retirement in 1982 were Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1968-77) and to the 
United States (1977-83). 
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present form his work rivals some of the best of the genre. His experiences and abilities 
are not, however, representative of those of his foreign service colleagues as a whole. 
Not excluding Sole, there is no South African Renouf who was among the first 
intake of diplomatic cadets into the Australian Department of External Affairs in 1943 
and rose through the ranks to head the department (1974-76) before serving as 
Ambassador to Washington for two-and-a-half years until his retirement at the age of 
sixty in 1979. In addition to his memoirs (The Champagne Trail: Experiences of a 
Diplomat. Melbourne, 1980), Renouf has written several works in retirement including 
a doctoral thesis in history on Dr Evatt's foreign policy which was published by the 
University of Queensland in 1983.88 Nor, obviously, is there a South African Nicholas 
Henderson who has published best-sellers about his time as Private Secretary to five 
British Foreign Secretaries and on his thirteen years as an Ambassador. 89 
South Africa likewise lacks an Alan Watt, Secretary of the Australian 
department from 1950 to 1954. While Director of the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs in retirement in the 1960s, he published the pioneering study The 
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965 (Cambridge, 1968). Apart from his 
memoirs (Australian Diplomat: The Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt. Sydney, 1972), he also 
published articles in academic journals (eg., 'Australia and the Ambassadorial Issue')90 
and contributed chapters ia. to G. Greenwood and N. Harper's Australia in World 
Affairs 1961-196591 ('The Australian Diplomatic Service 1935-1965') and to Z.S. 
Steiner's The Times SuJ1Jey of Foreign Ministries of the WorltP2 ('The Department of 
Foreign Affairs'.) 
The nearest South African equivalent to Watt is CJ.A. Barratt, also an Oxford 
graduate, who was a foreign service officer from 1954 to 1967. Barratt served in a 
junior capacity at South Africa's Mission to the United Nations between 1958 and 
1965 then at head office before resigning in 1967 to become Director of the South 
African Institute of International Affairs. He worked as such from 1 August of that 
88 A Renouf, Let Justice Be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr H V. Evatt. St Lucia, Qld., 1983. Other 
of his titles are The Frightened Country. Melbourne, 1979 and .Malcolm Fraser & Australian Foreign 
Policy. Sydney, 1986. 
89 N. Henderson, The Private Office: A personal view of five Foreign Secretaries and of government 
from the inside (London, 1986 (1984 )) and Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969-1982. 
90 The Australian Quarterly, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, December 1964, pp. 11-18. 
91 Melbourne/Canberra/Sydney, 1968, pp. 134-81. 
92 London, 1982, pp. 34-48. 
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year until his retirement early in 1994 contributing many articles, book chapters, and 
papers as well as editing or co-authoring several books, to the study of South Africa's 
international relations. 
Much the same as with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham 
House), an offshoot of the Foreign Office and partly funded by it, there was in Watt's 
day up to the present a symbiotic relationship between the Australian Department of 
External Affairs and the Australian institute. The latter, described by T.B. Millar, 
Watt's successor as Director, as 'a respectable and useful part of the Australian cultural 
establishment', has also been dependent on annual subventions from the department.93 
In at least one case an officer of the institute embarked upon a successful career with 
the department. W.D. (Bill) Forsyth, had been a part-time research secretary at the 
institute's Victorian Branch in 1938, full time in 1940, before joining the 
Commonwealth Public Service. He joined External Affairs in 1942, occupying several 
Ambassadorial posts, including that of Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations in the 1950s. He retired in 1969 and died in 1994.94 
For political reasons the relationship between the South African institute and 
the South African department has been less close, especially in the last decade of white 
rule, the institute wanting to demonstrate independence of the department. There was 
never, until recently, a financial tie between the two, the institute being funded by the 
business community. Ironically, now that post-27 April 1994 political developments 
render a closer relationship acceptable to the institute, it is regarded in some circles 
close to government as unacceptable precisely because of its association with business. 
Continuing on the theme there is not, so far as is known, even a South African 
Hugh Dunn who, in his second career as an academic (he was then honorary Professor 
of Asian and International Studies at Griffith University, Brisbane, Queensland), 
published about his service as Australian Ambassador to various Latin American 
countries in the 1970s.95 Nor is there a South African Dick Woolcott in the sense that 
93 See T.B. Millar, 'The Role of the Institute', Australian Outlook, Vol. 30, No. 1, April 1976, pp. 3, 
9, 10. Millar was Director of the Institute from 1969 to 1976. Thus H.V. Roberts, then General 
Secretary of the South African Institute, was not quite correct when he wrote in 1955 that institutes 
received 'no aid from their country's Government'. 'The South African Institute of International 
Affairs', The Forum, Vol. 3, No. 12, March 1955, pp. 29-30. 
94 See his 'The Pre-War Melbourne Group of the AHA: Some Personal Recollections', Australian 
Outlook, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 1974, pp. 44-49. 
95 H. Dunn, 'Reflections on service in Latin America 1973-76', World Review [Australia], Vol. 28, 
No. 1, March 1989, pp. 4-15. A China scholar, Dunn was at different times Ambassador to both the 
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(without penalty) at least one of his despatches found its way into print in a popular 
magazine. 96 
T.B.Millar, has said: 
The role of a foreign office is never easy to determine, and books 
or articles on it are usually factual without being very informative. 
They tell us how it functions; they do not tell us how it works, 
lives, palpitates; what alternatives to existing policy it puts up; 
which members are listened to and which are not; how reliable are 
its methods for collecting and assessing information; what are its 
continuing m)ths; what effect the office has on its minister and 
through him on the government. Important as these aspects are, 
the study of the 'family tree' of the department can ()nly hint at 
them. The problem usually is that only the serving foreign service 
officer really knows what is happening and he is forbidden from 
reporting it. 97 
Of course, practical experience of foreign service does not necessarily qualify 
one to write about foreign relations academically. Not even serving and former foreign 
service officers necessarily possess what D.P. Heatley called 'the habit of mind that is 
required for appreciating questions of foreign policy'.98 Nor do they necessarily 
understand the nature of the diplomatic process. Both qualities, Craig feels, are 
essential for historians of international relations.99 Millar holds that in Britain and 
Australia 'we try to keep in separate groups the people who study or write about 
foreign relations or foreign policy and the people who are engaged in making or 
administering them. It is a rare bird who flies successfully between the two groups1• 100 
Republic of China (Taiwan) (1969-72) and the People's Republic of China (1980-84). In 1991 he was 
Paul Martin Professor of International Relations at the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada .. The 
International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who 1994195, 42nd Edition (East Grinstead, Eng., 
1994), p. 181. 
96 His humorous despatch on a Tubman presidential inauguration that he attended on his 
government's behalf in the 1960s. The Bulletin (Australia), Vol. 95, No. 4858, 9 June 1973, pp. 12-
15. Woolcott was then High Commissioner to Ghana, apparently a penalty for having offended the 
then Australian E>..1ernal Affairs Minister, Hasluck, by his progressive but premature views about 
recognising the People's Republic of China. C. Hollis MP, oral communication, 20 July 1995. 
97 T.B. Millar, 'On \\Titing about foreign policy', Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1967, p. 
78. 
98 Quoted by G.A. Craig, 'On the Nature of Diplomatic History: The Relevance of Some Old Books' in 
P. G. Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (London, 1979), p. 22. 
99 Ibid. 
100 T.B. Millar, 'Academics and Practitioners in Foreign Affairs', The Round Table, No. 319, July 
1991, p. 275. Renouf would be one. A better general example is E.H. Carr, for twenty years a member 
of the British Foreign Office. Then there is Adam Watson, author of Diplomacy: The dialogue 
between states. London, 1984 (1982). Alan Watt is probably a better Australian example but there are 
others such as Hugh Dunn of Griffith University, Nathan, Queensland. Nonetheless, most of these 
people turned to academia only after their retirement from foreign service. A junior member of the 
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G.C. Olivier is probably the only South African to transfer from a senior level in 
academia to diplomacy. Once Professor of Political Science and International Politics 
at the University of Pretoria, he entered the Department of Foreign Affairs in the mid-
1980s at Director level and was until recently (November 1995) Ambassador to the 
Russian Federation. IOI 
South African foreign affairs studies lack an Edwards who has written exten-
sively about aspects of the field in Australia, producing in the early 1980s under the 
auspices of the Australian Institute of International Affairs an historical examination of 
the making of Australian foreign policy concerned 'not so much ... with what the policy 
was as with how and by whom it was shaped'_Io2 Cecil's 1976 study of the German 
Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service is of a similar nature: 'This is a book about 
diplomats, not about diplomacy. In investigating the German Foreign Office from 1871 
to 1914 I have examined the men who conceived and executed German diplomacy 
rather than the policies and stratagems through which they attempted to advance the 
Fatherland's interest. '103 
That is a sophisticated approach because foreign affairs is a field where the 
'who' is more easily ascertained than the 'what' or the 'why'. However, the natural ten-
dency is to reverse the sequence, thereby landing the enquirer in a morass of the eph-
emeral and short lived. South African foreign policy studies will have reached maturity 
only when articles such as E.T. Corp's 'Sir Eyre Crowe and the administration of the 
Foreign Office, 1906-1914', 104 his 'The Problem of Promotion in the Career of Sir Eyre 
Crowe 1905-19201105 and his 'Sir William Tyrrell: The Eminence Grise of the British 
Foreign Office, 1912-1915';I06 P. Gronn's 'Schooling for ruling: The social composition 
of admissions to Geelong Grammar School, 1930-1939'I07 and Zara Steiner's 'The Last 
Years of the old Foreign Office 1898-1905'I08 as well as Steiner's and Gosses' longer 
Department of Foreign Affairs for some eighteen months in 1963-64, the South African historian 
Hermann Giliomee does not write on foreign policy. 
lOI His doctoral thesis on South Africa's foreign policy was published as Suid-Africa se Buitelandse 
Beleid. Pretoria & Cape Town, 1977. He also contributed the chapter 'South African Foreign Policy' 
to D. Worrall, ed., South Aji-ica: Government and Politics (Pretoria, 1971), pp. 285-331. 
1o2 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. vii. 
I03 Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, Preface, p. ix. 
104 The Historical Journal, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1979, pp. 443-54. 
105 The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1982, pp. 236-49. 
I06 The Historical Journal, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1982, pp. 697-708. 
107 Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 25, No. 98, April 1992, pp. 72-89. 
108 The Historical Journal, Vol. VI, No. I, 1963, pp. 59-90. 
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works, 109 not to mention Edwards's book, prove possible. (See also the other articles 
and books listed in Appendix II.) 
Focusing as it does to a limited extent on the diplomats of two countries, South 
Africa and Australia, in the context of those countries' diplomatic relations with each 
other over the sixteen year period 1945-61, the present study is influenced by such 
works. Dr W.J. Hudson (see below) has broken down the postwar personnel of the 
Australian Department of External Affairs into different factions: 'Masons, Marxists 
(meaning left wing theorists, rather than Communists), Catholics and a sort of 
professional faction headed by [Alan] Watt' .11o That is another indication of the 
advances in foreign policy studies in that country. Being a pioneer in the field, the 
present writer was not in a position to dissect the South African department so 
minutely. 
Moorhouse says that few professions 'have produced as many writers as 
diplomacy. Not many professions provide such a variety of stimulating experiences, or 
appear to leave a man with as much spare time and energy to write in'. 111 He was 
referring to the British service and not to writers of memoirs but to 'publication by 
people still on active service'. That recalls the nineteenth century when, as has been 
written about the French, diplomacy 'was still something of a leisurely hobby and was 
related to literary pursuits, horse-riding, hunting, and the establishment of fine literary 
and musical studios'. 112 Of mid-nineteenth century Foreign Office clerks did Lord 
Palmerston say that like the fountains on Trafalgar Square they played between ten and 
four with an interval for lunch! 113 
Times had changed by the 1920s when new recruits were required to sign an 
undertaking that they were aware of the FO's hours of business and willing to work 
109 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy; F. Gosses, The Management of British Foreign 
Policy before the First World War, especially during the period 1880-1914. Trans. E.C. Van der 
Graaf. Leiden, 1948. 
11o Ms Moira Smythe, letter, 23 May 1995. 
11 1 Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p. 49. That accords with Bruce Lockhart's view. He said of his time in 
Prague in the early 1920s: 'I had ample spare time in which to write my books'. Bruce Lockhart, 
Retreat from Glory, p. 113. 
112 Hayne, 'Change and Continuity in The Structure and Practices of the Quai d'Orsay, 1871-1898', 
The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1991, p. 70. 
113 Cited by R.H. Bruce Lockhart in British Agent (New York, 1933), p. 44. (This had been published 
in England the previous year under the title Memoirs of a British Agent.) Others, including Tilley and 
Gaselee (J. Tilley and S. Gaselee, The Foreign Office (London, 19330, p. ix) and Steiner (The Foreign 
Office and Foreign Policy, p.12) quote this without identifying Palmerston as the source. 
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under such conditions. 'The hours of attendance are ordinarily seven, from Monday to 
Friday inclusive, with a half-day on Saturday, but the conditions of public business 
peculiar to the Foreign Office make it impossible to guarantee that these limits shall be 
rigidly observed, and in emergencies the staff must be prepared to work longer or later 
hours.' They certified at the same time that they had read the Official Secrets Acts of 
1911 and 1920 and appreciated that they came under their provisions. 114 
In the leisurely tradition of the nineteenth century the French diplomat J.J. 
Jusserand wrote several scholarly works in his spare time. Serving as French 
Minister/ Ambassador to the United States from 1902 to 1925, he was awarded the first 
Pulitzer Prize for history in 1917 for his En Amerique Jadis et maintenant (With 
Americans of Past and Present Days). In the 1920s he was President of the American 
Historical Association, chairing its committee on the writing of history. He contributed 
the opening chapter 'The Historian's Work' (pp. 3-32) to the committee's report, The 
Writing of History (New York, 1926). His diplomatic achievements included helping 
to bring the United States into the First World War. 115 While working as a Counsellor 
in the French Embassy in London he had earlier made a name for himself as a scholar 
of Middle English literature, publishing such works as Le Roman au Temps de 
Shakespeare (1887) and Les Anglais au Moyen Age (1884). Both appeared later in 
translation, the first as The English Novel in the Time of Shakespeare (1890) and the 
second as English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages (X!Vth Century) (1889). 
Translated by Lucy T. Smith, English Wayfaring Life had achieved eight 
editions by 1926. None other than George Macaulay Trevelyan cited it in support of a 
point in his English Social History: A Survey of Six Centuries; Chaucer to Queen 
Victoria. 116 Indicative of their quality, several of Jusserand's books were republished in 
English in the 1960s, more than thirty years after his death in 1932 at the age of sev-
enty-seven and in one case almost eighty years after it first appeared in translation.117 
114 BTS, S4/5/l/l, Vol. I, 'Memorandum' to be signed by new appointees. 
115 For brief biographical details see The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (Chicago, 1986 
(1974)), Vol. 6, Micropaedia, p. 661 and Webster's Biographical Dictionary, First ed. (Springfield, 
Mass., 1960), p. 799. 
116 London, 1945 (1941), p. 44, footnote. 
117 A Literary History of The English People, 3rd ed., New York, 1969 (1895-1909); The English 
Novel in the Time of Shakespeare, New ed., London/New York, 1966; and The School for 
Ambassadors and other Essays. Freeport, NY., 1968 (1925). 
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Jusserand's colleague Maurice Paleologue, the last French Ambassador to 
Imperial Russia, was another who 'found time to produce a substantial number of 
important books'. His Memoirs and a biography of Cavour secured his election to the 
French Academy in 1928.118 In the English-speaking world Harold Nicolson is perhaps 
the best-known scholar-diplomat. In the second of the two decades he spent in 
diplomatic service before resigning at the end of 1929 to take up a career in journalism, 
he published the biographies Paul "Verlaine (1921); Tennyson (1923); Byron: The Last 
Journey (1924); and Swinburne (1926); the novel Sweet Waters (1921); and the semi-
fictional memoirs Some People (1927). He had also completed work on the biography 
of his father, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart: First Lord Camack: A Study in the old di-
plomacy, which was published in 1930. 
Robert Vansittart, for eight years Permanent Under-Secretary of State (PUS) 
at the Foreign Office (1930-38) then Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British 
Government ( 193 8-41 ), was also a writer of some distinction. As a Third Secretary at 
the Embassy in Paris in 1905 he wrote a successful play in French which enjoyed a six 
week run at the Theatre Moliere. 119 His biographer calls The Singing Caravan 
(London, 1919) 'his most celebrated literary achievement'. 120 It was the product of his 
years in Teheran (1907-09) and reads like 'a kind of Persian Canterbury Tales'. 
Including The Singing Caravan, his Collected Poems were published in 1934.121 
In the South African Department of External Affairs officers could not, without 
permission, write for publication and what they wrote was expected to be vetted 
departmentally. No South African would have dared emulate Bruce Lockhart who, 
without permission, supplemented his income as British vice-consul in pre-1914 
Moscow by writing newspaper articles under a pseudonym. By such means he aver-
aged between £25 and £30 per month, a not inconsiderable sum for the times. 122 
Though even now the British have 'Diplomatic Regulations which require severe cau-
tion of a man who wants to rush into print'123 in the case of the South Africans such 
obstacles may have put the seal on an ingrained reluctance to do so. In A.J. Oxley's 
118 L.B. Schapiro, Introduction to M. Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs 1914-1917 (London, 
1973 (1923-25)), p. xi. 
119 N. Rose, Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat (London, 1978), pp. 22-23. The play was called Les 
Parias. Like Bruce Lockhart, Vansittart seems to have been motivated by financial considerations. 
120 Rose, Vansittart, p. 25. His memoirs, Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart 
(London, 1958), are also not without literary merit. 
121 Collected Poems of Robert Vansittart. London, 1934. 
122 Lockhart, British Agent, p. 77. 
123 Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p. 49. 
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case, though, it was not reluctance but departmental opposition. In 1990 he gave this 
account of the reaction to his desire to publish forty years earlier: 
I have not done any writing of my own on Foreign Affairs matters 
- having been severely chastised and rebuked for the one attempt I 
made in the early 1950s. I had addressed a Summer School in At-
hens on the subject of the Commonwealth, and Longmans Green 
wanted to use my talk in a schools text-book on current affairs. 
Correctly (but perhaps stupidly) I sought the Department's permis-
sion for publication. The reaction was horrendous and could 
hardly have been worse if I had murdered the King of Greece 
and/or burned down the Legation there! I was threatened with all 
sorts of punishment! 124 
Apart from the occasional (unpublished) thesis, and R.F. Botha who wrote 
short stories for an Afrikaans-language newspaper and magazines when he was a Ca-
det, 125 few South African foreign service officers have written anything other than 
what they had to do for their job. It is not clear whether their attitude was inspired by 
the environment in which they worked - the fiction that officers devoted all their time 
and attention to the Public Service - or whether it derived from the personal 
characteristics of those accepted for employment in the Department of External 
Affairs. 126 Perhaps a bit of both because the old style foreign service officer was never 
burdened with the reputation of being a reader (let alone a writer) of books, a trait 
which the old style Australian foreign service officer may have shared. The Oxford-
educated Walter Crocker remarked as recently as 1981 that he was struck repeatedly 
'how few of our officers had any real interest in or grip on international relations, and 
how little they read on anything at an•.121 
124 A.J. Oxley, letter, 9 October 1990. 
125 Botha says he obtained departmental permission to do so. Examples of his work are contained in 
Die Byvoegsel tot Die Burger, 19 June & 30 October 1954; 14 May, 8 & 22 October 1955; 31 March, 
25 August, 15 September & 24 November 1956; and Die Huisgenoot, 24 September, 9 October & 31 
December 1954; 29 August, & 14 November 1956; and 5 & 12 March 1956. 
126 As mentioned above, there was also the matter of the National Party's sensitivity about public ser-
vants or former public servants writing for publication. 
127 W.R Crocker, Travelling back: the memoirs of Sir Walter Crocker (South Melbourne, 1981), p. 
193. The Australian-born Crocker commenced his career in the British Colonial Service. He was an 
Assistant District Officer in Nigeria before joining the League of Nations Secretariat. After the 
Second World War he becam.! a member of the United Nations Secretariat. He was the first Professor 
of International Relations at the Australian National University, then joined the Australian diplomatic 
service at the invitation of the Minister of External Affairs, RG. Casey. He served as an Ambassador 
for eighteen years. He retired from the diplomatic service in 1970, later becoming Lt Governor of 
South Australia. His Australian Ambassador: International relations at first hand (Melbourne, 1971) 
is also cited from time to time in this study. 
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C.B.H. Fincham's 1948 Leiden doctoral dissertation on the domestic 
jurisdiction clause in the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter, 
in which his line diametrically opposed the official one, may have contributed to the 
climate. 128 Both the Smuts and the National Party governments based their case at the 
United Nations on what they perceived to be the letter and spirit of the domestic 
jurisdiction clause (Article 2 (7)), which allegedly prohibited intervention in a member 
state's domestic affairs. But Fincham, a Third Secretary in South Africa's Legation at 
The Hague, argued that it should be scrapped from the UN Charter. Although this has 
not so far proved possible to document, it was rumoured in the 1950s that Eric Louw 
had been tackled at a General Assembly session along the lines of 'You say this, but 
one of your officials says that'. It was not possible to discuss the matter with Fincham 
who died in 1984, but Sole writes: 
My own recollection is that although Charles [Fincham] felt that 
he was under a cloud, he was never victimised by the Department 
on account of the thesis. Eric Louw was reputed to have told 
Charles' head of mission in the Hague (Dr D.B. Bosman) that if he 
ever had any say in the matter Charles would never receive pro-
motion; but at the time Dr Malan was Minister of Foreign Affairs 
[sic] and when Eric Louw became Minister, he had more pressing 
preoccupations on his mind.129 
Academics have not applied themselves critically to the management of South 
Africa's foreign relations. In view of the government's beleaguered international status 
for most of the post-war period, there may have been a feeling on the part especially of 
Afrikaans-speaking academics of not wanting to give aid and comfort to the enemy by 
criticising South African foreign policy failures. Apart from that, according to Geld-
enhuys, the influence of outside pressure on South Africa's foreign and domestic poli-
cies, has 'seemingly become surrounded with taboos' for South African scholars. 130 A 
factor which may also have contributed to the lack of detailed attention paid South 
African foreign policy, at least by historians, is the National Party government's long 
restrictive attitude to the records of the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
128 C.B.H. Fincham, Domestic jurisdiction: The exception of domestic jurisdiction as a bar to action 
by the League of Nations and the united Nations: A contribution to the study of article 15, paragraph 
8, of the Covenant and article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Leiden, 1948. Perhaps the leading 
authority on the UN and domestic jurisdiction, M. S. Rajan, cites Fincham's thesis extensively and 
respectfully. M.S. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, 2nd ed. London, 1961 (1958). 
129 D.B. Sole, letter, 18 May 1993. 
13o Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 210. 
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Having been open in the 1970s, these records were later, until the early 1990s, 
closed to non-official researchers from 1910 onwards. Although most of the restric-
tions have been lifted and the so-called thirty year rule applied, not all foreign affairs 
records older than thirty years are yet available to general researchers. Many remain in 
the department's custody pending their transfer to the Archives a process which, in 
respect of material older than thirty years, is expected to be completed by the end of 
1996.131 
The Australian authorities have followed a less idiosyncratic approach to the 
records of their Department of Foreign Affairs. Having applied the thirty year rule for 
some years, the Australian Archives are accustomed to scholars researching foreign 
policy topics. In at least one respect, however, a researcher has more scope in the 
South African Archives as currently organised. For instance, once records are made 
available, the researcher is permitted to make his own photocopies (at a cost of fifteen 
South African cents - seven-and-a-half Australian cents - per page in 1993). In Austra-
lia all photocopying is undertaken by Archives staff, researchers having to list sepa-
rately and mark in the file the items they want copied. That is both a time-consuming 
and, at thirty Australian cents per page (sixty South African cents between 1990 and 
1992), a costly process. 
And while the Australian Archives applies the thirty year rule, automatic access 
1s not granted to records more than thirty years old. Where files have not been 
'cleared', applications for clearance have to be lodged and have in the past taken a year 
or more to be processed. 132 A side effect of the writer's own two-and-a-half years 
(part-time) in the Australian Archives was that he was instrumental in obtaining 
clearance for a multitude of files touching on South African/ Australian relations, 
thereby facilitating the task of future researchers. Another one is that in some instances 
he may be in possession of the only copies still extant of documentation destroyed 
pursuant to the Archives' 'sentencing' policy which rids its shelves of material deemed 
to have low value. 133 The references given here to Australian archival material were in 
131 Files with numbers commencing with 'l' were the first to be transferred; by rnid-1995 transfers 
had reached the number '70'. Information supplied by Mr Martin Meintjes. 
132 The clearance process has since been speeded up, albeit at much expense. Ms Moira Smythe, 
letter, 23 May 1995. 
133 The actual 'sentencing' is undertaken by the agencies controlling the records, in effect those which 
generated them. It is defined as 'the process of examining records against authorised criteria to deter-
mine their value for research and other purposes. This may result in their permanent or temporary 
retention or their destruction'. Archives leaflet 'What is Sentencing?', September 1992. 
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use between 1990 and 1992. Towards the end of the period some items were 
renumbered. The writer was advised in mid-1995: 
To prevent confusion at a later time, it would probably be better if 
you only supplied the Commonwealth Record Series number, 
rather than the individual consignment details for each file, in 
your citations. This also helps in regard to those record series 
which are currently undergoing sentencing. For those records, the 
individual consignment details can vary from one year to the 
next.134 
However, to prevent worse confusion in his own mind, he has retained the original 
references in the footnotes while following the advice in respect of his source list. 135 
Following the practice of the American State Department and other developed 
countries' Departments of Foreign Affairs, the Australian department includes an His-
torical Documents Branch. This falls under the Public Affairs Division and has been 
headed since 1976 by a leading historian of the country's foreign relations, indeed 'one 
of the most assiduous students of Australia's relations with the United Nations', 136 Dr 
W.J. Hudson. The Branch has two Sections, an Historical Documents Projects Section 
with a staff of six and a Historical Records Information and Access Section with a staff 
of seven. The task of the first-mentioned is to prepare for publication selections of 
documents relating to Australia's foreign relations. Some thirteen volumes have 
appeared so far. 
The task of the second Section, which comprises two Sub-Sections, Informa-
tion and Access, is inter alia, on the Information side, to meet 'the demand for more 
detailed research of the sort that is increasingly needed within the Department'. It han-
dles two to three thousand queries annually including those received from other agen-
cies and the public. Some are trivial but others involve weeks of work. Employing con-
sultants, the Access Sub-Section clears records for public access under the Archives 
Act. Initially this was a low priority and a 'lot of public complaint was needed to win 
134 J. Pepper, e-mail message, I August 1995. 
135 Ms Smythe writes: 'someone wishing to consult one of your references will have to approach Aus-
tralian Archives and reference staff will trace the file as long as the series is mentioned in some form 
or other. The great thing is to get the series number and the file number right. .. . the se-
ries/consignment number may by vary over time but Archives will be able to trace the correct file from 
the information cited'. e-mail message, 18 September 1995. 
136 H.S. Albinski, Australian Policy under Labor: Content, Process and The National Debate (St 
Lucia, Qld., 1977), p. 22. 
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the hearts and minds of the money people'.137 The Information and Access side of the 
Branch recently underwent an expansion to help it cope with the increased volume of 
work. 
Dr Hudson was at first precluded from publishing on his own account but at his 
request later allowed to do so in order to maintain his academic reputation. By agree-
ment with the then Foreign Minister, W.G. Hayden, he is restricted to sources released 
from the thirty year rule. His publications are not entirely private because he is author-
ised to use some official time and resources in their preparation. His staff publish on 
the same terms. 138 
Himself no mean historian, Hasluck made the point about the Documents on 
Australian Foreign Policy series, which commences with 1937 papers, that before that 
date it was most unlikely that 'official files in Australia could have provided the matter 
for a volume of documents on foreign policy worthy of archival respect'. 139 So brief is 
the effective life-span of the Australian department now called the Department of For-
eign Affairs and Trade, yet so much more has been published about its workings than 
about those of the South African department. And there is much greater interest in 
foreign policy questions among Australian scholars than among their South African 
counterparts. Thus Hudson's bibliographies of journal articles on Australia's external 
relations up to the 1970s are not matched in South Africa.140 
The few South African academics141 who write about foreign policy, mostly 
political scientists, focus on such high policy as they are able to extrapolate from offi-
cial pronouncements, newspaper accounts of developments and personal interviews, 
rather than on the actual roots of policy and on the personalities of its makers. They 
create the impression of a machine turning out considered policies in accordance with a 
137 Ms Moira Smythe, letter, 23 May 1995. 
138 Information supplied by Dr Hudson. His most recent titles include Casey (Melbourne, 1986); Aus-
tralian Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom~ Melbourne, 1988 (with M.P. Sharp); Blind 
Loyalty: Australia and the Suez Crisis (1956, Melbourne, 1989); and Australia and the New World 
Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945 (Canberra, 1993). Before joining DFAT, Dr Hudson was 
Associate Professor in the School of History at the University of New South Wales. 
139 P.M.C. Hasluck, 'Archives, Anthologies and Other Source Books', Australian Outlook, Vol. 32, 
No.I, April 1978, p. 105. 
140 SeeAustralian Outlook, Vol. 24, No. 3, December 1970, pp. 328-45; Vol. 25, No. 1, April 1971, 
pp. 69-93; Vol. 30, No. 3, December 1976, pp. 414-31; and Vol. 31, No. 1, April 1977, pp. 38-51. 
141 Or academics in general, mainly British, who write about South African foreign policy. 
30 
Introduction 
well-defined national interest. 142 Or if they detect the lack of such a machine and such 
policies, they urge their speedy creation. 143 Missing from their accounts is the 
haphazard and personalised nature of an operation where clashes of personality, both 
domestically and internationally, are sometimes what it is all about. 
The conduct of foreign relations is often more a case of crisis management than 
anything else. Millar has suggested that 'Most countries' foreign policy (including Brit-
ain's and Australia's) consists of today's answers to yesterday's telegrams'. 144 J.B. 
Shearar, formerly of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, is in general 
agreement, if less picturesquely: 'Hindsight can ascribe to the policy maker a much 
more in-depth analysis than he actually undertook. Policy in immediate terms is very 
often reaction to unexpected circumstances and the policy maker is totally dependent 
on the information and advice then available. •145 As for content, the dust-cover of a 
work about the reports of an early Australian role player in the foreign affairs field, of 
which Hudson was joint editor, provides useful advice: 
Academic studies of Australian foreign policy, reflecting the 
bureaucratic structure, have tended hitherto to concentrate on 
questions of 'high policy' in international relations. Australian 
governments, however, have been more consistently concerned 
with loan raising, with finding markets for Australian exports, 
with attracting investment and with immigration.146 
In South Africa's case, the requirements of domestic policy have practically 
always preponderated over other considerations. In that regard, Geldenhuys's view that 
the 'central tenet of Nationalist thinking on foreign affairs [was] the need to prevent the 
142 See, eg., A. Johnston, 'International Relations in Historical Perspective', A. Venter & A. Johnston, 
eds., Politics: An introduction for Southern African students (Cape Town, 1991), pp. 290-93. The 
South African DEA itself once succumbed to this illusion by proposing that its Cadets or junior staff 
not be employed 'in those sections at Head Office where the foreign policy of the Union is formulated'. 
BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 17, Secretary Public Service Commission/SEA, 26 February 1953. 
143 See, eg., G. Mills, 'Time to jack up foreign policy', The Star (Johannesburg), 12 October 1995, p. 
14. 
144 T.B. Millar, 'Academics and Practitioners in Foreign Affairs', The Round Table, No. 319, July 
1991, p. 278. 
145 J.B. Shearar, 'Response to Prof. Barber', in A.J. Venter, ed:, Foreign Policy Issues in a Demo-
cratic South Africa: Papers from a Conference of Professors World Peace Academy (South Africa) 
held north of Johannesburg (in Sandton), South Africa on 20-21 March 1992 (Johannesburg, 1992), 
p. 28. 
146 W.J. Hudson.& Wendy Way, eds., Letters from a "Secret Sel>'ice Agent": FL. McDougall to S.M 
Bruce. Canberra, 1986. 
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demands of foreign policy affecting domestic policy'147 is not as profound as it may 
seem. That applies to all countries. It certainly did to the Australians who (and more 
successfully than South Africa's Nationalists) insisted in keeping the international 
community at arms length in respect of their immigrant exclusion policy known 
colloquially as the White Australia Policy. But where the Nationalists proved 
unnecessarily obdurate, ultimately to their detriment, was absolutely to refuse to 
countenance the adaptation of domestic policy to meet the exigencies of the country's 
international position. And not only the Nationalists. As his handling of the Indian issue 
showed, Smuts was also guilty of that.148 In consequence and in the long term, 149 just 
about everything Smuts on the one hand and the Nationalists on the other aimed for in 
politics did not stand the test of time. 
Perhaps white South Africa's reluctance to adapt was a manifestation in another 
context of Blainey's 'tyranny of distance•.1so Isolated from the post-war changes in 
Western thinking, it was not aware that anything had changed. A comment by A.A. 
Roberts, a South African delegate to the Seventh Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1952 rather sums it up: 'I wonder if people at home realize the terrific 
momentum of the ideological flood of "human rights" and "self-determination" which is 
sweeping through the emotions of 1,500 million people'.151 
* * * 
Based on Australian and South African archival documents, this is the first 
study ever of diplomatic relations between the two countries as conducted through 
resident High Commissions or Embassies. As such it examines the main features of the 
diplomatic connection between 1945 and 1961, showing how it came about and its 
course. 
Except for a period in the 1950s when the Malan and Strijdom governments 
held Australia to be their best friend internationally (a feeling not reciprocated), neither 
147 D.J. Geldenhuys, The Effects of South Africa's Racial Policy on Anglo-South African Relations 
(Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1977), pp. 273-74. 
148 His obduracy over the Indian issue long predated the 1940s. See, for example, W.K. Hancock, 
Smuts and the shift of world power (London, 1964), pp. 15-19. 
149 Bearing in mind Keynes's view that in the long term we'll all be dead! 
150 After the title of his best-known book The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's 
History. Melbourne, 1966. 
l5l BTS 136/2/19, Vol. 2, Roberts/Forsyth, 30 December 1952. 
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country was a priority for the other. Even so, the study reaches the rather unorthodox 
conclusion that at the outset the diplomatic connection was of greater value to 
Australia than to South Africa. It was in fact initiated by the Australian government in 
1945. 
At another level the study provided an opportunity to examine the origins and 
early years of the South African and Australian Departments of External Affairs, the 
comparative approach within the same time-frame, illuminating hitherto obscure or 
unknown aspects of both. Such aspects are taken up in Chapter One. 
The period 1945-61 was a step in the evolutionary process which produced the 
Australian and South African foreign services as they are now or, in the case of the 
South African service, as it was up to the 27 April 1994 general election. Thus the 
study also provided an opportunity to examine what individual foreign service and 
associated officers did within a specific time-frame and context, how they, or at least 
their contemporaries, were recruited and trained, and how effective they were. 152 Such 
matters are canvassed in one form or another in Chapters Two through Seven. Chapter 
Seven focuses on a key aspect of diplomatic activity - reporting. 
A work on South Africa's foreign relations would be incomplete if it ignored 
the government's efforts to project a positive image of itself and its policies abroad, 
and to counter media and public hostility. Tending to dominate the debate in the 1970s 
and 1980s about what white South African diplomats should be doing, the information 
question gathered momentum in the 1950s. South African information efforts in an 
Australian setting are discussed in Chapter Five. 
152 It must be mentioned that the quality of the source material about the Australians is inferior to that 
about the South Africans. That will be apparent from Chapter Four. The material on the Australians 
consists largely of biographical entries in the Australian Who's Who, in various editions of The 
International Year Book and Statesmen's T¥ho's Who, in various editions of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs' confidential Appointments and Biographies, and references in published works. The 
personnel records have been destroyed. Ms. Moira Smythe, letter, 23 May 1995. Two of the 
Australians have entries in the Australian Dictionary of Biography - Hodgson and Knowles - both in 
Vol. 9. M.J.S. Knowles's article 'Canberra in the early government period' in the Canberra Historical 
Journal (New Series, No. 19, March 1987, pp. 3-8) contains more e>.1ensive biographical information 
about his father. I am grateful to Mr Knowles for sending me a copy of this issue of the journal. I am 
also indebted to Mr Hugh Gilchrist for supplying me with background information about some of his 
former colleagues. In the case of the South Africans, while only Viljoen has an entry in the Dictionary 
of South African Biography (Vol. IV), which is not entirely accurate, departmental personnel material 
was consulted. 
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Also intended to put the sending country in a favourable light are the standards 
its diplomats maintain abroad, especially in respect of their accommodation. As The 
Economist put it recently, 'countries think it important to express their prestige and 
personality in their physical presence'. This is 'architectural diplomacy'. 153 Such 
standards are also a tribute to the status of the receiving country and its image of itself 
In any case, the physical environment in which diplomatic missions operate has an 
impact on their work. Chapter Six examines such aspects. 
At the political level, what ultimately conditioned the bilateral relationship from 
the Australian side was the South African government's controversial standing at the 
United Nations. That is dealt with in Chapter Eight as are the Australian and South 
African roles in the establishment of the United Nations. The writer's perusal of the 
official documents of both countries as well as UN records has given him a perspective 
on the founding of the organisation and on South African/UN relations not previously 
possible. 
In fact, so far as is known, from the South African side the present study is the 
only non-popular treatment, even if in passing, of the San Francisco Conference which 
drafted the United Nations Charter.154 
153 The Economist, Vol. 336, No. 7929, p. 75. ('Prestige on the Potomac'). 
154 Apart from the contemporary news reports filed by David Friedmann as South African Press 
Association (SAPA) representative at the conference, there are B.G. Fourie's and J.C. Smuts's 
references to it in their respective works, Buitelandse Woelinge (pp. 31-34) and Brandpunte (pp. 34-
36) and Jan Christian Smuts (pp. 480-83). Leif Egeland, who was a last-minute substitute on the 
delegation, also touches on it in Bridges of Understanding (pp. 168-71 ). 
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THE DEPARTMENTS 
Departments or Ministries of Foreign Affairs assist the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to manage a state's foreign relations. As Zara Steiner, the historian of the 
British Foreign Office, says: 'No state is strong enough or weak enough to live in 
splendid isolation .... No state has as yet permanently Closed its Foreign Ministry.'1 If, 
as Steiner also says, 'the need to communicate between states ... provides the raison 
d'etre of all diplomatic institutions', 2 in South Africa's case it was the policy of the 
Hertzog National Party government of the 1920s to create such institutions in order to 
demonstrate the country's political independence of the United Kingdom.3 For 
'diplomatic representation abroad is a function of sovereign independence'. Its estab-
lishment by South Africa is therefore 'an essential part' of the country's 'constitutional 
history'. 4 
The concept of the diplomatic unity of the British Empire, beloved of various 
Australian administrations in the 1920s and 1930s, if not actually anathema to 
Hertzog's government, had no appeal for it. Prestige was probably a factor. W.T. 
Cosgrave, the Irish Prime Minister, thought so. He congratulated Hertzog on the 
South African department's establishment in June 1927: 'My best wishes for the suc-
cess of the new department ... and for the increased prestige of the Union in her rela-
tions with all nations. •s 
The First World War and the creation of the League of Nations accelerated the 
movement of the self-governing Dominions - Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa (Ireland's case was rather different) - towards international maturity and 
full independence. The Dominions enjoyed separate representation at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference and they signed the Peace Treaty in their own right. That was fol-
lowed by individual membership of the League of Nations. The drive for political inde-
pendence was strongest in those Dominions which p()ssessed a large non-British sec-
tion among the politically active elements of their populations. Ireland, Canada and 
1 Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of tht! World, p. 31. 
2 Ibid., p. 11. 
3 See Hertzog's statement in the House of Assembly on 10 April 1930. HA Deb., Vol. 15, 1930, Col. 
3022. 
4 J.J.J. Scholtz, D.J. Potgieter, ed., Standard Encyclopaedia of South Africa, Vol. 4, p. 618. 
5 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Cosgrave/Hertzog, 8 June 1927. 
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South Africa were prominent in that regard. French Canadians constituted about a 
third of the country's population and Afrikaners a majority of South Africa's white 
popufation. Afrikaners, French Canadians and the Irish were at best lukewarm, hostile 
in the case of the last-mentioned, towards the British connection. 
At the 1926 Imperial Conference Hertzog, was the mainspring behind the so-
called Balfour Declaration or Report6 which set the scene for the Statut~ of 
Westminster five years later when the British Parliament renounced its legislative 
power over the Dominions. 7 The Balfour Report said of Britain and the Dominions 
that 'They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in 
no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or internal affairs ... ' 
South Africa set up its Department of External Affairs on 1 June 19278 and from 1929 
started opening legations in several countries. By 1936 it was said to have 
'outdistanced all of the other dominions. having no less than eight legations abroad' in 
Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United 
States.9 
Canada, Ireland and South Africa agitated for complete political independence 
and for them the Statute of Westminster represented the achievement of that goal. 
Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland were 'pulled along unwillingly' in their 
wake and went along only reluctantly with the idea of a Statute of Westminster. 10 They 
believed that 
6 To distinguish it from the 1917 Declaration of the same name in respect of a Jewish national home 
in Palestine. 
7 See H. Duncan Hall, 'The Genesis of the Balfour Declaration of 1926', Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1963, pp. 169-93 for an account of the background to the 
declaration. Hall maintains (p. 172) that 'four figures, besides Balfour, stand out as the architects of 
the Balfour Declaration: General Smuts, Sir Robert Borden, L.S. Amery and General Hertzog'. Robert 
Menzies, then Attorney-General of the Australian Commonwealth, a political position equivalent to 
Minister of Justice in South Africa, demonstrated understanding for the positions of South Africa and 
Canada in his article 'The Relations Between the British Dominions', The Australian Quarterly, No. 
28, December 1935, pp. 5-9. 
8 Before that the External Affairs Branch of the Prime Minister's department handled South Africa's 
membership of the League of Nations, the South West Africa mandate, and communications between 
the Union government and the Dominions' Secretary through the Governor-General's Office. A 
Second Grade Principal Clerk, M.S.J.C. van Tyen (salary £650 per annum), devoted most of his time 
to external work. Other officials spent about 50 per cent of their time on it. The work of the 
department as a whole was said to consist of an equal amount of external and internal work. BTS, 
S4/5/2, Vol. l, Annexes A to D to Gordon Watson/Secretary, PSC, 9 March 1927. 
9 CPD, Vol. 151, 5 November 1936, p. 1534. 
10 Year Book Australia 1988, No. 71(Canberra,1988), p. 173. See also Robert Menzies's article 'The 
Relations Between the British Dominions', The Australian Quarterly, No. 28, December 1935, pp. 5, 
6. Menzies was then Attorney-General of the Australian Commonwealth. 
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constitutional development should continue to be in accordance 
with the peculiar genius of the British Constitution with its elas-
ticity and power of adaptation to new conditions, rather than that 
an attempt should be made to circumscribe future constitutional 
development by a rigid legal formalism. 11 
In deference to their wishes, the Statute contained the proviso that it would not 
apply to them until their Parliaments decided so. 12 Australia adopted it in 1942 and 
then only for reasons connected with the war. 13 The positions of Australia and South 
Africa on the Declaration of War in September 1939 revealed their attitudes to the 
British connection. Australia's Prime Minister of less than five months, R. G. Menzies, 
chose to take his country into war without consulting parliament, citing as grounds the 
fact that Britain was at war. 14 In South Africa and Canada the decision to go to war 
was supported by a parliamentary debate and vote. 
Australia's first real foreign office dates from November 1935 when, appar-
ently 'as a result of the increased volume of business' generated by the Abyssinian 
situation, 15 the External Affairs Branch of the Prime Minister's department became a 
separate department with the former's administrative head, W.R. Hodgson, as its first 
Secretary. Hodgson held the position for a decade. 16 A Department of External Affairs 
had been one of seven government departments created at the time of federation in 
1901. In its initial incarnation it was responsible for federal territories such as Papua 
and the Northern Territory and for immigration including the administration of the 
White Australia Policy. Early Prime Ministers also used it as their secretariat17 and 
what became the Prime Minister's department in 1911, with its own Secretary, com-
menced as a section of the Department of External Affairs. Having in fact lost its prin-
cipal justification with the creation of a separate Prime Minister's department, 18 
11 AA, Al066/l, P.I. 45/140, 'The importance of External Affairs to Australia', n.d., p. 2. 
12 Section 10(1). Hudson and Sharp give an interesting account of the preliminaries to the Statute of 
Westminster viewed from an Australian perspective. W.J. Hudson & M.P. Sharp, Australian 
Independence: Colony to Reluctant Kingdom. Melbourne, 1988. 
13 See Evatt's statement in the House of Representatives, CPD, Vol. 172, 2 October 1942, pp. 1387-
1400. 
14 Menzies believed in the indivisibility of the crown. A. Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign 
Policy 1938-1965 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 272. 
15 Ibid., p. 504. 
16 Between November 1944 and 1952 Hodgson served in Canada, France and Japan, besides 
representing Australia at early sessions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. From 1952 
until his retirement in 1957 he was Australia's third High Commissioner to South Africa. 
17 W.J. Hudson, 'The Department of Foreign Affairs: 1935-1985', Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 
Vol. 56, No. 11, November 1985, p. 1065. 
l8 Year Book Australia 1988, p. 173. 
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External Affairs was abolished in 1916, its functions being split between the former 
and the new Department of Home and Territories. Its Secretary, Atlee Arthur Hunt, 
became Secretary of the latter. 19 After 1921 it was revived as a branch of the Prime 
Minister's department 'to deal with matters arising from Australia's membership of the 
League ofNations•.20 
At the time of the department's second founding, one of its principal functions 
was the collection and distribution of information on 'the progress of international 
events'. 21 On the distribution side, its main vehicle was a fortnightly (later monthly) 
publication which appeared under the title Current Notes on International Affairs until 
January 1973 whereupon it was renamed Australian Foreign Affairs Record.22 The 
brainchild of the then Minister of External Affairs ( 1934-3 7), Sir George Pearce, this 
became in time 'a basic source of information on Australian policy in the English-
speaking world'.23 Its initial free circulation of some eight hundred copies included 
Members of Parliament, schools, universities, libraries and trade unions throughout 
Australia. 24 Circulation expanded rapidly, reaching three thousand by 1939.25 It was 
seven thousand two hundred in December 1965 with a 'waiting list' of four hundred. 26 
There was no thought then of Australia opening its own diplomatic missions. 
Instead, it was believed that the country's interests could best be served by attaching 
liaison officers to British Embassies. 27 Pearce claimed that Australia was in that regard 
19 See MacKirdy, 'The First Australian Department of External Affairs 1901-1916', The Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 25, November 1959, p. 503; A3299/1, Folder 1, 
'Historical Summary of the Department of External Affairs', 1960, pp. 1-2, 8. 
20 MacKirdy, 'The First Australian Department of External Affairs 1901-1916', The Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 25, November 1959, p. 503. 
21 AA, Al066/l, P.I. 45/140, 'The work of the Department ofEx1ernal Affairs', 1937, p. 1. 
22 Ibid., p. 2; Current Notes, Vol. 43, No. 12, December 1972, pp. 599-602. See also Vol. 37, No. 4, 
April 1976, p. 1, '30th Anniversary of"Current Notes".' 
23 P.R. Heydon, Quiet Decision: A study of George Foster Pearce (Melbourne, 1965), p. 126. 
Heydon, a career foreign service officer until his appointment as Secretary for Immigration in 1961, 
had been Pearce's Private Secretary during his term as Minister of External Affairs. The only South 
African so far to write a study of Australia's foreign policy, P.J. van der Wal, refers approvingly to 
Current Notes. He calls it an indispensable source for primary material, which it is. Die Buitelandse 
Beleid van Austra/ie met spesiale verwysing na ~ be/eid ten opsigte van Suid-Afrika (Unpublished 
D.Phil thesis, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1986), p. 8. 
24 AA, Al066/l, P.I. 45/140, Hodgson/Hardy, 25 October 1936. 
25 Ibid., 'Summary of activities of the Department of External Affairs in 1939', p. 1. 
26 Current Notes, Vol. 36, No. 12, December 1965, p. 841. 
27 See the Introduction above. 
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'at least as well served as the other dominions' by their legations 'and at far less cost'. 28 
Pearce exaggerated the extent of the liaison officer network. At the suggestion of Allen 
Leeper,29 an Australian-born Foreign Office official whose services he obtained for six 
months to advise him on the administration of Australia's external relations, Prime 
Minister S.M. Bruce had sent R.G. Casey, the later External Affairs Minister, to 
London in 1924 as liaison officer attached to the Foreign Office. 30 His instructions 
were to report on British policy where this touched on Australia's interests which 
Bruce hoped to influence during its formulation stage. Casey did not fall under the 
High Commissioner but reported directly to Bruce. In fact, he was physically separated 
from Australia House because the Australian-born Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey, 
gave him rooms in the cabinet secretariat.31 In practice Casey fed Bruce, later the 
Department of External Affairs, with a mass of information and gossip about British 
policies and personalities. 
In time the liaison officer became the principal representative of the Depart-
ment of External Affairs on the staff of the High Commissioner (who fell under the 
Prime Minister's department until 1972) and was called the External Affairs officer. On 
his return to Australia in 1929 where he subsequently entered federal politics, Casey 
was succeeded by V.C. Duffy who held the position until 1932. F.G. Shedden, later a 
long time Secretary of Defence, took over from him. Keith Officer was the first 
External Affairs official to hold the post, doing so from 1933 to 1937 when he went to 
Washington as Counsellor on the British Ambassador's staff.32 Alfred Stirling, who 
replaced him in London, was liaison officer for much of S.M. Bruce's long term as 
High Commissioner (1933-45), until his own appointment in 1946 as High Commis-
sioner to Canada. 
28 CPD, Vol. 151, 26 November 1936, p. 2368. Sir George Pearce had visited South Africa in 1919 in 
his earlier capacity as Minister of Defence. Pearce was a senator for thirty-seven years and a cabinet 
minister for twenty-five. See his entry in theADB, Vol. 11(Melbourne,1988), pp. 177-82. 
29 Harold Nicolson gives a sketch of him in Peacemaking 1919, p. 105. Leeper accompanied Smuts 
on his mission to Bela Kun in 1919 as did Nicolson himself. (Ibid., pp. 292-308.) Nicolson also refers 
to Leeper in his sketch 'Arketall' in the semi-fictional reminiscences Some People. 
30 AA, A1066/1, P.I. 45/140, 'Confidential Handbook of Information concerning the Department of 
External Affairs', 1941, p.3. 
31 For particulars of the establishment and early years of the Liaison Office, see the Introduction to 
W.J. Hudson & J. North (eds.), My dear P.M: R.G. Casey's let:ers to S.M Bruce 1924-1929 
(Canberra, 1980), pp. vii-xxiii; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, pp. 69-79 and 'The Rise 
and Fall of the High Commissioner: S.M. Bruce in London, 1933-45', AF. Madden & W.H. Morris-
Jones, eds., Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship (Sydney, 1980), pp. 42, 46. 
32 Reydon (see note 23 above) published a lengthy profile of Officer in Quadrant, No. 66, Vol. XIV, 
No. 4, July-August 1970, pp. 30-41. ('Keith Officer (1889-1969) Pioneer and Symbol'.) 
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Apart from the London office, Officer was in fact, as Counsellor in the British 
Embassy in Washington DC, the only liaison officer. In 1937 Hodgson proposed 
appointing one in the South African Department of External Affairs along the lines of 
the London office. LR Macgregor, Australian Trade Commissioner in Canada, raised 
the matter with the departmental Under-Secretary, P.R. Botha, during an official visit 
to South Africa in April of that year.33 Hodgson subsequently took it up with his South 
African counterpart, H.D.J. Bodenstein, at the 1937 Imperial Conference, following up 
in writing. Hodgson did not formulate his proposal well and Bodenstein did not appear 
to grasp what he had in mind. Rejecting the idea of a liaison officer in his department, 
Bodenstein said there would be 'no objection to receiving an officer representing Aus-
tralia in the Union in the same manner as the British High Commissioner represents the 
United Kingdom Government'.34 But the Australians were not ready for that - it would 
have interfered with their idea of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. 35 They had 
already (in 193 5) responded negatively to a Canadian suggestion for the exchange of 
High Commissioners, saying that the time was inopportune. 36 
The deteriorating world situation and the outbreak of the Second World War 
brought about a change of policy. Australia opened its first legations, in Washington 
and Tokyo in 1940 and in Chungking in 1941. In response to an invitation from the 
Canadian government in September 1939, it also appointed a High Commissioner to 
Ottawa who assumed duty in March 1940.37 Although the cabinet resolved to enter 
into negotiations with New Zealand and South Africa for an exchange of High Com-
missioners with those countries, Australian offices were opened in them only in 1943 
and 1946 respectively. 38 There was press speculation on the occasion of Leslie Black-
well's visit to Australia as Smuts's emissary in November and December 1941 that one 
of the points he wanted to investigate was the advisability of exchanging diplomatic 
representatives.39 In that regard, the newly installed Labor Party Prime Minister, John 
33 BTS 4/2/32, Vol. 1, P.R. Botha, Memorandum 'Direct contact between Australian and Union 
Departments of External Affairs', Cape Town, 22 April 1937. 
34 BTS 4/2/31, Vol. 1, Bodenstein/Hodgson 30 November 1937. 
35 P.G. Edwards, 'The origins and growth of professional diplomacy in Australia', Australian Foreign 
Affairs Record, Vol. 56, No. 11, November 1985, p. 1074. That was why they were not prepared to 
open their own diplomatic missions at that time. 
36 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, pp. 122-23. 
37 Ibid., 121-25. 
38 Jbid., p. 123; R.G. Neale, ed., P.G. Edwards, H. Kenway & H.J.W. Stokes, asst. eds., Documents on 
Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Vol. 11:1939 (Canberra, 1976), p. 233, item 198. 
39 The purpose of the visit was to study Australia's war effort and government policy in respect of 
post-war reconstruction, social security and the reintegration of soldiers into civilian life. See The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 11 November 1941. Other press reports on the visit are contained in The 
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Curtin, was quoted to the effect that Australia would not open a High Commission in 
South Africa because 'the expense involved would not be justified by the work 
involved'. 40 By the early 1950s Australia's representation abroad outnumbered South 
Africa's as it has done ever since.41 
Common to all countries is the financial burden posed by their diplomatic rep-
resentation. In 193 0 Smuts said that 'if we want to do justice to our foreign representa-
tion, we shall have to limit it, as it is going to be a very expensive thing'. 42 That was 
wise counsel even though it fell (and falls) on deaf ears. In the end it is a matter of 
prestige and governments are not known to allow monetary considerations to interfere 
with that. What The Canberra Times said in 1953 is still valid: 
No nation can be great without assuming the responsibilities of 
greatness, and nowhere is this more evident than in the field of 
foreign relations. . .. Each mission that Australia appoints abroad 
has to be maintained at a level consistent with the status that we 
want to achieve .... If diplomatic representatives are asked to pres-
ent a poor figure abroad, the loss in prestige far outweighs any 
monetary sa,·ings that may thereby be made.43 
The Star (Johannesburg) subconsciously echoed that in its comments on the 
investigation into the South African diplomatic service Eric Louw announced shortly 
after he took over the External Affairs portfolio in January 1955: 'a country's 
importance is often judged by the kind of state its ambassadors are able to maintain and 
they should not be placed at a disadvantage by parsimony at home'. 44 Four decades 
later the British Foreign Office was using similar arguments in an effort to disarm a 
Treasury move to reduce its allocations. 45 Drawing on his research into the pre-1914 
German Foreign Office, Lamar Cecil supplies the following rationale, which would 
Herald (Melbourne), 30 October 1941, The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 & 22 November 1941 and 
The Press (Christchurch, NZ), 27 & 29 November 1941. 
4° C. Mulrooney, Australia's relations with South Africa 1901-1975 (Unpublished MA thesis, 
University of Sydney, 1980), p. 26, citing The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November 1941. 
41 By1951 Australia had 31 missions abroad to South Africa's 25. At head office it had 7 Counsellors, 
12 First Secretaries and 12 Second Secretaries to South Africa's 2, 3 and 6 respectively. See Sole's 
October 1951 handwritten note to Jones on BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2. That resulted from the Spender 
reorganisation of 1951. The senior echelon of the department's head office had been considerably 
smaller a year previously. See AA, A6213, RCE/H/9, 'Department of External Affairs, Officers of 
Divisions and Sections Stationed in Canberra, 1st July, 1950'. 
42HA Deb., Vol. 15, 10 April 1930, Col. 3017. 
43 The Canberra Times, 19 August 1953. (Editorial: 'The minimum price of world status'). 
44 The Star (Johannesburg), 20 January 1955. (Editorial: 'Accent on diplomacy'). 
45 For a counter-argument, see 'Punched out', The Economist, Vol. 334, No. 7907, 25 March 1995, p. 
48. (Bagehot). 
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strike a chord with most modern governments, especially of new middle-ranking and 
smaller countries: 
The Foreign Office believed that the relationship between states 
was affected by the impression which an envoy's style and that of 
his establishment made on a foreign court or government, as well 
as on the country's press and public opinion. A shabby embassy 
could be regarded as a sign of German indifference to the nation 
concerned or as an indication that Germany was not a power of the 
first magnitude. 46 
On a more humble scale M.H. Marshall, the Official Secretary at the Australian 
High Commission in South Africa, said of the disbursement of his representation 
allowance in the last quarter of 194 7: 'the hospitality extended is largely in accordance 
with the general practice in Diplomatic circles in this country. This hospitality is 
regarded as essential in making and maintaining good "contacts", as well as keeping up 
the prestige of the Mission'. 47 In a nutshell, why diplomats are given entertainment 
allowances. 
Also relevant are Mattingly's observations about fifteenth century Italian 
diplomacy: 'In no department of government is a steady dependable revenue free from 
embarrassing controls more important than in the conduct of foreign affairs. . . . the 
daily drain of a well-staffed chancery and of permanent resident embassies is unlikely 
to be met ... except by governments with ample funds and little need to account for 
them. 48 If today democratic governments are obliged to account in detail for the 
expenditure of taxpayers' money, the rationalisations and justifications sometimes 
border on the grotesque such as, for example, the proposition that the presence of an 
embassy in a foreign country has a direct and quantifiable effect on the sending coun-
try's export trade. 
A recent British commentator (1994) expressed doubt whether there was 'ever 
such an outrageous squandering of taxpayers' money as on some foreign embassies' in 
London. He referred indignantly to what 'desperately poor, tiny African . . . countries 
are spending to keep up an establishment which . . . is often doing no more than 
servicing domestic politicians and their wives when they pass through London'. He said 
46 Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, pp. 184-85. 
47 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Marshall/DEA, 7 October 1947. 
48 G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London, 1955), pp. 73-74. 
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that the 'panoply of country [ie. national] days and chauffeur driven cars and receptions 
and doing the diplomatic round' was 'quite obscene'.49 
It was reported in September 1995 that the Zairean Embassy in Harare had 
been closed because of non-payment of rent for more than a year. 50 In late 1994 the 
print media drew attention to the Zairean charge d'affaires in Warsaw who was obliged 
to sleep at the railway station because he had not been paid for a year and to his. col-
leagues who survived on welfare payments from the host government. 51 A year earlier 
Zairean Embassy personnel in Bonn were said not to have been paid for eighteen 
months. Families were 'living without electricity or telephones and with the threat that 
the water supply' would be cut off. Children had been expelled from private schools for 
non-payment of fees. 52 
These are extreme examples of what can happen when governmental preten-
sions are not checked. But few governments are free of pretensions. It was also 
reported in 1994 that the British Embassy in Paris, the United Kingdom's most expen-
sive, cost some £ 16. 7 million annually to run with an annual entertainment bill of £3 5 9 
000. 53 While the costs would cover the whole Embassy and all its operations, the 
tendency in such reporting is to focus exclusively on the official residence and on what 
is perceived to be the ambassadorial life-style. 
The United Kingdom is not the only country where such matters appeal to the 
journalistic imagination. During Sir Harold Caccia's time as Ambassador in the 1950s, 
the distinction of harbouring the most costly British Embassy was enjoyed by Wash-
ington. At £ 1400 the cost of the Queen's Birthday reception there at that time equalled 
the annual cost of heating the residence, a huge house three storeys high whose main 
49 Simon Jenkins, columnist for The Times (London) on Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary, BBC 
World Service Radio Programme, 22 May 1994. (The third of the series.) Walter Crocker, makes a 
telling point: 'The receptions commonly cost their taxpayers enough to feed a village for weeks in 
India, Indonesia or Africa' Crocker, Australian Ambassador, p. 46. 
so The Citizen (Johannesburg), 21 September 1995. 
51 BBC World Service report, 3 December 1994. See also The Weekly Telegraph, Issue No. 177, 
November 30/December 6, 1994. 
52 The Pretoria News, 2 October 1993. 
53 The Times (London), 17 August 1994. M. Binyon, A price for our pomp. See also The Welkly Tele-
graph, Issue No. 163, August 24/30, 1994. Suzanne Lowry, A world of claret and cordialite. By way 
of contrast, it was reported in March 1995 that the South African Embassy in Paris spent more on 
entertainment than any other South African mission, 'about R480 000'. Business Day (Johannesburg), 
14 March 1995. This was Jess than a quarter than that spent by the British Embassy, a much larger 
mission. 
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corridors were said to be '100 yards long'. 54 In the 1990s running costs of the British 
High Commissioner's Cape Town residence alone were said to amount to some £330 
000 (Rl.9 million) annually. 55 There is also the High Commissioner's residence in 
Pretoria which is occupied for only half the year. 
Although the Australians and the South Africans operated in each other's capi-
tals on a more modest, even a shoestring scale in the 1940s and 19SOs the perceived 
need to cut a dash inspired the South Africans to construct in 19S6 and 19S7 a 
residence for their High Commissioner in Canberra at a total cost up to February 1960 
of £SA44 602 17.7d (£ASS 7S3 4.6d). 56 Perhaps because they bought rather than built, 
not to mention the lower cost of housing in South Africa, the Australians got away 
with less. In March 1960 they paid £SA18 750 (£A23 437 10.0d) for their High 
Commissioner's Pretoria residence. On this aspect, more in Chapter Six. The 1930s, 
1940s and early 1950s were a less profligate time than the present one and there was 
undoubtedly then, before the advent of 'public sector managerialism' (an aspect of what 
the Americans call 'big government'), at least in Australia and South Africa greater 
accountability for the expenditure of public funds. Diplomats and their head offices 
were kept on a tight rein. 
Australia's decision to open its own missions brought about an escalation of 
costs: 57 
54 The Advertiser (Adelaide), 18 April 1959. 
55 The Star (Johannesburg), 27 March 1995. 
1934/35 
1935/36 
1936/37 
1937/38 
1938/39 
1939/40 
1940/41 
1941/42 
1942/43 
£A 5 916 
£A 7 827 
£A 12 417 
£A 14 215 
£A 20 129 
£A 39 135 
£A 98 048 
£Al52 444 
£A173 336 
56 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, Acting Secretary for Public Works/SEA, 14 November 1959 and 
Snyman/SEA, 16 February 1960. 
57 DF AT, 'The Department of External Affairs. History - Functions and Organisation - Staff 
Establishment - Recruitment and Training - Budget', Unpublished, Canberra, 25 January 1946. 
'Expenditure: Department of External Affairs. Table I.' Figures for 1936/37 - 1941/42 are also given 
in Al066/l, P.I. 45/140, 'Confidential Handbook of Information concerning the Department of 
External Affairs', 1941, Appendix B. However, the two sources differ on the amounts for 1940/41 and 
1941/42. The figures for 1935/36 were derived from 'Departmental Expenditure', a three line list 
which may have been prepared in response to a request by W.M. Hughes, then the Minister for 
External Affairs. See AA, Al066/l, P.I. 45/140, Hughes/Hodgson, 17 December 1937. 
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1943/44 
1944/45 
1945/46 
£Al99 112 
£Al95 441 
£A260 500 
By contrast, South Africa's head start in setting up a department and opening missions, 
saw it incur greater expenditure at an earlier date: 58 
1932/33 £SA 77 000 
1933/34 £SA107 000 
1934/35 £SA128 000 
1935/36 £SA142 000 
1936/37 £SA157 000 
1938/39 £SA163 414 
1939/40 £SA172 762 
1940/41 £SA173 089 
1941/42 £SA158 986 
1942/43 £SA172 170 
1943/44 £SA228 948 
1944/45 £SA484 053 
1945/46 £SA4 519 741 
In 1940 the Canberra staff of the Australian Department of External Affairs 
numbered twenty-five59 including the Records (4), Cables (1) and Typing Sections 
(7),60 a figure South African head office staff had reached in 1932, including the 
Typing (3), Messengers (3) Records (2) and Accounting Sections (3).61 In that year 
the Public Service Inspector recommended that the South African establishment be 
expanded to twenty-seven.62 It reached thirty-six in 1936.63 Even in 1944 the 
Australian department was so compact that 'Everyone met for the tea-break in one 
room each morning and afternoon'.64 Reflecting the small size of the Australian 
department in the late 1930s is this instruction about the distribution of S (presumably 
secret) letters and Foreign Office (confidential) prints: 
58 The figures for 1932/33 to 1936/37 were derived from BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 3, Staatsdienskommissie, 
Inspeksierapport - Departement van die Eerste Minister en Minister van Buitelandse Sake 15 Julie 
1936, p. 10, para. 23; the others from BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 12, Pohl/Secretary, PSC, 14 January 1949. 
The decrease in expenditure in 1941/42 is explained by the reduction in the number of missions on 
account of the war. The increase from £SA 484 053 in 1944/45 to £SA 4 519 741 in 1945/46 may 
presumably be ascribed to the fact that (in Pohl's words) 'the old Legations were not only re-opened 
but the Government extended its consular and diplomatic representation to other countries'. 
59 AA, Al066/1, P.I. 45/140, 'Department of External Affairs, October, 1940', p. 1. 
60 Ibid., 'Department of External Affairs, Statement showing disposition of Staff as in Permanent 
Staff List.' 
61 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Smith/Secretary, PSC, 16 August 1932, p. 3, para. 4. 
62 Ibid., para. 78, p. 34. 
63 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 3, Staatsdienskommissie, Inspeksierapport - Departement van die Eerste 
Minister en Afinister van Buitelandse Sake 15 Julie 1936, p. 2, para. 6. 
64 Renouf, The Champagne Trail, pp. 13-14 .. 
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S. letters are opened by the Acting Secretary and forwarded by 
him to Mr. Mathew for perusal. 
The Acting Secretary or Mr. Mathew will indicate any special dis-
tribution such as papers to Minister. 
They are then handed to Mr. Waller who will detach for the Min-
ister the carbons of S. letters and Foreign Office prints, marking 
the latter on the attached schedule with an asterisk. 
He will then hand the S. letters and the remainder of the Foreign 
Office prints to Mr. Westcott for registration and filing. 
The files will be returned to Mr. Waller who will superintend the 
departmental distribution and pass on the files to Mr. Oldham and 
Mr. Deschamps for perusaJ.65 
If these establishments seem small by comparison with the relatively gargantuan 
and labour-intensive ones maintained in the latter part of the present century,66 the 
British Foreign Office establishment all told numbered just over a hundred on the eve 
of the First World War. The diplomatic service, a separate service, then totalled one 
hundred-and-twenty-four: forty-one heads of mission, thirteen counsellors, forty-five 
secretaries, and twenty-five attaches, a figure up from one hundred-and-twelve in 1850 
when there were thirty-one heads of mission, twenty-five secretaries, and fifty-six 
attaches.67 Only two hundred-and-twelve career diplomats entered the British diplo-
matic service between 1860 and 1914.68 In 1914 as in 1850 the diplomats 'had to do 
their own copying, ciphering, archive and account keeping and press work' and the 
'total cost of the service to the country was then only a fraction of the present figure. 
The embassy or legation was a "one-horse show".'69 
The South African head office establishment reached one hundred-and-seven in 
1957, a year when twenty-one diplomatic and seven consular missions were manned by 
three hundred-and-five staff members including locally recruited people. 70 In 1951 the 
Australian diplomatic staff division consisted of one hundred-and-ten officers of whom 
65 AA, Al066/l, P.I. 45/140, 'Distribution of S. letters, Foreign Office prints, etc.', 26 April 1937. 
Initialled J.K.W. 
66 Steiner attributes the expansion to changing international circumstances. See The Times Survey of 
Foreign Ministries of the World, pp. 26-27. 
67 Jones, The British Diplomatic Service, p. 167. 
68 Ibid., p. 139. 
69 
'The Future of the Foreign Service', The Round Table, No. 125, December 1941, pp. 62, 63. 
70 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, handwritten note on Fourie/Scholtz, CT 620, 6 May 1957. 
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seventy-three were serving in twenty-nine m1ss1ons abroad. 71 By January 1960 the 
Department of External Affairs employed four hundred-and-one people in Australia 
and one hundred and fifty Australia-based ones and four hundred and-twenty-eight 
others at thirty-eight overseas missions. 72 
Judging by the periodic flare-ups in the press, 73 Australian public and political 
opinion was more critical of External Affairs expenditure than the South African pµblic 
and politicians. The authors of the brief manuscript 'History of the Department of 
External Affairs' argued in 1962 that, faced with the view that it was something of 'an 
expendable luxury', the early Australian department had as one of its principal tasks the 
establishing of its standing in the eyes inter alia of the Public Service and the general 
public. 74 Indeed, they hold that Current Notes was part of the process of the 
department proving its worth and justifying the expenditure devoted to it. 75 Be that as 
it may, Current Notes was to prove of inestimable value to the Australian department 
in impressing itself on the notice, and establishing its worth in the eyes of people who 
counted in Australia. 
The South African department would have done well to print its own authori-
tative account of international events. But, dating back to the Smuts years, there was 
always ambivalence as to what policy was76 and the domestic political climate in which 
External Affairs was obliged to operate, especially during the decades of the National 
Party's ascendancy, worked against the idea. The National Party member for Pretoria 
West, B.J. van der Walt, had in fact proposed such a regular publication in the 1955 
debate on the External Affairs vote, and in terms suggesting that he was familiar with 
Current Notes: 'We can start with a quarterly, a publication in which official documents 
which are not confidential, may be printed; and in which officials of the Department 
and members of the public could write articles about South Africa's foreign policy.'77 
71 BTS, 1/25/8, Vol. 1, Press release P.R. 12/51, 28 February 1951, attached to Nel/SEA, 2 March 
1951. 
72 A3299/l, Folder 1, 'Historical Summary of the Department of External Affairs', 1960, pp. 5-6. 
73 See, for example, The Canberra Times, 19 and 20 August and 23 October 1953; 23 May 1956; and 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 September 1955. 
74 AA, A3299/l, Folder 1, 'History of the Department of External Affairs by L.G. Sellars and J.M. 
McMillan', p. 7. 
75 Ibid., p. 8. 
76 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 67. 
77 HA Deb., Vol. 88, 5 May 1955, Col. 5113. He referred in the same statement to Casey's Friends 
and Neighbours especially the reference to Australia's establishment of a parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee. 
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The new Minister of External Affairs, Eric Louw, was dismissive, saying he 
could hold out no hope that such a publication would be started and one wasn't. 78 
What his department did at the time, however, was to prepare a 'Weekly Review of 
International Events' as well as 'special memoranda on matters of importance to the 
Union'. 79 (See Chapter Seven.) Cabinet ministers were on the distribution list for such 
items but initially not missions abroad. Distribution was minimal, being confined to 
departmental officials, other departments and the cabinet. In earlier as well as later 
years there was a 'Policy Review' which, among other material, incorporated select 
reports from missions. 
In its Sixth Report (1953) which dealt with the Department of External Affairs, 
the parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts referred to criticism of the cost 
of Australia's 'external representation' and sought to answer the question 'whether the 
scale of spending was too lavish' in terms of the country's 'economic and financial 
standing'. 80 In a statement to the Committee, the Secretary for External Affairs had 
expressed the cost as a percentage of the national budget, comparing it with other 
Commonwealth countries' related percentages for the same year, 1950-51 :81 
Australia 0.186 
United Kingdom 0.335 
Canada 0.277 
New Zealand 0.186 
South Africa 0.343 
India 0.824 
Pakistan 0. 729 
78 Jbid., Col. 5128. 
79 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, 'Staff position of the Political (General) Section', 27 September 1956, p. 2, 
para. 6. (Initialled 'R.J.' for R. Jones.) 
80 1951-52-53. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. No. 211 [Group B.]-F. 4208. Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts. Sixth Report. Department of External Affairs, para. 18. The report 
provides a useful account of the department's history and administration up to that time. 
81 Ibid. The Australian Minister of External Affairs, R.G. Casey, had used these percentages in an 
article in the May 1952 issue of Current Notes (Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 211-13) to make the point that the 
cost of maintaining Australia's overseas representation was 'not high'. Referring to Casey's article in a 
letter to Spies, the South African Under-Secretary, Australia's Acting High Commissioner, K.T. 
Kelly, said 'I should like to th.ink that in time public opinion in Australia will permit my Department 
to spend at least .3 of the Australian budget'. BTS, 1/25/8, Vol. 1, Kelly/Spies, 9 June 1952. Bearing 
in mind the parity achieved when expenditure was expressed as a percentage of the national income, 
these percentages indirectly indicate the difference in size between the Australian and South African 
national budgets and therefore their economies. There is little doubt that already in the 1950s the 
Australian department was outspending the South African one. 
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The committee, however, which was not unsympathetic to the department, felt that a 
better comparison would be expenditure as a percentage of the national income (1950-
51 ):82 
Australia 0.058 
United Kingdom 0.133 
Canada 0.043 
New Zealand 0.074 
South Africa 0.059 
The committee concluded from this that Commonwealth government expenditure on 
external representation was not 'out of line with that of other British Commonwealth 
countries'. 83 That was then obviously also true of South Africa's expenditure. That the 
Australians should at least ask such questions while the South Africans did not may 
reflect the countries' relative standing in the world at the time. 
The early South African department was seen as the channel of communication 
between the government and all other governments including those of the United 
Kingdom and the other dominions. 84 In 1936 it took a relatively sophisticated and 
ambitious view of itself, saying that its 'primary function' was 'to be au fait with the 
whole field of international politics' in which respect it was the duty of its External 
Relations section 'to occupy itself with a continuous study of international and imperial 
problems. By these means it should be possible to provide the Head of the Department, 
when he calls for it, with an exhaustive precis on any particular situation'. 85 In 1944, 
the department described itself as 
the recognised point of contact between external Governments, 
whether of the British Commonwealth, or otherwise, in all matters 
of common concern, and the administrative unit charged with 
ascertainment, interpretation and application of the Union's for-
eign policy.86 
From a practical point of view the birth of the modem South African depart-
ment dates back to the early post-war reorganisation. Contrasting his department's 
82 Joint Committee of Public Accounts. Sixth Report, Department of External Affairs, para. 19. 
83 Ibid., paras. 21, 73. See The Canberra Times, 19 August 1953 for an account of the committee's 
examination of Watt in respect of Casey's written statement on departmental representation. 
84 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Executive Council Minute 1377, 6 June 1927 (Provisionally approved by the 
Governor General on 31 May 1927.) The immediately preceding minute concerned H.D.J. 
Bodenstein's appointment as Secretary for fa.1ernal Affairs and Secretary to the Prime Minister. 
85 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 3, Muller/Secretary, 24 December 1936. 
86 Ibid., Vol. 7, Pohl/PSC, 22 November 1944, pp. 7-8. 
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small size with that of Dominion foreign offices which were 'much larger' and pos-
sessed 'a greater cadre of experienced officers', the then Secretary for External Affairs, 
D.D. Forsyth, wrote in 1951 that it 'had to be almost entirely reconstructed and staffed 
since 1945'. 87 He was overlooking the Australian department in respect of which his 
observation was even more apposite - in the three years from 30 June 1946 its 'total 
staff more than trebled, from 210 to 642'. The number of missions grew from nine in 
1945 to 26 in 1949. 88 By 1951 Australia had thirty-one missions to South Africa's 
twenty-five. 
The establishment of a registry system in the British Foreign Office in 1906, 
consisting of a central registry and three sub-registries, was more than just an adminis-
trative reform affecting the way papers were kept. 89 It changed the distribution of 
work which in turn transformed the Foreign Office from 'a cozy ... family party' into 'a 
great and efficient department of state'. 90 In terms of the new procedure, 'when papers 
were sent to the Foreign Secretary a sheet was attached giving the opinions of depart-
mental officials'. 91 It did not matter that the central registry was in fact 'a giant bottle-
neck' which caused the mechanism to collapse by 1913, the volume of business having 
increased by 36 per cent over the previous six years.92 What was important was that 
the clerks had become 'advisers engaged in the policy-making process'93 or, as Jones 
says, 'sat in judgement on despatches'. 94 Never again 'were the permanent officials cut 
off from the nerve centre of political decision'. 95 
So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, this points to the permanency of 
the Foreign Office's influence in relation to that of the politicians. Indirectly, it suggests 
a reason for Mrs Thatcher's complaint decades later that one of her Foreign Secreta-
87 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 14, Forsyth/Under-Secretary, 24 May 1951, commenting on Staatsdienskom-
missie, D€partement van Buitelandse Sake, Jnspeksieverslag oor Kantoor van die Eerste Minister en 
Minister van Buitelandse Sake, 3 Maart 1951. 
88 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 180. 
89 For a description of the system, see Z. Steiner, 'The Last Years of the old Foreign Office, 1898-
1905', The Historical Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1963, p. 88. 
90 R. Butler, 'Beside the Point: Sir Eyre Crowe', World Review (United Kingdom), New Series, No. 
50, April-May 1953, p. 9. 
91 V. Cromwell, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office', The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of 
the World, p. 557. 
92 Steiner, 'The Last Years of the old Foreign Office, 1898-1905', The Historical Journal, Vol. VI, 
No. 1, 1963, p. 90. 
93 Ibid., p. 88. 
94 Jones, The British Diplomatic Service, p. 219. 
95 Steiner, 'The Last Years of the old Foreign Office, 1898-1905', The Historical Journal, Vol. VI, 
No. 1, 1963, p. 90. 
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ries, Sir Geoffrey Howe, had fallen under the spell of the Foreign Office 'where com-
promise and negotiation were ends in themselves'. 96 Eric Louw said something similar 
in 1961 when the cabinet contemplated terminating South Africa's membership of the 
United Nations. He said officials would never recommend that South Africa leave the 
organisation because 'that was the nature of the people in their profession'.97 But Bruce 
Lockhart's view of the Foreign Office could certainly not have been applied to the 
South African department whose officials have never enjoyed the status of their British 
counterparts: 
The F.O .... is very like the Vatican. They know that, wars or no 
wars, they will be there whatever happens. Even if Britain 
becomes a third-class power, there will be a Foreign Office, and it 
will be run very much on the same lines as it is at present. The 
professional members, too, are like the Italian cardinals. They run 
the show and have survived all the storms of criticism. 98 
Around the time of the birth of the South African department in 1927, the reg-
istry in conjunction with the library was still the 'most important factor in the Foreign 
Office'99 and the Librarian and Keeper of the Papers was a man of considerable sta-
tus.100 The clerks did not become advisers in Australia or South Africa. Those count-
ries' Departments of External Affairs set up registries or records sections to manage 
and store the flow of correspondence, but they were altogether lacking in influence as 
were their personnel in status. Not only that. During the war and especially in Australia 
they did not cope well. Hasluck writes of 'a motley staff stowing away 'masses of pa-
per' which 'after much fumbling and delay' they could produce if required. An historian 
by training, he warns of 'major difficulties for the archivist in handling the department's 
records'. 101 In connection with his work on the official war history102 he had already 
96 Barnaby Mason, 'Matters of tact', BBC Worldwide, No. 19, May 1994, p. 18 .. 
97 B.M. Schoeman, Van Malan tot Verwoerd (Cape Town/Pretoria, 1973), p. 240. 
98 K. Young, ed., The diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. 2 (London, 1980), p. 520. 
99 BTS, S4/5/l/1, Vol. 1, 'Memorandum on Foreign Office Organisation', n.d. 
1 oo One of them, Stephen Gaselee, collaborated with a former Chief Clerk, the Rt. Hon. Sir John 
Tilley, on a study of the Foreign Office, ie. J. Tilley & S. Gaselee, The Foreign Office. London, 1933. 
101 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, pp. 4, 5. That is not the position today. 
102 P.M.c.· Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941 (Canberra, 1952) and The 
Government and the People 1942-1945 (Canberra, 1970). (Vols. I & II of The Australian War 
Memorial's Series 4 (Civil) of Australia in the War of 1939-1945.) The reason for the eighteen year 
gap between the two volumes was the intervention of Hasluck's political career. He became a minister 
within two years of entering parliament in 1949, quitting politics in 1969 when he was appointed 
Governor-General. He retired in 1974 and died in January 1993. 
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discovered that the External Affairs archives were 'among the worst organised and 
worst kept' of all government archives.103 
The Australian External Affairs Records Section began modestly. In the late 
1930s C. T. Moodie, a diplomatic officer, was in charge, assisted by G.A. Westcott. 
Moodie's job description was: 'Custody of secret documents. Perusal and filing of For-
eign Office despatches and letters from Liaison Officers abroad. Distribution of publi-
cations.' Westcott was responsible for 'General filing and general assistance with 
records. Despatch of mails. '104 The onset of war greatly increased the section's respon-
sibilities which (apart from Westcott) were discharged by untrained temporary staff, 
thus Hasluck's comment. The minuscule pre-war Records Section grew to ten in 
1944105 then to sixteen in the 1945/46 departmental re-organisation. 106 In 1945 the 
department itself had proposed an establishment of twenty-five excluding despatch, 
which the Treasury felt 'appeared to be more than necessary when compared with the 
numbers in other Departments'. 107 Stuart records having reorganised the filing system 
in 1945. 108 
At no time did the South African registry ever match that level of staffing. Be-
fore the establishment of the Department of External Affairs on 1 June 1927, the 
records of the Prime Minister's department were handled by a solitary First Grade 
Female Clerical Assistant, Miss J.C. Bowen, whose duties were to receive the post, 
place the correspondence on the relevant files, index and keep the records generally, 
and see to the despatch of all out-going letters. 109 Thereafter, the registry of the new 
department was manned initially by two male clerks, one First Grade, the other Second 
Grade. But the Public Service Inspector suggested in 1932 that such duties should not 
'be entrusted to male officers of the status of first grade Clerks' because their prospects 
103 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 4. 
104 AA, Al066/1, P.I. 45/140, 'Department of External Affairs. Organisation and Distribution of 
Duties', n.d. but pre-war from the internal evidence. 
105 AA, A571/62, 45/244, Assistant Secretary/Secretary, 'Post Hostilities Planning Division of Depart-
ment of External Affairs', 7 August 1944. (Internal Treasury minute.) 
106 Ibid., Dunk/Secretary, Department of the Treasury, 9 December 1946. See also 'Department of 
External Affairs. Proposed Organization. 11th October, 1945. Statement of Duties.' 
107 Ibid., 'Department of Ex1ernal Affairs, Proposed Organization, 11th October, 1945', Central 
Registry, pp. 25-26; and internal Treasury minute 'Permanent Staff- Department ofEx1ernal Affairs', 
19 October 1945. 
108 Towards coming-of-age, pp. 87-88. 
109 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Annex C to Gordon Watson/Secretary, PSC, 9 March 1927. Gordon Watson 
preceded Bodenstein as Secretary to the Prime Minister. Miss Bowen later married the Anglican 
Bishop of Pretoria. W.C. du Plessis, 'n Mens vir die Mens, Johannesburg, 1972, p.4. 
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were 'distinctly impaired by their continued employment on registry work'. Instead, 
also because the volume of work was too great for two people to handle, the Inspector 
recommended the replacement of the two male clerks by four Woman Clerks of dif-
ferent grades, 110 who would be paid less than their male counterparts. 
At that time there were said to be some ten thousand files in active use. 111 That 
was possibly an overestimate because the following year there were reckoned to be 
8043 files, an increase of 3724 from 1929. In 1933 ninety-nine letters were received 
daily as opposed to thirty-five in 1929.112 Sixteen years later there were thought to be 
eight thousand files. m In 1951 the writing up of incoming mail in a register, apart 
from that received from missions by diplomatic bag, occupied the time of a Woman 
Clerk, Grade I, for half-an-hour per day.114 
By 1944 the registry establishment had expanded to one Special Grade Woman 
Clerk, one First Grade Woman Clerk, three Second Grade Woman Clerks and one so-
called Paper Keeper. The first-mentioned's salary scale, ranging from £300 to £400 per 
annum, was less than that attached to the second most junior diplomatic rank, that of 
Third Secretary or Vice-Consul - £400 to £600 per annum. 115 Another First Grade 
Woman Clerk had been added to the establishment by 1947 and a Temporary Woman 
Clerk held against the post of Second Grade Woman Clerk. 116 From June 1947 to 
January 1958 when she retired, the registry was commanded by Miss D.N. Mapstone, 
a Special Grade Woman Clerk. She was highly regarded and the junior male staff, the 
Cadets, who addressed her as 'Mappy', were in awe of her. When she failed an Afri-
110 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Smith/Secretary, PSC, 16 August 1932, pp. 22-27, paras. 49-62, especially 
49-50, 52-53 and 56. 
l l I Ibid., para. 50. 
112 Ibid., Farrell/Secretary, PSC, 11 December 1933. The minute scale of this operation will be 
apparent from these figures of registered correspondence in the Foreign Office: 1821 - 6193; 1849 -
30 727; 1869 - 51 000; 1916 - 264 537; 1926 - 145 169. V. Wellesley, Diplomacy in Fetters, London, 
1944, p. 192. 
113 BTS, S4/5/2, Pohl/Secretary, PSC, 12 July 1948 and Miss Mapstone's undated, hand-written note 
on which Pohl's letter was presumably based. 
114 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 14, Staatsdienskommissie, Departement van Buite/andse Sake, lnspeksieverslag 
oor Kantoor van die Eerste Minister en Departement van Buitelandse Sake, 3 Maart 1951, pp. 18-19, 
para. 35. 
115 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, Pohl/PSC, 22 November 1944, pp. 12, para. 50, and 4, para. 15(b). 
116 Ibid., Vol. 11, Mapstone/Spies, 3 September 1947. This memorandum gives an indication of the 
duties attached to each post. 
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kaans language test in 1955 tpe upgrading of her post to Clerical Assistant, Grade I, 
which she had requested, 117 w~s held in abeyance. 
The department felt that, given the highly satisfactory way she carried out her 
duties, a view shared by the Public Service Inspector, 118 it would not be fair to proceed 
with the proposal because that would mean the appointment of someone else in the 
regraded post. 119 If anything conveys the esteem in which Miss Mapstone was held it is 
that McDonald (Don) Spies, the Under-Secretary, advised her that while the 
department proposed approaching the Public Service Commission to upgrade her post, 
the matter would be held over until she had 'a further opportunity of satisfying the 
prescribed language requirements'. 12o Few others would have been accorded a similar 
courtesy. 
Indicative of the department's small size at the time, despite its eighteen year 
existence, was that D.D. Forsyth, the Secretary for External Affairs, who took a per-
sonal interest in the registry and its staffing, 121 raised Miss Mapstone's case with his 
Minister. Louw instructed it be handled that way. 122 Louw also took a personal interest 
in administrative and staff matters, intervening in them more than once, especially 
during his first years as Minister of External Affairs. As early as 1932 when he was 
Minister in Washington he had proposed the administrative separation of the Depart-
ments of External Affairs and of the Prime Minister. 123 Within three months of taking 
over the External Affairs portfolio in January 1955 he told Forsyth that some overseas 
offices might be overstaffed, that he wanted consideration given to reducing staff and 
117 She had requested it the previous year. BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 18, Mapstone/Scholtz, 5 October 1954 
(handwritten note on Chief Clerk/Officer in Charge, Registry, 1October1954.) 
118 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 14, Staatsdienskommissie, Departement van Buitelandse Sake, Jnspeksieverslag 
oar Kantoor van die Eerste Minister en Departement van Buitelandse Sake, 3 Maart 1951, p. 17, 
para. 29. 
119 The upgraded post required of its incumbent a higher standard of bilingualism than that expected 
of Special Grade Woman Clerks. 
120 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 18, Spies/Mapstone, 19 August 1955. 
121 Another example is the case of Mrs E.M.G. Gamble who had applied for the post of Woman 
Clerk, Grade II in the registry. See various items on BTS, S4/5/2, Vols. 17 and 18. Forsyth noted on 
the file copy of his 24 September 1953 letter to the PSC about Mrs Gamble (Vol. 17) that she had 
been interviewed by Miss Mapstone who was 'agreeably impressed'. They later established a joint 
household and lived together for the rest of their lives, both dying in t!le 1980s. (Mrs Gamble was the 
writer's aunt.) 
122 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 18, Mapstone/Chief Clerk, 14 January 1955; Scholtz/Mapstone, 4 May 1955; 
Mapstone/Scholtz, 6 June 1955; Scholtz/Secretary, 5 August 1955 plus handwritten notes on this 
submission - Forsyth/Under Secretary, 11 August and Spies/Scholtz, 12 August 1955. 
123 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Lou\\/Bodenstein, 17 May 1932. 
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that, pending further instructions, 'no more Cadets [were] to be recruited'.1 24 In 1956 
he claimed to have obtained from the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, 
Dirk Steyn, a measure of discretion for G.P. Jooste (Forsyth's successor) and himself 
to depart from strict rules of seniority in respect of promotions and transfers. 125 
If true, that was some achievement in view of the Commission's status and the 
statutory weight given its recommendations. (See Chapter Two.) But it may not have 
been true. For instance, Sole mentions that the Commission at first withheld its concur-
rence from B.G. Fourie's appointment as Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions in 1958 because it meant he would supersede other officers, including Sole him-
self 126 Also in 1956 Louw instigated that year's inspection of overseas missions con-
ducted by the Chief Public Service Inspector, J.P.B. van Veen, and retired diplomat 
W.G.W. Parminter.121 
If the Foreign Office Registry and Library was the hub of the British system, in 
1946 the Coding Section was called the hub of the South African one. 128 In fact, since 
it bestrode the department's communications, it was in respect of day-to-day business 
more important than the Registry. Recognition was given that by slotting the section in 
initially under the Prime Minister's department.129 Up to June 1927 J. Neser, a First 
Grade Clerical Assistant on an annual salary of £430, was responsible for coding and 
decoding as well as parliamentary and internal work. 130 After June 1927 Neser, by then 
a Senior Clerk, was assisted by W.C. du Plessis, a Third Grade Clerk, whose place was 
124 Ibid., Vol. 18, For5)-1h/Under Secretary, 18 April 1955. 
125 BTS, 4/5/l, AJ 1957. Memorandum E.H.L., 17 August 1956. According to Louw, Steyn fell in 
with this but asked to be informed before promotions were announced 'so that formal approval could 
be given'. An instruction from Spies to Scholtz on the file copy indicated that Louw did not want his 
memorandum (attached to which was a list of promotions and transfers for 1957 including Uys from 
Canberra to Cologne and Hamilton from Washington to Canberra) sent to the Public Service 
Commission. 'It should, however, carefully be placed on record here so that it can be found at any 
time, even after years'. 
126 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 212. Louw announced Fourie's appointment in the House of Assembly 
(HA Deb., Vol. 97, 18 August 1958, Col. 2368) before the PSC had pronounced on it. 
127 Their report, dated 8 October 1956, is on BTS, 4/5/l, AJ 1957. See Sole, Reminiscences, p. 31, for 
a description of Parminter. Louw's four-page list of instructions is on BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 18 ie. 
'Proposed inspection of the Union's foreign missions by the Chief Public Service Inspector, Mr J.P.B. 
van Veen and Mr W.G.W. Parminter, formerly Minister for the Union in Paris'. 
128 Public Service Commission, Department of External Affairs and :Jfjice of the Prime Minister, 
Routine Inspection Report, 30th September 1946, p. 19, para. 90. 
129 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, Public Service Commission, Department of the Prime Minister, Report on 
the Staffing requirements of the Parliamentary and Coding Section, Cape Town, 18th March, 1935, 
pp. 1-2 para. 3; 4, para. 8; Sole, Reminiscences, p. 17. 
130 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. l, Annex C to Gordon Watson/Secretary, PSC, 9 March 1927. 
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later taken by Second Grade Clerk J.P.V. Visser. Visser was to head the Prime Min-
ister's department in the 1950s and 1960s. rn Neser himself was later Secretary for 
South West Africa and Secretary for Justice. And Du Plessis's defeat of Smuts at 
Standerton in the 1948 General Election marked the beginning of a fair political career. 
After a spell in the House of Assembly, this took him to Ottawa and Washington as 
High Commissioner (and Permanent Representative to the United Nations) and 
Ambassador, respectively, before his appointments as Secretary for Information and 
Administrator of South West Africa in the 1960s. 
Coding work continued to be combined with parliamentary duties. The volume 
was not great and in 1936 the work was basically performed by one clerk assisted by 
others in times of crisis. 132 In its November 1944 reorganisation proposals the depart-
ment recommended that the Coding Section be placed in the Economic, International 
Reconstruction and General Branch and that it be strengthened by increasing its staff 
from three to five and put in charge of a Third Secretary. 133 The Public Service Com-
mission assigned it to the Political, Diplomatic and Consular Branch. At the time of the 
1946 inspection, the section was directed by a Second Secretary who, apart from 
exercising a supervisory role, checked punctuation and helped with deciphering during 
rush periods. He was assisted by one Grade I Clerical assistant, one special grade Wo-
man Clerk and two Grade I Woman Clerks.134 The inspector recommended the addi-
tion of one Grade I Woman Clerk.135 He remarked on the presence of two Cadets in 
the section for training. 136 
131 Du Plessis, 'n Mens vir die Mens, p. 4. Du Plessis was then the most junior member of a 
departmental staff consisting of only thirteen people, including three typists and two messengers. 
132 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 3, Staatsdienskommissie, lnspeksierapport - Departement van die Eerste 
Minister en Minister van Buitelandse Sake 15 Julie 1936, p. 15, para. 36. 
133 Ibid., Vol. 7, Pohl/PSC, 22 November 1944, p. 10, para. 46. 
134 A handwritten list supplies the names of three Grade I Woman Clerks, Misses D. Griffiths, K. 
Whitford and R.J. Fourie. The Second Secretary was D.C.M. van der Merwe and the Clerical 
Assistant, Grade I, M.W.W. Aucamp. BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 9. This volume contains complaints from 
senior staff in late 1946 about the Coding Section's slowness in circulating telegrams. It was then 
operating with a reduced staff on account of illness. 
135 Public Service Commission, Department of External Affairs and Office of the Prime Minister, 
Routine Inspection Report, 30th September 1946, pp. 11-12, 16, paras. 55, 57, 79. 
136 Ibid., para. 81. Those particular cadets were presumably on their way to missions abroad. A 'Cadet 
training pool' was established in 1953 to permit new recruits to circulate through various head office 
sections for about a year for 'training in every aspect of the department's work', including Coding, 
Registry and Accounts which constituted their primary responsibility in a mission abroad. BTS, 
S4/5/45, Vol. 2, Steyn/SEA, 26 February 1953 and telephonic conversation with RF. Botha, 1 July 
1994. At the time of his capture by the opposing university in 1953, Botha was a Cadet in the Coding 
Section. See Die Transvaler, 29 May 1953. 
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The bulk of the cables arrived at night and were delivered to the Coding Sec-
tion when it opened for business the next morning. Incoming material had to be deci-
phered or decoded, typed and ready for distribution not later than 12 noon. Outgoing 
messages needed to be ready for despatch before the local post office closed at 4.30 
pm. Thereafter they could be handed in at the General Post Office on Church Square. 
In the case of urgent ('Immediate') incoming messages after hours, the post office was 
required to telephone the Second Secretary or the First Grade Clerk who would attend 
to the deciphering. 137 For the twelve months September 1945 to September 1946 the 
cable account averaged £SA996 monthly, the amount for July 1946 being 
£SA1289.4.1 l. 138 In respect of volume, 1333 messages were despatched and 2684 
received in the first six months of 1944 as opposed to 2156 and 3246 in the first six 
months of 1946. During the month of July, 236 were despatched and 435 received in 
1944 compared to 460 and 6 77 in that month in 1946. 139 During the whole of 193 1 
only 549 telegrams were received and 376 despatched in one or other of various codes 
and cypress in the personal charge of the Senior Clerk, varying in length from two to 
two thousand words.140 
An important recommendation in 1946 was that the section should henceforth 
be staffed by women only since, according to the inspector, they were 'eminently suited 
to this type of work'. That would have the advantage of ensuring continuity, minimise 
staff changes and provide a permanent head of section, besides releasing 'a trained 
diplomat', of which there was a marked shortage, for other work. In any case, males 
were 'apt to be discontented after a while in that they feel that they are losing ground in 
the matter of experience'. A potential obstacle, though, was the after hours work which 
'it would be unwise for women to do ... unless escorted'. 141 The recommendation had 
been put into effect by 1948. In 1950 Forsyth observed that 'the Coding Section, 
staffed as it is now exclusively by women, has been pretty fairly tested and has justified 
itself .142 
137 Public Service Commission, Department of External Affairs and Office of the Prime Minister, 
Routine Inspection Report, 30th September 1946, p. 17, paras. 82-83. 
138 Ibid., p. 18, para. 87. 
139 Ibid., p. 17, para. 84. These numbers were insignificant by comparison with the upwards of thirty 
thousand messages a year in the later stages of the war that the Australian External Communications 
Section, which handled all government traffic, was dealing with. 
140 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Smith/Secretary, PSC, 16 August 1932, p. 14, para. 30(a). The paragraph 
gives a brief description of measures taken to safeguard the codes. 
141 Ibid., p. 19, paras. 91-92. 
142 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 13, Forsyth/Under-Secretary (Pretoria), 'Coding Section', 1February1950. The 
future Mrs Sole, Miss E.D. Wookey, was then on the point of leaving the section on the occasion of 
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At that time it was still expected of the head of section to construct 'a basic 
English cypher ... an Afrikaans cypher and a proper codebook' all of which were said 
to be 'elementary requirements in the case of any country aspiring to international 
standing and none of which we at present possess'. 143 By 1954 the Coding Section had 
been grouped with the Political, International Organisations, Africa and Protocol Sec-
tions in the Diplomatic and Consular Division. Its staff consisted of one Senior Clerk 
(Miss M.D. Wood), one Clerical Assistant, Grade I, (Miss D. Griffiths), one Special 
Grade Woman Clerk (Miss A.G. Newton) and two Grade I Woman Clerks (Misses 
D.J.M. Brink and J.G.A. Krause.)144 Miss Newton was in charge of the section from 
the late 1950s until her retirement in the early 1970s. 
In Australia there were at first two sections dealing with external cables, the 
Cables Branch of the Prime Minister's Department and the Cables and Records Section 
of the Department of External Affairs. The latter had been set up at the outbreak of 
war to cope with 'the greatly increased cable traffic'. Before that the Political Section 
had encyphered and decyphered the department's cable traffic with its London 
Office. 145 In 1940-41 the Cables and Records Section consisted of 'half a dozen or so 
clerks' headed by E.A.G. Tilley, himself a Clerk. 146 These sections merged in May 
1943 to form the External Communications Branch of the Department of External 
Affairs under the eccentric J.L. Mulrooney.147 It seems that a reason for the merger 
was that Dr Evatt, the Minister of External Affairs, wanted to control the flow of 
information. 
In 1945 two-thirds of Australian expenditure on External Affairs was incurred 
by the External Communications Branch whose share that year, with all the wartime 
traffic - upwards of 30 000 cables a year handled by a staff of about a hundred - was 
her marriage. She had joined it from the Registry of the Department of Social Welfare less than two 
years before. See correspondence on BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 11 and Sole, Reminiscences, p. 133. 
143 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 13, Spies/ForS)th, 6 February 1950. 
144 Ibid., Vol. 17, 'Diplomatieke en konsulere afdeling, hoofkantoor', 8 April 1954. This grouping 
demonstrates the low priority given Africa at the time. RF. Botha was then listed as a Cadet in the 
General Section. 
145 DFAT, 'The Department of External Affairs. History' etc., p. 2. 
146 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 3. See also AA, A1066/l, P.1. 45/140, 'Department of External 
Affairs, Statement showing disposition of Staff as in Permanent Staff List', 1940 and 'Confidential 
Handbook of Information concerning the Department of External Affairs', 1941, Appendix C. Tilley 
had joined the Public Service in 1917 and the Department ofEx1ernal Affairs in 1940. AA, Al067/1, 
S46/238, 'Department of External Affairs: Seniority of Officers'. 1940. 
147 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 152; Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, pp. 10-11. 
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estimated at £A103 000. 148 Expenditure in 1939-39 had been £A4532149 and that 
mainly in respect of communications with London. While the end of the war was 
expected to bring about 'a drastic reduction in cable costs and staff', expenditure was 
thought unlikely ever to return to its pre-war level. 150 Nor did it. 
The 1947 approved staff establishment of seventy-three posts151 dwarfed the 
Records Section as it did the South African Cables Section. Of considerable assistance 
to researchers is the practice of the External Communications Branch of numbering all 
incoming and outgoing cables consecutively, the numbers of the former being preceded 
by I and the latter by 0, apart from whatever other reference numbers they bore. The 
Is were typed on special, printed blue bordered paper and the Os on red, both bearing 
the heading 'Cablegram'. From late 1956 these became 'Inward Cablegram' and 
'Outward Cablegram'. The South African set-up was relatively primitive by comparison 
with cables typed initially on all sorts of odd pieces of paper. At a later date incomings 
were circulated on blue flimsy paper and outgoings on red but without an overall 
number. 
Reference was made in the Introduction to Millar's view that the role of a for-
eign office is hard to determine, books and articles on the subject not saying anything 
really significant about it. Only 'the serving foreign service officer really knows what is 
happening and he is forbidden from reporting it•.1s2 A work which accords with that 
description is Deon Geldenhuys's The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign 
Policy Making (Johannesburg, 1984.) In many respects an admirable attempt to cut 
through to the core of the policy-making process, it is in the end very much the pro-
duct of an outsider looking in. Of the examples that can be cited, there is Geldenhuys's 
treatment of Munger's proposition that South African Ambassadors were kept on a 
tight rein politically, 153 no doubt along the lines of Sir Francis Bertie's view that after 
the introduction of the registry system in the Foreign Office 'the ambassador had been 
148 AA, A571/62, 45/244, Assistant Secretary/Secretary, 7 August 1944, p. 2, para. 10. (Internal 
Treasury minute). 
149 Ibid., Hamilton/Assistant Secretary (Finance), 'Accountant - Department of External Affairs', 12 
April 1945, para. 2. (Internal Treasury minute). The Australian£ was worth about eighty per cent of 
the South African £. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., Dunk/Secretary, Department of Treasury, 13 February 1947. 
152 At least not immediately. T.B. Millar, 'On writing about foreign policy', Australian Outlook, Vol. 
21, No.I, April 1967, p.78. 
153 E.S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, 1965), p. 26. 
It was, however, true in the financial sense. 
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reduced to the status of a marionette, whose strings were manipulated from 
London'.154 In South Africa's case, however, that is to do too much honour to the 
departmental head office. 
That Munger is wrong will be evident from Sole's complaint about the lack of a 
directive or brief (see Chapter Three, p. 146) which applied to most career officers 
who sank or swam according to ability and inclination, not to mention the particular 
circumstances in which they found themselves. Geldenhuys's error lies in attaching too 
much significance to his interviews with serving and retired officers. Of Hamilton, for 
example, following Munger, 155 he writes that he had been given 'a relatively free hand 
to improve the very poor relations between South Africa and Sweden following the 
disappointing performance of his predecessor in the post'. 156 Hamilton himself would 
have been his source. 
In November 1961, O.L. Davis, the Australian High Commissioner, recorded a 
conversation with Hamilton who was visiting Pretoria on the occasion of an inaugural 
flight. Hamilton had said that despite his strong disagreement with government policy 
Jooste 'had told him that he could "play it his own way" in Stockholm and hoped that 
he would have as much success as in Australia'. Hamilton said 'that relations with 
Sweden had considerably improved. He said that there had been considerable 
misunderstanding in Sweden in relation to South Africa and that his predecessor had 
tended to antagonize by an over-zealous pressing of the Government's point of 
view'. 157 In fact, Hamilton's predecessor, J.E. Bruce, was not perceived to have done 
badly at all. Eric Louw told the House of Assembly in 1959 that he was doing 
'exceptionally good work'158 and Jooste told Hamilton in January 1961 that he had 
done 'excellent work'.159 
While it may be difficult for outsiders to determine a foreign office's influence 
on the policy-making process at any given time, it is useful to bear in mind Steiner's 
154 Jones, The British Diplomatic Service, p. 219. However, at least in respect of the British Service, 
the invention of the telegraph had already sounded death knell of the independent, policy-making 
Ambassador. See W.A.P. Phillips, 'The machine age of government', The Forum, Vol. 5, No. 6, 
September 1956, p. 37. 
155 Munger, South African Foreign Policy, p. 27. 
156 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 135. 
157 AA, A9421/l, 221/1, Record of conversation Davis/Hamilton, 16 November 1961. 
158 HA Deb., Vol. 101, 6 May 1959, Col. 5482. 
159 Hamilton, Vol. 3, SEA, Pretoria/High Commissioner, Canberra, Cypher OTP telegram No. 1, 9 
January 1961. Jooste drafted this telegram personally and it was approved by Verwoerd. 
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view that a 'study of the role of the Foreign Office really implies a study of specific 
individuals and policies' .160 Such an exercise has yet to be attempted in respect of the 
South African department if not the Australian one after 1949. Yet in general and from 
a practical point of view, it can be said that a department's influence is in inverse pro-
portion to its Minister's personality and knowledge. The more experienced and better 
informed the Minister and the stronger his personality, the less influential the depart-
ment is likely to be. That has proved true of both the Australian and the South African 
departments from their inception. Probably the only time the South African department 
enjoyed any real influence was under Malan and possibly under Hilgard Muller after 
the assassination of Dr Verwoerd (ie. between 1966 and 1977). 
The department was in no position to challenge Smuts's primacy in foreign rela-
tions even if it had wanted to because its head, Forsyth, was a career public servant 
brought in from outside, who altogether lacked experience and qualifications in the 
field. That was clearly how Smuts wanted it. Given his initial limitations, Forsyth was 
not a bad Secretary. His rise and varied experience in the public service from fifteen 
year old office junior to head of department in less than thirty years showed that he 
was a good, perhaps outstanding, administrator. In fact his successor, Jooste, called 
him one of the most able administrative officials he had known. 161 Wentzel du Plessis 
was another from across the political divide who spoke well of Forsyth's abilities, as 
did Leif Egeland. 162 Nonetheless, Smuts concentrated all policy in his own hands and 
his officials were terrified of his intellect and that cold blue eye. In essentials, Sole 
confirms that, writing that Smuts 
did not look on the Department as an aid to the formulation of 
policy and Forsyth in those years was not prepared to do more 
than carry out his master's instructions. With the advent of Malan, 
after an initial period of intense nervousness and because of 
Malan's initial ignorance of foreign policy, albeit a policy whose 
objectives were holding actions rather than new initiatives al-
though we did achieve something positive in persuading the gov-
ernment to participate in the Berlin air lift and in the Korean 
War.163 
160 Z.S. Steiner, 'The Foreign Office under Sir Edward Grey, 1905-1914', F.H. Hinsley, ed., British 
Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (Cambridge, 1977), p. 26. 
161 Jooste, Diensherineringe, p. 186. 
162 Du Plessis, Die GGue Draad, p. 100; Egeland, Bridges of Understanding, p. 143. 
163 D.B. Sole, letter, 7 June 1993. See also Sole, Reminiscences, p. 143. 
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In an early draft chapter of the official history of the South African Department 
of Foreign Affairs, the late Professor C.J.F. Muller argued that the first permanent 
head of the department, Dr H.D.J. Bodenstein, was more important than Forsyth, his 
successor. Muller may have been looking at things from the wrong perspective. 164 
Both brought different qualities to bear and were valuable in their own way. A law 
professor from Stellenbosch University, and considered something of an eminence 
grise, 165 Bodenstein did not know his way round the Public Service machine; Forsyth, 
who was skilled in techniques of attracting scarce resources, human and otherwise, to 
his department, did. 
Much the same could be said of W.E. Dunk in Australia who replaced 
Hodgson as Secretary for External Affairs in 1945. He soon fell out with his Minister, 
Dr Evatt, and, after eighteen months, accepted Chifley's offer of the Chairmanship of 
the Public Service Board, a post he retained until his retirement a decade later. 166 
There is a tendency to regard Dunk's eighteen month term at External Affairs as an 
interregnum and the man himself at that time as 'only a glorified staff manager'. 167 
From his own testimony that is obviously wrong: 
it was perhaps the most concentrated productive effort of my offi-
cial life . . . in a brief year and a half, and starting literally from 
scratch, the Department was firmly founded with normal estab-
lishment structure, lines of authority and communication, with 
around twenty overseas posts and growing at a rapid but healthy 
rate. 
As with South Africa, therefore, the birth of the modern Australian department clearly 
dates back to the early post-war reorganisation and Dunk's eighteen months should 
receive more scholarly attention than has so far been the case. 
164 Draft chapter 'The foundation of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1927', p. 11. (Original in 
Afrikaans). Muller may have been influenced by Bodenstein's three-and-a-half column entry in the 
DSAB, Vol. II, (Pretoria, 1983 (1972)), pp. 66-68. There is no entry for Forsyth who died in 1987 
after the first series of the DSAB had been discontinued. 
165 He was most unpopular with the ex-Unionist side of the United Party who believed that his 
influe11ce was malevolent. See, eg., Egeland, Bridges of Understanding, pp. 88-89 and Sole, 
Reminiscences, p. 20. 
166 W.E. Dunk, They also sen;e (Canberra, 1974), pp. 65-67 and Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 90. A 
two-part profile of Dunk is contained in Nation (Australia), No. 20, 20 June 1959, pp. 9-10 and No. 
21, 4 July 1959, pp. 14-15. 
167 'Canberra's destiny-man', Nation, p. 14. 
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If Malan was prepared to accept his officials' counsel the strong and assertive, 
pugnacious even, Eric Louw was not. 168 An example of that, which led to his censure 
by the United Nations General Assembly, was his rejection of Jooste's advice to tone 
down his proposed contribution to the 1961 general debate. 169 Louw's attitude was 
that the time had passed whereby South Africa could 'afford to appear conciliatory and 
even strictly diplomatic'. 170 Inasmuch as he was obviously playing exclusively to the 
domestic gallery, he no doubt welcomed the censure as well as the high level 'welcome 
home' ceremony at Jan Smuts airport on his return from New York in December. 171 If, 
as was rumoured, Verwoerd was planning to replace him as Foreign Minister, Louw 
may have bought himself time.112 By contrast, the British High Commissioner, Sir John 
Maud, who was present at the airport, thought that everything Verwoerd said on the 
occasion, including his observation that this was the 'pinnacle' of Louw's career, was 
consistent with the possibility that [he] might be encouraged to retire early in the new 
year' .173 Instead, he carried on for a further two years, successfully resisting efforts to 
dislodge him. 
Louw was more likely to heed the advice of a political colleague than that 
tendered by an official. Not that he initially did in the case of the so-called Caltex affair 
when he publicly criticised that company for a television programme on South Africa 
sponsored by its parent company, Texaco. But no official could have tackled him the 
168 The New York Times (13 October 1961, Profile) called him a 'quietly pugnacious Afrikaner'. 
169 Traditionally item 9 on the General Assembly's agenda, the general debate gives heads of 
delegation the opportunity to express their views on the international situation. It is not a debate and 
speakers, who are called upon in the order in which they inscribe their names on the President's list, 
read from prepared tex1s. Brazil is traditionally the first speaker. See BTS 136/2/29, Vol. 2, 
Louw/Secretary, 19 September 1961 and 'Notes on the Minister's Speech' (Original in Afrikaans); 
'Draft framework of statement to United Nations' General Assembly'; and 'Sixteenth Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly: Statement by the Honourable Eric H. Louw, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of South Africa'. 
170 BTS 136/2/29, Vol. 2, Louw/Secretary, 19 September 1961. 
171 Verwoerd was among cabinet ministers, members of the diplomatic corps and senior officials in 
an estimated crowd of 2000 to 3000 people who met Louw at the airport. Verwoerd reportedly told 
him: 'You have become one of the heroes of South Africa'. Rand Daily Mail, 8 December 1961. 
172 Munger, South African Foreign Policy, p. 30. Inasmuch as Verwoerd had cabled Louw his 'full 
support' just after the event - 'Premier sterk min. Louw', Die Transvaler, 13 October 1961 - it would 
have been difficult subsequently to repudiate him. Van der Schyff claims that Verwoerd considered 
Louw's 'performance at the UN session of 1960 as the climax of his career and his part in the eventful 
session of 1961 his finest hour'. Compare this, however, with Geldenhuys's interpretation. 
Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 27. And Van der Schyff is wrong when he says that South 
Africa 'was prohibited from taking part in UN discussions' in 1961. DSAB, Vol. V (1987), p. 470. 
173 AA, Al838/2, 15517/14, Pt. 1, Memo. 714, Davis/DEA, 11 December 1961, Attachment (Record 
of conversation Davis/Maud, 8 December 1961 ), p. 1, para. I. 
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way Wentzel du Plessis, the Verwoerd-appointed ambassador to the United States, 
did: 
I fear that your statement yesterday as reported concerning 
Huntley programme can create a difficult and even delicate 
situation for us in our relations with the press in this country 
because it is going to be interpreted as an attempt at intimidation. 
Du Plessis said methods to bring pressure to bear could be effective only when 
undertaken on a confidential basis and added that he had much appreciation for what 
Caltex was trying to do for South Africa in the United States. 174 Louw disagreed: 
I regret that I cannot agree with your attitude which seems to 
suggest that Huntley's malicious campaign against South Africa 
must be allowed to continue without any reaction on our part. I 
must remind you that your previous intervention did not have 
desired effect. 175 
Louw eventually lowered his profile on the issue, leaving his colleague, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Diederichs, to pick up the pieces when replying to a question put by 
a member of the parliamentary opposition. 176 
According to Sole, by the end of his term as Foreign Minister Louw was 
'widely distrusted both abroad and at home•.1 77 While one may query the 'distrusted', 
there is no disputing that he was disliked 178 and it would have been better from the 
government's point of view if Verwoerd had replaced him earlier. Piet Cillie, Editor of 
Die Burger, told the Australian High Commissioner, O.L. Davis, in May 1960 that 
sending Louw to that year's Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference 'had been a 
disaster. . . . Mr. Louw was a very bad choice as he was constitutionally unable to 
present South Africa's case in an attractive and friendly manner. He seemed to like to 
pick a quarrel and preferred to be disliked rather than liked' .179 Davis himself had 
written the previous month, asking that his comments be drawn to Robert Menzies's 
attention: 
174 BTS, 136/3/IO, Vol. 4, Du Plessis/Louw, No. 34, 22 April 1960. Also BTS, 136/3/IO/l, Vol. 1, Du 
Plessis/Jooste, 4 May 1960. 
175 BTS, 136/3/IO/l, Vol. 1, Louw/Du Plessis, No: 30, 26 April 1960. 
176 The Cape Argus, 13 May 1960; BTS, 136/3/10/1, Vol. 1, Oral reply to question XXXIII. 
177 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 262. Sole gives reasons on p. 231 why Louw's officials respected him. 
178 See, for example, the report on his press conference in London on 4 May 1960. The Times 
(London), 5 May 1960. 
179 AA, Al 838/1, 20111/2, Pt. 3, Record of conversation Cillie/Davis, 17 May 1960, p. 2., para. 5. 
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Mr Louw is not held in high regard in South Africa .... Among the 
members of the diplomatic corps he is not highly regarded and is 
considered to be of not more than average intelligence. .. . In his 
own Party .. . the moderate element, including Mr Sauer, Dr 
Donges, Mr Naude and Mr Fouche do not appear to think well of 
him .... Mr Louw is a poor speaker and does not show up well in 
Parliament. Both publicly and privately he talks too much and 
listens too little. .. . During Mr Macmillan's visit to South Africa 
he accompanied Mr Macmillan and, according to the United 
Kingdom High Commissioner, left a very poor impression on Mr 
Macmillan. 180 
In September 1958, shortly before the end of his term as Acting High Commissioner, 
Hugh Gilchrist had said Louw was 
such a bad listener: apart from being slightly deaf in one ear, he 
prefers to lecture rather than to listen, and there is rarely an 
opportunity to interrupt or get a word in without being very 
brusque. One also has the impression that he suffers from the 
\\idespread South African failing of self-deception and wishful 
thinking. I also have some doubts whether Jooste always tries very 
hard to correct this thinking in his Minister, especially when the 
correction is certain to arouse strong emotion in him. 181 
Aware though he was of Louw's limitations, Robert Menzies respected his 
qualities. He wrote of him later: 'I knew Louw well. I had always found him somewhat 
stiff and intractable ... Yet I knew him to be courageous, honest, and devoted to what 
he regarded as the proper interests of his country'. l 82 Menzies may even have held him 
in some affection. After the 1961 censure, replying in the House of Representatives to 
the question 'whether he was not concerned that Australia remains one of the last 
countries to be associated with South Africa', he said: 'Mr Louw ... made a speech, no 
doubt very severely expressed as those who know him would expect it to be, but no 
more severely expressed, and perhaps less severely expressed, than many other 
speeches that have been made in the General Assembly'. 183 
His acknowledgment ofLouw's congratulations on his victory at the November 
1958 elections seemed to go beyond the merely formal and routine: 'My dear Eric, I 
greatly appreciated your congratulations ... I assure you it was wonderful to hear from 
180 AA, A9421/l, 201/3, Davisffange, 22 April 1960. 
181 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 733, Gilchrist/DEA, 17 September 1958, p. 3, para. 10. 
182 R. Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events (Melbourne, 1967), p. 194. 
183 BTS, 136/2/29, Vol. 3, Woodward/Department of Foreign Affairs, 19 October 1961. 
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my friends, and your thoughtfulness in sending a message through your High Commis-
sioner made me extremely happy. With warmest regards'.184 
Someone else who may have liked Louw, at least initially, was the Canadian 
High Commissioner J.J. Hurley who congratulated him in glowing terms on his 
performance at the 1959 session of the United Nations General Assembly: 'May I also 
say how very pleased I was to learn of your well received activities and speeches at the 
14th Session of the United Nations, and to learn of the increase in the favourable 
atmosphere toward the Union of South Africa which was no doubt due to your 
efforts.'185 Also at least initially, Hurley may have been well disposed towards South 
African government policies, a position from which he was said later to have retreated. 
Gilchrist, the Acting Australian High Commissioner, reported in December 1958: 
the Canadian High Commissioner (Hurley) seems to have 
somewhat revised the very favourable initial opinions of Union 
Government policies which he held soon after his arrival here last 
year (opinions formed largely as a result of conversations during 
his first formal calls on Cabinet Ministers). 186 
There again, Hurley may have been playing both ends against the middle. In May 1963 
the Australian Trade Commissioner, J.L. Chapman, reported (enviously) that he had 
attended a businessman's lunch in Cape Town at which Hurley revealed that he was 
on Christian name terms -with the Deputy Minister of Economic 
Affairs and the Secretary of Commerce and Industries and others. 
I might also suggest that personally from his utterances he played 
politics locally, which were not in line with the policy of his 
Government. 187 
Early in 1961 Louw seemed, metaphorically, to have been expenencmg 
something of a cold wind. He was recovering from an operation at the time of UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold's visit and could not take part in the discussions. 
Nonetheless, he took strong exception to the omission of his name from the press 
release announcing that the visit would commence on 5 January. Accordingly he had 
his wife dictate a note to his typist, Bess van der Wateren, for delivery to Jooste, 
184 BCB, Vol. 3, 615, Vol. IV, Menzies/Louw, 6 January 1959. 
185 BTS, 136/2/3/14, Hurley/Louw, 17 November 1959. A coolness may have entered their relations 
after the detention of the Canadian journalist Norman Phillips during the state of emergency the 
following year. See various items on BTS, 136/3/10, Vol. 2. 
186 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 733, Gilchrist/DEA, 17 December 1958, p. 3, para. 13. 
187 AA, A9421, 112/3, Pt. 1, Chapman/Secretary, Department of Trade, 22 May 1963. 
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saying that he was 'very disappointed and also disturbed' by the press release which had 
not mentioned that illness prevented him from taking part in the talks. 'The Minister is 
simply shoved aside, though he is the responsible Minister, and had conducted the pre-
liminary discussions with Hammarskjold in London'. He demanded a follow-up release 
to put the matter in perspective. 'If the release was drafted by the Prime Minister, or on 
his instructions, then Mr Jooste should kindly mention this objection to the Prime 
Minister'. 188 It is not known how Verwoerd received this, but the next day's news 
reports about the Hammarskjold visit, which was delayed for a few days, mentioned 
that Louw, having just been discharged from hospital, would 'not be available for the 
talks'. 189 
Seeking to assess Louw's diplomatic role up to 1937, A.J. van Wyk, one of the 
academics associated with the official history, 190 cites American sources to the effect 
that Louw was 'rather naive' when he took up his post as Trade Commissioner in New 
York in 1925. He also mentions that the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir 
Ronald Lindsay, called Louw 'completely second-rate' on the occasion of his departure 
from the United States in 1933 after his term as Minister.191 That was not the way the 
American media saw him. One journal said he was 'Politically astute, capable, 
unassuming' and 'One of the most interesting personalities in the Diplomatic Corps' .192 
(Lindsay, who had been Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office 
between 1927 and 1929 and would have met, if not actually worked with Louw when 
he was High Commissioner in London, was himself 'less than widely liked in the 
United States'.)193 Naivety in someone on his first overseas assignment as Louw then 
was is understandable while, as Van Wyk points out, the British view of Louw as se-
cond-rate was tinged with self-interest. He refused to play their game of the diplomatic 
unity of the Empire but, in line with his party's policy, sought as far as possible to 
demonstrate the fact of South African political independence, and that even before the 
adoption of the Statute ofWestminster in 1931. 
188 BTS, 136/3/10/3, Vol. 4, Van der Wateren/Secretary, 3 January 1961. 
189 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 4 January 1961. 
190 See the Introduction above. 
19I Draft chapter 'Adv Eric Louw, Pionee; Diplomat, 1925-1937', pp. 4, 17-18. 
192 AA, A981 SOUTH AFRICA 39, 'South Africa's Envoy Departs', World-Telegram (New York), 2 
November 1933. 
193 Heydon, 'Keith Officer (1889-1969) Pioneer and Symbol', Quadrant, No. 66, Vol. XIV, No. 4, 
July-August 1970, p. 36. Rose calls Lindsay 'a rather pedestrian figure'. Rose, Vansittart, p. 67. 
Vansittart succeeded Lindsay as PUS. 
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A decade later British officials tended to regard J.W. Burton, the third head 
(Secretary) of the resuscitated Australian Department of External Affairs (1947-50) 
with similar hostility because he wanted Australia to develop an independent foreign 
policy, especially in Asia.194 They would not, however, have described Burton as sec-
ond-rate. A pre-war London School of Economics PhD graduate in Politics and Eco-
nomics, perhaps the least (but most public) of his attributes was that he was an Aus-
tralian Labor Party (ALP) zealot. Evatt appointed him head of the department at the 
age of thirty-two. 195 He held the Secretaryship until the age of thirty-five, stepping 
down six months after the Liberal-Country Party Coalition took office in December 
1949. He subsequently accepted the High Commissionership in Colombo but resigned 
in controversial circumstances to contest a House of Representative seat on behalf of 
the ALP at the 1951 election. He failed to gain the seat and spent much of the rest of 
the decade trying to enter federal politics, without success - his talents did not lie in the 
direction of electoral politics. 
He commenced an academic career in 1964 at the age of forty-nine, taking up a 
teaching post at University College, London. He was Director of the Centre for the 
Analysis of Conflict there, moving to the University of Kent in 1979. From 1983 he 
taught at the University of Maryland and at George Mason University, Virginia, where 
he helped establish centres for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. 196 His publications 
include such influential and frequently-cited works as International Relations - a 
General The01y (London, 1965), Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge, 
1968) and Conflict & Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in 
International Relations (London, 1969).197 
If the British knew their enemies they also knew their friends, among whom 
they counted D.D. Forsyth. 198 Appointed to his post by Smuts in 1941 at the age of 
194 See G. Pemberton, 'A matter of independence', The Canberra Times, 17 August 1991. 
195 Burton was born on 2 March 1915. He transferred to External Affairs from the Department of 
Labour and National Service on 30 June 1941. He became Secretary for External Affairs on 27 March 
1947, resigning on 17 June 1950. AA, A6213, RCE/H/9, CV. 
196 Burton CV. I am indebted to Mr Hugh Gilchrist of Canberra for obtaining this CV from Dr 
Burton. 
197 Some of his other titles: Peace Theory: pre-conditions of disarmament (1962); World Society 
(1972); Deviance, Terrorism and War: A study in process in solving unsolved social and political 
problems (1979); Dear Survivors (1982); Global Conflict (1983); Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict 
( 1987); and the Conflict Series of four books (two with Frank Dukes, 1990). 
198 See Berridge, 'The Ethnic "Agent in Place": English-speaking Civil Servants and Nationalist 
South Africa, 1948-57', Intelligence and National Security, 4 (2), April 1989, pp. 257-67. Berridge 
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forty-five, Forsyth retained it for eight years after the Nationalist victory in 1948, 
stepping down at the normal retirement age of sixty in March 1956. He was then 
appointed a Director of De Beers (the diamond concern). He seems to have enjoyed an 
easy relationship with Dr Malanl99 but not with Eric Louw, who took over the 
External Affairs portfolio in January 1955. Suggesting that is that Louw personally 
drafted the press release announcing Jooste's appointment as Forsyth's successor200 and 
he had to be talked out of his insistence that all staff proposals suggested by Forsyth in 
his final months be deferred for Jooste's consideration. 201 A few months after his 
retirement Forsyth sought an interview with Louw inter alia to make the point that the 
British preferred the use of the term External Affairs not Foreign Affairs to describe a 
Commonwealth country's 'Foreign Office'. Louw replied that he was well aware of 
that. 202 In fact, this disagreement over terminology symbolised what he had striven for 
during most of his public life and he personally was probably delighted still to be min-
ister when the switch was made on the occasion of South Africa becoming a republic 
in 1961. 
Personal likes and dislikes certainly play a role in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, and not only foreign relations. David Kelly, whose career in the British service 
extended from the second to the fifth decades of the present century, writes of many 
times having seen 'purely personal likes or dislikes, personal health, vanity, prejudice, 
or just lack of time for proper consideration, decide important issues'.203 A Canadian 
scholar writes of the influence exercised by the personality of Canadian Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King on his dispute with the Governor-General, Lord Byng, in 1926 over 
the former's request for the dissolution of the House of Commons. That contributed to 
the Imperial Conference's recommendation later that year that the Governor-General of 
writes (pp. 262-63) that 'Glowing tributes' to Forsyth's 'soundness' and 'general helpfulness to Britain' 
abound in British documents of the time. 
199 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 21. 
200 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 18, Draft in Louw's hand attached to ForS)th/State Information Office, 8 De-
cember 1955. 
20 1 Ibid., Vol. 19, Spies/Scholtz, 13 January 1956. 
202 Ibid., Louw/ForS)1h, 10 September 1956. 
203 Kelly, The Ruling Few, pp. 1-2. Walter Crocker calls the Australian-born Kelly 'an outstanding 
British ambassador of the era'. Travelling back, p. 179. 
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a Dominion should no longer represent the United Kingdom government. 204 Eden's 
dislike of John Foster Dulles is said to have contributed to the Suez crisis in 1956. 205 
Smuts's and Evatt's mutual dislike had an impact on Australian/South African 
relations, at least from the South African side, in the early post-war period.206 
Relations improved when the National Party took office and Malan got on well with 
Evatt the only time they met.2°7 (See Chapter Three). With particular reference t() the 
South West Africa question at the United Nations in 1949, Hudson in fact claims to 
have been 'told authoritatively that Evatt's regard for some members of the South 
African government influenced his behaviour' in favour of South Africa. 208 In 1950, 
after he had left office, Evatt even proposed to the South Africans that he should put 
their case for them at the International Court of Justice at the hearings in connection 
with the first advisory opinion on South West Africa. 209 
On the Australian side, the Department of External Affairs waxed and waned, 
prospering under ministers such as McMahon in the early 1970s but plumbing the 
depths earlier under Hasluck (1964-69) who, Juddery says, 
rarely entered his department's offices at the eastern end of the 
Administration Building. Foreign policy was run, almost exclu-
sively, from the minister's office on the bottom floor of Parliament 
204 J.E. Esberey, 'Personality and Politics: A New Look at the King-Byng Dispute', Canadian Journal 
of Political Science, VI, No. 1, 1973, pp. 37-55. 
205 M. Rutherford, 'Time to concede the end of a political affair', Business Day, 16 May 1994. 
(Review of J. Dickie's 'Special' No More - Anglo-American relations: rhetoric and reality. London, 
1994.) 
206 Evatt appears, however, to have had at least a grudging respect for Smuts. Thus Hudson writes: 
'Evatt, like most of his generation, admired Smuts and tended to stress South Africa's role in the "war 
against fascism".' Dr W.J. Hudson, undated comments to the writer, 1995. 
207 So did Eric Louw who had met him at the 1948 session of the UN General Assembly over which 
he presided. A.T. Stirling, Lord Bruce: The London Years (London, 1974), p. 431. The ship bearing 
Evatt to Australia called at Cape Town for seven hours on 31 December 1948. See Chapter Three 
below. 
208 W.J. Hudson, 'Australia and the South-West Africa Question', World Review (Australia), Vol. 5, 
No. 2, July 1966, p. 29. 
209 BCB, Vol. 7, 8/4, Viljoen/Forsyth, 12 May 1950 and ForS)'th/Viljoen, 1 June 1950. While still 
Minister of External Affairs, in an effort to be helpful, Evatt proposed that South Africa should submit 
information on South West Africa under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. Evatt/Viljoen, 25 August 
1949 and High Commissioner, Canberra/SEA, Code telegram No. 28, 26 August 1949. Three years 
later, then out of office, also trying to be helpful and following on a discussion with Sacer during his 
visit to Australia on the Qantas inaugural flight - see Chapter Three - Evatt suggested to Malan that 
he co-operate with any good offices committee the UN should set up in respect of the treatment of 
Indians issue. BCB, Vol. 8, 8/8, OTP telegrams High Commissioner, Canberra/SEA, No. 32, 6 
November 1952; SEA/High Commissioner, Canberra, No. 36, 7 November 1952; and Nel/Evatt, 10 
November 1952. Malan declined, pleading the Charter's domestic jurisdiction clause (Article 2(7)). 
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House. He did not welcome alternative proposals from his depart-
ment. 
Nor did Hasluck encourage initiatives on the part of his diplo-
mats. 210 
At least Hasluck, who had worked for the Department of External Affairs in a 
temporary capacity for six years in the 1940s, was not guilty of what he accused his 
then Minister: 'Evatt ... used to regard his department as his own possession and to 
expect his department to be the instrument of his will'. 211 Hasluck claimed to have 
based his 194 7 resignation on that. 'Reluctantly, I was forced to the opinion that the 
present Minister for External Affairs does wish to make the diplomatic staff and the 
staff of the Department of External Affairs his personal possession. I do not wish to 
have any place in a service of that kind'2 12 However, Hasluck's own ministerial modus 
operandi was not beyond reproach: 'His intrusion into detail was such that public 
servants privately criticised him for wanting to be not merely minister but also 
departmental secretary, section head and junior clerk'.213 
Evatt was a difficult man and may have suffered from a form of epilepsy which 
ultimately impaired his mental faculties.21 4 Even now, thirty years after his death, his 
memory evokes strong feelings. In 1993 Peter Ryan, a former Director of Melbourne 
University Press, called him 'a man of unsound mind - there were signs apparent in the 
mid- l 940s ... of the gathering darkness under which he died'. Ryan said that it 'would 
be hard to think of a figure ever in Australian public life so politically evil and so per-
sonally odious'.215 Edwards is more charitable, holding that it 'is not unduly fanciful to 
see his career as worthy of a Shakespearian tragedy - a man of exceptional ability, in 
whom many placed great hopes, ultimately felled by fatal flaws of personality'. 216 One-
210 B. Juddery, At the Centre: The Australian Bureaucracy in the 1970s (Melbourne, 1974), p. 95. 
Juddery could have mentioned that it was also Evatt's practice to work out of his office in the 
parliament building. Gareth Evans, the present Foreign Minister, does so too. Perhaps other 
Liberal/Countl)' Party External A.ff airs Ministers did likewise. 
211 Hasluck, Diplomatic H'itness, p. 292. 
212 Jbid., p. 293. Statement at the University of Western Australia, 9 September 1947. Others suggest 
the reason was Evatt's appointment of the 32 year old Dr J. W. Burton as Secretal)' for E;x1ernal 
Affairs. Whatever the reason, there can in retrospect be no doubt at all that Hasluck's resignation was 
a very 'smart career move' from his point of view. His subsequent career had a fairy tale quality about 
it. 
213 The Age (Melbourne), 11 January 1993. 
214 K. Buckley, B. Dale & W. Reynolds, Doc Evatt: patriot, internationalist, fighter and scholar 
(Melbourne, 1994 }, pp. 405-07. 
215 Peter Ryan in The Weekend Australian, August 28-29, 1993. See also Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, p. 
412 and Renouf, Let Justice be Done, p. l. 
21 6 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 141. 
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time United Nations Under Secretary-General Brian Urquhart called him 'a brilliant but 
insecure man, almost paranoid in his desire to dominate and in his suspicion of those 
around him. He was even jealous of Eleanor Roosevelt'. 217 Evatt is, however, someth-
ing of a secular saint to important sections of the present-day Australian Labor 
Party.218 
His political rival of the 1950s, Robert Menzies, described him as 'a scholar of 
great attainments and a well-furnished lawyer, but, oddly enough, a poor advocate. He 
was a strange and controversial figure•.219 His personality, working methods and style 
caused unhappiness to most External Affairs officers who came into contact with him. 
Watt, who worked with him in a senior capacity in Canberra and at international con-
ferences, said Evatt caused him 'seriously to doubt whether I could serve him and at 
the same time keep my self respect•.22o The more junior J.K. Waller, who had been 
Secretary of the Australian delegation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, who also 
commented years later, was more explicit: 
I disliked Evatt more than any other person I've ever worked with 
or for ... [He] viewed me with some suspicion, as he viewed a 
number of people in the Department. This was his normal state of 
mind . .. Loyalty with Evatt meant, of course, personal loyalty -
that you were his slave - and this I found very distasteful.221 
Evatt's principal External Affairs protege of the time, J.W. Burton, was made of 
sterner stuff A 1991 interview suggested that the Tuggeranong (Canberra) farm he 
217 B. Urquhart, A life in peace and war, London, 1987, p. 117. 
218 Thus Gareth Evans, the present Australian foreign minister, dedicated his book Cooperating for 
Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (St Leonards, NSW, 1993) 'To the memory of 
Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, Leader of the Australian Delegation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference and 
President of the Third United Nations General Assembly, and to all those men and women throughout 
the United Nations system today who share his vision and commitment.' 
219 R.G. Menzies, The Measure of the Years (North Melbourne, 1970), p.155. Among Evatt's 
scholarly attainments was writing several well-reviewed and kindly-received (by professional 
historians) historical works while a member of the Australian High Court (1930-40). See eg. G.C. 
Bolton, 'Australian Historians in Quest of a Theme', Teaching History, Vol. 3. Part 2, September 
1969, pp. 10-11 and Buckley et al., Doc Evatt, Chapter 11, pp. 123-36. Perhaps the best-known of 
this genre was Rum Rebellion: A Study of the Overthrow of Governor Bligh by John Macarthur and 
the New South Wales Corps (Sydney, 1938). This has been reprinted many times. The same Bligh had 
captained H.M. S. Bounty at the time of the famous 1789 mutiny. 
220 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 314. 
221 Waller, A Diplomatic Life, pp. 17-18. Waller was Secretary for Foreign Affairs from 1971 to 
1974. 
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bought in the early 1940s represented his independence from Evatt: 'When you worked 
with Evatt, you needed an escape. I didn't want to become a yes man'. 222 
For the historian C.K. Webster, a member of the British delegation at the same 
conference, Evatt was 'a really malignant man•.223 On the other hand, the Australians 
found Webster himself wanting. F.W. Eggleston, the Minister in Washington, who was 
present in San Francisco, said he was 'frequently exceedingly rude and intolerant',. and 
'a very dogmatic man, talks everybody down and refers to their arguments as poppy-
cock. He did as much harm on his side as anything done on the other [Australian] 
side'.224 
F.H. Stuart, an Oxford-educated Australian who transferred from the British 
consular service to the Australian foreign service at the end of the war, called Evatt 'a 
malevolent man who frequently adopted the crudest devices to poison his colleagues 
and associates against each other. His effect on me was from the beginning an uncom-
fortable one: I found him, quite simply, evil'. 225 Stuart said he 'found working for him 
debasing'.226 M.H. Booker described the Australian department under Evatt as 'divided 
into those who were members of his personal coterie, and who worked directly with 
him in the international field; and those who were not', 227 an observation which is per-
haps germane to an examination of the post-1977 South African foreign service. Thus 
Geldenhuys refers to 'a small circle of relatively young officials' whom R.F. Botha228 
grouped around himself known as the 'Washington Mafia' which was said to consist of 
officials who had served under him in Washington and at the United Nations. Gelden-
huys raises the issue only to drop it inconclusively. 229 
222 P. Clack. 'Theories amidst cows and hills', The Canberra Times, 8 September 1991. I am indebted 
to Mr Hugh Gilchrist for this article. 
223 P.A. Reynolds & E.J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the 
United Nations 1939-1946 (London, 1976), p. 71. 
224 W.J. Hudson & Wendy Way, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Vol. VIII: 
1945, Eggleston/Bruce, 9 July 1945, p. 146; W.J. Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt 
at San Francisco, 1945 (Canberra, 1993), p.156. 
225 Stuart, Towards-coming-ofage, pp. 68-69. 
226 Ibid., p. 92. 
227 M.H. Booker, The Last Domino: Aspects of Australia's Foreign Relations (Sydney, 1976), p. 108. 
228 South African Foreign Minister from April 1977 to May 1994. 
229 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 137 and 270, footnote 126. Of the five Directors-
General who served Botha during his seventeen years as Foreign Minister - B.G. Fourie, J. Van 
Dalsen, P.R Killen, N.P. van Heerden and L.H. Evans - the last two had worked in his private office. 
Van Heerden was a member of the Embassy in Washington when Botha was Ambassador there. They 
had worked together while Botha was still a junior official on the administrative preparations for the 
South West Africa Case at the International Court of Justice (1963). With the possible exception of 
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Watt's predecessor but one as Secretary for External Affairs, W.E. Dunk, ad-
ded his own charge to the indictment:, writing of Evatt's 'highly individual methods 
which required freedom to gather his daisies as opportunity occurred without much 
regard for whether they grew in his field or his neighbour's', of his working through a 
'few individuals and sycophants', and of the 'unhealthy cynicism' which prevailed which 
'together with the way Dr Evatt used (and abused) junior staff ... brought me to the 
realization that the gap of our incompatibility was too wide and too temperamentally 
deep to be bridged'230 Pointing, perhaps, to the difference between the two countries' 
foreign service and public service cultures, it is difficult to conceive of South African 
officials publishing such comments about their Ministers, no matter what they thought 
of them and however long after their connection with them. 
Dr Malan saw Evatt from another perspective. In a personal message cabled on 
the occasion of the ALP's defeat at the December 1949 general election he said: 
I am confident that the close understanding between our two 
countries which you have done so much to build up ... will con-
tinue to operate . . . No only were you largely responsible for the 
establishment of direct diplomatic relations but we in South Africa 
owe you a special debt of gratitude for your firm support of the 
South African point of view under most difficult circumstances at 
the United Nations and we shall always remain most appreciative 
of the personal attention you gave to our problems.231 
Their brief meeting in Cape Town on the last day of 1948 when each made a favour-
able impression on the other set the scene for this. It is unlikely that Smuts would have 
said the same if he had remained in office. 
Evatt's immediate successors were also his political opponents - P.C. Spender 
(1949-51), R.G. Casey (1951-60) and R.G. Menzies (1960-61). Spender had been 
Treasurer then Minister of the Army in Menzies's first administration (1939-41). He 
served for less than eighteen months as External Affairs Minister before resigning in 
1951 to become Ambassador to the United States. That fuelled speculation that Men-
zies had thereby rid himself of a potential rival. 232 On the other hand, Spender himself 
the last of them, the Botha-appointees had no obvious rivals for the job at the time of their 
appointments. 
230 Dunk, They also serve, p. 66. 
231 BTS, 1/25/A, Vol. 1, Minister External Affairs/High Commissioner, Canberra, Cablegram No. 35, 
14 December 1949. 
232 E.A. Lyall, 'Australia's Overseas Representation and Government Patronage', Australian Outlook, 
Vol. 23, No. 2, August 1969, pp. 126-27; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 122. 
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wrote in his memoirs233 that Menzies offered him Washington when told of his desire 
to quit active politics on grounds of health. 
Although Spender's term as Minister was but an interlude between the eight 
year Evatt term and the nine year Casey term, it witnessed two of Australia's principal 
early post-war foreign policy achievements, the Colombo Plan and the Anzus Treaty. 
Edwards writes that his 
short tenure of the ministry, from December 1949 to April 1951, 
was highly significant. His parliamentary speech of 9 March 
1950, 234drafted in collaboration with departmental officials, accu-
rately outlined the major emphases of Australian foreign policy for 
the nex1 two decades, and the ANZUS Treaty, which Menzies was 
later to claim as one of the greatest achievements of his long term 
as Prime Minister, was achieved largely by Spender's energetic 
diplomacy, taking astute advantage of opportune circumstances 
and overriding the initial pessimism of his Prime Minister.235 
On the administrative front, Spender initiated a review of the basic organisation of the 
Diplomatic Staff Division of the Department of External Affairs which led to certain 
structural changes being made, enabling the department better to cope with its 
increasing responsibilities. 236 
Because of the magnitude of the achievements crammed into such a brief term 
(it was sufficiently brief not to include any failures), Spender was conceivably the most 
successful of all Australian foreign ministers. Originally a leader of the Sydney bar, he 
resigned the Washington Embassy in 1957 on his election to a nine year term on the 
International Court of Justice. He is best known in South Africa for his casting vote as 
President of the Court in 1966 which in effect delivered victory in the South West Af-
rica Case to South Africa. Sole claims that the 'personal link' established with Spender 
at the 1950 Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Ministers of External Affairs, at 
which South Africa was represented by Paul Sauer, 'laid the foundation for his under-
standing of the South African situation which was to prove crucial in the judgement of 
233 Politics and a Man (Sydney, 1972), pp. 301-02. 
234 See below, p. 277 and note 187. 
235 Prime Ministers and Diplomats, pp. 186-87. See also G. St. J. Barclay, Friends in High Places: 
Australian-American diplomatic relations since 1945 (Melbourne, 1985), Chapter 2, pp. 32-55. 
236 BTS, 1125/8, Vol. 1, Press release P.R. 12/51, 28 February 1951, attached to NeVSEA, 2 March 
1951; 'Reorganisation of the Department of Ex1ernal Affairs: Statement by the Minister for External 
Affairs, the Hon. P.C. Spender, K.C., M.P., 28th February, 1951', Current Notes, Vol.22, No.2, 
February 1951, pp.106-07. 
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the International Court of Justice•.237 Spender cabled Dr Malan after the Colombo 
Conference that he had 'the pleasure of a close association with Mr. Sauer at Colombo 
and I well realise that South Africa has commitments in areas other than South and 
South-East Asia'.238 That is one way of looking at it. It was in the prevailing political 
climate a controversial verdict and Spender's act brought down much opprobrium upon 
his head besides damaging Australia's reputation in the eyes of the anti-apartheid lobby 
at the United Nations. 
Spender's successor, Richard Gardiner Casey, 239 was independently wealthy as 
Spender was not. Casey and his wife Maie24o were licensed pilots and accustomed to 
using their own light aircraft almost as a means of regular long distance transportation 
within Australia as they had done in the United States in the early 1940s. Flying was 
also a means of recreation and Casey would from time to time engage in eagle shoots 
from single-engined aircraft. 241 He was one of the most experienced of Menzies's Min-
isters by the time he took over the External Affairs portfolio. He had served as Treas-
urer242 as far back as the mid-l 930s, as Minister of Supply at the outbreak of war, as 
United Kingdom Minister of State in the Middle East, a war cabinet position, and as 
Governor of Bengal in the 1940s, before returning to Australian politics. He had 
resigned from the Cabinet in 1940 to head the newly-opened Australian Legation in 
Washington with the rank of Minister. 
Casey, whom his biographer calls 'one of the last of the great Anglo-Austral-
ians', 243 is also thought of as the father of Australian diplomacy because of his work as 
liaison officer in London between 1924 and 1931, with a break in 1927. 244 (See p. 39 
above.) He served a record term as Minister of External Affairs. In that capacity he 
seems to have been on a friendly footing with the various South African High Com-
missioners in Canberra up to 1961. Otherwise, his contact with South Africa and South 
Africans was mainly at the United Nations or in a United Nations context. With an eye 
to Australia's stand on the domestic jurisdiction issue, he was generally sympathetic 
237 Reminiscences, p. 140. 
238 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, 0. 2289, Spender/Malan, 18 February 1950. 
239 See W.J. Hudson's biography, Casey. Melbourne, 1986. 
24o Short for Ethel Marian. 
241 The Canberra Times, 11July1955. The Canberra Times of 19 September 1950 carries a report on 
a forced landing made by Maie Casey. 
242 Minister of Finance in South Africa. 
243 Hudson, Casey, p. vii. 
244 W.J. Hudson, 'The Yo-yo Variations: a Comment', Historical Studies, Vol. 14, No. 55, October 
1970, p. 425. 
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towards the South African government's embattled position at the UN but only on the 
legal aspects. He held no brief for the discriminatory content of South Africa's domes-
tic policies. Indicative of his attitude towards the colour question were his comments 
about S.E.D. Brown's The South African Observer on whose mailing list he was. He 
called it 'a most vicious anti-coloured publication'. 245 
That at least in the mid- l 950s South Africa was of minimal interest to him is 
revealed by a contemporary diary entry: 'An occasional letter from W.R. Hodgson 
(Australian High Commissioner in South Africa) reminds me of how little South Africa 
comes into our thoughts or our calculations. '246 That was a few years after he had 
initially displayed enthusiasm for a suggestion by M.H. Marshall, newly-returned from 
a five year posting to South Africa, that Australia should 'accord South Africa and 
Southern Africa generally a place of high importance in its political and strategic 
thinking'. In that regard, Marshall recommended that Casey should visit South Africa 
at his 'earliest convenience'. 247 Casey told Watt, the permanent head of the department, 
that Marshall's view was 'a timely corrective'. He had never been to South Africa, one 
of the places to which he had 'not given anything like enough thought': 
I can well believe that what Mr. Marshall says about South Africa 
(and perhaps of Africa as a whole) is true - and that we should pay 
more attention to this area. 248 
He called for Alfred Stirling's comments on Marshall's paper. (Stirling, then 
Ambassador to the Netherlands, had been High Commissioner in South Africa until 
1950.) Stirling wrote back expressing general agreement with Marshall including that 
the vacant High Commissionership (which had been vacant since his own departure in 
May 1950) should be filled. 249 There the matter rested. Whether or not Marshall's and 
Stirling's views expedited an appointment, the next High Commissioner, W.R. 
Hodgson, took up duty a few months later. Twenty years on Watt wrote in his mem-
oirs that Casey had a tendency to develop 'crushes' for people which lasted a while 
before he switched to other people. 250 That seems to have applied also to issues. 
245 AA, Al838/1, 201/2/5, Pt. 7, Casey/Plimsoll, 27 April 1959, concerning the March 1959 issue 
(Vol. IV, No. 11). Brown would then have been mainstream National Party. 
246 T.B. Millar, ed., Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries ofR.G. Casey 1951-60 (London, 1972), 
p. 176. 
247 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, 'For the Secretary and the Minister', M.H. Marshall, 30 January 
1952. 
248 Ibid., Casey/Watt, 11 February 1952. 
249 Ibid., Memo. Hague 61/52, 7 March 1952. 
250 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 202. 
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After stepping down from External Affairs Casey was made a Life Peer. His 
last official position was Governor-General of Australia (1965-69). He died in 1976. 
As elsewhere, the favouring of some officials over others on grounds other 
than merit is quite common in foreign service which is, after all, a human occupation. 
Perhaps it is its nature coupled with the personalities of those engaged in it. Eighteenth 
century courtiers would not have been surprised. They knew all about the role of the 
King's favourites not to mention that of his mistresses. If the influence of the last-men-
tioned - where they still exist - has waned, that of Ministerial or Ambassadorial wives 
should not be discounted. 251 There is also the Churchillian aphorism which Waller 
cites: 'the art of good administration is favouritism', meaning that 'you must pick the 
people in whom you have confidence so that you can delegate to them with a clear 
conscience without fear of being let down'. 252 Someone in another occupation who 
held a similar view was the early twentieth century First Sea Lord, Jacky Fisher, who 
said 'Favouritism is the secret of efficiency'. 253 
What critics may subconsciously have in mind, though, is something along the 
lines of the Oxford University Boat Club president's lament that his predecessor had 
selected the team 'arbitrarily, picking personal favourites, wrecking morale'. 254 Or the 
Lyndon Johnson model: 'He was ill at ease with abstract loyalty, loyalty to issue, to 
concept, to cause, which might lead one to occasional dissent, a broader view, and 
might mean that a man was caught between loyalty to civil rights and loyalty to 
Lyndon Johnson.'255 And A.JP. Taylor's point about 'patrons' in journalism is not 
without relevance to foreign service, if not quite so apocalyptically. ('As so often hap-
pens in journalism, maybe in other walks of life, when you lose your patron you are 
done for. ')256 Undoubtedly, however, what counted with the South African department 
251 See Sole on Mrs Margo Diederichs and Henderson on Lady Spender. Sole, Reminiscences, pp. 
205-06 and Henderson, Privilege and Pleasure, pp. 34-37, 42-43. See also Clark, Corps 
Diplomatique, p. 93. 
252 Waller, A Diplomatic Life, p. 42. 
253 The Economist, Vol. 334, No. 7906, 18 March 1995, p. 93. (Review of J. Morris, Fisher's Face 
(1995)). 
254 International Herald Tribune, 29 March 1995. ('An American Pulling Hard To Save Oxford'). 
255 D. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn., 1973 (1969)), p. 526: "'How loyal 
is that man?" he asked a White House staffer about a potential hand. "Well, he seems quite loyal, Mr. 
President," said the staffer. "I don't want loyalty. I want loyalty. I want him to kiss my ass in Macy's 
window at high noon and tell me it smells like roses. I want his pecker in my pocket."' (Emphasis in 
original.) 
256 A.J.P. Taylor, A Personal History (London, 1983), pp. 204-05. 
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in recent years was the ability as well as the connections to manipulate the system to 
one's advantage. 
In any event, it is no coincidence that both the present (1995) and the immedi-
ately previous (1992-93) Australian Secretaries for Foreign Affairs and Trade are ALP 
supporters. The last-mentioned, the late Peter Wilenski, had held a number of senior 
public service positions under ALP governments extending back to the mid- l 970s 
when he was Gough Whitlam's Private Secretary. 257 The first-mentioned, Michael 
Costello, had been W. G. Hayden's Private Secretary for six years in the 1980s, from 
even before Hayden became foreign minister. In their cases, though, it was probably 
more loyalty to cause than to person. And on the other side of politics, R.G. Casey, 
had, Watt said 
a tendency to develop a 'crush' upon some person he had newly 
met which diminished with the passage of time. Having drawn 
from such an indhidual all the 'bright' ideas he could produce, 
Casey would come to feel that he was not such a first-class man af-
ter all, and switch his interest to someone else. 258 
What all this says is that ministerial idiosyncrasies and preferences are import-
ant. They influence the course of foreign service careers besides playing a role in the 
formulation of foreign policy. Thus Edwards writes of some who survived the Evatt 
regime 'by ability, strength and good fortune' going on to 'distinguished careers in di-
plomacy or elsewhere'. But others 'were left broken men, forced to seek spiritual, or 
sometimes spirituous, consolation'. 259 
257 See J. Walter, The Ministers' Minc(ers: Personal Advisers in National Government (Melbourne, 
1986), pp. 69-73, for details of the Polish-born Wilenski's career up to the early 1980s. Although 
trained as a medical doctor, Wilenski was something of a public sector management specialist. From 
1971 to 1980 he was fow1dation professor of the Australian Graduate School of Management at the 
University of New South Wales. In 1983 he was appointed Chairman of the Public Service Board. He 
next became Secretary for Transport and Communications before going off to the United Nations as 
Australian Permanent Representative in succession to RA Woolcott. His last assignment before 
retirement for health reasons in 1993 was Sec;etary for Foreign Affairs and Trade. He died in 1994. 
His published articles include "Social change as a source of competing values in public 
administration", Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, September 1988, 
pp. 213-22. 
258 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 202. 
259 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 144. 
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On the academic side many, perhaps most, foreign service officers are general-
ists holding only a bachelor's degree, especially in arts. That was certainly true of the 
South African service during the period covered by this study. In fact like Australia's, 
perhaps like most, the South African service has traditionally offered arts graduates an 
alternative career to teaching. Down the years some teachers and others who aban-
doned that profession before qualifying were lured by the presumed attractions of 
foreign service. Also, in the early days of the South African service a few junior 
magistrates employed by the Department of Justice switched to foreign service. 
In mid-1938, of the some seventy officers making up the staffs of the combined 
South African Departments of the Prime Minister and of External Affairs at head office 
and abroad, twenty-two held BAs, nine B Corns and eight BA LLBs. However, 
probably at no other time was the departmental top structure - the Secretary and his 
immediate deputy, the Under-Secretary - academically so well-qualified: the former 
held an LLD and the latter a BA LLD. 1 Heads of Mission abroad, all but two of them2 
political appointees, were also well-qualified: the four Envoys Extraordinary and Min-
isters Plenipotentiary held between them a BA LLB, a BA PhD, an MD and a DD and 
the two Accredited Representatives an MA and a BA LLB. Of the ten Legation 
Secretaries, as they were then known, five held BAs. The thirteen Attaches or Vice-
Consuls counted among their number four BAs, three B Corns, three BA LLBs, one 
BA B Com, one BA LLD and one B Econ. Of the ten Probationer Diplomats, later 
called Cadets, the 'Sole generation', 3 five held BAs and three B Corns in addition to 
which there was one BA LLB and one M Com. 4 
1 P.R. Botha, the Under-Secretary, was awarded a doctorate in laws by the University of Amsterdam 
in 1925 for his thesis Die Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek onder 
Kruger en Leyds. Amsterdam, 1925. He succeeded W.J.H. Farrell as Under-Secretary in October 1933 
on transfer from the Department of Commerce and Industries. At the time he was Trade 
Commissioner in Montreal. BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Secretary, PSC/Secretary, DEA, 23 October 1933. 
See Sole, Reminiscences, p. 20, for a description of him. 
2 The Accredited Representatives in Ottawa (De Waal Meyer) and Geneva (Andrews). 
3 ie., D.B. Sole was among their number. Sole's immediate group of six comprised in addition to 
himselfH.A. van Huyssteen, J.M. Hoogenhout, M.H.H. Louw, G.J.J.F. Steyn and G.C. Nel. Nel, BTS, 
S4/5/2, Vol. I, Botha/Secretary, PSC, 2 February 1938. Only Ne! and Sole spent their working lives in 
the foreign service. 
4 Analysis of the three-page list on BTS, 4/5/17, Vol. 1. 
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In April 194 7 twenty-three out of seventy-eight officers held BAs, fourteen BA 
LLBs, three B Econs, one BA LLD, one MA LLB, one MA, one B Com D Com, one 
M Com, one B Sc LLB, one B Ed MA, one BA (Admin) and one MA (Admin). Only 
the then head of department, D.D. Forsyth, did not have a degree, being in possession 
of the Civil Service Lower and Higher Law Certificates. 5 Then, a return of cadets 
submitted pursuant to Treasury Circular No. 17 of 1951 shows that of the thirty-eight 
recruited between January 1946 and June 1951, nineteen held BAs, five B Corns and 
five BA LLBs. One had a B Comm LLB, three BA (Hons), two B Scs and one B Sc 
(Econ). The 194 7 and 19 51 lists contained a handful of Oxford graduates, one being 
A.AM. Hamilton, the future High Commissioner to Australia. 
On the Australian side, of the fifty-four cadets accepted for training between 
1943 and 1947-48, twenty-two were listed as having no academic qualifications upon 
appointment;6 otherwise, there were fifteen BAs, seven BA (Hons), two LLBs, one 
BSc, one MA and one LLM. Under pre-war conditions one or two graduates under 
twenty-five years of age were recruited every year after 1935. There were nine such 
officers by the outbreak ofwar. 7 Five of the thirteen officers (apart from the Secretary, 
Hodgson) making up the staff of the department at the time, including the London 
Office and Keith Officer at the British Embassy in Washington, held Oxford or 
Cambridge degrees. Only one, Westcott, of the Records Section did not have a 
degree. 8 
As they grew older, even the legally-qualified among the South Africans were 
ill-equipped to earn a living elsewhere including in the legal profession. Diplomacy was 
the only trade they knew, a point made recently (1994) about diplomats of the former 
German Democratic Republic.9 Renouf says the same of Australian diplomats. 10 
(Perhaps this could also be said of modern politicians). That is ironic in view of the 
supposedly elitist nature of foreign service and the emphasis laid on the need for 
specialised training after entry. Although there was at that time neither entrance 
examination nor formal training, junior South African officers were required to take 
5 See BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 11. 
6 That was because of the special circumstance prevailing during the war which interrupted many 
young people's tertiary education. In some instances it may also have been a case of cadets being 
accepted when their final results were known but before the degrees had actually been conferred. 
7 AA, Al838/l, 1260/7/2, 'Department of External Affairs - Recruitment Policy', n.d. 
8 AA, Al066/1, P.I. 45/140, 'Department of External Affairs. Personnel', n.d. 
9 S. Kinzer, 'For East German Diplomats, the Cookie Crumbles', International Herald Tribune, 12 
July 1994, p. 1. Australians found themselves in the same position. 
IORenouf, The Champagne Trail, pp. 152-53. 
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part-time courses inter alia in law and economics additional to subjects they had 
completed for their degrees. The standard was equivalent to a first year degree course 
and candidates were required to make their own arrangements for study. 11 They could 
apply for exemption if the subjects had formed part of their degree courses. 12 The 
prescribed period for completing the courses was three years but, depending on 
circumstances, some officers took much longer. 
G.C. Nel, who joined the Department of External Affairs in 1938 on the 
strength of his BA degree and Higher Education Diploma, completed his last 
departmental course in 1948 whereupon he qualified for promotion to Second 
Secretary. 13 He was awarded the promotion when he took up duty as Second 
Secretary in the South African High Commission, Canberra. 14 By that time he had 
already served in the Consulates in Lourenco Marques (1940-41) and Cairo (1941-47). 
Failure to complete the departmental courses was an impediment to promotion. In 
Nel's case his brother-in-law, E.G. Malherbe, 15 the Principal of the University of Natal, 
concerned about reports of the Ne! family's straitened financial circumstances m 
Cairo, 16 wrote to Forsyth asking that Nel be promoted. Forsyth replied firmly that 
in this Department there is an absolute bar to promotion to the 
'Secretaryship' grades unless an officer has certain prescribed 
qualifications which Nel has not. Consequently, with the best will 
in the. world I cannot give him promotion. 17 
Later that year, replying to a 'long, rambling letter' (Nel's description) he had received 
from Ne! himself, Forsyth said: 
I am glad to hear that you are getting down to your studies. Your 
progress (or lack of it) in that regard has been worrying me for 
some time. It would be a pity to get yourself left behind simply 
11 BTS, 24/2, Vol. l, Pohl/Careers Master, Hilton College, 15 December 1945. 
12 Sole, Reminiscences, pp. 22-23. 
13 BTS, Nel, Vol. II, Nel/DEA, 11February1949 and Spies/Nel, 3 March 1949. 
14 Ibid., Spies/PSC, 23 March 1949. 
15 Malherbe's wife Janie was Nel's sister. E.G. Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 347. 
16 It was alleged at the time that 'South African representation [was] among the poorest paid in the 
world'. Rand Daily Afail (Johannesburg), 16 September 1947, Leading article 'Orphans in Striped 
Trousers'. H. Thomas, a Public Service Inspector, who inspected South African offices abroad in the 
course of a seven months trip between May and December 194 7, quoted in extenso from this article in 
his report, saying that it gave 'a reasonably accurate picture of the general position'. BTS, 4/5/1, AJ 
1957, Public Service Commission, Department of External Affairs, Inspection Report on Overseas 
Offices: General Report, 13th January, 1948, p. 5, para. 9. Thomas said he was 'convinced that early 
relief in various directions [was] imperative' (p. 2, para. 6.) 
17 BTS, Ne!, Vol. IL ForS}th/Malherbe, 8 February 1946 and Malherbe/Forsyth, 2 February 1946. 
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because you had not the additional qualifications upon which we 
insist. 18 
Considered objectively, the value of these part-time courses lay in their forming part of 
the rites of initiation neophytes were compelled to undergo. Their content certainly 
failed to equip those who passed them any better for their careers. In that regard 
hands-on, in-service experience was, as it still is, the best training. Forsyth's own career 
in various public service departments was an excellent example of that. 19 As Moodie 
said to Renouf when the latter took over his desk in Canberra in 1943, 'The best way 
to learn this job is to do it'. 20 The British believe that too. 21 
Once the formal system of recruitment known as the diplomatic cadet scheme 
had been set up at the end of 1942, the Australians focussed on full-time academic 
training. For between 1943 and 1949 their service was open to school leavers as well 
as to university graduates. The University of Sydney devised a special nine-month 
course for the first intake of diplomatic cadets in 1943 - five graduates and seven 
undergraduates, including four first-year students. Training was taken over by the 
specially created School of Diplomatic Studies at the University College of Canberra,22 
which then fell under the aegis of the University of Melbourne, for the 1944 and 
subsequent cadet intakes up to 1949. The course was designed to provide cadets with 
'the higher education of which they [had] been deprived owing to their entry into the 
armed forces, and to include the study of subjects likely to be of most use to them in 
18 Ibid., Vol. I, Nel/ForS)th, 30 July 1946 and Forsyth/Nel, 7 August 1946. 
19 Born on 6 March 1896, he joined the Department of Defence as a Junior Clerk at the age of 15 on 1 
July 1911. A year later he became a Second Grade Clerk in Pretoria. He was promoted to Stores Clerk 
Grade II in 1917. During the First World War he served in the South West Africa and East Africa 
campaigns. In 1920 he was transferred to the South West Africa Administration rising to Grade II 
Magistrate at Otjiwarongo in 1931. Between 1931 and 1934 he was a Grade I Magistrate falling under 
the Department of Justice in Sutherland, Cape Province. In 1934 and 1935 he served as a Public 
Service Inspector. From 1937 to 1939 he was Under Secretary for Social Welfare. In July 1939 he 
returned to South West Africa as Secretary of the Territory. On 30 July 1941 he became Secretary to 
the Prime Minister and Secretary for External Affairs, serving in the former capacity until the two 
departments separated in January 1955 and in the latter until his retirement at the age of 60 on 1 
April 1956. Thereafter he was appointed a Director of De Beers. ForS)th, Vol. 4, CV. He died in 
1987. 
20 Renouf, The Champagne Trail, p. 9. A founder member of the Australian service, C.T. Moodie was 
Ambassador to South Africa from 1972 to 1975. 
21 E. Clark, Corps Diplomatique, London, 1973, p. 31. 
22 See The Canberra Times and The Sydney Morning Herald of 4 March 1944; 'The Training of 
Diplomats', Current Notes, Vol. 41, No. 2, February 1970, p. 52; undated paper 'Canberra University 
College' on AA, A659/l, 44/1/123 and AA, 'The Department of E>.iernal Affairs. History', etc., pp. 
14-16. 
83 
Chapter Two: The Diplomats 
their career'. 23 In a broader sense it was 'seen as a further step in the formation of a 
National University at Canberra'.24 The entrance examination was dispensed with in 
1949 and only university graduates accepted. The scheme was dropped entirely in 
1956 'in favour of a policy of direct recruitment to Third Secretary level'. 25 
Born amidst much 'hype',26 the diplomatic cadet scheme was intended to serve 
as a vehicle for recruiting and training junior foreign service officers in circumstances 
where the war-time expansion of Australia's overseas representation had left depart-
mental ranks in Canberra seriously depleted. In 1942, for example, after the opening of 
a legation in the Soviet Union, 'only two permanent professional officers were left in 
the Department besides the Secretary'. 27 With modifications, the cadet scheme was for 
thirteen years an important method of recruitment to the Australian foreign service. 
Although it was intended to ensure the department a steady supply of recruits at a time 
of a labour shortage and a need to expand Australia's diplomatic service rapidly, the 
way the scheme was structured and operated said much about how contemporary 
Australians viewed the world and their country's place in it. 
The cadet scheme has received the lion's share of attention. But it was not the 
only method of recruitment nor, in respect of officers destined to occupy top posts in 
the 1960s and 1970s, if not later, was it the most important one. Thus the assertion of 
his latest biographers that Evatt 'improved the selection of staff through the cadetship 
system'28 requires qualification. During his short Secretaryship ( 1945-4 7) Dunk 
bypassed the scheme. He said later that he went 'outside the Public Service for recruits 
at various levels' giving 'those selected direct entry to the classification for which they 
were considered qualified'. He 'looked for young graduates in the twenty to early thirty 
age group . . . selected applicants were given direct and immediate appointment and 
placement'. 29 At the time he told an External Affairs officer, P.R. Heydon, that he 
23 DFAT, 'The Department of External Affairs. History' etc, p. 14. 
24 Ibid., p. 15. 
25 S.J. Mackay, The Diplomatic Cadet Scheme (Unpublished undergraduate essay, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1992), p. 23; AA, A3299/l, Folder 1, 'Historical Summary of the 
Department of External Affairs', 1960, p.4 .. 
26 See J.G. Starke, 'Our diplomatic service must come of age', The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 6 
October 1943 and J. Stone, 'Training for an Australian Foreign Service', The Australian Quarterly, 
Vol. XV, No. 3, September, 1943, pp. 33-46. A lot of the hype may have been generated by the 
publicity attendant upon the announced changes to the British diplomatic service at that time - the so-
called Eden Reforms. See Cmd. 6420, Proposals for the Reform of the Foreign Service, 1943. 
27 AA, A98l/l, 43/300/1/29/8, Hodgson/Secretary to the Treasury, 29 October 1943, para. 3. 
28 Buckley et al, Doc Evatt, p. 304. 
29 Dunk, They also serve, p. 67. 
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wanted to discontinue the cadet scheme because the department was 'unbalanced in the 
number of officers in the junior age group'. His policy was rather 'to bring in public 
servants of proved capacity and special qualifications at higher ages and try and get 
some spread in age grouping•.3o The contradiction between going outside the Public 
Service and bringing in Public Servants will have been noted. 
Of the some one hundred and fifteen diplomatic staff listed as being employed 
by the department in 1946, 31 including temporary staff such as Paul Hasluck and men 
on secondment from other departments, fifty-three or 46.09 per cent had been 
recruited before 1945. Of these, twenty-one (39.62 per cent) were Cadets or Third 
Secretaries; nine (16.98 per cent) Second Secretaries; fourteen (26.42 per cent) First 
Secretaries; six (11.32 per cent) Counsellors; and three (5.66 per cent) Assistant 
Secretaries or, in terms of salary, at that level. Thirty-seven of the one hundred and 
fifteen (32.17 per cent) joined the department between 1940 and 1944. Sixty-two 
officers (53.91 per cent), some of them already in the Public Service, were recruited in 
1945 and 1946, twenty-five (21.74 per cent) in 1945 and thirty-seven (32.17 per cent) 
in 1946. In terms of salary (both years combined), thirty of the sixty-two ( 48.39 per 
cent) were Cadets or Third Secretaries; nineteen (30.65 per cent) were Second 
Secretaries; seven (11.29 per cent) were First Secretaries and six (9.68 per cent) were 
Counsellors. Dunk was not, therefore, markedly successful in reducing the intake of 
junior staff. Years later he observed happily that 
in the many times since that I have visited our Embassies, High 
Commissions, etc., it has been a pleasure to be greeted by an 
Ambassador. High Commissioner or other senior staff and recall 
bringing them into the department in relatively junior positions. 32 
Short though it was, his term as Secretary had a major impact on the 
composition and structure of the Australian Department of External Affairs. His 
contribution endured for decades. Clearly, he was by no means just 'a glorified staff 
manager'. 33 
30 AA, Al838/l, 1260/5/1, Dunk!Heydon, 23 August 1946. 
31 AA, Al067/l, S46/238, undated tabulated list showing salary scale, actual salary and allowances 
and appointment details. Not on the list are heads of mission on contract, Dunk himself, Hodgson, 
Keith Officer and Stirling. The percentages and figures in the text derive from an analysis of the list. 
32 Dunk, They also serve, p. 67; Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 180 . 
. 
33 
'Canberra's destiny-man', Nation, No. 21, 4 July 1959, p. 14. See Chapter One. 
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Among those who entered the department in 1945 and 1946 were O.L. Davis 
(1946), J.C.G. Kevin (1945), O.C.W. Fuhrman (1946),34 M.H. Marshall (1946), K.T. 
Kelly (1945), H. Gilchrist (1945) and L.E. Phillips (1946), all of whom later served in 
South Africa.35 Phillips came in as a Third Secretary (£490); Kelly (£562), Davis 
(£598) and Gilchrist (£616) as Second Secretaries; Fuhrman (£856), Kevin (£808) and 
Marshall (£784) as First Secretaries. (Their annual salaries in 1946 appear in 
parenthesis after their names). M.J.S. Knowles, the son of the first High 
Commissioner, Sir George Knowles, was taken temporarily on strength in 1946 so that 
he could accompany his father to South Africa as Third Secretary. He was then an 
officer of the Department of Commerce and Agriculture on temporary transfer to the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction.36 He returned to Commerce and Agriculture 
after his South African posting. Davis was High Commissioner/ Ambassador from 1959 
to 1962 and Kevin Ambassador from 1962 until his death in 1968. Fuhrman and 
Marshall were Official Secretaries, the former for three months in 1946, the latter from 
1946 to 1951. Kelly and Gilchrist were First Secretaries respectively from 1952 to 
1955 and 1955 to July 1957. Gilchrist then acted as High Commissioner to January 
1959 being succeeded by Phillips. 37 Kelly was thirty-five when he joined the 
department. 
Other entrant Second Secretaries in 1946 who were to be heard of later were 
K.C.O. Shann (£580), T.W. Cutts (£598), and W.G.A. Landale (£598). 38 L.H.E. Bury 
(£784) and A.H. Tange (£784) were entrant First Secretaries who made their mark: 
Bury as Australian (and South African) Executive Director at the International 
Monetary Fund in the 1950s. He later entered federal politics, becoming a Liberal 
Party Cabinet Minister including Minister of External Affairs in the early 1970s. Tange 
was Secretary for External Affairs and Secretary of Defence for a total of two decades. 
Omitted from this tally are J.P. Quinn who acted as High Commissioner for a year in 
1951 and 1952, who preceded the cadet scheme having joined the department in 1940, 
34 Fuhrman came from the Department of Social Services. While working in the Australian High 
Commission, London, he served as Secretary to Australian delegations to League of Nations Assem-
blies from 1924 to 1937, with a break in 1928. W.J. Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations 
(Sydney, 1980), Appendix I, pp. 193-96. 
35 AA, Al067/l, S46/238, list of 115 officials. 
36 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Dunk/PSB, 16 May 1946. 
37 The holder of a BA LLB degree from Sydney University, Davis was initially recruited for a three-
month period as a temporary Second Secretary. AA, A447/l, Al945/2291, Cumpston/PSB, 9 January 
1946 and Schneider/DEA 15 January 1946. 
38 Cutts was Ambassador to South Africa in the 1970s. Landale, the father of the Michael Landale 
referred to in Chapter Four, was the Chief of Protocol in Canberra in the late 1950s. 
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A. T. Stirling, the second High Commissioner, and W.R. Hodgson, for ten years head 
of the department. Renouf, a graduate of the first cadet scheme, would complain later: 
Nor did I like what I learned of the conduct of the Department in 
Canberra. Officers who had not been able to join through the 
diplomatic cadet scheme, were being brought into the Department 
and appointed to ranks higher than my own. 39 
He had a point. 
K. Desmond (1946), Miss E.A. Warren (1948), R.A. Woolcott (1950), I.E. 
Nicholson (1955) and J.H. Brook (1953) were also products of the cadet scheme. 
South Africa was the first post for Miss Warren (1951-54), Nicholson (1957-59) and 
Brook (1960-64) after graduating from it and the second one for Desmond (1948-51) 
and Woolcott (1954-57). If it had not been for the severance of diplomatic relations 
between Australia and the Soviet Union in 1954 (his first post) it is conceivable that 
Woolcott's career would not have taken him to South Africa. 
The 'hype' surrounding the diplomatic cadet scheme deflated with the passage 
of time perhaps because, as C. T. Moodie said in 1956, people had 'seen through the 
glamour into the facts'. 40 In 1943 the first advertisement for diplomatic cadets attracted 
one thousand five hundred applications nationwide. Thereafter the numbers dropped 
dramatically, stabilising around one hundred annually.41 As the 1950s advanced, the 
feeling grew that the scheme was a cumbersome means of recruitment and actually 
deterred prospective candidates because of the two year cadetship on low pay, besides 
what had come to be known of the nature of foreign service putting people off 'We all 
want to get bright young men', Moodie wrote, 
but a great deal of the work we have to do overseas does not 
require high intellectual qualifications but a lot of common sense 
and knowledge of human beings. A highly qualified intellectual is 
often of little use to us and finishes up by getting disgruntled. I 
would rather have for most of my needs a good Consular type even 
if he is only a fair Pass Degree.42 
39 Renouf. The Champagne Trail, p. 32. 
40 AA, AI838/l, 1260/l, Pt. IA, Moodie!Tange, 13 February 1956. 
41 In the decades since the numbers have climbed to several thousand annually. 
42 AA, Al838/l, 1260/l, Pt. IA, Moodie!Tange, 13 February 1956. This recalls the British practice of 
diverting those who passed the competitive entrance examination well to the diplomatic service and 
those who didn't to the consular service. The latter fate befell Francis Stuart, later of the Australian 
service. See Towards coming-ofage, p. 30. 
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South African officials would have agreed with him. He could have said the same 
about the head office. 
Once considered to have a special role requiring specialised training, to-day, at 
least in Australia, the professional foreign service officer tends to be regarded as just 
another public servant. P.G.F. Henderson, Robert Menzies's son-in-law (he married 
Menzies's daughter Heather) and himself a former Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1979-
84 ), wrote a few years ago that the concept of 'a professional foreign service' was 'no 
longer a generally agreed upon point of departure': 
Instead of the term 'foreign service' encompassing a body of men 
and women who have engaged themselves in a profession that is 
recognisable and demanding, there is pressure for it to mean only 
intermittent or single periods of service overseas by various public 
servants who may or may not have served overseas before -
something anyone can do for a while. •43 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had even placed advertisements 
for junior staff which 'made no mention of the term 'foreign service' or 'diplomat' but 
referred instead to graduate recruitment for international work'. 44 That marked the 
culmination of a process initiated two decades earlier by K.C.O. (Mick) Shann, then a 
Deputy-Secretary in the department who, together with its head, J.K. Waller, 
attempted 'to end the separate caste existence of the diplomats by making diplomatic 
postings available to any clerical/administrative employee in - or, theoretically, outside 
of - the Department'.45 Shann, who had followed the Public Service route into the 
department (he came from the Department of Labour and National Service), urged that 
the 'def acto closed shop of the diplomats, with their pretensions to elitism' should be 
ended. 46 At best, and at least in Australia, foreign service officers are now what 
Hudson calls 'specialist public servants . . . who tend to maintain aristocratic 
43 P.G.F. Henderson, S. Harris and RA. Woolcott, Managing Australia's Diplomacy: Three Views 
from the top (Geelong: Australian Institute of International Affairs/Deakin University School of 
Social Sciences, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1989), p. I. 
44 Ibid., pp. 3-4. Bearing in mind the circumstances of his dismissal from the Secretaryship by the 
Labor Foreign Minister, W.G. Hayden, a certain bitterness on Henderson's part is understandable. 
45 Juddery, At the Centre, p. 102. 
46 Ibid., p. 103. Shann had spent seven years in the Bureau of Census and Statistics and the 
Department of Labour and National Services before joining External Affairs in January 1946. BTS, 
1/25/8, Vol. 1, 'For the Press - New Minister to the Philippines - Mr K.C.O. Shann', 31May1955. 
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conventions' and who work in 'foreign offices which usually are not mentioned in the 
same breath as humdrum domestic government departments'. 47 
This may all be part of the 'tall poppy' syndrome in terms of which it is almost a 
national sport to bring down those thought to have climbed too high. Anti-elitism is 
very much ingrained in Australian Labor Party culture. Some years ago an Australian 
resident in New York City defined the matter in these terms: 'If I do good work [in the 
US] people are happy about it. In Australia what I found was that if I did good work, 
people would be angry about it'.48 Even so, the idea of putting an end to the diplomatic 
'closed shop' was not unique to Australia. More than a generation previously N.F.W. 
Fisher, the longtime Secretary to the Treasury and head of the British Civil Service 
(1919-39), believed firmly in a unified Civil Service, including also the Foreign Office, 
whose members 'would be promotable, according to merit, between departments'. 49 
There was a time when foreign service tended to attract 'the best people' in 
Australia who had attended 'the best schools' as well as some who had not. Some 
rejected applicants (including many who had not attended the best schools) went on to 
make spectacular successes of other careers, particularly politics, in fact doing better 
for themselves than if they had spent their working lives in the foreign service. One 
thinks of Neville Wran, Premier of New South Wales from 1976 to 1986,so and Kim 
Beazley and John Wheeldon who became federal cabinet ministers - Beazley was Min-
ister of Education and Wheeldon Minister of Social Services, both in the Willtlam 
government (1972-75). Turned down by External Affairs in 1953,51 Billy Mackie 
Snedden went on to lead the Liberal Party during the Whitlam era ( 1972-75). Before 
that he had been Attorney-General (1963-66), Minister for Immigration (1966-69), 
Minister for Labor and National Service (1969-71) and Treasurer (1971-72). He was 
47 W.J. Hudson, 'The Australian People and Foreign Policy', F.A. Mediansky & A.C. Palfreeman, 
eds., Jn Pursuit of National Interests: Australian foreign policy in the 1990s (Sydney, 1988), p. 1. 
48 National Geographic, Vol. 173, February 1988, p. 199. 
49 Rose, Vansittart, 1978, p. 65. 
50 Whom Grenfell Price of the Selection Board grouped among 'a mediocre collection of pass people'. 
He was 'a weak pass man, with unsuitable subjects'. Al838/l, 1260/6/1, Grenfell Price/Burton, 27 
December 194 7. 
51 His active interest in politics may have had something to do with his rejection. At the time of his 
application he was an immigrant interviewing and selection officer in Italy. Lyall suggests that 
appointment resulted from his political affiliations - he had already unsuccessfully contested State and 
Federal seats on behalf of the Liberal Party. He entered parliament shortly after his overseas tour. The 
then Minister of Immigration, Harold Holt, said later that the purpose of Snedden's overseas posting 
which included also the United Kingdom, was 'to broaden him out'. E.A. Lyall, 'Australia's Overseas 
Representation and Government Patronage', Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 2, August 1969, p. 133. 
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Speaker of the House of Representatives between 1976 and 1983, ie., for most of 
Malcolm Fraser's term as Prime Minister. 
Donald Horne, perhaps best known for his book The Lucky Country (1964) 
was accepted in 1944 but dropped out the same year for journalism, later becoming an 
editor52 and still later a Professor of History. He is now what might be called an 
Australian icon, a status he achieved without the benefit of a university degree. 53 Jill 
Ker Conway was rejected in 1958 on grounds, she thought, of her gender. 
(Perceptions of her personality seem also to have been a factor.) An historian, she later 
completed an MA at the University of Sydney and a PhD at Harvard. She taught at the 
University of Toronto from 1964 to 197 5 and was Vice-President there. Until recently 
she was President of Smith College, an 'Ivy League' institution for women in 
Northampton, Massachusetts, from 1975. She also serves on the boards of several 
major American corporations. 54 
Arthur Roden Cutler VC entered the Australian service by a 'side door instead 
of up the front steps'. 55 His career is an good example of the upward mobility of some 
Australian External Affairs officials. A recipient of the Victoria Cross (VC) for heroism 
during the Syrian campaign in 1941 when he lost a leg, 56 he was taken by Evatt into 
the Department of External Affairs in the mid- l 940s, being appointed immediately, at 
the age of twenty-nine, High Commissioner to New Zealand. He remained with the 
department for two decades, serving as Chief of Protocol in Canberra as well as 
heading several missions abroad. In 1966, while Ambassador to the Netherlands, he 
came to the notice of the New South Wales Premier, Robert Askin, who recommended 
his appointment as Governor of New South Wales, a position he held for fifteen years 
(1966-81). 
52 Inter alia of Australia's leading news magazine, The Bulletin, where he was responsible for 
removing the slogan 'Australia for the white man' from the honoured place it had occupied on the 
masthead ever since the magazine's founding in the 1880s. The issue of 30 November 1960 (Vol. 81, 
No. 4216) was the last to carry the slogan. 
53 See his entry in The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Uno 1994195 (42nd ed., East 
Grinstead, Eng., 19<;4 ), pp. 285-86. He holds honorary doctorates. 
54 Who's Hno In Australia 1994 (Melbourne 1994), pp. 843-44. 
55 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 6. 
56 He was awarded the VC for 'exceptional courage in driving enemy back and establishing outposts'. 
Two weeks later he was 'seriously wounded in leg - subsequently amputated'. Who's Who In Australia 
1994, p. 416. 
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The Australian department has traditionally enjoyed a better reputation in the 
wider community than the South African department and its top echelon has tended to 
serve as a nursery from which the heads of other Public Service departments are 
recruited. An early example was P.R. Heydon who became Secretary for Immigration 
in November 1961 at the age of forty-seven57 holding the post until his death ten years 
later. K.C.O. (Mick) Shann was Chairman of the Public Service Board in 1977-78.58 
Cutler was not the only External Affairs official to become the Governor of an 
Australian State. James Plimsoll, the department's Secretary in the mid- to late 1960s, 
served as Governor of Tasmania from 1982 to 1987, dying in office. 
There was less mobility on the South African side, quite likely because most 
recruits between 1927 and the end of the Second World War and for some time 
thereafter were drawn from other Public Service departments. Men rejected by 
External Affairs simply continued with their existing employment. Two who were 
appointed to head other departments, G.J.J.F. Steyn (Commerce and Industries) and 
H.M. Stoker (Census and Statistics), left External Affairs relatively early in their 
careers. 59 For reasons which may have to do with the nature of their societies, the 
South African foreign service has also enjoyed less status than its Australian counter-
part. Ironically, in view of the supposedly egalitarian nature of Australian society, more 
'hoop-la' has surrounded the Australian service from its early days than the South 
African one. The Australians took the cadet selection process more seriously, initially 
making this a combination of high marks in a competitive entrance examination and a 
personal interview for which candidates qualified on the strength of their showing in 
the examination. Standards were high and a Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade in 
the late 1980s failed to qualify for an interview in 194 7 because his marks in the 
examination were not good enough. 60 
Interviews were conducted by a Selection Board consisting of a senior member 
of the Department of External Affairs, a member of the Public Service Board 
(equivalent to the South African Public Service Commission) and a prominent aca-
57 The Canberra Times, 11 & 12 August 1961. 
58 The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who 1983 (Thirty-First ed., East Grinstead, 
Eng., 1983 ), p. 620. The Australian Public Service Board is equivalent to the South African Public 
Service Commission. See below. 
59 Steyn was a member of the 'Sole generation'. See footnote 3 above. Stoker was older. 
60 By the time of his admission the examination had been abolished in favour of an interview only. 
See below. 
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demic.61 Thereafter, the Minister of External Affairs would himself announce the 
names of the successful candidates. 62 These would spend two years full-time at the 
School of Diplomatic Studies then attached to Canberra University College, a period 
subsequently reduced to one year with a year's service in the department. By contrast, 
no publicity attended the South African intake and there was initially no selection panel 
but the Secretary for External Affairs personally interviewed applicants. When Eric 
Louw became Minister of External Affairs in January 1955 it was his practice to 
interview all applicants63 in addition to the departmental interview thereby demon-
strating, apart from anything else, the small size of the service at that time. The 
procedure followed for entrants brought in from elsewhere in the Public Service was 
the same as for men coming directly from the universities, viz. 
applicants who on paper would seem to be suitable are asked to 
come to Pretoria for an interview and those considered fit for 
appointment are recommended to the Public Service Commission 
for its approval. 64 
Early in 193 5 the Chinese Consulate-General requested information about the 
training of diplomatic and consular staff. It was advised that with few exceptions 
officials were recruited from the Public Service and that the juniors among them were 
trained abroad. 65 
Revealing of the influence of the British system of public administration were 
the Public Service Board in Australia and the Public Service Commission in South 
Africa whose function was to lay down conditions of service for public servants as a 
whole, to involve themselves in appointments and promotions and to promote 
economy and efficiency in government departments. In South Africa the Public Service 
and Pensions Act, 1923, empowered the Commission to make recommendations about 
61 The board did its interviewing in the State capitals. Stuart, who was secretary to the first board in 
1943 writes briefly of the experience. Towards coming-of-age, pp. 85-86. 
62 See, eg., The Canberra Times, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Argus (Melbourne) of 10 
January 1951. 
63 AA, Al831/l, 1348/5/1, 12 July 1956, Memo. 256, GilchristtDEA, 12 July 1956. His advice to 
them was that they should regard foreign service not as a career but as a vocation. Louw also 
personally reviewed the 'proposed appointment of every officer of rank above Third Secretary to an 
overseas post, before the posting is approved'. Ibid. 
64 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 3, Spies/Mrs Heber Percy, 29 March 1952. 
65 Ibid., Vol. 1, Consul-in-charge/DEA, 21January1935; Botha/Consul-in-charge, 8 February 1935. 
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appointments and promotions to the Minister of the department concerned. 66 Such 
recommendations could be overridden only by the Governor-General on the advice of 
Ministers. In both countries the Commission or Board and the Treasury were the two 
departments with which the Departments of External Affairs were most intimately 
concerned. In South Africa submissions to the Commission and the Treasury tended to 
be set pieces in which certain propositions occurred regularly. Phrases such as 'the 
present staff is totally inadequate' to cope with work which was having to be 
performed at 'high pressure' are enduring examples. 67 
Thus, following Crocker, neither the Australian nor the South African depart-
ment were allowed to administer themselves68 but, unlike the British Foreign Office, 
formed part of the wider Public Service which is still the case.69 Not having 
encountered its like in any of the countries where he served (South Africa was not 
among them), Crocker called the Public Service Board a 'unique Australian mammoth'. 
Neither Australia nor South Africa has ever seriously considered the alternative - to 
separate External or Foreign Affairs from the Public Service and to form a separate 
service like the military. That has probably never been a viable option for either 
country. 
In the 1940s and 1950s South African foreign service officers usually pro-
ceeded from one post to another on promotion. If a head office official declined a 
posting abroad, that meant in effect that he was declining promotion and he was 
thereupon superseded by another. R. (Bob) Jones, who elected to spend the rest of his 
career in Pretoria after postings in Lisbon, Leopoldville, London and Ottawa; was 
probably the only official to fall into that category on a long term basis. 70 In 195 7 
A.H.H. Mertsch, then Ambassador to West Germany, declined promotion to the post 
66 See 'The Appointment of Public Servants in South Africa', The Round Table, Vol. XX, December 
1929 to September 1930, p. 885 and Lord Hailey, An African Suniey: A study of problems arising in 
Afi·ica South of the Sahara (London, 1938), p. 221. 
67 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, SEA/Secretary, PSC, 2 March 1935. 
68 Crocker, Australian Ambassador, p. 60. 
69 The British Foreign Service was formally separated from the Home Civil Service in 1944. D.C. 
Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the formulation of British Foreign Policy in the twentieth 
century (London, 1965), p. 5; Sir Brian Barder, e-mail message, 22 September 1995. See also T.B. 
Millar, Australia's Foreign Policy (Sydney, 1968), p. 17. 
70 Jones served continuously in Pretoria from 23 January 1947 until his retirement in 1969. BTS, 
S4/5/2, Vol. 17, unsigned submission to Secretary, 28 May 1954; Sole, Reminiscences, Q.P. 21-104. 
See also AA, Al050/2, 201/10, Memo. 401, Gilchrist/DEA, 9 August 1957; Hamilton, Vol. II, 
ForS)1h!Secretary, PSC, 9 November 1953, p. 2; and Hamilton, Vol. III, Forsyth/Secretary, PSC, 8 
July 1954. 
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of Under-Secretary at Head Office, a post which, according to Jooste, would 
thenceforth be used to give suitable heads of mission an opportunity to serve 
periodically at Head Office. 71 The post had been held by Spies until his transfer to the 
Department of Lands, at his request, on Jooste's appointment as Secretary for External 
Affairs. In those years, whatever they felt about it, South African officers were obliged 
to spend long years abroad, moving from one post to another at irregular intervals. If 
no one found himself in the position of the United Kingdom's Sir Nevile Henderson 
who spent his entire career abroad, 72 at senior level the South Africans were abroad for 
most of theirs. As a note on an Australian file put it: 
In view of there only being two posts above the rank of Counsellor 
at Head Office i.e. Secretary and Under-Secretary for External 
Affairs, it follows that officers senior to the first mentioned grade 
rarely, if ever, have periods of service in the Union. Contact with 
the Union in such cases is maintained through the home leave 
privileges accorded and occasionally by the recall of officers for 
purposes of discussion. 73 
For many if not most officers that was part of the job's attraction. 
G.C. Nel spent only two short terms at Head Office (1938-1940 and 1947-
1949) and the rest of his career abroad until his retirement in the 1970s - in Australia, 
Spain, Chile, the Netherlands, Mo9ambique, Uruguay and New York. E.J.L. Scholtz 
reported after his November 1957 inspection of the Canberra High Commission that 
D.P. Olivier, the Official Secretary, who had been abroad since June 1948, 
would welcome a transfer back to Head Office. I assured him that 
in so far as the exigencies of the service permitted such 
applications received sympathetic consideration and his request 
would be borne in mind. 74 
Early in 1958 Hamilton took the subject up with Scholtz. 'Olivier should know', 
Scholtz replied, that there were 
71 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, Secretary, PSC/SEA, 28 February 1957; Jooste/Naude, 4 March 1957. W.C. 
Naude accepted Jooste's offer of the post. 
72 The Times (London), 4 January 1943. (Obituary). 
73 AA, Al838/l, 1348/5/1, 'Diplomatic and Consular Service', n.d. (Probably 1953). 
74 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, ScholtzJSecretary, n.d. p. 7. 
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curiously enough, a large number of officers who have been 
abroad for some time and wish to have a spell at Head Office and 
only a few vacancies to accommodate them. 75 
In the event, Olivier's wish was fulfilled in October of that year. But for two 
relatively short periods at Head Office ( 1944-4 7; 1969-70), Hamilton's own career lay 
abroad. He served in London as Second Secretary/First Secretary (194 7-54 ), 
Washington as Counsellor (1954-57), then as head of mission in Canberra (1957"'.6 l ), 
Stockholm (1961-65), Madrid (1965-68) and Tokyo (1970-74), retiring at the age of 
sixty-five in December 1974. Between times he attended several sessions of the 
General Assembly in the early years of the United Nations. He and his wife now (1995) 
live in retirement at Somerset West, near Cape Town. 
The Australians did things differently. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, some 
heads of mission excepted, foreign service personnel in so-called arduous posts tended 
to be recalled to Head Office after two years and in other posts after three years 
continuous service. It was claimed that the 
policy of short term service abroad ensures that the work in the 
different divisions in Head Office is kept up to date, is handled by 
experienced officers and adequately compensates and justifies 
higher transportation costs of more frequent transfers of officers. 
It also obviated the need for home leave and the corresponding expense. 76 
While professing admiration for the Australian practice, Spies held that South 
Africa was not in a position to follow suit because 'our field staff is at present so much 
larger than the units at Head Office that our period has inevitably to be stretched a 
good deal more'. 77 That was why there was a greater turnover among the Australian 
staff in South Africa than among the South Africans in Canberra. On the South African 
side between 1949 and 1962 there were three Third Secretaries78 and three Second 
Secretaries. 79 Including Ne!, there were five heads of mission. 80 Between 1946 and 
75 BTS, Olivier, Vol. 1, ScholtzJHamilton, 14 February 1958. 
76 BCB, Vol. 4, 6/5/l SR, Viljoen/SEA, 16 November 1949, 'Salary and Allowances - Australian 
Foreign Service Personnel', p. 2. 
77 BTS, 1/25/8, Vol. 1, Spies/Kelly, 16 June 1952. 
78 P.R. Killen (1949-54), C.R. Roberts (1954-59) and J.C. Bosch (1960-64). 
79 G.C. Nel (1949-54), D.P. Olivier (1955-58) and P.L.T. Snyman (1959-62). 
80 Dr P.R. Viljoen (1949-51), G.C. Ne! (1951-54), J.K. Uys (1954-57 ), A.AM. Hamilton (1957-61) 
and H.H. Woodward (1961-64). 
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1962 six Australian Third Secretaries served in South Africa, 81 six First Secretaries82 
and seven heads of mission (excluding people who acted for only a few months). 83 
With the exception of the most junior staff, all of the career South African offi-
cials posted to Canberra in the 1940s and 1950s went there on promotion. 84 In 1953 
Jones had been earmarked for the High Commissionership in Canberra and J.K. Uys 
for that in Ottawa. 85 When the former declined the promotion he was superseded by 
the latter who arrived in Canberra in March 1954. W.C. du Plessis, then a Member of 
Parliament, became High Commissioner in Ottawa and Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations. Jones was eventually promoted to the 'newly-created post of 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in the Africa Section of the Head 
Office establishment', 86 a post created especially for him though it was presented 
publicly as being pursuant to the policy of building up the department's Africa 
section.87 
Renouf reminds us of a significant aspect of the Australian diplomatic cadet 
scheme, namely, that the Department of External Affairs itself recruited cadets through 
an open examination88 thereby at least partly circumventing the Public Service Board. 89 
The South African department was never afforded that latitude. Indeed, on at least one 
occasion it was told not to correspond with applicants. ('The Commission desires me 
to state that it would be glad if the department would be so good as to avoid 
correspondence with applicants in future, and, for the sake of uniformity of procedure, 
refer all enquiries by applicants regarding prospects of appointment, etc., in the Public 
service to this office for disposal. ')90 And in 193 7 it was challenged to justify why it 
81 M.J.S .. Knowles (1946-48), K. Desmond (1948-1951), Miss E.A. Warren (1951-54), RA. 
Woolcott (1954-57), I.E. Nicholson (1957-59) and J.H. Brooke (1960-62). Woolcott was promoted to 
Second Secretary in 1957. 
82 O.C.W. Fuhrman (August-November 1946), M.H. Marshall (1946-51), K.T. Kelly (1952-55), H. 
Gilchrist (1955-57) and L.E. Phillips (1959-60). 
83 Sir George Shaw Knowles (1946-47), A.T. Stirling (1948-50), M.H. Marshall (1947-48; 1950-51), 
J.P. Quinn (1951-52), Lt Col W.R. Hodgson (1952-57), H. Gilchrist (1957-59) and O.L. Davis (1959-
62). See Appendix I. 
84 P.R. Killen was a Cadet held against a vacant post of Third Secretary. BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 12, De 
Villiers/SEA, 18 May 1949. 
85 BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2, ForS)th/Prime Minister, 11 May 1953. 
86 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, Jooste/Jones, 30 November 1956. 
87 Ibid., Scholt1JDirector of State Information, 3 December 1956, Annex11re. 
88 Renouf, The Frightened Country, p. 500. Renouf himself was among the twelve cadets comprising 
the first intake under the scheme in 1943. 
89 The Public Service Board was represented on the Selection Board. 
90 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, Burke/SEA, 9 January 1936. 
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wanted H.H. Woodward and another junior official in preference to thirteen other 
Public Service applicants who were their senior.91 
For the researcher into the history of the South African Department of External 
Affairs, the Commission's value lies mainly in its detailed inspection reports. Many 
times between the 1920s and the 1950s Public Service Inspectors descended on the 
department and reported on aspects of its organisation and activities, with 
recommendations for improvements.92 The Public Service Commission had also 
prepared the way for the department's establishment in 1927.93 That was an 
environment in which Forsyth as opposed to Bodenstein was perfectly at home 
because he himself had been an inspector. Bearing in mind Millar's view cited in the 
Introduction94 these reports and the departmental responses to them furnish excellent 
descriptions of the department's sinews even if they do not convey a sense of its soul. 
Once in the department the newly appointed South African juniors - Learner 
Diplomats, Probationer Diplomats or (from May 1945) Cadets - found themselves 
regarded with ambivalence. On the one hand they tended to be treated with disdain by 
senior officers at head office and abroad along the lines of the British Third Secretaries 
who were 'treated as skivvies by old fashioned Ambassadors'. 95 On the other, there was 
a real need for their services as working members of their sections despite such 
occasional fantasies, in which the Public Service Commission concurred, as 'the 
employment of Cadets abroad should be restricted as far as possible with a view to 
their entire withdrawal from your overseas service' and in respect of the desirability of 
avoiding 'the employment of Cadets in those sections at Head Office where the foreign 
policy of the Union is formulated'. 96 This last suggests complete ignorance of the 
foreign policy formulation process. In fact, what the department told the Commission 
91 Ibid., Vol. 3, Secretary, PSC/SEA, 23 February 1957. 
92 Some examples: Public Service Commission, Department of the Prime A1inister, Report on the 
Staffing requirements of the Parliamentary and Coding Section, Cape Town, 18th March, 1935; 
Staatsdienskommissie, lnspeksierapport - Departement van die Eerste Minister en Minister van 
Buitelandse Sake 15 Julie 1936; Public Service Commission, Department of External Affairs and 
Office of the Prime Minister, Routine Inspection Report, 30th September 1946; Public Service 
Commission, Department of External Affairs, Inspection Report on Overseas Offices: General 
Report, 13th January, 1948; Staatsdienskommissie Departement van Buitelandse Sake, 
lnspeksieverslag oor Kantoor van die Eerste Afit1ister en ~Minister van Buitelandse Sake, 3 ~Maart 
1951. 
93 See BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 1, Annexure to Chairman, PSC/Prime Minister, 30 March 1927. 
94 p. 20 above. 
95 Quoted in Moorhouse, The Diplomats, p. 47. 
96 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 17, Secretary, PSC/SEA, 26 February 1953. 
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about its External Relations Section in 1935 is valid even today, both at home and 
abroad: 'were it not for the services of the newly appointed probationer diplomats, 
who, of course, are not intended as permanent units of this section, the position would 
have been intolerable'.97 
Thus Spies, at that time the Chief Clerk, was disconcerted to be told in mid-
1946 that a new recruit's capacity for work was just about zero' besides which he had 
little Afrikaans and no Dutch. (It was contemplated posting him to The Netherlands.)98 
Although down the years some of his contemporaries if not his superiors would have 
considered this assessment to have ongoing validity, a forty year career took that 
Cadet to many countries and he was a (non-Ambassadorial) head of mission at least 
four times covering a period of many years. In fact, he spent most of his career abroad. 
An early negative assessment was also no barrier to advancement in the Australian 
service. Watt tells of difficulties with 'a very young officer' whose file he marked 
'Never to be sent overseas again'. 99 He was and in an Ambassadorial capacity. 100 
White South Africa made no pretence of being an egalitarian society and its 
hierarchical, authoritarian and paternalistic nature was mirrored in the early foreign 
service, then very much of a white male preserve. The reasons for excluding women 
were perhaps what a modern feminist would have expected: 
if women are admitted to the Diplomatic Service, they would com-
pete against the male personnel. A promotion line would have to 
be drawn somewhere for women otherwise it would be soon be 
found that a woman would be placed at the head of an office while 
male clerks would be her direct subordinates. To the best of my 
knowledge such a policy is rejected by all Government 
Departments. If a promotion barrier was set for women - say not 
above posts of Third Secretary - I believe that we would in due 
course receive incessant representations from such women to lift 
the barrier. It will be appreciated that such a position would have 
e>..'1remely adverse consequences. IOI (Italics added.) 
E.J.L. Scholtz, then a Chief Clerk, Grade I, drew up the paper in which this 
appeared as a defence against charges by Supreme Court Justice K.R. Bresler that his 
97 Ibid., Vol. 2, SEA/Secretary, PSC, 2 March 1935. 
98 BTS, S4/l/5/2/l, Vol. 3, Memoranda Louw/Spies, 6 May 1946 and Spies/Louw, 9 May 1946. 
99 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 166. 
lOO P. Hastings, 'Alan Watt, an admirable ambassador', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 1988. 
The article marked Watt's death in Canberra earlier that month at the age of 87. 
101 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 17, 'The question of the employment of women in the South African foreign 
service', 24 February 1954. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
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daughter Claire had been misled. The University of Pretoria had admitted her for study 
towards the degree BA (Diplomatic) which he claimed External Affairs had 'dictated' 
but she discovered in her final year that her gender made her ineligible for service in 
the department. The Public Service Commission referred this to the department for its 
comments. In its reply, the department mentioned the 'aversion which the majority of 
men have to serving under women', that it could ill afford to lose trained personnel 
through marriage, and that 'women cannot be suitably employed in certain consular 
posts and posts involving trade work'. Rather disingenuously it denied having 'dictated' 
the BA (Diplomatic) course to the university; the latter had instituted this 'after 
consultation with the Department but not at its request'. 102 
The Commission need not have asked. It knew what the position was. Only six 
years before, the Public Service Enquiry Commission had pronounced itself 'unable to 
recommend that there should be any alteration in the present policy of not recruiting 
women for the Diplomatic and Consular Service•.103 No doubt because its report was a 
public document, the Commission refrained from mentioning the aversion of men to 
serving under women, confining itself to the prospect of female officers leaving the 
service on marriage 'even if the marriage bar were removed'. There was also a problem 
of women not being so readily transferable as men. It conceded, however, that 'women 
trained in the Diplomatic and Consular Service will become quite as efficient as men 
similarly trained'. 104 
The Australians would not, ostensibly, have dared to behave so crassly if only 
because the female applicants in some years were superior to the male. 105 That was 
probably true of Elizabeth Anne Warren who was admitted to the 1948 scheme. She 
had been a prize-winning student in History and Anthropology at the University of 
Sydney in the early to mid-1940s, obtaining high distinctions for those subjects in the 
course of her undergraduate studies. 106 As mentioned, she served in South Africa from 
102 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 3, Spies/PSC, 11 March 1954. Vol. 2 contains the department's correspondence 
on the subject with the University of Pretoria in 1950. No effort was made to turn the university from 
its course. 
103 U.G. 54-'48, Sixth Report of Public Service Enquiry Commission, Cape Town 1948, p. 29, para. 
204. M.H. Marshall drew this paragraph to the attention of the Australian department. See AA, 
A423 l/2, South Africa 1948, Departmental Despatch No. 6/48, 5 April 1948. 
104 Ibid., para. 203. 
105 Mackay, The Diplomatic Cadet Scheme, p. 17. 
106 AA, Al838/l, 1260/6/l, 'Department of External Affairs: Particulars of University Course of 
persons selected to enter the School of Diplomatic Studies, March, 1948'. The phenomenon of the 
'high distinction' still features in Australian academia. 
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1951 to 1954. Equality of opportunity for men and women was very much the ALP's 
policy during its eight years in government in the 1940s and the first intake of diplo-
matic cadets in 1943 consisted of nine men and three women; two of the latter did not 
have degrees. The later Menzies government was less interested in advancing the cause 
of women and 1950 was the last year a woman was appointed under the diplomatic 
cadet scheme. 107 While applications from women continued to be entertained, they 
were not taken seriously. Thus a 1952 handwritten assessment of applicants under the 
heads 'Character', 'Intellectual "Attack'", 'Technical qualifications', 'Manners, dress etc', 
and 'Other interests' listed the male and female applicants separately and focussed only 
on the former as potential cadets.108 
A year later Waller, then Assistant Secretary for Personnel Affairs, thought that 
the 'female element' would disappear because the Public Service Board had authorised 
a maximum cadet intake of only sixteen over the next four years. 109 The female 
element did not disappear but was deliberately kept to a minimum. A 1963 Department 
of Trade submission about women Trade Commissioners110 quoted Nicholas 
Parkinson, a future head of the Department of External Affairs ( 1977-79), to the effect 
that in terms of the Public Service Act women could not be prevented from applying 
for positions in that department. Many more applications were in fact received from 
women than from men. But only about one in twelve appointees were women and that 
on the basis 'of the quality of their educational achievements'. 
As mentioned, Jill Ker Conway, who had excellent educational qualifications, 
was turned down in 1958 on grounds of gender and personality. Elizabeth Anne 
Warren of the 1948 intake was by contrast 'a nice and capable girl'111 a description 
which would not, as with a 'nice looking girl with good dark eyes and pleasant features' 
(see below), have been applied to a male officer. The average woman recruit married 
within five years. (Until the 1970s, even under Labor women who married were 
107 Mackay, The Diplomatic Cadet Scheme, p. 19. It was probably no coincidence that Dr Burton, 
who encouraged the recruitment of women during his time as Secretary, resigned in 1950. See The 
Diplomatic Cadet Scheme, pp. 17-19. 
108 Al838ffl74, 1260/11/5, Confidential note 1October1952. 
l09 Ibid., 1260/12/1, Waller/Moodie, 23 June 1953. 
110 AA, A3120, 106/1/6, Taysom/Director, 'Women Trade Commissioners?', 13 March 1963. I am 
indebted to Ms Moira Smythe for a copy of this document and for a copy of the report in The 
Financial Review (Australia), 5 September 1995, which refers to it. ('How the mellow men once 
blocked the "battle-axes".') 
111 AA, A9421, 91213, Pt.I, Jamieson/Quinn, 26 November 1951. 
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obliged to resign their positions.)112 It was an expensive process but External Affairs 
lacked the 'courage to slam the door because of parliamentary opinion, pressure groups 
and so on'. 
The submission itself was couched in terms which read strangely today: 
it is difficult to find reasons to support the appointment of women 
Trade Commissioners ... a relatively young attractive woman 
could operate with some effectiveness, in a subordinate capacity ... 
[but] such an appointee would not stay young and attractive for 
ever and later on could well become a problem ... It is extremely 
doubtful if a woman could, year after year, under a variety of 
conditions, stand the fairly severe strains and stresses, mentally 
and physically, which are part of the life of a Trade Commissioner 
... A spinster lady can, and very often does, tum into something of 
a battleaxe with the passing years. A man usually mellows; A 
woman would take the place of a man and preclude us from giving 
practical experience to one male officer. She could not be regarded 
. as a long term investment in the same sense as we regard a man. 
White women were not, of course, the only South Africans excluded from the 
foreign service. That was barred to all who were not white, ie. most of the population. 
While it may not have erected formal barriers, in practice Australia did not differ 
greatly in that respect except that it employed a foreign service officer of Chinese race 
(whose career was not of a 'high-flying' nature).113 Not unnaturally the foreign service 
reflected the mores operative in white South African society at large. In April 1956 
Uys enquired from Australia what his attitude should be towards non-white diplomats, 
citing the fact that dancing sometimes took place at receptions and pointing out that 'In 
the Union mixed dancing is frowned upon. Indeed, it is strongly disapproved.'114 After 
consulting inter alia with Eric Louw, Spies, the Under-Secretary, replied a month later 
by way of a personal letter: 'You will however realise what a sensation it would cause 
here if a photograph or report should be published of a member of the Uys family 
dancing with a non-white, and it is felt that you should tactfully ensure that something 
like that doesn't occur'. i 15 
112 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 105. 
113 Charles Lee. See M. Booker, The Last Domino: Aspects of Australia's Foreign Relations (Sydney, 
1976), p. 60 and DF AT, Department of Foreign Affairs. Manual of Information and Instructions, Vol . 
../,Statement of Service, Appointments and Biographies, First Ed., 1976, p. 287. 
114 BTS 1/25/6, Vol.l, Uys/Acting SEA, 24 April 1956. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
115 Ibid., Spies/Uys, 26 May 1956. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
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Who was accepted for foreign service? In Australia, a candidate's academic 
record and perceptions of his appearance, personality and character were among the 
main considerations. A 1951 circular indicated that applicants were judged 'on their 
applications, testimonials and personal interview'. Importance was attached to 'certain 
essential personal characteristics'. Academic achievement was not the primary 
consideration. 116 That year it was said of one man: 
his academic record was good, his knowledge of Japanese most 
valuable and his general knowledge of international affairs, 
although not outstanding, was good. On these points he deserved 
placing in the first five previously selected. On the other hand, his 
personality and appearance were disappointing. The Committee 
unanimously agreed that whilst he would make a useful junior 
officer he lacked the personality ever to rise to be a Chief of Mis-
sion.117 
Also in 1951 Hugh Dunn was held to possess the required attributes. Interviewing him 
in London, the selection committee described him as 
A very pleasant personality, modest, reliable, unassuming and of 
good appearance. He gives impression of having a very strong 
character, and considerable maturity of judgment which would 
make him invaluable in a crisis. His knowledge of international 
affairs was weak ... A Rhodes Scholar, Dunn is at present reading 
for an honours degree in Chinese .... Because of the impression he 
gave of capacity, reliability and intelligence, the Committee 
awarded Dunn first place among the candidates. 118 
Dunn seems to have been rather ambivalent about a foreign service career and joined 
the department only in 1954, having first lectured in Chinese for two years at the 
University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada.119 
The following compendium of extracts from the comments accompanying its 
'Suggested list for final consideration' shows the emphasis the 1953 Australian Cadet 
Selection Board120 placed on personality and appearance: 
116 Al838ffl84, 1260/10/1, Administrative Circular No. 33/51, 30 March 1951, para. 6. 
117 Unsigned single sheet dated 17 September 1951 attached to AA, Al838ffl84, 1260/10/4/1, 
Waller/Kevin, 27 September 1951. 
118 AA, Al838ffl84, 1260/10/4/1, Memo. 706, Waller/DEA, 29 August 1951, Attachment, p. 1. 
119 The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's fVho 1994195 (42nd Edition, East Grinstead, 
Eng., 1994), p.181. 
12° Comprising Prof C.M.H. Clark of Canberra University College, J.K. Waller of the Department of 
External Affairs with W.H. Tucker of the Public Service Board as Chairman. Clark, the author of A 
Hist01y of Australia which was published in six volumes between 1962 and 1986 was an Australian 
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( 1) 'A nice, clean looking lad with a very pleasant personality indeed. A somewhat 
boyish appearance'; (2) 'Another boyish type. A little rougher or more rural than [(1)] 
and [(7)]'; (3) 'Tall, presentable with spectacles and a good deal of aplomb'; (4) A 
pleasant personality with quite a nice manner ... Nice speaking voice, pleasant smile. 
Sense of humour. Definitely a leader. Not a first class brain but a lot of other qualities'; 
(5) 'Quite a presentable young man in spectacles. Nervous but reasonably well under 
control. Good chin'; ( 6) 'A nice looking boy - not very talkative and a not very supple 
mind; (7) 'A very nice lad. Still very young and pimply but definitely above the average 
in intelligence and in spite of rather boyish manner he answered a lot of very difficult 
questions including one on German unification very sensibly'; (8) 'Somewhat red and 
scruffy appearance. Improves when he smiles. Nice speaking voice'; (9) 'Not a very 
forthcoming personality although reasonably presentable in appearance. A little 
bellicose in appearance'; (10) 'A nice looking girl with good dark eyes and pleasant 
features'; (11) 'He is a nice looking lad well set up, modest and a trifle shy. Did not 
answer questions very well. I had an odd feeling that he had been politically "got at" 
and that he might be a plant. His academic record is excellent and yet it did not show in 
his interview'; (12) 'Reasonably presentable. A little brash, but on the whole pleasant, 
well controlled, steady and very interested in the work'. 121 
The final selection fell on ( 1 ), (3 ), ( 5 ), ( 6) and ( 11) plus an applicant in 
London. The London applicant was appointed but only three of the others: Nos. (1 ), 
(3) and (5). No. (6) declined appointment while No. (11) took up a Rhodes 
Scholarship. 122 No. (I) died a year later. Not surprisingly, the 'nice looking girl with 
good dark eyes' was not selected. No. (5), M.E. Lyon, served as Ambassador to South 
Africa between 1981 and 1984. After his first year as a cadet, he was assessed as 
up to standard but not above it. His manner has improved during 
the past 12 months but there is still a lack of poise. He is intel-
lectually less mature than [E] and rf] but should develop into a 
sound though unimaginative officer. 123 
icon of the 1980s and early 1990s until his death in 1991. Paul Johnson gives an idea of the ex1ent of 
his influence in The Times Literary Supplement, 13 May 1994, p. 25. 
121 AA, Al838ffl84, 1260/12/5, 'Suggested list for final consideration' 1953. 
122 Ibid., Waller/PSB, 1 December 1953 and 28 February 1956; Ibid., 'External Affairs Cadetships. 
PR 15, 1March1954; The Canberra Times, 2 March 1954. 
123 AA, Al838ffl84, Shaw etc/PSB, 14 April 1955. 
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Commenting on the 1954 list, Waller of the Selection Board told Tucker, the 
Chairman: 
[A], [B], [C] and [D] all struck me as weak characters. [A] does 
not yet know where he is going and is I think more suited for an 
academic life than the rough and tumble of the Public Service. [C] 
is also more a research type. [B] and [D] left me with an 
impression of effeminacy which may merely have been immaturity 
but which strongly affected my judgement. [D] also had an 
unfortunate inability to look one in the eye.124 
Homosexuality, if not obvious effeminacy, would not today be a disqualification. 
Of B. G. Dexter it was written in 194 7: 
when we got the excellent private testimonials I told the rest of the 
Committee that I thought we had misjudged him. School, Geelong 
Grammar; a master at Wesley; an Honours B.A. in Languages; the 
Diploma in Education; invalided from New Guinea, and an 
Instructor in the Navy - it seems a very good and suitable record. 
Unfortunately he is evidently solid and slow, and we couldn't get 
much life out of him in the interview, but he has an exceedingly 
good manner and personality.125 
That year Dexter was among candidates preferred to Neville Wran, a future Premier of 
New South Wales. Dexter was the son of a 'poverty-stricken Anglican parson, 
educated at Geelong Grammar on a church scholarship and at university partly under 
the Commonwealth Reconstruction Training Scheme'. 126 Much more so than for the 
South Africans, the schools the Australian candidates attended were of considerable 
importance, 127 Geelong Church of England Grammar School alone supplying eleven 
per cent of all entrants between 1942 and 1962.128 
124 AA, A1838/268, 1260/13/5, Waller!Tucker, 13 December 1954. 
125 AA, Al838/l, 1260/6/1, Grenfell Price/Burton, 31 December 1947. When he was serving as 
Ambassador to Laos in the late 1960s, De>.1er's 'good manner and personality' sufficiently impressed 
Prime Minister Harold Holt to offer him the directorship of the Office of Aboriginal Affairs. This 
became the Department of Aboriginal Affairs with Dexter as its Secretary. Juddery, At the Centre, p. 
140. De>.1er later returned to the foreign service. He is now associated with former Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser in running CARE International and CARE Australia. 
126 Juddel)', At the Centre, p. 139. Dexter later became P.R. Killen's brother-in-law, the former 
marrying Judith Craig in 1948 and the latter Anne Craig in 1952, daughters of a Perth medical 
specialist. See below. · 
127 Thereby contradicting the widespread notion of Australia as an egalitarian society. In as much as 
white South Africans are probably more status conscious than Australians, it is interesting that the 
South African department should have laid no stress on an applicant's school. That was possibly 
rooted in two facts: (a) most appointees were drawn from other Public Service departments and (b) 
Afrikaners had no tradition of exclusive private schools. Perhaps that was why Eric Louw put his son 
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There may have been several reasons for that. For instance, the school's general 
ambience may have prepared its students to cope well with the selection process and, 
equally important, the exceptional long time headmaster, James Darling, an English 
immigrant, steered students towards the Commonwealth Public Service in general and 
to External Affairs in particular. 129 (Very much a member of the 'establishment', 
Darling was appointed chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Commission even 
before he retired as headmaster of Geelong Grammar.)130 
In the case of the South Africans, the periodic circularising of other Public Ser-
vice departments may have served to draw the attention of junior officials to what was 
on offer. 131 In a few cases, applicants had relatives in the department or they knew 
people at university who were interested in a career in foreign service. 132 Some, as in 
Sole's case, responded to newspaper advertisements133 while others developed an 
interest at school and wrote in for information, whether of their own accord or because 
their teachers suggested it. T. Langley, a member of the South African parliament from 
1966 to 1994, requested information in his pre-matriculation (Std 9) year. Nothing 
came of that but forty-six years later the ANC-led Government of National Unity 
nominated him Ambassador to Portugal, thereby making him a late entrant by the back 
door. When the Portuguese government refused to grant him agrement, apparently on 
grounds of his conservative background, he was subsequently nominated and accepted 
in a Washington DC public school only hastily to remove him because of the presence of black 
children. A.J. van Wyk, Official history, draft chapter Adv Eric Louw, Pioneer Diplomat, 1925-1937, 
p. 11. 
128 P. Gronn, 'Schooling for ruling: The social composition of admissions to Geelong Grammar 
School, 1930-1939', Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 25, No. 98, April 1992, p. 86. The British 
school Eton College has traditionally supplied a large proportion of entrants to the British diplomatic 
service. While comparisons are no doubt odious and one is reluctant to call Geelong Grammar the 
Australian Eton, it is interesting that the former's headmaster, John Lewis, was appointed headmaster 
of Eton in 1993 after thirteen years at Geelong. A New Zealander by birth, he had been a master at 
Eton for nine years in the 1970s. He took up the appointment in September 1994. The Times 
(London), 1December1993. The Prince of Wales spent two terms at 'Timbertop', a branch of Geelong 
Grammar on the slopes of the Australian Alps, in the first half of 1966. 'Timbertop' was established 
in Darling's time. The Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 4138, 3 June 1959. 
l29 Gronn., Australian Historical Studies, Vol. 25, No. 98, April 1992, pp. 83-84. 
130 The Canberra Times, 29 June 1961. He was also chairman of the Australian Road Safety Council 
and a member of the Council of the University of Melbourne, of the Universities Commission and of 
the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council. He died in Melbourne in November 1995 at the 
age of96. The Weekly Telegraph (London), Issue 225, November 8-14, 1995, p. 34. (Obituary). 
131 See, for example, BTS, 24/2, Vol. 1, PSC/Heads of Department etc, Circular No. 4of1934, 8 May 
1934. 
132 As in the case of the present writer. 
133 Sole's mother also had a hand in his application. In fact, she seems to have been the prime mover. 
See Reminiscences, pp. 14-15. 
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as Ambassador to the Czech Republic.134 Others who requested information and who 
became prominent in other careers include the historian B.A. Le Cordeur, then a first 
year student at Rhodes University, and the United Party politician Radclyffe Cadman, 
then a Sub-Lieutenant in the Royal Navy.135 
J.E. Spence would ostensibly have been a catch. The senior History Master at 
Pretoria Boys' High School, M.S. Geen, wrote on his behalf in 1947: 
One of my senior pupils, who is likely to obtain a first class with 
several distinctions in the Matriculation Examination at the end of 
next year, is considering the diplomatic service as a career. 
I should be glad if you would let me know (a) the subjects that he 
should study for the B.A. degree, and (b) the conditions of service 
for cadets in the Union Diplomatic Service.136 
Spence indeed obtained a first class pass in the 1948 matriculation examination with 
distinctions for English Higher, History and Latin. 137 But after completing his BA 
(Hons) degree at the University of the Witwatersrand, he proceeded to the London 
School of Economics and a distinguished academic career in the United Kingdom. 
Now retired, he is Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a 
post once held by Arnold Toynbee. Spence says that he was not aware until now that 
Geen had made the enquiries.138 
Piet Beukes, then a Rhodes Scholar, later editor of the United Party newspaper 
Die Suiderstem and other publications, applied in 1936. Charles te Water interviewed 
him in London, saying he had 'made a very favourable impression' and was 'the type we 
require in our service'. He recommended that Bodenstein see him personally. Beukes 
also impressed C.K. Allen, the Warden of Rhodes House, who sang his praises to Te 
Water. 139 But his application was not successful. In retrospect, from what one knows 
of Beukes's subsequent career in journalism, and given his personality and sense of 
humour he would probably have found foreign service too restrictive. 
134 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 2, Langley/DEA, 10 November 1949; Rapport, 19 February 1995; The Star 
(Johannesburg) and The Citizen (Johannesburg), 16 August 1995; Die Afrikaner, 28 July - 3 August 
1995. 
135 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 3, Secretary, PSC/SEA, 12 September 1955; Cadman/DEA, 22 December 1944. 
136 BTS. 24/2, Vol. l, Geen/DEA, 14 August 1947; v.d. Berg/Geen, 28 August 1947. 
137 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) and Die Transvaler, 4 January 1949. 
138 Prof. J.E. Spence, oral communication, August 1994. 
139 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 1, Te Water/Bodenstein, 2 November 1936 and Allen/High Commissioner, 23 
October 1936. 
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The South African department also considered personality and appearance to 
be of prime importance. The motivation for the 1944 reorganisation held that 
The men selected to represent South Africa overseas must be 
persons who will commend themselves to the Governments to 
which they are accredited or by whom they are received and to the 
foreign colleagues with whom they will be in daily social and 
professional contact. They must be men of education and of 
culture and must have personality. They must be competent to 
observe and interpret political and economic trends and to report 
intelligently upon them.140 
Rightly or wrongly, it was thought that the 
men possessing these qualities are the exception rather than the 
rule among the ordinary run of candidates for appointment in the 
Public Service. They will have to be carefully selected and trained 
for the duties they will be required to discharge and ... their aca-
demic and practical training should be designed to produce good 
'all-rounders' rather than specialists in any particular aspect of 
foreign representation. 
There in a nutshell is why to this day a bachelor's degree is a better 
recommendation for an aspiring South African foreign service officer than a PhD. The 
holder of a BA will be younger, more malleable and less likely to cause trouble and 
make waves. It is also why Departments of Foreign Affairs, at least not the Australian 
or the South African ones, are not places known for their intellectual sparkle. 
G.C. Nel was always rated highly for his acceptability. His first head of mission, 
E.K. Scallan, wrote from Louren~o Marques that he had 
become extremely popular \\ith all sections of the community both 
Portuguese and British and in this respect he has been able to 
render very valuable services to this Consulate General through 
his intimate contacts with them.141 
Sole, his contemporary, says that he had 'a most engaging personality'.142 Forsyth, his 
head of department, described him as an 'attractive officer with a very pleasant manner 
which endears him to all'. Nel had, he said, 'developed immeasurably' in the time he had 
140 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, Pohl/PSC, 22 November 1944, p. 2, para. 8. 
141 Nel, Vol. 1, Scallan/SEA, 15 September 1941. 
142 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 17. 
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acted as head of mission in Canberra. There again, it was not an 'onerous post'. 143 Paul 
Sauer wrote to Dr Malan about him after his visit to Australia in 1952: 
the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, and the Governor-General, Sir 
William McKell, both unsolicited, spoke particularly highly of 
him and gave me the impression that they would like him to stay 
on. It came through that his predecessor [Viljoen] was sometimes 
'a little moody', as Mr Menzies put it to me.144 
Forsyth's notes on his final interview with Viljoen the previous December 
recorded that Viljoen had said 'Mr Gert Nel has shaped very well and is very popular 
with everyone with whom he comes in contact•.145 Shortly after taking over as High 
Commissioner in 1954 J.K. Uys reported that 'everywhere you go they speak of him 
[Nel] with the highest praise. Everybody knows Gerrie'. 146 A few months later he 
wrote that he 'had scarcely set foot in Australia when, completely unsolicited, he heard 
the most positive remarks and words of praise about Mr Nel'. Before his departure 
from the Union he had 'heard from at least two heads of department about the good 
work Mr Nel was doing' in Australia. And Minister Havenga had spoken well of him, 
calling him a hard working chap.147 
Nel's name also featured prominently (in his absence) at the customary lunch 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet gave Uys a few months after his arrival. Ministers told 
Uys that Nel 'was always up with the job'.148 Uys would not have known of the 
contemporary Australian report that Nel was among the 'three closest friends' of the 
previous Indian High Commissioner, Kumar Shri Duleepsinhji, the Cambridge 
University, Sussex and England cricketer, 149 and that at a time of tension between the 
Indian and South African governments. Such a spread of testimonials from foreigners 
as well as his own people is unusual and has not so far been encountered in respect of 
any other officer. 
143 BTS, Nel, Vol. 3, 9 December 1952 comments on 8 August 1951 Staff Report. 
144 Ibid., Sauer/Malan, 24 September 1952. (Original in Afrikaans.) Something does not jell here for 
Viljoen and Menzies seem to have been on a good footing. See Chapter Four below. 
145 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, Forsyth/Spies, 6 December 1951. 
146 BTS, Uys, Vol. 3, Ex1ract from Uys/Scholtz, 9 April 1954. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
147 BTS, Nel, Vol. 3., Uys/SEA, 17 June 1954. (Original in Afrikaans.) Havenga had met Nel when 
he attended the January 1954 Conference of Communwealth Ministers of Finance in Sydney. 
148 BTS, Uys, Vol. 5, Uys/SEA, 8 July 1954. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
149 AA, Al838/2, 169/11/128, Pt. 1, Note by J.E. Oldham, 11 May 1954, on Gen. Cariappa's 
statement of 6 May. Duleepsinhji was once thought of as a rival to the famous Australian, Donald 
George Bradman. I. Rosenwater, Sir Donald Bradmon: A biography, London, 1978, p. 295 and M. 
Page, Bradmon: The Jllustrated Biography, South Melbourne, 1983, p. 87. 
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Needless to say, the words of praise did not lead to accelerated promotion for 
Nel. If he did not scale the heights in his career that was perhaps because of a tendency 
to obsequiousness towards his superiors for, while he lacked a Sole's or a Fourie's 
intellectual penetration, he was a conscientious administrator and there was nothing 
wrong with his reporting. Sole has another explanation: 'he was an Afrikaner who did 
not support the Nationalist Party' and 'he had an American wife who made little 
attempt to speak Afrikaans'. Sole feels that both 'these elements had in varying degrees 
their impact on the careers of other officials of the Department'. 150 
That the worm eventually turned, is shown by Nel's complaint about the 
disruption of his arrangements in connection with his transfer from The Hague to 
Louren90 Marques in 1964. If he behaved out of character, the incident also said 
something about departmental obsequiousness towards politicians. For, as a safeguard 
against things going wrong, he was required to remain in The Hague until the new 
Ambassador, the politician J.J. ('Buks') Fouche, had pre~ented his credentials. And that 
despite the routine nature of the occasion and the presence there of Nel's experienced 
successor as second-in-command. The reprimand Nel received from J.K. Uys, the 
Deputy Secretary in Pretoria, was typical ofUys: 
I consider it a pity you wrote to the Department in the way you did 
because I can say that from what I have seen of your work there 
you acquitted yourself well in The Hague. Why spoil everything 
now with a letter such as that we received from you. 151 
Bruce Lockhart wrote of the British service that 'promotion in any government 
service abroad is often accelerated by the favourable reports brought back to London 
by influential and important visitors'. He himself had profited from that phenomenon 
during his time in Moscow. 152 That did not apply to the South African service when 
N el was in Canberra. In any case the merit system which sorted the wheat from the 
chaff in the rest of the Public Service was then thought to have no place in the 
Department of External Affairs. That was because 'it was found impossible to assess 
with equity the merits of person[s] serving in various centres throughout the world vis 
a vis their colleagues in the same grade'. 153 The merit system was eventually introduced 
150 Letter, 26 December 1994. 
151 BTS, Nel, Vol. 4, Nel/SEA, 23 September 1964 and Uys/Nel, 12 October 1964. (Originals in 
Afrikaans). 
152 Retreat from Glory, p. 98. 
153 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 3, undated paper 'Diplomatic and Consular Service' attached to Taljaard./Kelly, 2 
February 1953. 
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into the department during Fourie's time as Secretary whereupon some officers started 
receiving early promotion without, however, the problem of equitable assessment 
being overcome. It remains a problem to this day. 
A practical illustration of the South African emphasis in the 1940s and 1950s 
on personal attributes was Sub-Section 8( c) of the half-yearly report on Cadets (P .M. 
3/3/651) which posed nine questions about the subject's personality, viz.: (i) Measure 
in which his conduct and bearing inspire respect and confidence; (ii) Measure of 
maturity and balance; (iii) Force of character; (iv) Personal address; (v) Personal 
appearance; (vi) Amenability to discipline; (vii) Any special qualities, aptitudes or 
shortcomings; (viii) Does he (and if married, his wife) participate in local social and 
sporting activities; and (ix) Does he (and if married, his wife) appear to be completely 
acceptable socially amongst officials and diplomats of approximately comparable 
grading. 
On 4 July 1952 Gert Nel reported on his 25 year old colleague, P.R. Killen, 
who had then completed four years of service with the Department of External Affairs: 
one at Head Office and three in Canberra: (i) Conduct and bearing correct and inspire 
respect and confidence not only amongst staff members but also amongst those with 
whom he associates outside the office; (ii) Shows maturity and balance in advance of 
his age; (iii) Has strong and independent character, is determined and will work hard 
on own initiative to find solutions to problems; (iv) Pleasing conduct and demeanour; 
(v) Exemplary, always neat; (vi) Is amenable to discipline and assists in maintaining 
discipline; (vii) Shows particular interest and aptitude in matters of a political nature, Is 
interested in his work and anxious to promote relations between his own country and 
Australia by personal contact. (viii) Yes, participates in local social activities and 
suitably reciprocates. Takes part in sporting activities - belongs to tennis, cricket, 
hockey and badminton clubs.; (ix) Yes, popular not only amongst officials and 
diplomats of comparable but also of higher grading. 154 In short, he possessed what it 
took for a successful career. 
As mentioned, there was no South African selection board in the early years. 
Since both service and intake were sm.all, Forsyth did most of the selecting as had 
Bodenstein before him. 155 He interviewed candidates, recording his impressions in his 
154 BTS, Killen, Vol. IA. 
155 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 14. 
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execrable handwriting under such headings as Full name, Address, Married or Single, 
Children, Appearance, Personality, Degree subjects taken, English - spoken, Afrikaans 
- spoken, Other languages, Where grew up, Parents, Previous experience, First impres-
sion. In Killen's case, his appearance was 'pleasant, prepossessing' and his personality 
'good'. First impression of Killen: 'Good. If he improves his Afrikaans should do 
well'. 156 Forsyth interviewed C.F.G. von Hirschberg in the same year that he did Killen. 
Von Hirschberg writes: 
I applied in January 1948 and was asked some time later to travel 
by train to Pretoria for an interview with Forsyth which could not 
have lasted more than fifteen or twenty minutes. I saw no one 
else.157 
The emphasis on personal characteristics and appearance is probably common 
to all foreign services. As Walter Crocker put it: 'Diplomats ... have to deal with and to 
live with foreigners . . . and to be effective, they have to be acceptable to them, 
specifically to foreigners with power, so that personable social qualities retain their 
relevancy'. 158 Lord Strang, sometime British Permanent Under Secretary of State, held 
that prospective foreign service officers should 
be interested in people, since so much of the work of diplomacy is 
done by talking. The tongue and the pen are the tools of his trade. 
If he likes people, he should not be too reserved to let them feel 
that he likes them. Ifhe does not like them, he should not be so ill-
mannered as to let the dislike appear.159 
Those to whom Professor Sir Walter Raleigh's words apply: 
I wish I loved the Human Race; 
I wish I loved its silly face; 
I wish I liked the way it walks; 
I wish I liked the way it talks; 
And when I'm introduced to one 
156 BTS, Killen, Vol. 1, Killen interview sheet. 
157 Letter, 18 July 1994. 
158 Crocker, Australian Ambassador, p. 48. Crocker (Travelling back, p. 179) approvingly quotes 
Kelly's The Ruling Few which turns around this proposition. See especially pp. 117-19. See also 
D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Sen1ice: Bri1ish Consuls since 1825 (London, 1971), p. 241 (Appendix: 
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugesen to Sir Alexander Cadogan) and Cd 7748, Royal Commission on the 
Civil Sen1ice, Fifth Report of the Commissioners, London, 1914, p. 16, para. 16 and Reservation by 
Mr Arthur Boutwood, p. 43. Boutwood held that the 'primary qualification for the Diplomatic Service 
is a capacity to deal on terms of equality with considerable persons and their words and works'. 
159 The Diplomatic Career, London, 1962, p. 54. 
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I wish I thought What Jolly Fun!160 
should not, as Strang said, 'try to join the Foreign Service'161 where there is scope 
enough for misanthropy without need for misanthropists. 
Paul Hasluck wrote of the pioneering Australian social anthropologist, A.P. 
Elkin, that he 'never made anyone feel that aborigines had become important simply 
because he had started to take an interest in them'. 162 Diplomacy, it must be said, tends 
to attract to its ranks people who believe and try to make others do so too, that it is 
important precisely because they are engaged in it. That is probably a necessary 
attribute, a shield and buckler against Bruce Lockhart's description of it as a 'belittling 
and narrow existence'163 or, to adapt Frances Crofts Cornford on Rupert Brooke, 'the 
long littleness of [diplomatic] life'. 
'Genuineness', we are told, 'does not flourish in diplomatic circles. Diplomatists, 
even those who start honest [in the sense of being unaffected], often finish vain'. 164 The 
retired Australian diplomat Gary Woodard put it better: 'Diplomacy is a profession 
which can easily lend itself to the absorption of false values'. 165 A desirable attribute is 
the ability to comply with norms which seem ridiculous to others. Jill Ker Conway 
gives the 1950s example of Canberra-based External Affairs officers who wore striped 
trousers, carried furled umbrellas and, on entering an elevator, removed bowler hats 
from perspiring heads. 'It was 103 degrees outside and these men were dressed as 
though they were in Whitehall.'166 
An examination of the selection process as it applied to the Australian Dick 
Woolcott and the South African Rae Killen adds perspective to the matter of selection. 
Both rose to head their countries' Departments of Foreign Affairs, Woolcott from 
September 1988 to February 1992 and Killen from 1985 to 1987. Richard Arthur 
Woolcott was born in Sydney, NSW, on 11June1927, the son of a naval dentist. Peter 
Rae Killen was born in Durban, South Africa, on 10 January 192 7, the son of a factory 
160 
'Wishes of an Elderly Man Wished at a Garden Party, June 1914', Laughter from a Cloud 
(London/Sydney/Bombay, 1923), p. 228. 
161 The Diplomatic Career, p. 55. 
162 Mucking About, p. 227. See also Hasluck's essay 'The Problem of Administration' in RM. !£C.H. 
Berndt (eds.), Aboriginal Man in Australia, pp. 435-52. 
163 Lockhart, Retreat from Glory, p. 84. 
164 Hambloch, British Consul, p. 38. 
165 John Paul Quinn: Recalled by some of his friends for his children, 1968, p. 16. 
166 J.K. Conway, The road from Coorain (London, 1990 (1989)), p. 190. 
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manager. Early in their careers they served as Third Secretaries in the other's country, 
Woolcott in South Africa from July 1954 to January 195 7 and Killen in Australia from 
June 1949 to July 1954. Woolcott was promoted to Second Secretary while he was in 
South Africa. Killen was more academically gifted than Woolcott, obtaining a first 
class pass with two distinctions (English and Latin) in the 1943 matriculation 
examination and a distinction for Roman Law, one of his major subjects for his BA 
degree in 194 7. Both displayed an early interest in foreign service as a career and when 
they were sixteen167 their parents - Woolcott's father and Killen's mother - approached 
the respective Departments of External Affairs for information about the qualifications 
required. 
In February 1944 Surgeon Commander Woolcott wrote personally to 
Hodgson, the Secretary for External Affairs, saying that his son Richard, newly 
embarked upon his final year at Geelong Grammar School, was interested in a foreign 
service career. He asked Hodgson to let him have 'some information regarding subjects 
most suitable for special study . . . as the Diplomatic Corps is still his ambition'. 168 
Hodgson replied two weeks later. While at that time, just over a year after the launch 
of the Australian diplomatic cadet scheme, applications were still being entertained 
from academically unqualified men and women in the age group seventeen to twenty-
four, Hodgson said young Woolcott would be 'well advised to complete a University 
course prior to attempting the [competitive entrance] examination'. That was because 
though 'schoolboys may enter, they will in normal times have to compete with 
University graduates who, of course, have a marked advantage over them both in 
knowledge and intellectual maturity'. 169 In respect of subjects, Hodgson felt that 
a history course gives on the whole the best training to a candidate 
for the Diplomatic Service. If it is possible to include in this some 
study of economics so much the better. At present a knowledge of 
languages is not a pre-requisite of entry, but it remains a con-
siderable advantage'. 170 
167 Sixteen and seven months in Woolcott's case; sixteen and eight months in Killen's. 
168 A989/1, 43/300/1/29/6, Pt. 1, Woolcott/Hodgson, 15 February 1944. A 'layman's' reference to his 
own country's foreign service as 'the Diplomatic Corps' is a common error. The term refers today to 
Ambassadors and their staffs in a foreign capital. In 1914, however, the Royal Commission on the 
Civil Service used the term in its Fifth Report to distinguish between the Foreign Office in London 
and the Diplomatic Service abroad. Cd 7748, p. l. 
169 A989/l, 43/300/1/29/6, Pt. 1, Hodgson/Woolcott, 29 February 1944. 
170 Ibid. 
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Young Woolcott did not take Hodgson's advice. He was next heard from in 
September 194 7 when, in the second year of a three year arts course at Melbourne 
University, having yet to write his second year examinations, he applied for a dip-
lomatic cadetship. 171 He sat the examination on 11 October 1947 but his results were 
not such as to qualify him for a personal interview.172 Someone who was interviewed 
that year was the later ALP cabinet minister (in the Whitlam government, 1972-75), 
J.M. Wheeldon, then eighteen, who was rejected both on account of his age and the 
fact that he lacked a university degree. 173 With unconscious irony the thirty-three year 
old Secretary for External Affairs, J.W. Burton, told Wheeldon's sponsor, Kim Beazley 
MP, who had himself been an unsuccessful applicant for a diplomatic cadetship in 
1943, 174 that the required 'maturity and academic experience' could not 'reasonably be 
expected from an applicant of l 8' .175 
While the same could be said of thirty-three year old heads of department, 
Burton, if inexperienced, by all accounts possessed the personal attributes to make a 
success of the job. Evatt's successor as Minister of External Affairs, the Liberal Party's 
P.C. Spender, thought highly of Burton's ability and he resigned of his own volition ra-
ther than being forced out. Perhaps this is a moot point but if he was forced out it was 
because of policy differences, not lack of ability. Spender said later of Burton 'He was 
a most personable man and I liked him. He was, moreover, a highly intelligent one and 
a resolute adviser with considerable experience. '1 76 (But not of the minutiae of running 
a Department of External Affairs.) 
Woolcott persisted and was accepted two years later, quite likely because the 
entrance examination had been dispensed with. 177 After graduating he worked as a 
journalist in London for a few months in 1949. 178 Once in the department he displayed 
171 See AA, Al067/l, S47/323 UVW for his signed application dated 11 September 1947. 
172 See the undated file copy of the letter addressed to unsuccessful candidates with surnames 
commencing with 'W' on AA, Al068/l, S47/323 UVW. His is the only familiar name in that group. 
173 Mackay, The Diplomatic Cadet Scheme, p. 20. 
174 Ibid., p. 14. Beazley and Wheeldon were cabinet colleagues in the Whitlam administration, the 
first mentioned Minister for Education and the latter Minister for Social Security. 
175 Ibid., p. 20. 
176 P.C. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZ US Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney, 1969), 
p, 28. 
177 Mackay, The Diplomatic Cadet Scheme, p. 16 and 'The Australian Diplomatic Service', Current 
Notes, Vol. 22, No. 5, May 1951, p. 284. 
178 At the London office of The Herald (Melbourne). He had intended to work for The Herald in Mel-
bourne in 1950 but was instead selected as a diplomatic cadet. R.A. Woolcott, letter, 17 January 1995. 
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an aptitude for the work coupled with an engaging personalityl79 that saw him scale 
the heights in a forty-two year career. In the early 1970s he was, according to one 
observer, 'ferociously capable in his dual role' of 'diplomat/politician'. 180 His job at the 
time - head of the department's information and cultural relations branch but, at the 
same time, 'unofficially its chief political trouble-shooter' 181 - was tailor-made to his 
abilities. So well did he do that he was spoken of in 1974 as 
a key figure at the interface of the political and bureaucratic levels 
of government'. Already his encyclopaedic command of detail and 
public relations skills had put him into the limelight as a regular 
travelling companion of ministers.182 
The same year he was Gough Whitlam's first choice as Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs but was said to be 'too young'. 183 Woolcott says it was he himself 
who responded to Gough Whitlam's suggestion of the 
Secretaryship in late 1973 by saying I was perhaps, too young, that 
the appointment could be disruptive to the Department and that 
there were other suitable, more experienced officers available.1 84 
One may agree with his comment that this was 'curious in these days of unrestrained 
ambition'. While political and service exigencies occasioned an eighteen year delay 
before he became Secretary, he was always in the running. As Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans said at his retirement dinner in 1992: 
for the last 20 years or so, I do not think anyone has been in any 
doubt that it was really only a question of when, not whether, Dick 
Woolcott became Secretary.185 
179 That he was no 'pushover' was revealed by his handling of the Eybers case. See Chapter Six. 
180 He denies playing the politician, saying that while serving the government of the day he was 
careful to avoid a political role. 'I served Menzies, Holt, McMahon, Whitlam and Hawke (three 
Liberal PMs and two Labour PMs) in an advisory capacity on their overseas travels. It was in fact 
suggested to me by leaders of both parties that I enter Federal politics, a course which I eschewed'. 
Letter, 17 January 1995. 
181 Juddery, At the Centre, p. 94. 
182 Ibid., p. 105. A fact Woolcott lists in his Who's Who entry, ie. Who's Who Jn Australia 1994, p. 
1602. Differences in public sector culture as well as perceptions of the importance of public servants 
in relation to politicians virtually preclude such a discussion of individual officers in the South 
African Department of External Affairs. Perhaps that is why there are no public sector specialists 
equivalent to Juddery and other Australasians (Juddery was New Zealand-born) air..ong South African 
journalists. 
183 Renouf, The Champagne Trail, p. 99. 
184 Letter, 17 January 1995. 
185 
'Farewell to Dick Woolcott: Speech by Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, to Retirement Dinner, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 February 1992', p. 3. 
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It is not every foreign service officer whose minister calls him 'a very notable [citizen] 
and an outstanding servant of his country'. 186 Few South Africans have qualified for 
such an accolade. 
A developed sense of fun marked Woolcott's career from the beginning. An 
early, if juvenile manifestation of it was chopping down the flag pole at the Canberra 
University College hall of residence, 'Gungahlin', on the eve of his first overseas 
posting, to Moscow, at the end of 1951. 187 A fellow resident, P.G.F. Henderson, 
himself later a Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1979-84) recorded his impressions: 
'This,' I thought, 'must lead to real trouble.' It did. But Dick still 
went off on his posting. The long-suffering head of the 
Department's Personnel branch may well have thought, as others 
in that position have thought since, that some of our most highly 
regarded colleagues are sometimes better employed serving 
overseas than at home. 188 
The South Africans were not exempt from displays of high spirits. When RF. 
Botha, later Foreign Minister (1977-1994), was a Cadet in 1953 he was also Pretoria 
University's cheerleader, a position requiring the incumbent to keep the enthusiasm of 
his team's supporters at peak during the annual rugby match against the University of 
the Witwatersrand. It was practice in those days for the universities to seek to capture 
their rival's cheerleader, a fate which befell both that year. Botha was carried off to 
Johannesburg and detained for forty-eight hours in one of the men's residences on 
campus. 189 The Department of External Affairs was not amused. Botha was required 
to give a full explanation for his absence and was reprimanded. 190 
Rae Killen's rise was less assured and less spectacular than Woolcott's. At the 
time of his appointment as Director-General he was the senior Deputy Director-
General in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs. He had served in far 
fewer posts than Woolcott - in subordinate capacities in Australia, the Belgian Congo, 
Canada and the United Kingdom - and never as Ambassador. In fact, his only 
Ambassadorial experience was the three years he spent in that capacity on contract in 
186 'Farewell to Dick Woolcott', p. 5. 
187 A more mature example was the despatch he wrote after representing Australia at one of the many 
W.V.S. Tubman presidential inaugurations in Liberia. See the Introduction above. 
188 Henderson, Privilege and Pleasure, pp. 25-26. 
189 Die Transvaler, 29 May 1953. 
190 R.F. Botha, telephonic communication, 1 July 1994. An earlier incident had seen three Cadets 
engaged in a chicken-stealing expedition. 
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London after being displaced as Director-General in 1987 by N.P. van Heerden, the 
Foreign Minister's preferred choice to head the department. He retired in 1991 and 
died the following year. 
Almost fifty years earlier, in September 1943, his mother, Mrs D. Killen of 149 
South Ridge Road, Durban, had written to the Department of External Affairs 
requesting 'all available information regarding the qualifications & training necessary 
for a candidate for the South African Diplomatic Service•.191 She omitted to mention 
that she wanted the information for her son and the clerk who replied to her letter 
accordingly assumed she was writing on her own behalf Forwarding a copy of circular 
D.A. 11-l192 which gave details of the required qualifications, he appended the rider: 
'It may be mentioned that at present it is not the policy of this Department to appoint 
women in diplomatic posts'.193 
Circular D.A. 11-1 made it clear that a recognised university degree was a sine 
qua non for entry into the South African diplomatic service. Nothing more was heard 
' 
- from Killen until he approached the department on his own behalf in March 194 7 to 
ask for 'details of the conditions applying to entry into the diplomatic Service'. In the 
interim he had served with the South African forces in Italy for fifteen months after 
leaving school (November 1944 - April 1946). He said that he was in the final year of 
his BA (Legal) and that he hoped to proceed to the LLB degree. 194 The clerk who had 
replied to his mother three-and-a-half years before sent him a memorandum setting out 
'the requirements for admission to, and advancement in, the Union's Diplomatic and 
Consular Service'.195 
That was by way of a feeler on Killen's part because he addressed a further 
letter to the department in December of the same year seeking advice. He said that he 
had taken his degree, 'with two prospects in view: either Law as a profession, or the 
Diplomatic Service'. Law no longer interested him but he was attracted by the scope 
offered by External Affairs. Should he return to university to take the courses 
prescribed by the department, or should he take an LLB degree? He could also apply 
for a scholarship for overseas study and he wanted to know what Oxford or 
191 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 1, Mrs Killen/DEA, 9 September 1943. 
192 Issued over Bodenstein's signature on 2 November 1938. 
193 BTS, 24/2, Vol. I, Louw/Mrs Killen, 18 September 1943. 
124 Jbid., Killen/DEA, 16 March 1947. 
195 Ibid., Louw/Killen, 11 April 1947. 
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Cambridge degree would be best for employment in the department?196 He would not 
have known it then but putting such questions to a department which, unlike the 
Australian department, set little store by Oxford and Cambridge degrees, was unlikely 
to draw genuinely helpful answers. Many of its senior officers, including the permanent 
head, Forsyth (whose only formal qualification was the Civil Service Lower and Higher 
Law Certificates), had joined the Public Service at a young age, obtaining degrees 
through part time study and, as far as the staff section was concerned, that was the 
tried and tested route to preferment. 
A year or so later there was the case of C.B.H. Fincham, academically perhaps 
the most gifted South African foreign service officer of the post-war generation, whom 
the University of Leiden awarded a Doctor of Laws degree in 1948 for an 
internationally respected dissertation on the domestic jurisdiction clause in the League 
of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter.197 When Fincham joined the 
department in December 1945 at the age of almost thirty (he was born on 19 July 
1916) he was in possession of a BA from the University of Cape Town comprising 
mainly legal subjects, an MA in Psychology from the same university and an LLB from 
the University of South Africa. He had also long been interested in a foreign service 
career, making his first approach to the department in 1936. 198 
According to Sole 'there was a story that when Charles sent his LLD certificate 
to the Departmental staff section for registration the question was asked: "where is 
Leiden and what sort of university is it?" .'199 The file does not confirm that but it does 
reveal that South African English-language universities of the day declined to equate a 
Leiden LLD with one of their own doctoral degrees. The universities of Pretoria and 
Stellenbosch were, however, in no doubt about its value.200 External Affairs had initi-
ated the matter by asking the University of South Africa in April 1949 whether 
Fincham's doctorate was 'equivalent to the Doctor's degree of any South African 
university and, if not, what measure ofrecognition it would receive here'. 201 
l96 Jbid., Killen/DEA, 3 December 1947. 
197 C.B.H. Fincham, Domestic jurisdiction: The exception of domestic jurisdiction as a bar to action 
by the League a/Nations and the united Nations: A contribution to the study of article 15, paragraph 
8, of the Covenant and article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Leiden, 1948. 
198 BTS, 24/2, Vol. 1, Fincham/DEA, 1May1936. 
199 Letter, 18 May 1993. 
200 BTS, Fincham, Vol. 2, Secretary for Education/SEA, 30 June 1949. 
20 1 Jbid., v.d. Berg/Registrar, University of South Africa, 27 April 1949. 
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When that university proved 'unwilling to express an opinion', External Affairs 
referred the matter to the Union Education Department.202 The latter took it up with 
all South African universities with the above result. The correspondence dragged on 
for eighteen months. O.G. Albers who was later taken up in the department's 
diplomatic wing but then in the staff section, 203 drafted some of it. When all is said and 
done, it is not clear why the staff section should have taken the matter to such lengths. 
For Fincham received neither promotion nor additional emoluments for. his 
achievement. 
Perhaps it was a manifestation of the department's then strongly authoritarian 
tendencies. 204 At that time foreign service officers were obliged to obtain departmental 
permission to marry, their intended spouses, whether South African or foreign, having 
to be approved before the marriage. 205 Junior officers appeared to have submitted 
meekly to this and there are no known cases, at least not to this writer, of rebellion in 
the ranks. Possibly that was because the people likely to object were precisely those 
whose personalities would have disqualified them from selection in the first place. 
Although departmental approval was a sine qua non, it is not known whether any 
prospective brides were abandoned at the altar because approval was not forthcoming. 
The Australians had no similar provision as Forsyth discovered when he 
approached the High Commission in Canberra for details of 'Australian regulations and 
practice in respect of the marriage of foreign service officers with non-Australian 
nationals'. Australians could marry whom they pleased except that 'in exceptional 
cases', while there were 'no actual prohibitions', an officer could be advised against 
marrying a particular person.206 Nel, who himself had been through the process in 
Cairo in the 1940s - his wife was an American - for some reason professed ignorance 
of the rule earlier the same year when taking up with Forsyth personally Killen's desire 
to become engaged to an Australian. (We 'would ... like to know ... what the position 
2o2 Ibid., v.d. Berg/Secretary for Union Education, 9 May 1949. 
203 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 13, Joubert/PSC, 24 November 1949. At that time he seems to have been 
employed in a temporary capacity. The Public Service Commission's recommendation for his 
appointment as Clerical Assistant, Grade II, was dated 5 December 1949 which Dr Malan approved 
on 9 December. 
204 See Sole, Reminiscences, pp. 216, 222-23 for examples of what he calls departmental 'lack of con-
sideration'. 
2o5 While still a formal requirement, this is no longer enforced. 
206 BCB, Vol. 4, 61511 SR, ForS)th/High Commissioner, Canberra, 23 September 1952 and Nel/SEA, 
16 October 1952. Nel stressed that 'no prior approval whatsoever' was needed for Australian foreign 
service personnel 'who contemplate marriage \\ith either Australian or non-Australian nationals'. 
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is if one of our officers wishes to marry a girl of foreign nationality'.) Forsyth replied 
firmly: 'the prior approval of the Department is necessary in the case of the marriage of 
any member of our diplomatic staff to anyone - even though she may be ~ South 
African citizen•.2o7 (Emphasis in original.) 
Because theirs was a unilingual country, the Australians had no rule requiring 
the wives of foreign service officers to demonstrate their language proficiency. 
Initiated by Eric Louw, the proviso that South African foreign service wives should 
prove their fluency in both official languages was aimed at the foreign women some of 
his officers married while serving abroad. (He prohibited the practice in respect of 
those who were not yet married and required offenders to leave the service. )208 What it 
came down to was that the wives of foreign service officers abroad were expected to 
converse fluently in Afrikaans with visiting Afrikaans-speaking South Africans. 209 As 
far as Louw and the department were concerned, that was more important than the 
wife's or husband's ability to speak the language of the country in which they were 
stationed, though Louw always insisted on French as a prerequisite for a diplomatic 
career. 
In keeping with the idiosyncratic management style manifest in a department 
which has had only four Ministers since 1955210 and eight permanent heads since 
1927,211 the language requirement was applied selectively until it was abandoned in the 
201 BTS, Killen, Vol. 1, Nel/Forsyth, 17 April 1952; ForS)th/Nel, 2 May 1952. 
208 Fourie, Brandpunte, p. 48. This would have been enough to deter the older generation of foreign 
service officer. However, there are no cases known to this writer of officers being forced to leave the 
service after contracting foreign marriages. 
209 Louw made that clear in a message to South African diplomats within days of taking office. See 
Die Burger and Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 20 January 1955; Die Transvaler, 21 January 1955 
and The Star (Johannesburg), 20 January 1955. (Editorial). Sole writes approvingly of this: 'I 
recognised fully the importance of ensuring that wives serving abroad, who should be as fully 
representative as their husbands, were able to converse in both of South Africa's official languages. 
Reminiscences, p. 231. Louw's message formed the subject of Hodgson's first ministerial despatch of 
1955, ie., AA, A4231/2, Cape Town/Pretoria 1955, No. 1/55, Hodgson/Casey, 28 January 1955. 
210 E.H. Louw (1955-1963), H. Muller (1964-1977), RF. Botha (1977-1994) and A. Nzo (1994-). By 
contrast, by the time R.G. Casey became Australia's Minister of External Affairs in April 1951, he 
was the twenty-fourth holder of the office. The Canberra Times, 9 July 1959. Many of his 
predecessors had combined it with other portfolios including the Prime Ministership. He has had 
eleven successors to date: R.G. Menzies (1960-61); G.E.J. Barwick (1961-64); P.M.C. Hasluck (1964-
69); G. Freeth (1969); W. McMahon (1969-71); L.H.E. Bury (1971); N. Bowen (1971-72); E.G. 
Whitlam (1972-73); D.R. Willesee (1973-75); A.S. Peacock (1975-80); A. Street (1980-83); W.G. 
Hayden (1983-88): and G.J. Evans (1988-). 
211 The first two (H.D.J. Bodenstein and D.D. Forsyth) served for twenty-nine years and the next two 
(G.P. Jooste and B.G. Fourie) for twenty-six. They were followed by two (H. van Dalsen and P.R. 
Killen) who had a total of five years between them, by one (N.P. van Heerden) who served for five 
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late 1960s with changes of Minister and head of department. However, even (and per-
haps especially) Afrikaans-speaking officers were hounded down the years on account 
of their English-speaking or foreign wives' inability to speak Afrikaans. Much seemed 
to depend on the husband's standing in the estimation of the departmental hierarchy. If 
the hierarchy fancied you, a blind eye was turned on your wife's lack of fluency in Afri-
kaans, even your own. 
Thus E.M. Rhoodie claimed that Anthony Hamilton, his head of mission in 
Canberra in the late 1950s, 'could barely speak Afrikaans'. The same applied to Mrs 
Hamilton whom, Rhoodie said, would ask his wife to give her a sentence in Afrikaans 
that she would 'proudly throw at the visitors' during visits by South African 
politicians.212 That never harmed Hamilton's career any more than his political views, 
which were known to (and reported on by) Australian officials before he went to 
Canberra. 213 Hamilton was too much of the beau ideal of a foreign service officer, a 
man who had established close relationships with Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime 
Minister, and with the aristocratic British High Commissioner in Canberra, Lord 
Carrington, to be regarded any way other than favourably by his department and Min-
ister in the prevailing circumstances. 
For a government struggling to obtain international recognition and accept-
ance, here was one of its diplomats who had achieved that within his circle, to it's 
benefit. Neither Louw nor Jooste were going to move against a man like that. (On the 
other hand, Sole rightly points out that 'under the Nationalist Government ... Hamilton 
served [as Head of Mission] only in those overseas posts that were regarded as out of 
the way where he would have little contact with Afrikaners•214 other than members of 
years, and lastly by the present incumbent (L.H. Evans) who was appointed to a five year term in 
1992. In 1995 the Government of National Unity confirmed Evans in his post until the expiry of his 
contract in 1997. In the si>-1Y years since 1935, the Australian department has had fourteen permanent 
heads: W.R. Hodgson (1935-45); W.E. Dunk (1945-47); J.W. Burton (1947-50); A.S. Watt (1950-54); 
A.H. Tange (1954-65); J. Plimsoll (1965-70); J.K. Waller (1970-74); A.P. Renouf (1974-77); N.F. 
Parkinson (1977-79); P.G.F. Henderson (1979-84); S. Harris (1984-88); R.A. Woolcott (1988-92); 
P.S. Wilenski (1992-93); and M.J. Costello (1993-). 
212 E.M. Rhoodie, The real information scandal (Pretoria, 1983), p. 43. He was presumably thinking 
of the delegation to the 1959 meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Mrs Rhoodie, 
who seems not to have got on \\'ith Mrs Hamilton, does not refer to this in her book Agter 'n 
Marmerskans (Johannesburg/Cape Town, 1982). 
213 See, for example, AA, Al838ff54, 1500/1/30/8, Memo. 397, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 August 1957 and 
file note dated 30 August 1957 by J.C.G. Kevin. Citing Rhoodie, Berridge mentions Hamilton's name 
in passing in his article 'The Ethnic "Agent in Place",' Intelligence and National Security, 4 (2), April 
1989, p. 261. 
21 4 Letter, 6 January 1995. 
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his staff - Canberra, Stockholm, Madrid and Tokyo. So perhaps Rhoodie's criticism 
had some effect after all). In any case, others who were less gifted, useful or likeable 
were less fortunate and for so long as the requirement remained in force, the quality of 
his wife's Afrikaans was a potential barrier to an officer's advancement though not, of 
course, in the Public Service at large. 
Hamilton kept up his association with Menzies until the latter's death in 1978 
and is still in touch with Lord Carrington. He writes of the latter: 'We stayed with them 
frequently on our visits from European posts and they twice came to stay with us in 
Pretoria when the Tories were in opposition and Peter was between posts at the 
Admiralty. They are coming out to see us this summer [1994]; we hope.'215 
Geldenhuys refers to the English/ Afrikaans divide in the Department of Ext-
ernal Affairs. 216 This writer is hesitant to share his conclusion that 'Afrikaners and 
Nationalists - but particularly Afrikaner-Nationalists - [were] in some important 
respects "more equal" than other officials'.217 Given basic ability, what counted was not 
'ethnic' background but personal chemistry with the Minister and the Secretary. 
Hamilton had a rapport with Jooste (less so with Louw) while many of his Afrikaans-
speaking colleagues did not. As Steiner says of the influence of Hardinge, Crowe and 
Tyrrell in the pre-1914 Foreign Office, the 'personal factor was all important', meaning 
their relationship with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. 218 At the height of the 
National Party's ascendancy in the 1950s and 1960s, the appointments of Jooste and 
Fourie to head the department were clearly on merit. All things considered, they were 
the best choices at the time. The fact that two of Fourie's three principal rivals (Sole 
and Taswell) were English-speaking should not be allowed to cloud the issue. In itself 
that was an indication that English-speakers could be considered seriously for the 
position. 
Australia's Alan Watt wrote of being 'haunted' when Secretary for External 
Affairs by a disgruntled, perhaps unhinged wife: 
215 A.M. Hamilton, Antipodean Days 1957- to '61, August 1993, p. 7 and letters, 9 August, 1 
Septeniber, 28 October and 22 November 1993. Lord Carrington spent three weeks in South Africa 
early in 1995. Hamilton, letter, 20 February 1995. 
216 The Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 134-35. 
217 Ibid., p. 135. 
218 Z.S. Steiner, 'Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 1906-1910', The Historical Journal, Vol. X, 
No. 4, 1967, p. 349. 
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I would be telephoned or 'isited at home, waylaid as I left the 
office after a long day, or forced to explain to Prime Ministers or 
Ministers for Ex1emal Affairs to whom she had written about her 
husband. When the latter was posted overseas to an important 
position, she visited the relevant diplomatic representative in 
Canberra to ask that the foreign Mission should refuse to issue a 
visa to her husband.219 
The woman behaved that way because of her husband's conduct. Few wives 
would then have done so on account of Watt's or his department's perceived short-
comings towards themselves. Few South African wives of the day, though they may as 
Sole says, have resented its exercise, 220 would have denied their husband's employer 
the right to pronounce on their command of the official languages or, indeed, whether 
they were suitable consorts for foreign service officers. A South African foreign 
service officer whose wife behaved as V. Sackville-West221 did and refused to 
accompany him on his overseas postings would have been obliged to leave the service. 
Even now such an officer would not be posted overseas. 
At least in Australia and other countries of the developed world, the position is 
very different today. In Australia and Canada the parties to what are known as de facto 
(common law) marriages accompany their partners abroad at government expense, as 
do parties to longstanding homosexual (gay) relationships. South Africa lags behind in 
that respect. In the context of the language question Sole, a foreign service officer of 
the 'old school', remarks that 'wives serving abroad ... should be as fully representative 
as their husbands'. 222 A modem Australian, British or American, if not South African, 
foreign service wife would hold that if that were so, they should be remunerated 
accordingly and in some cases they are. In those countries there are strong diplomatic 
wives associations which have achieved benefits for their members undreamed of by 
previous generations of foreign service wives. 
In Sweden a diplomatic wife receives her own pension. In Sweden and 
Denmark, where a foreign service officer divorces his wife, he is required to 'divide his 
pension between his two (or three) wives according to the number of years each 
219 Watt, Australian Diplomat, pp. 166-67. 
220 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 231. 
221 Harold Nicolson's wife. 
222 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 231. 
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woman has served as a partner in diplomatic postings'. 223 The period we are examining 
was less enlightened. If in the case of South African officers their wives' performance 
was not formally taken into account in the periodic assessment of their promotability 
(as in the United Kingdom), perceptions of the wife could still indirectly make or break 
the husband's career. Even so, that would not have been to the extent, as with some 
services, of forcing the husband into early retirement. 224 Public Service regulations 
would not have provided for that. 
223 C. Enloe, Bananas, Beaches & Bases: making feminist sense of international politics (London, 
1989), pp. 104-05. The chapter 'Diplomatic Wives' (pp. 93-123) is a useful counterbalance to the 
traditional concentration on the foreign service husband's career. 
224 E. Clark, Corps Diplomatique, p. 93. 
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The Australian government initiated the exchange of High Commissioners with 
South Africa in the early postwar period. Domestic political considerations were 
probably the immediate reason for the proposal and its timing. Parliamentary. and 
public pressure built up to satisfy the perceived need to fill the gap represented by 
South Africa in the network of Australia's relations with other members of the British 
Commonwealth. Smuts's standing as international statesman, 'the one South African 
with an international reputation', 1 could have had something to do with it.2 By that 
time Curtin's common sense view that 'the expense involved would not be justified by 
the work involved' (see Chapter One, pp. 40-41 above) had been forgotten. Domestic 
political pressure was probably also the reason for the premature disclosure of the 
government's intentions. It was said on its behalf in the Senate in June 1945 during 
Evatt's absence at the San Francisco Conference that favourable consideration had 
been given the proposal. 3 
In September, replying to an Opposition speaker who held that 'some diplo-
matic contact' with South Africa was 'of extreme importance', N.J. 0. Makin, acting as 
Minister of External Affairs on the occasion of yet another Evatt absence, told the 
House of Representatives that conversations between the two countries were pro-
ceeding. 4 D.D. Forsyth commented on the file copy of the Rand Daily Mail report on 
Makin's remarks: 'P.M. informed. He knows nothing about this and nor do I'. 5 In the 
same debate an ALP backbencher advocated the opening of a mission in South Africa 
before one was opened in Latin America, as planned. 6 Makin in fact anticipated by 
more than a month his submission to Cabinet of 29 October 1945 requesting authority 
1 W.A. Spooner, United States policy toward South Africa, 1919-1941, political and economic 
aspects (Unpublished PhD thesis, St John's University, NY, 1979), p. 260. 
2 According to Hudson 'Evatt, like most of his generation, admired Smuts and tended to stress South 
Africa's role in the "war against fascism".' Written comments, June 1995. However, in view of what is 
said about ii in Chapter One and later in the present chapter, it would seem Evatt's attitude towards 
Smuts was ambivalent. The point is valid in respect of Australian public opinion at large. 
3 CPD., Vol. 182, 5 June 1945, p. 2462. 
4 lbid., Vol. 185, 20 September 1945, pp. 5717, 5719. 
5 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 1, 24 September 1945. 
6 CPD., Vol. 185, p. 5710. 
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to communicate with the South African government. The submission was approved the 
following day. 7 It made these points: 
In addition to the general value which such a step would have in 
completing our representation in the British Commonwealth of 
Nations it is suggested that it would be important for the following 
reasons:-
(i) In the work of the United Nations and its various constituent 
bodies members of the British Commonwealth should be fully 
unformed as to each other's attitudes, policies and problems; 
(ii) Trade between South Africa and Australia might very well 
increase as a result; 
(iii) South Africa and Australia, owing to the similarity of their 
climatic conditions, can probably assist each other very consider-
ably in the exchange of scientific and economic information, par-
ticularly relating to agriculture and the pastoral industry; 
(iv) It would facilitate the general growth of cultural and educa-
tional ties. 
The proposal took the form of a cable to Smuts as South African Prime Min-
ister expressing the hope he would agree to receiving a High Commissioner at Pretoria 
'in the near future' and reciprocate 'by appointing a High Commissioner with residence 
in Canberra'. We feel, the cable concluded, 'that our relations in the past have lacked 
the continuous and positive character which such an exchange of representatives 
would develop on the basis of our friendship in peace and war as fellow members of 
the British Commonwealth'.8 Smuts sought to put the Australians off:9 An 'acute 
shortage of personnel' made it difficult to reciprocate at that time. It was therefore 
hoped that 'the appointment of an Australian High Commissioner could be delayed 
until such time as a convenient date could be agreed upon'. 10 Burton conveyed this to 
Evatt, then in Washington, saying it was proposed to reply that 'we appreciate their 
difficulty' but hope the exchange would 'prove possible by middle of 1946'. Evatt's 
7 AA, Al066/l, M45/2l/6, Agendum No. 979, 29 October 1945, 'Australian Representation in South 
Africa' and Strahan/Makin. 31October1945. 
8 AA, A46l/l, A348/l/18, 0. 27815, I November 1945. 
9 Ibid., I. 3510, 7 November 1945. 
10 BTS, 412132, Vol. 1, Smuts's handwritten instructions on Canberra's telegram No. 118. A copy of 
this telegram is also on BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1 as is a copy of the South African reply, No. 101, des-
patched on 7 November. As received in Canberra the next day, this was numbered I. 3510. It is not 
clear why the South African reply was despatched only on 7 November because five days previously (2 
November) Smuts had instructed ForS)th and Forsyth Jooste about the action to be taken. 
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suggested amendment - 'at latest by middle of 1946' - was not incorporated in the cable 
as despatched. 11 
The domestic pressures on the Australian government did not subside and on 9 
April 1946, the day the Cabinet approved his appointment for 'not more than three 
years', it cabled Smuts its intention to appoint as High Commissioner Sir George 
Knowles, since 1932 Solicitor-General, Head of the Attorney-General's Department. 
and Chief Parliamentary Draftsman. The cable held that there was 'considerable public 
feeling in Australia that the initial step should be taken' and expressed the hope that 
Knowles could 'proceed to South Africa in June or soon afterwards'. 12 This time the 
South Africans did not demur but 'warmly welcome[ d] the decision to appoint a High 
Commissioner . . . and the choice of so distinguished representative as Sir George 
Knowles'. Expressing the hope of reciprocating 'as soon as possible', the reply 
requested Australia's 'ready understanding of the circumstances' which precluded 'an 
immediate appointment'. 13 A year earlier, however, in a lengthy submission to the 
Public Service Commission on the question of its post-war re-organisation, the 
Department of External Affairs had anticipated the establishment of High Commis-
sionerships in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as well as representation in Ireland 
and lndia. 14 
The Australian press release announcing the opening of a High Commission in 
South Africa stressed the 'importance of completing the network of Australian repre-
sentation in British Commonwealth countries'. The release also announced appoint-
ments to Ireland and New Zealand. 15 Not that Ireland then really qualified for the 
description of Commonwealth country. After all, de Valera was perhaps the only gov-
ernment leader anywhere in the world to pay his condolences in person at the German 
Legation on the occasion ofHitler's suicide in 1945.16 
11 AA, Al066/l, M45/21/6, Burton/Evatt, 14 November 1945 (draft); Evatt/Burton, 16 November 
1945; AA, Al066/l, M45/21/6, 0. 29644 (No. 130), 22 November 1945. 
12 AA, Al066/l, M45/21/6,, Strahan/Evatt, 9 April 1946; 0. 7010 (No. 27), 9 April 1946. 
13 BTS, 130/10, Vol. l, Minister of External Affairs, Cape Town/Minister of External Affairs, Can-
berra, No. 24, 12 April 1946. 
14 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, Pohl/Public Service Commission, 22 November 1944, p. 6, para. 25. 
15 AA, Al066/l, M45/21/6, 'For the Press: Appointment of Australian High Commissioners', 8 May 
1946. 
16 The Earl of Longford & T.P. O'Neill, Eamon de Valera (London, 1970), pp. 411-12; J.T. Carroll, 
Ireland in the War Years (Ne\\ ton Abbot/New York, 1975), pp. 160-61. 
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There can therefore be no doubt that the Australian government initiated the 
diplomatic link between the two countries and was rather forward about it. By not 
reciprocating immediately with its own appointment, the Smuts government caused the 
Australian government embarrassment. That was mainly the latter's own fault. An 
almost parallel situation had arisen some months before when the Australians in effect 
rejected a Portuguese request for an exchange of diplomatic representatives. On 
instructions S.M. Bruce, the High Commissioner in London, told the Portuguese 
Ambassador that Portugal should not press 'the question of the appointment of a 
Charge d'Affaires in Australia' at that time. That was due to 'the fact that at the 
moment we were heavily committed with regard to new missions abroad, with conse-
quent demands on personnel to staff them'. Australia 'fully appreciated that the Portu-
guese Government would not regard it as discourteous if, while agreeing to the Portu-
guese appointment at Canberra, we did not reciprocate by sending a representative to 
Lisbon'. Even so, the government felt that despite 'the comprehending attitude of the 
Portuguese Government, it was not a desirable situation that one sided representation 
should continue indefinitely'.17 
Bruce recorded that the Ambassador was upset, but the face-to-face interview 
left his government with no room for manoeuvre. The absence of personal contact in 
the case of their own proposal to the South Africans encouraged the Australians to 
disregard Smuts's wishes. They then found themselves in precisely the situation they 
warned the Portuguese about. In the event, the opening of a Portuguese mission in 
Australia was delayed until 1960. 
Hudson holds that Evatt admired Smuts (see footnote 2 above); Sole would 
disagree. For instance, he says Evatt 'revelled in the humiliations' Smuts received at the 
1946 session of the UN General Assembly 'in part with Australian assistance'. (Sole got 
that first-hand from Evatt's 'court jester', Sam Atyeo.)18 It may have been a case of 
admiration mixed with envy. From Smuts's side, however, admiration was quite likely 
altogether lacking. He would probably have agreed with Sir Alexander Cadogan that 
Evatt was 'the most frightful man in the world'19 as a generation earlier this would have 
summed up his attitude towards W.M. Hughes, Australia's Prime Minister during the 
17 Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Vol. VIII, pp. 206-07. The reason for the Australian atti-
tude was less shortage of.staff than a desire for clarification of the position of Portuguese Timor. 
18 Reminiscences, pp. 103-04; also letter, 30 June 1994. 
19 D. Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945 (New York, 1972), p. 745 -
Diary entry for 23 May 1945. 
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First World War. (His relations with Hughes at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference were 
not happy.) His personal feelings towards these Australians perhaps compounded his 
standoffish attitude towards their country. In any case, the existence of the animus 
would not have helped him be more receptive to Australia's proposal. He simply did 
not attach much importance to the connection and Australia accepted that. 
Supporting that perception is a comment from just before the 1948 South 
African general election: 
your Prime Minister carries so much more weight in Empire coun-
sels than does ours and consequently has infinitely more numerous 
and more effective channels of communication with London than 
we can possibly have; and that you have so many more people of 
substance coming to you from London than we have ... 
You in South Africa, therefore, need be much less anxious than we 
about the effectiveness of your communications with London. We 
are greatly perturbed and dissatisfied and are likely to go on being 
so.20 
In retrospect and from its own point of view, the Chifley government's insis-
tence on the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa was ill-advised. It 
may (though this is unlikely) have come to that conclusion itself by the time of its fall 
four years later. It courted South Africa against the background of Smuts's interna-
tional eminence and did not anticipate the controversy that would soon envelop his and 
his successors' domestic policies. Nor did it anticipate Smuts's own fall less than two 
years later. The controversy would bedevil the South African government's relations 
with the international community from the time of the first session of the UN General 
Assembly in 1946 (see Chapter Eight) until the end of while rule almost five decades 
later. In time it would show signs of damaging the international standing of the South 
· African government's interlocutors including Australia whereupon they started to dis-
tance themselves. 
As early as 194 7 Evatt and Burton contemplated signalling Smuts to mend his 
fences with India in respect of the Treatment of Indians item. After the 194 7 session of 
the UN General Assembly Burton instructed that a telegram be prepared 'reviewing 
20 BTS, l/25/2A, Vol. 1, Loose paper 'Copy: From Curthoys, Melbourne, March 23, 1948'. R.L. 
Curthoys was The Times' (London) chief correspondent in Australia at the time. He had earlier been 
Editor of The Argus (Melbourne). His remarks seem to be a manifestation of the so-called 'cultural 
cringe' or undue deference to things English (or European) in relation to things Australian. 
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Australian support for South Africa ... and tactfully suggesting that, during the ensuing 
year, they make a determined effort to reach an agreement with India'. 21 The draft 
commenced by referring to Australia's 'determined efforts' at the 194 7 session to sup-
port South Africa over the Indian and South West Africa questions. In respect of the 
last-mentioned, Evatt had 'made a special plea on South Africa's behalf. Unfortunately, 
It is probable (and our reports from India tend to confirm the 
view) that this support has diminished the reserve of goodwill 
which Indians have shown towards Australia. Although this is in 
itself disturbing to us, we are more concerned lest the present dis-
agreement over Indians in South Africa should unduly prejudice 
India and Pakistan in their attitude towards the British Common-
wealth as a whole. I am confident that you will agree on the 
importance of India and Pakistan remaining within the Common-
wealth as full and actively cooperating members, and I cannot but 
feel that if a solution to the problem is not found soon such 
membership on their part may be seriously jeopardised.22 
The fury this would have produced in Smuts can be imagined. It would likely 
have damaged the budding official relationship which was probably why Evatt did not 
send it. (The draft bears the inscription 'No [sic] sent'.) His reasons may have included 
the feeling that if he did, Smuts would never appoint a High Commissioner to Austra-
lia. In any case the draft expressed sentiments which should best conveyed orally rather 
than in writing let alone in a cable. Smuts was not as concerned as the Australians to 
keep India in the Commonwealth. He was more interested in the domestic political 
problems local Indians were perceived to be causing. Some six months earlier when 
warning the New Zealand government against allowing Chinese to enter New Zealand 
on the same terms as other aliens, he had drawn an unflattering parallel with his own 
country's situation: 
we wonder, having regard to Asiatic aspirations, commitment to 
the policy [of giving Chinese immigrants the status of other aliens] 
will not expose New Zealand to very grave risk in the future. It is 
China today. It will be other Asiatic countries, including Japan, in 
the future. Our difficult Asiatic problem once appeared as innocent 
as does the question which confronts you today.23 
21 AA, Al068/l, M47/21/4/l, Box I, Townsend/Middle East [Branch], I December 1947. 
22 ibid., 'Draft telegram to the Prime Minister of South Africa. Top Secret. For the Prime Minister 
from the Acting Prime Minister', undated. 
23 AA, Al838/2, 539/12, I. 9343, 8 May 1947. (Addressed Wellington No. 19; repeated London No. 
500; Ottawa No. 13; and Canberra No. 20 ). 
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Indian government complaints about the treatment of South African Indians 
achieved momentum well before the question reached the United Nations. By mid-
1946 India was on the point of withdrawing its High Commissioner from South Africa. 
That was the background against which Indian officials claimed that 'the readiness of 
the South African Government to exchange High Commissioners with Australia' could 
be a 'sinister move'. At least that is what Moodie of the Australian High Commission in 
New Delhi, reported to Canberra on the basis of a conversation with Banerjee, the 
Secretary of the Indian Department of Commonwealth Relations. India, he said, feared 
that South Africa 'would send to Australia a High Commissioner who would pump 
anti-Indian propaganda into the Australian Government and public'.24 
The South African government continued to plead shortage of staff 25 But 
shortly before the 1948 general election Smuts apparently asked J.R.F. Stratford, 
United Party MP for Parktown, whether he wanted to go to Australia. He declined for 
personal reasons. 26 After it took office the National Party government, which probably 
expected its relations with London to be shaky, responded positively to the idea of 
appointing a High Commissioner. Forsyth had, however, to explain the situation to 
Malan when Evatt's telegram of 6 June 1948 arrived. In it Evatt indicated his intention 
of announcing Alfred Stirling's appointment in succession to Knowles who had died in 
Pretoria the previous November. 27 At the same time Evatt reminded Malan about the 
lack of a South African High Commissioner. 
It would give me pleasure to be able to announce at the same time, 
the intention of your Government to appoint a High Commissioner 
to Australia in the near future. This was always the express inten-
tion of the South African Government, but it has not been carried 
out up to the present. I should appreciate your early comments. 28 
24 AA, Al067/l, M46/21/7, Moodie/Heydon, 21 June 1946. 
25 See Knowles's report on his interview with F.S. Waterson., AA, A4231/2, Pretoria Despatch No. 
44/46, 14 November 1946. 
26 AA, Al838, 201/10/7, Pt. 1, No. 5/48, Marshall/Minister of External Affairs, 10 March 1948. 
27 From a post-operative thrombosis following a prostate operation after some sixteen months in 
South Africa. Knowles, 'Canberra in the early government period', Canberra Historical Journal, New 
Series, No. 19, March 1987, p. 8. See The Canberra Times, 24 & 25 November 1947 and The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 24 November 1947. Canberra had been told that Knowles had entered the Pretoria 
Nursing Home on 3 November because of 'some recurrence of pleurisy trouble'. AA, Al838/1, 1348/2, 
Pt. 1, I. 21755, 4 November 1947. Perhaps the reference to 'pleurisy' was a euphemism. 
28 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Minister of External Affairs, Canberra/Minister of External Affairs, Pretoria, 
No. 13, 6 June 1948. 
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Forsyth minuted on the telegram: 'This morning I explained to Dr Malan what 
had happened (ie. the circumstances surrounding the appointing of an Australian H.C. 
in the Union)'. The timing of Stirling's appointment may have been Malan's reassuring 
first broadcast as Prime Minister a few days earlier. He said South Africa would gladly 
continue its good relations with Britain and the Commonwealth. 29 No doubt that came 
as a welcome surprise against the background of press and parliamentary predictions to 
the contrary. 30 There was also Australian press speculation that the change of govern-
ment in South Africa had influenced the making of the appointment then: 'Significance 
is added to the South African post by the defeat of General Smuts as Prime Minister 
and the uncertain future of South Africa in the Empire set-up.'31 In his response to 
Evatt, Malan promised to give the 'important matter' of a South African High Com-
missioner his 'earliest attention' as soon as 'the pre-occupations attendant upon the 
assumption of office' permitted him to do so. 32 
When Evatt passed through Cape Town on the last day of the year on his 
return to Australia after the 1948 session of the UN General Assembly, he again re-
minded his hosts that they had no man in Canberra. 33 (He and his wife and seventeen 
year old adopted daughter were guests of the government for the time - seven hours in 
Cape Town and twelve in Durban - they spent on South African soil.) In a press inter-
view in Durban he said Australia was 'looking forward eagerly to a reciprocal 
appointment by South Africa'.34 According to Stirling, Evatt got on 'very well' with 
Malan and Eric Louw who had represented South Africa at the General Assembly ses-
sion over which he had just presided. The same applied to the Governor-General, G. 
Brand van Zyl, to the extent that Evatt appropriated one of the latter's cricket books!35 
(Stirling refrained from mentioning the purloined book in his official account of the 
visit.)36 
29 The Times (London), 5 June 1948. 
30 Evatt's press release announcing Stirling's appointment suggests that. Undated draft on A1838/1, 
201/10/6/1, Pt. 1. See also Mulrooney, Australia's relations with South Africa, p. 29. 
31 The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 June 1948. 
32 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6/1, Pt. I., Minister of External Affairs, Pretoria/Minister of External Af-
fairs, Canberra, No. 35, 14 June 1948. 
33 See The Cape Argus, 31 December 1948; The Pretoria News, 31December1948; Die Burger, 31 
December 1948 and l January 1949; Cape Times, 1January1949. See also Stirling, Lord Bruce, pp. 
430-31. 
34 The Natal Daily News, 3 January 1949; The Natal Mercury, 4 January 1949. 
35 Stirling, Lord Bruce, p. 431. 
36 AA, A423I, South Africa 1949, Cape Town despatch 1/49 dated 4 January 1949. 
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Evatt declined to meet a deputation from the Natal Indian Congress which 
wanted to call on him during his ship's call at Durban.37 The briefing paper prepared 
for the newly appointed South African High Commissioner some months later saw this 
as equivocation on Evatt's part in respect of the domestic jurisdiction issue: 
The Natal Indian Organisation had sent him a telegram asking 
whether he would meet its representatives to enable them to give 
him first-hand information. The Australian High Commissioner 
replied as follows: 'Have been asked by Dr. Evatt to acknowledge 
your message and express regret that his short stay and full itiner-
ary made compliance "With your request impossible. He suggests 
that your communications be put in writing and forwarded to the 
Australian High Commissioner, Cape Town, for onward trans-
mission to him'.38 
The February 1949 announcement of the appointment of Dr P.R. Viljoen, 
South Africa's High Commissioner to Canada and a former Secretary for Agriculture, 
as High Commissioner to Australia was greeted by a sigh of relief in that country. Poli-
ticians and press, if not the public, had become restive, viewing the lack of a South 
African presence as a slight. ('South African neglect of Australia is neither flattering 
nor farsighted.')39 Evatt had in January expressed his thanks to Malan 'for his rapid 
response to my suggestion' when Viljoen's name was submitted.40 Presumably, how-
ever, he knew that Stirling had drawn Canberra's attention to Viljoen early the previous 
December and that Forsyth had enquired in mid-December whether a house would be 
available if an appointment were made soon.41 Viljoen was approached about the post 
in November42 and as far back as the beginning of September 1948 the Australian 
press had reported the South African government's decision to send a representative to 
Australia.43 Eric Louw told the House of Assembly on 30 August that the decision had 
37 Die Burger, 8 January 1949. 
38 BTS, Vol. 229, 1/25/5, Vol. II, 'Australia's attitude towards the Indian question'. 
39 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 1, Article from Pix, 6 September 1947, attached to Baker/SEA, 30 September 
1947. Calling Pix 'one of Australia's leading magazines', the New Zealand-born R.H. Brooke who, 
apart from being a South African MP (for Mowbray), was also Chairman of the Australia-New 
Zealand Association in Cape Town, quoted this in the House of Assembly. HA Deb., Vol. 64, 30 
August 1948, Col. 1142. 
40 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 1, Forsyth/Stirling, 21 January 1949; Stirling/Forsyth, 24 January 1949; AA, 
Al838!Tl7, 1500/1/30/1, I. 1212, 22 January 1949, 0. 1163, 26 January 1949 and I. 2348, 11 Feb-
ruary 1949. 
41 AA, Al838!Tl 7, 1500/1/30/1, I. 19795, 14 December 1948 and I. 712, 15 January 1949. 
42 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 5, Viljoen/ForS)th, 22 November 1948; Cypher OTP telegram No. 90, For-
syth/Viljoen, 15 December 1948; Cypher OTP telegram No. 93, ForS)th/Viljoen, 21 December 1948; 
and Viljoen/Fors)'th, 31 December 1948. 
43 AA, Al838/1, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, I. 14110, 31August1948; The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 Sep-
tember 1948. 
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been taken some three weeks previously. 44 Other names mentioned at the time were 
G.P. Jooste and J.D. Pohl among officials, J.F. T. Naude among politicians, and AL. 
Geyer. 45 
References to a diplomatic link between Australia and South Africa in the 
1940s are misleading .. The early part of the period 1945-61 marked an intermediate 
stage in the constitutional history of the Commonwealth. At the beginning of the 
period the term 'diplomatic connection' would have been a misnomer because of doubts 
whether Commonwealth representatives in the other Dominions should in fact enjoy 
diplomatic status. As Hancock had said earlier, Australia had 'international relations 
with foreign countries, but her relations with Great Britain or New Zealand are not 
international relations: they are constitutional relations'. 46 An Australian scholar 
pointed out in 194 7 that High Commissioners and their staffs were 'not strictly diplo-
mats' because the king was individually the head of state of each of the Dominions and 
it was felt that he could not appoint representatives to himself That was why there was 
no question of High Commissioners handing over formal credentials. At best they were 
'quasi-diplomats'. 47 
For all that, as the American Minister, Lincoln MacVeagh, reported to Presi-
dent Roosevelt in 1942, the British High Commissioner, then Lord Harlech, a former 
Colonial Secretary, was 'the most important personage' among resident diplomats in 
South Africa. He was 'as outstanding' among them as his job was 'beyond theirs in 
range and complexity'. 48 
Interviewed by the Winnipeg Free Press in 1946, C.J. Burchell, Canadian High 
Commissioner to Australia from 1939 to 1942 then to South Africa, gave a practical 
illustration of his difficulties: 
when Eleanor Roosevelt was given an official state dinner in Aus-
tralia the official representatives of all other governments were 
invited but the Australian government had gracefully to explain to 
the High Commissioner for Canada that he had really no official 
44 HA Deb., Vol. 64, 30 August 1948, Col. 1151. 
45 AA, Al838, 201/10/7, Pt. 1, I. 18975, 29 November 1948. 
46 W.K. Hancock,Auslralia (London, 1930), p. 262. 
47 C.A. Sharp, 'Diplomats', The Auslra/ian Outlook, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 1947, p. 51. See also 
B.D. Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic Hist01y (Washington, DC, 
1982), p. 109. 
48 
"'Dear Franklin ... ' Letters to President Roosevelt from Lincoln MacVeagh, U.S. Minister to South 
Africa 1942-1943", Munger Africana Library Notes, No. 12, March 1972, p. 21. 
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standing in diplomatic circles and was, therefore, at the bottom of 
the list and they were sorry that there was no room for him. 
(The same thing happened to his predecessor in South Africa on the occasion of State 
dinners given Lord Killearn. )49 Burchell concluded that 
in hesitating to appoint men with the title or status of Ambassador 
or Minister to the other self-governing Dominions Canada is not 
standing up to her position of a completely self-governing Do-
minion as was fully acquired under the Statute of Westminster 
1931, nor is Canada recognizing the other Dominions as being 
fully self-governing. 50 
He had complained in November 1944 to Norman Robertson, the head of the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs, about the 'continued use of the title of High 
Commissioner'. For South Africans, including the newspapers, made no distinction 
between the terms Trade Commissioner and High Commissioner. Indeed, that very 
week newspapers in Pretoria and Johannesburg had called him a Trade Commis-
sioner!51 Already in July of that year he had recommended that his title be changed to 
'Ambassador'. 52 
The inferior status of High Commissioners was a practical manifestation of the 
indivisibility of the crown. Until the establishment of the Indian republic within the 
Commonwealth in 1950 the polite fiction was maintained that Commonwealth count-
ries were members of one big, happy family whose representatives were not in the 
same category as those of foreign countries. Thus while the Foreign Office dealt with 
foreigners, the Commonwealth family was the preserve firstly of the Dominions Office, 
the lineal descendant of the old Colonial Office, then of the Commonwealth Relations 
Office. Once the position was separated from that of the Governor-General who con-
tinued to be the personal representative of the sovereign, early British High Commis-
sioners in Commonwealth countries were not Foreign Office representatives but offi· 
cials of the Dominions Office. For that reason the 'foreign offices' of the dominions 
were not called that but Departments of External Affairs. 
49 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa, p. 107. 
50 BTS PM 43/4, Vol.II (21112/28 - 30/9/55, Undated cutting from the Winnipeg Free Press attached 
to Pick/Fors)th, 30 September 1946. 
51 CA, DEA Records, File 167(S), Burchell/Robertson, 6 November 1944. However, The Pretoria 
News of 2 November, without mentioning Burchell himself, refers to his office as that of 'the 
Canadian High Commissioner'. 
52 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa, p.107. 
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All of this was anathema to South Africa's Nationalists who sought in vain to 
have the High Commissioner in London accorded diplomatic status. Established by Act 
of Parliament in 1911 and falling under the Department of Finance, the High Commis-
sion in London was the first South African mission abroad. The British authorities did 
not regard it as a diplomatic one and accorded its head, the High Commissioner, a 
lesser status than that enjoyed by foreign envoys. High Commissioners were exempt 
from taxation but they did not enjoy immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction. 53 
The Australian and Canadian High Commissioners were in a similar position. In the 
case of the Australians, the High Commissioner resorted under the Department of the 
Prime Minister. When Hertzog appointed a political as opposed to a trade representa-
tive to Canada before the Second World War he was given a title other than the pe-
jorative 'High Commissioner', that of'Accredited Representative'. 
If Bodenstein and the Department of External Affairs thought thereby to cir-
cumvent the susceptibilities of the Canadians and in that way have their man enjoy 
diplomatic status, they were mistaken. The Canadians refused to play along and in fact 
considered the Accredited Representative to be of lesser importance than even a High 
Commissioner. The first Canadian representative in South Africa, appointed in 1940, 
was a High Commissioner. In keeping with the Smuts government's view of the 
Commonwealth, Viljoen, who was appointed in 1945 as the successor to the Accred-
ited Representative, was also described as High Commissioner. 54 
The position of the High Commissioners was regularised at the 1948 Common-
wealth Prime Ministers' Conference. What would have contributed to that was the 
independence of India and Pakistan, for the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, told 
W.G. Parminter, the South African Minister in Paris, in March 1948 that 
The position had become urgent by the creation of the two new 
Dominions of India and Pakistan. It was essential that, in the capi-
tals of both these countries, the British High Commissioners 
should have at least equal diplomatic status with the foreign 
Ambassadors who would be accredited there, otherwise the posi-
tion of the High Commissioners would be intolerable. 55 
53 BTS 130/11, Vol. 1, Annex A (Status and Title of High Commissioner) to memorandum Jooste/ 
Secretary. 30 October 1947, p.5. Until the passage of the Diplomatic Privileges Act, No. 71 of 1951, 
High Commissioners in South Africa enjoyed more or less the same privileges as foreign diplomatic 
representatives except immunity from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of South African Courts. AA, 
Al838/2, 1511/2/1/7, Nel/DEA, 14 October 1949. 
54 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa, pp. 105, 106. 
55 BTS, PM 43/4, Vol.II (21/12/28-30/9/55), Parminter/SEA, 19 March 1948. 
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It seems, however, that the original intention was to devise a means of keeping Ireland 
in the Commonwealth. 56 
Early in 1949, with the consent of their governments, High Commissioners 
were accorded the style 'Excellency', put on an equal footing with Ambassadors and in 
all respects integrated into the Diplomatic Corps. Even so, anomalies persisted: the 
Commonwealth Relations Office continued to handle the affairs of Commonwealth 
countries while in deference to British sensitivities Commonwealth 'foreign offices' 
kept on calling themselves Departments of External Affairs. And for some time there 
continued to be resistance on the part of foreign diplomats to High Commissioners 
serving as Deans of the Corps not to mention other aberrations such as the refusal of 
the French Ambassador to South Africa in 1950 to accord Australian High 
Commissioner Alfred Stirling's designated consort, his sister Dorothy, the courtesies 
due her position. 
Stirling saw this as the outcome of objections by heads of legation in South 
Africa (ie. Ministers) whose wives were outranked by his sister, the equal of an 
Ambassador's wife. 57 He had been Menzies's Private Secretary in the early 1930s and 
reported the matter to his old chief, possibly because an item about it had appeared in a 
Melbourne newspaper. 58 Menzies's reaction is not known59 but External Affairs in 
Canberra was quite relaxed. R.L. Harry minuted Anstey Wynes whom, among other 
duties, was performing those pertaining to Chief of Protocol:60 'The attitude of the 
Ministers (and of the French Ambassador) on the status of High Commissioners is 
interesting, and should be known to Legal & Consular Division, where I suggest this 
correspondence might come to rest'. 61 
In 1956 the Dean of the Corps, Netherlands Ambassador van den Berg, who 
'for years tried to give High Commissioners a place outside the Diplomatic Corps', 62 
56 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa, p.112. 
57 See The Canberra Times & The Cape Times, both of 7 January 1950. 
58 AA, Al838fT13, 1500/2/18/1, Stirling/Menzies, 16 January 1950. 
59 Perhaps it fell within the category of the 'slightly contemptuous affection' in which Waller says 
Menzies held Stirling. Waller, A Diplomatic Life, p. 4. In any case, Dorothy Stirling was known to 
Menzies and his wife and had accompanied the latter, from London, on a visit to Norway and Sweden 
in 1938. A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Vol. 1: 1884-1943 (Melbourne, 1993), p. 225. 
60 In that capacity he had met Viljoen in Sydney on arrival. The office of Chief of Protocol was 
created only in 1954. F.H. Stuart was the first holder - Towards-coming-of-age, p. 164 - followed by 
A.R. Cutler and W.G.A. Landale. 
61 AA, Al838ffl3, 1500/2/18/1, RLH/Dr Wynes, 15 February 1950. (Handwritten). 
62 AA, Al838/2, 201/11/1, Pt. 3, Quinn/Secretary, 15 February 1960. Underlining in original. 
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objected to the Australian High Commissioner acting as Dean during his own absence 
on vacation. He was overruled by Eric Louw.63 
Knowles was given a 'credential' to hand over during his call on the Governor-
General, G. Brand van Zyl, on 3 September 1946. His temporary Official Secretary, 
O.C.W. Fuhrman, cabled the South African Secretary for External Affairs from the ss. 
Nestor which was bearing Knowles and his suite to South Africa asking 'what pro-
cedure do you suggest should be followed by Sir George Knowles in matter of lodging 
his credentials and at what place should this be done'.64 The South African department 
considered this for almost two weeks before replying that it had not been 'prescribed in 
the Union for High Commissioners as representing other Commonwealth Governments 
to hand over formal credentials'. 65 The reason for the delay is not clear. The file copy 
of the cable bears J.D. Pohl's instruction to G.P. Jooste: 'Pse have procedure for 
assumption of office of new H.C. gone into and discuss'. Jooste presumably did a thor-
ough job! 
There were few precedents to guide him, in fact only the Canadian High 
Commissioners Henri Laureys in 1940 and C.J. Burchell in 1944, the British High 
Commissioner being in a different category of importance. At least Knowles fared 
better than Laureys and Burchell who were not even met on arrival. 66 Knowles had no 
complaints about his reception, having been met when the Nestor called at Durban 'by 
representatives of the Union Government and Provincial Administration, the Munici-
pality of Durban, a number of local organisations and the Press'. 67 Knowles reported in 
the same despatch, his first, that 
prior to my audience with His Excellency, it was made clear to me, 
by a representative of the External Affairs Department, that the 
Union Government did not desire the presentation of any Creden-
tials by me since the South African Government took the view that 
the presentation of Credentials by a High Commissioner repre-
senting a Member State of the British Commonwealth of Nations 
to the Representative of his Majesty in the territory of another 
Member was neither expected nor necessary. Accordingly, when 
calling upon His Excellency the Governor-General, I did not take 
63 AA, Al838/l, 1500/2/18/3, Memo. 18, Hodgson/DEA, Annex, Annual Report 1956, Part A, p. 9, 
para. ll(a). 
64 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Fuhrman/SEA, 27 July 1946. 
65 Ibid., SEA/Fuhrman, 8 August 1946. 
66 Tennyson. Canadian Relations with South Africa, p.108. 
67 AA, A4231/2, PRETORIA 1-26, 1946, Pretoria Despatch No.I, 13 September 1946. See also The 
Natal Mercury, 15 August 1946. · 
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with me the Credential with which I was furnished in Australia. 
His Excellency made no mention of the non-production of this 
document and apparently took its absence for granted. 68 
Considerable progress had been made towards granting High Commissioners 
diplomatic recognition by the time of Viljoen's appointment to Australia, though the 
matter of the King accrediting diplomatic representatives to himself as the constitu-
tional head of another dominion remained unresolved. To overcome the difficulty, 
Viljoen was given a letter from Malan commending him to Chifley, the Australian 
Prime Minister, thereby establishing a precedent which old Commonwealth members 
followed for some years. 69 Years later Louw told Casey that South Africa wanted the 
system of accreditation of High Commissioners to be put on exactly the same footing 
as that of diplomats from foreign countries 'in that they wanted to have names put up 
to them in advance so that they had the alternative of accepting them or refusing 
them'. 70 
So it eventually came to pass. Hugh Gilchrist of the Australian High 
Commission did not like Louw and commented snidely on his remarks when he 
received the record of the conversation. Louw, he said, should 'be aware, but probably 
is not, that the C.R.O [Commonwealth Relations Office] may often act as a kindly 
buffer between him and the Foreign Office. It is not apparent to us that Louw's 
political theses would receive more tender consideration from the latter than from the 
C.R.O; in fact, they might well receive less'.71 
The matter must be put into perspective. The one-time Canadian High 
Commissioner in London later Governor-General, Vincent Massey, had felt as long 
ago as 1925, on the establishment of the CRO's forerunner, the Dominions Office, that 
the one essential step towards better understanding is to bring the 
Dominion representatives into direct contact with the Foreign 
68 AA, A4231/2, PRETORIA 1-26, 1946, Pretoria Despatch No.I, 13 September 1946. I have not so 
far been able to trace a copy of this credential. 
69 At least, a paper dated 24 April 1950, initialled by J.E. Bruce, the Chief of Protocol, entitled 
'Accreditation of High Commissioners' on the file BTS 130/11, Vol. 2, gives the impression that 
South Africa initiated the practice. A letter from Attlee to Malan dated 5 February 1951 on the same 
file confirms this impression as does Alfred Stirling's Departmental Despatch No. 4/49 of 3 March 
1949 (AA, A423 l/2, South Africa 1949). 
70 Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Record of conversation Casey/Louw, New York, 11 October 1958. Maud 
records that Louw rejected the first name proposed as his successor as British Ambassador to South 
Africa in 1963. J. P.R. Maud, Experiences of an Optimist (London, 1981), p. 93. 
71 AA, Al838/2, 201/11/1, Pt. 2., Memo. 632, Gilchrist/DEA, 30 October 1958. 
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Office itself. An intermediate department, however able its staff or 
well-intentioned its head, will serve only to cause circumlocution, 
delays and misunderstandings. 72 
He discovered later as High Commissioner that 'the Dominions Office machin-
ery delayed the transmission of information about foreign crises'. He thought then that 
the DO's functions could be performed better by a Dominions section within the For-
eign Office. His views were shared by Sir William Clark, a former British High Com-
missioner to Canada and South Africa and a Dominions Office official. Clark argued in 
1944 that Britain and the Dominions 'would be on a more comfortable parity if our 
Foreign Office and Dominions Office were merged into a Department of External 
Affairs'. 73 Louw's views a decade and a half later were, therefore, perfectly reasonable. 
The improved status of High Commissioners was an outward manifestation of, 
and connected to, changes in the nature of the Commonwealth that were occurring at 
the political level in the early post-war period. Apart from the Irish question, and soon 
to overtake it in importance, there was the admission of non-white states to dominion 
status and to full membership of the Commonwealth which they retained after 
becoming republics. The Commonwealth's changed composition was ultimately to 
contribute to South Africa's exclusion when it became a republic in 1961. Conscious 
that its position was at risk, the South African government at first tried to resist the 
automatic admission to the Commonwealth of newly independent Asian States but 
gave this up as a bad job. Ghana was the only African State to gain admission before 
South Africa's exclusion. 74 
Much was said in the 1950s especially by the South African government's 
domestic political opponents about the familial nature of the Commonwealth and how 
disastrous it would be for South Africa to leave it. It was a reason advanced for South 
Africa not becoming a republic. An object of Australian policy in the 1950s was both 
to keep South Africa a monarchy and within the Commonwealth. Thus a 1952 depart-
mental memorandum held that 
72 Quoted by J.A. Cross, Whitehall and the Commonwealth (London, 1967), p. 74. 
73 Ibid. Clark had been High Commissioner to both Canada and South Africa. 
74 C.A. Smith, the South African Information Attache in Canberra, told Miss E.A. Warren of the 
Australian Department of External Affairs in 1954 that 'Dr Malan would leave the British 
Commonwealth rather than accept the Gold Coast as an equal member. AA, Al838, 201/10/7. Pt. 1, 
Record of conversation Warren/Smith, 9 July 1954. 
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there is room for us, by intelligent interest and continuous good 
will, to help delay the eventual establishment of a South African 
republic and perhaps influence the decision whether the republic 
will be in or outside the Commonwealth. 75 
If they were not unwilling for the country to remain in the Commonwealth, far 
outweighing this in importance for South Africa's Nationalists was the achievement of 
the republic. It is in retrospect ironic that the republican status for which they fought 
so hard, anathema to Australian governments of the day, should be an object of 
Australian domestic and constitutional policy in the 1990s. At least in that regard, if 
not in respect of its domestic policies, the South African National Party was on the 
right side of history. Himself a strong exponent of the Commonwealth connection in 
the 1950s, Hugh Gilchrist had become deprecatory by the 1990s. He wrote in 1995: 
For 30 years I have regarded it as an organization of little value 
and of some potential embarrassment to Australia. Its value 
diminished sharply when Britain joined Europe, and continued to 
diminish with every minor accession to membership. . .. For Aus-
tralia it has no defence or economic value, and little cultural value 
... rather less than the British Council. 76 
South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth served to a limited extent as 
a buffer for its situation at the United Nations. (See Chapter Eight.) If nothing else, it 
had the effect of restraining the old white members in their rhetoric. On the other hand, 
the leader of the anti-South African coalition in the UN General Assembly, India, was 
also a member of the Commonwealth. Even before the issue was submitted to the 
General Assembly, it was being said that the 'studied refusal of the South African 
authorities to meet the Indian case may well be one of the factors contributing to an 
Indian decision to go outside the British Commonwealth'.77 In those circumstances it 
availed South Africa little that it was a member of the Commonwealth and that, until 
the end, its domestic policies were not discussed at the regular heads of government 
meetings where decisions were taken by consensus. 
75 Al838/l, 201/10/6, Pt. 1, Desmond/Lee, 'The political importance of our South African post', 
30/1/1952. Kieran Desmond had served in South Africa as Third Secretary/Second Secretary from 
1948 to 1951. Charles Lee, a Chinese Australian, was his senior in the Africa and Middle East 
branch. 
76 H. Gilchrist, letter, 20 January 1995. 
77 AA, A423 l/2, New Delhi Despatches 1-52 1946, No. 28/46, Mackay/ Acting Minister of State, 29 
May 1946, p. 10, and Al067/l, M46/21/7, 'Note on South African - Indian relations', 25 June 1946, p. 
2, para. 11. The Indian government's request for the item to be included in the General Assembly's 
provisional agenda was dated 22 June. See UN Doc. Nl49, 21October1946. 
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It might have been expected that the old Commonwealth would at least put up 
a united front at international conferences such as that which drafted the United 
Nations Charter. 78 Far from it. Driven by perceptions of their national interest, 
Australia and New Zealand and, perhaps to a lesser extent Canada, went their separate 
ways, actively opposing what the United Kingdom was trying to achieve. Thus Smuts, 
who supported the British line, remarked ruefully when summing up the work of the 
conference: 'The British Commonwealth distinguished itself in many ways, but not 
least by showing how much that great Regional Group can sometimes differ among 
themselves'. 79 
In the event, and for various reasons, including the attitude of Australia's Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister at the time, Robert Menzies, South Africa's departure 
from the Commonwealth had a minimal effect on Australian-South African relations. 
On Menzies's recommendation the Cabinet decided on 10 May 1961 that 'the general 
approach should continue to be to keep intervention against South Africa at the 
minimum'. 80 Two years later the Cabinet rejected proposals by Menzies's successor as 
Minister of External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, to modify Australia's stand on South 
Africa in order to safeguard Australia's general international standing and improve its 
tactical position at the eighteenth session of the UN General Assembly. 
Barwick had proposed, firstly, that Cabinet seriously consider 'publicly 
imposing limitations - complete or partial - on the export of arms to South Africa'. 
Failure to take 'some public step' in that regard 'could produce an unfavourable inter-
national reaction' especially if the lack of action should be associated with the recent 
decision to accept a South African Military Attache. Secondly, the government should 
express to its South African counterpart 'its concern at recent international develop-
ments' and urge it 'to moderate the rigours of its racial policies'. Thirdly, for 
'presentational purposes' internationally as well as domestically, the government should 
make a public statement on its attitude to apartheid. That would reaffirm 'the repug-
nance' it felt towards apartheid in theory and practice and at the same time explain 'the 
legal and practical reasons' why Australia was 'unable to support the extreme approach' 
adopted by the majority of UN members. 81 
78 The United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO). 
79 Central Archives, Al (Smuts Collection), 298, 'Press statement on San Francisco Conference (To 
be released for publication on Sunday, 24th June, 1945)', p. 8. The statement was published in the 
Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) on 25 June 1945. 
80 AA, A5818/2, Vol. 26, Decision No. 1361, 10 May 1961. 
81 AA, A5819/2, Vol. 22, Submission No. 883, paras. 3, 6, 10, 12. 
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The Cabinet turned him down on all three points. The minute recording the 
decision indicated doubt was expressed that 
Australia's position, including in relation to its own domestic 
policies. would in the long run be assisted by concessions to 
United Nations or African pressures over South Africa, nor that it 
would be in keeping with its policy towards and relationship with, 
South Africa to make such concessions. Therefore it indicated that 
there should be no modification of Australian policies towards 
South Africa nor of the position Australia has taken publicly and 
internationally. 82 
Practically speaking, viewed from the vantage point of the South African 
Department of External Affairs, the greatest immediate deprivation entailed by loss of 
Commonwealth membership was the lack of access to reports generated by the British 
Foreign Office network. 83 South African officials also forfeited attendance of the 
regular meetings of representatives of the 'old' Commonwealth in London and 
elsewhere in respect inter alia of items on the agenda of the United Nations General 
Assembly. Cabling Canberra about his conversations on the subject of South Africa's 
pending departure from the Commonwealth, the External Affairs officer in Australia's 
London High Commission reported that 
It is quite clear that from 3 lst May the South African High 
Commission here will be excluded from all Commonwealth Con-
sultations, will receive no distribution of cables and will not be 
invited to the many Meetings to which South Africa has always 
come. Chad\\ick84 commented wryly that this might mean that 
they will get far better service in London. But this is, of course, 
untrue, and unduly cynical. I think the South Africans here are 
going to feel strangely isolated. 85 
The feeling of isolation would of course be confined largely to the officials who 
had previously attended Commonwealth meetings and to those of their colleagues else-
where abroad accustomed to fraternal exchanges with Commonwealth colleagues in 
the same capitals. Whether South Africa was in or out of the Commonwealth would 
have little impact on the bulk of its citizens. 
82 Ibid., Decision No. 1012, 10 September 1963. 
83 See The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 December 1946, for an indication of the extent of the FO 
network in the early postwar period. 
84 A Commonwealth Relations Office official. 
85 AA, Al838/2, 15517/14, Pt. I, I. 8095/96, 29 March 1961, para. 3 (H). 
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At the personal level, though, there would be less, if any, of those fraternal 
feelings which had marked relations between individual Australian and South African 
diplomats at posts abroad at a time when the two countries took their first steps in 
diplomacy. The small size of the missions not to say of the Commonwealth itself 
encouraged an intimacy that would have been lacking later even if South Africa had 
remained in the Commonwealth. In London during the war, besides the High Commis-
sioners who met regularly, 86 their staffs were in close touch. The association predated 
the war. It flourished in the 1930s, the South Africans enjoying the reputation of being 
willing interlocutors. 
Stirling considered Parminter, the Official Secretary at South Africa House in 
the late 1930s, to be 'a very good colleague, always ready to meet and co-ordinate'. 
Parminter once lent Stirling the original of a telegram from Smuts which saved him 
several hours work. 87 And as the war progressed, Stirling found the 'exchange of 
information with South Africa ... increasingly useful'. 88 Not only in London but also 
during later postings in Ottawa and Washington, he thought South African diplomats 
were 'among the best - certainly the most readily co-operative - of the Commonwealth 
colleagues'. 89 
In the 193 Os the staff of the Australia's London Liaison Office monitored South 
African issues especially political developments quite closely, reporting their gleanings 
to Canberra. Their sources were news items or information received from South 
African colleagues or other sources. Oswald Pirow's 1938 visit to Germany attracted 
attention. Stirling reported it on the basis of 'Mr. [Malcolm] MacDonald's record of a 
talk with Mr. Pirow on the latter's return'. While it was not possible 'to procure a copy 
of the record' Stirling had 'endeavoured to reconstruct it' and believed the outcome to 
supply 'a fairly complete reproduction of Mr. Pirow's views'.90 Though the cir-
cumstances of its compilation reduce the value of its content, the report is not without 
interest. For example, according to Stirling, Pirow had told Hitler and Goering that 'no 
Government in South Africa which kept out of war [if war had come in September 
86 They and their Canadian and New Zealand colleagues were briefed daily by the Dominions 
Secretary or by the Deputy Prime Minister. In Waterson's time he and the Australian S.M. Bruce 
would see each other frequently, sometimes playing golf together. 
87 Lord Bruce, p. 161. 
. 
88 Ibid., p. 206. 
89 Ibid., p. 430. 
90 AA, A981/l, SOUTH AFRICA 28, No. 107, Stirling/Hodgson, 21December1938. 
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1938] could have remained in office' and that 'if it were to secure the peace of the 
world, South Africa would give up South-West Africa'.91 
In 1939 Stirling reported the appointments of Alwyn Zoutendyk and Robert 
Harrower (Roy) Coaton respectively as South African Consul-General and Vice-
Consul in Buenos Aires. His despatch consisted entirely of extracts from the 1938 
Annual Report of the British Ambassador to Argentina. The Ambassador found 
Zoutendyk a 'genial and agreeable colleague'. Back in Canberra a reader of the 
despatch underlined the sentences dealing with the Argentine Government's decision to 
grant Zoutendyk 'the right of access to the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs' and 
'a special status with quasi-diplomatic privileges such as "franchise de douane".'92 
A decade later, J.S. Cumpston, Australian Charge d'Affaires in Chile, reported 
the help he had given Coaton to set up an office in Santiago. S.F. du Toit had been 
appointed non-residential South African Minister to Chile - his headquarters were in 
Buenos Aires - and Coaton Charge in Santiago. Du Toit visited Santiago from 23 
August to 9 October 1948. He presented his credentials on 1 September. 
The first member of the South African Legation to arrive was Mr 
R.F. Coaton [sic], who reached Santiago at midnight on 2nd July, 
1948. He and his family were met at the station and taken to the 
Hotel Carrera by the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Mr. 
F.C. Mason; the First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy, Mr. 
Paul Tremblay, and myself. Mr. Coaton subsequently established 
himself in one of the rooms of my offices while he located an 
office where he could set up his Chancery. He was also given 
sufficient space to house a typist and a Clerk and for the Minister 
to work in the office during his visit to Santiago in August and 
September. ... For this accommodation and for the use of the 
telephone and other incidental services, it was arranged that the 
sum of US.$100 per month should be paid to the Australian 
Consulate-General in New York. This sum was paid for the 
months of July (from the 9th July), August and September .... 
As the South African Minister was unable to make satisfactory 
arrangements for the use of a car while in Santiago, it was 
arranged that he and I would share the use of the Cadillac car 
during the period of his stay. It was agreed that he would pay for 
his share at the rate of 1/- Australian currency per mile.93 
91 Ibid., H. 223, Stirling/Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 21December1938. 
92 AA, A/981, ARGENTINE 13, 4 August 1939. Consuls-General normally enjoy neither access to 
Foreign Ministers nor diplomatic privileges. 
93 AA, Al838/l, 1500/4/10, Ministerial Despatch No. 20/1948, Cumpston/Evatt, 2 November 1948. 
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What its members should be doing once they get there is integral to opening a 
diplomatic mission. At least, outsiders would see it that way. That gives rise to the 
question of instructions. Seventeenth and eighteenth century French diplomacy 
attached great importance to written instructions: 
These documents ... contained not only a statement of the policy to 
be pursued by the ambassador, but a full account of political con-
ditions in the country to which he was accredited. Delicate and of-
ten waspish comments were added on the origins, careers and 
characters of those statesmen and diplomatic colleagues with 
whom he would have to negotiate.94 
The instructions given the French Ambassador to Austria in 1774 consisted of 'a whole 
volume, divided into five separate chapters, covering the entire European situation and 
indicating the policy to be pursued, not towards Austria only, but in every continental 
country'. 95 
The South Africans and the Australians were more relaxed about instructions. 
Sole records that when he opened the South African legation in Vienna in the late 
1950s, from his own department he 
experienced nothing but frustration, ineptitude and indecision. Not 
one section in the Department had bothered to draw up a brief on 
what the Government's objectives were in opening up a mission in 
Vienna. .. . The general impression I received was that because I 
did not possess any special political or personal pull, no one was 
interested. 96 
Later he objected to the publication of such comments as they were inter alia by the 
Sunday Times (Johannesburg). He said his memoirs were based on his weekly letters to 
his parents which 
quite naturally give expression to the gripes and frustrations, the 
tribulations and petty triumphs of a diplomat who spent most of 
his career abroad and who presented impressions from his par-
ticular vantage point without any attempt to achieve an overall 
perspective. 97 
94 Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method, p. 56 
95 Ibid., p. 57. 
96 Reminiscences, p. 190. 
97 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 24 November 1991 (Letter). 
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As far as this writer is concerned, however, that is what memoirs are about and com-
ments such as these impart authority to his work. 
Senior Public Servants are probably even more sensitive than politicians to 
what they consider to be their rights. Late in June 1946 Knowles sent for O.C.W. 
Fuhrman, who would accompany him to South Africa as temporary Official Secretary 
pending the arrival of the newly-recruited M.H. Marshall. No doubt having regard to 
his previous occupation as Solicitor-General, Knowles complained about the lack of a 
"'brief' - in the sense that he had no "written instructions".'98 In mid-July when his ship, 
the Nestor, was proceeding around the Australian coast from Sydney to Fremantle, 
calling at Melbourne en route, the absence of a written reply to his representations 
which included inter alia the use of his personal car, a second-hand Daimler, as the 
official car99 and the payment of a mileage allowance, caused him to reprimand Dunk 
smartly: 
I think you will ... agree that when I write you officially on any 
matter I am entitled to an official reply in writing ... I request 
therefore that you will send me by air mail to Fremantle an official 
reply to the letter referred to in my telegram of 13th July.100 
Dunk having in the meantime departed for the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, Alan 
Watt replied as Acting Secretary. In respect of the lack of a 'brief, he said: 
it has not been customary for the Minister for External Affairs to 
issue written instructions to Heads of Missions on taking up their 
duties. This would be particularly difficult as regards current 
problems in South Africa, as Government policy in this connection 
has not yet been determined. I hope, however, that the conversa-
tions held before your departure from Canberra will have thrown 
some light upon the problems themselves and the way in which 
Australian interests are likely to be affected. Instructions on par-
ticular matters will, of course, be telegraphed by the Minister from 
time to time as required. Io I 
98 AA, A1838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Fuhrman/Secretary, 27 June 1946. (Handwritten.) Such complaints, 
which continue to this day, were present from the beginnings of modern diplomacy in the fifteenth 
century, as were those about ambassadors' 'pecuniary embarrassment'. See Mattingly, Renaissance 
Diplomacy, p. ll l. 
99 Mervyn Knowles writes (11September1995) that his father acquired the Daimler, a 1939 model 
that had been on blocks for most of the war for some £1800 because of the projected six to nine month 
delay before delivery of an official car. In the event the_ latter (a Cadillac) was delivered in March 
194 7. The Daimler was sold for £850 after Knowles's death. 
ioo AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Knowles/Dunk, 16 July 1946. 
101 Ibid., Watt/Knowles, 24 July 1946. From the time of John F. Kennedy American Presidents have 
issued their Ambassadors abroad with letters of instruction. D. Swartz, 'Make the Ambassador 
Responsible for What the CIA is Doing', International Herald Tribune, 31October1995, p. 10. 
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Anticipating, perhaps, that he was not going to be furnished with a brief, 
Knowles had already declared that, in the matter of reporting, he proposed sending 
Evatt despatches 'concerning matters dealt with by me or calling for report' at fourteen 
day intervals or more frequently if the situation required. 102 Gough Whitlam rightly 
described Knowles as a 'relentless worker' 103 and in the sixteen months he spent in 
South Africa before his death he seems personally to have generated more than ninety 
per cent of the some one hundred-and-sixty despatches addressed to Evatt from the 
High Commission in South Africa.104 In fact, Knowles was the most active Australian 
head of mission in South Africa up to 1961. He was focussed in his activities and made 
the best use of his time. Thus a four hour journey by Skymaster from Johannesburg to 
Cape Town saw him writing 'about 30 pages of a scribbling block, covering two des-
patches ... besides looking out a good deal, and following our course on the map which 
I had brought with me'. 105 According to his son he took on 'with almost missionary 
zeal the task of informing South Africans about Australia' which 
involved carting Australian films and projector all over the coun-
try for showing to dignitaries and, indeed, almost anyone who 
expressed interest. . . . In Pretoria and Capetown he used this pro-
cedure to entertain Minister, officials and foreign representatives 
and inform them about the other country 'down under•. 106 
102AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Knowles/Dunk, 3 July 1946. 
103 ADB, Vol. 9, p. 623. Mervyn Knowles, Sir George's son, provides an indication of his father's 
capacity for work in 'Canberra in the early government period', Canberra Historical Journal, New 
Series, No. 19, March 1987, pp. 3-8. 
104 They are contained in bound volumes in the series A4231/2, Pretoria 1946 and 1947. There were 
66 despatches in second half of 1946 and 85 in 194 7 up to the time of Knowles death, some quite 
lengthy. 
105 Diary entry, 7 June 1947, p. 388. I am obliged to Mr Mervyn Knowles for sending this to me 
under cover of his letter of 16 March 1995. 
106 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 7 June 1994. Viljoen was not so fortunate. Treasury turned down his pre-
departure request for a 16 mm. sound projector. BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Pohl/Treasury, 8 March and 
Treasury/External Affairs, 22 March 194-9. I am grateful to Mr Knowles for providing me with copies 
of reports illustrative of Sir George's public relations work from the following South African 
newspapers: Die Suiderstem, 10 January 1947; Oudtshoorn Courant, 9 April 1947; Eastern Province 
Herald, 9 April 194 7; Oudtshoorn Observer, 10 April 194 7; Grocott's Daily Mail (Grahamstown), 11 
April 1947; The Dai~y Representative (Queenstown), 14 April 1947; Diamond Fields Advertiser 
(Kimberley), 21June1947. 
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The matter of a brief was next raised by Gilchrist when he acted as High 
Commissioner in the late 1950s. He did so by way of a report on the Canadian practice 
of issuing new heads of mission with a Letter of Instructions. That was a 'massive 
document' running to '25 foolscap pages of single spaced typescript, plus a dozen 
pages of annexes' which included background on a wide variety of subjects. Its very 
size led to its substitution in 1957 by the Letter of Appointment which outlined 
'Canada's main interests in the country . . . important tasks concerning the Post, and 
other matters of immediate concern', consigning matters of detail to a 'loose-leaf Post 
Book issued to each Post'. 107 In drawing attention to the Canadian practice Gilchrist 
unwittingly echoed Sole's contemporary complaint, in effect the professional foreign 
service officer's lament which extends back to fourteenth and fifteenth century Euro-
pean diplomacy: 108 
On the occasion of my departure to take up duty in this post I was 
unable to obtain from senior officers any indication of the lines of 
Prime Ministerial or Ministerial interest in either the region or the 
post. ... If any formulation of Australian policy at any level with 
regard to South Africa exists, it has not been communicated to this 
Mission. 109 
Then in charge of departmental administration, J.C.G. Kevin countered with: 
'Our usual practice is to give oral briefing to senior officers proceeding to posts ab-
road, and as a general rule we think this preferable to the more formalised Canadian 
practice of issuing a letter of instruction.'110 (It also had the advantage of keeping off 
the record superficial briefings exposing a lack of knowledge of the subject or error-
ridden ones.) Gilchrist followed up on his return to Canberra after his posting and, 
thanks to his persistence, O.L. Davis, was supplied with 'guidance notes' shortly after 
his arrival in 1959.111 
Casey, the Minister of External Affairs, also corresponded with him. 112 Casey 
had written to him on 20 March. Davis replied on 3 April. Casey's 29 May letter 
referred to Davis's 3 April letter. Casey noted on the coversheet which forwarded the 
107 AA, Al838/l, 1348/5, Memo. 657, Gilchrist/DEA, 13 December 1957, paras. 2, 7 and Al838/1, 
201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, Lee/Kevin, 3 February 1958. Working through an agent it did not prove possible to 
trace copies of the Letters of Instructions and Appointment in the Canadian Archives. 
108 See Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 111. 
109 AA, A1838/l, 1348/5, Memo. 657, Gilchrist/DEA, 13 December 1957, para. 8. 
110 Ibid., 201110/6/1, Pt. 1, Kevin/ Australian High Commission, Pretoria, 4 February 1958. 
111 Ibid., Memo. 140, Heydon/High Commissioner, 22 May 1959, Attachment, 'Guidance notes for 
Australian High Commission', 22 May 1959. 
112 Ibid., Casey/Davis, 29 May 1959. 
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draft to him 'This is a good letter'. 113 The matter on which Davis particularly sought 
guidance was how far he should go in 'trying to persuade South Africa to retain its link 
with the crown and the Commonwealth' (3 April). Casey replied on 29 May: 'Our 
reason for preferring South Africa to remain a monarchy is basically sentimental, as is 
the Afrikaner nationalists' desire for a republic'. On the other hand, there was 
in the Union a large English-speaking minority of British origin, 
with whom we have a great deal in common. Under a republic 
based on extreme Afrikaner Calvinist nationalism, this English-
speaking minority would almost certainly exert less influence in 
the politics of Southern Africa, and might undergo much pressure 
to accept assimilation into Afrikanerdom, or otherwise suffer 
politically as a group. 
There was also the matter of South Africa breaking its constitutional link with 
Australia. Another aspect was the attitude of the non-white majority. The South 
African government held that the republican question was of no interest to non-whites. 
While their views were not yet clear, 'many of them seem to regard it as of secondary 
importance'. 114 
The guidance notes, Casey's letters (two) and a reply by A.H. Tange, the 
Secretary for External Affairs, to a letter Davis had sent him115 all appear to have been 
drafted by Gilchrist. Their message accordingly bears his stamp: 
Australia's interests would best be served by South Africa having a 
stable, progressive pro-Western Government which caused the 
least possible irritation to Asian and other African countries. 2. 
Insofar as the Union Government has promoted economic devel-
opment and successfully checked Communism at home, and has 
morally supported the West abroad, it has acted in accord with 
Australian interests. 3. On the other hand, the government's han-
dling of racial problems has strongly (and to some degree 
unnecessarily) antagonised not only African and Asian but most 
European and American opinion.116 
Viljoen was better served than Knowles in the matter of a 'brief because it was 
then South African practice (according to Forsyth and perhaps confined to non-career 
113 AA, Al838/2, 201111/1, Pt. 3, Heydon/Minister, 30 April 1959. 
114 AA, Al838/I, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, Casey/Davis, 29 May 1959. 
115 Ibid., Davis!Tange, 8 April 1959; Tange/Davis, 28 May 1959. A copy of Gilchrist's draft of 
Tange's letter is on Al838/2, 201/1111, Pt. 3 
116 
'Guidance notes for Australian High Commission', 22 May 1959, paras. 1-3. The 'and to some 
degree unnecessarily' implies a measure of justification. 
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appointees) to provide heads of new missions 'with a set of general directives and 
background papers covering the more important aspects' of the subjects with which 
they would be concerned. It was expected that much of his time would 'be taken up in 
promoting a sympathetic understanding of the Union's problems', in which respect 
'You will yourself be able to judge what particular methods should be followed in 
achieving this object, but you will no doubt refer to this Department for advice and 
guidance where necessary'. 117 
Ironically, Sole drafted this letter and he had a hand in preparing the series of 
fourteen relatively comprehensive briefing papers which accompanied it. The subjects 
covered included 'Australia and the United Nations', 'Australian attitude towards the 
Indian question in South Africa', 'The White Australia policy' and 'Communism in Aus-
tralia'. Conceding that 'Our information in regard to Australia's attitude towards the 
black, brown and yellow races is rather limited', the 'White Australia' paper inter alia 
required Viljoen to report 'how the policy can be reconciled with the Human Rights 
declaration which the Australians championed to such an extent at the recent [UN] 
General Assembly Session'. Some years later, though, the Australians were under the 
impression that 
A South African Head of Mission suffers from the fact that he 
receives little in the way of advice or instruction from his Gov-
ernment. The South African High Commissioner in London is 
probably an exception or so it struck Stirling and myself during 
the war-years; the South African Ambassador at Washington is 
not an exception i.e. he is given very little political information 
from home and he is allowed a minimum of initiative. l l 8 
Trade was the second of the four points mentioned in the Cabinet submission 
of 29 October 1945. Australia had a Trade Commissioner (G.R.B. Patterson) in place 
in Johannesburg and an Assistant Trade Commissioner (AB. Millard) in Cape Town 
by mid-194 7 .119 What Mervyn Knowles calls a 'minor difficulty' arose because Millard, 
a Colonel, had outranked Patterson, a Major, during the war. 120 Sir George Knowles 
117 BTS, 1125/lA, Vol. 1, Forsyth/Viljoen, 19 May 1949. 
118 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, Record of conversation Oldham/Hamilton, 15 October 1957. For 
that reason Oldham felt 'it may be of help in furthering Australian relations with South Africa to give 
Mr. Hamilton non.;,::onfidential information'. His views on South African Ambassadors being allowed 
a minimum of initiative, even if incorrect, foreshadowed what Munger said on the subject. Munger, 
South African Foreign Policy, pp. 26-27. 
119 AA, Al838/l, 1348/9, DENAustralian High Commission in South Africa and DEA/External 
Affairs Officer, London, both dated 23 April 1947. 
120 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 4 April 1995. 
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had stressed trade on his arrival, mentioning his intention of opening information 
offices in Pretoria and Cape Town to 'tell South Africans about Australian business and 
trade'. 121 The Australian Trade Office was also operative in the British colonies in 
Southern and Eastern Africa which was reflected in its designation from March 1948. 
The Cabinet had approved Patterson's appointment the previous November. 122 All in 
all, nine Trade Commissioners and Assistant Trade Commissioners represented Aus-
tralia in South Africa between 1947 and 1961. (See Appendix I). 
The salaries of some of these people were elevated. Six months before the 
retirement of the third High Commissioner, Hodgson, in July 1957, Casey put up a 
submission to Cabinet recommending an increase in his salary from £A2500 to £A3500 
which would in tum raise his retirement benefits. He said that the Trade Commissioner 
in South Africa was paid in the range £A2603 to £A2933 and it seemed 'anomalous 
that the High Commissioner should be paid less than one of his staft'. 123 And Hodgson 
had been Secretary for External Affairs for ten years. Crocker implies, in fact, that it 
was not uncommon for Trade Commissioners to be paid more than their ambassadors: 
'In order to keep the emoluments of Trade Commissioners secret an accounts section 
was set up separate from that of the embassy and as far as possible the Trade Com-
missioner office was kept outside of the embassy building'. 124 
South Africa followed suit with its own trade representation only in 1961 inter 
alia as a result of suggestions from Australian quarters that it do so. 125 It did not seem 
to lose much by the lack of a representative - for much of the 1950s the trade balance 
was in its favour. 126 In 1963 the Australian Trade Commissioner observed that without 
121 The Star (Johannesburg), 15 August 1946; Rand Daily Mail, 22 August 1946. 
122 AA, Al838/l, 1270/9, Pt. 1, Thomson/DEA, 22 November 1946. 
123 AA, A4926, XMI, Vol. 21, Submission NO. 512, 23 January 1957. 
124 Crocker, Travelling back, p.192. Domestic politics played a role in this as it did in South Africa in 
the 1970s in respect of relations between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information. 
Relations between Australian External Affairs officials and Trade Commissioners who then resorted 
under the Department of Commerce and Agriculture were demarcated in 1945. See AA, Al068, 
M47/21/2/4, 'The relationship of officers of the Department of External Affairs and Commerce and 
Agriculture at posts outside Australia'. This document was sent to Knowles in South Africa at his 
request. AA, A1838/1, 1348/9, I. 10281, 22 May 1947; A1068, M47/21/2/4, 0. 8405, 26 May 1947; 
and A1838/l, 1348/9, Burton/Official Secretary, Cape Town, 26 May 1947. , 
125 See BCB, Vol. 9, 15/34, Vol. 1, Anderson/Olivier, 23 October 1958. 
126 For five of the eight years between 1947/48 and 1954/55. Also in 1957/58 and 1958/59. AA, CP 
54/1/1, 363/F/2, Balance of trade with Union of South Africa. n.d.; A1838/2, 201/10/.2, Supplement 
No. 2 to Trade Policy Report No. 9/1955, p. I; A1838/2, 774/1, Pt. 2, 'Australian Trade with South 
Africa', n.d. and 'Australia's interest in South Africa', n.d. 
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wheat, which South Africa had been importing large quantities, the trade balance 
would be well in the latter's favour.121 
As with the proposal to exchange High Commissioners, the establishment of 
the Australian trade office was ill-considered and its existence hardly justified the 
expense. Crocker's criticism of the Australian Trade Commissioner Service as 'an 
expensive, privileged, highly mixed, and almost entirely useless, excrescence'128 may, 
therefore, not have been without significance as regards the South African part of its 
operation. For it was reported after the office had been operating for eight years: 'As 
South Africa is self-sufficient in most of Australia's principal exports, we have not been 
able to develop a substantial export trade with that country'. 129 That was because 
'Australia and the Union of South Africa [had] similar types of economies and [were] 
natural competitors in some products'. BO 
Four years after that the new High Commissioner, Davis, was informed that the 
'economies of Australia are competitive, rather than complementary. The value of their 
trade with each other is small'.131 In the result, 'Australian trade with South Africa 
never reached one per cent of either exports or imports'. 132 In 1963 and 1964, for 
instance, exports amounted to 0. 9 per cent and 0. 7 per cent respectively of total 
exports and imports to 0.8 per cent of total imports in both years. 133 
By virtue of similar conditions South Africa was Australia's best market for 
agricultural (including horticultural and viticultural) machinery, taking 46.21 per cent 
in 1953/54 and 31.21 per cent in 1954/55 of the latter's exports. But in those years to-
tal exports to South Africa amounted to only 0.43 and 0.37 per cent respectively of 
Australia's global exports. 134 Similar percentages characterised Australia's export trade 
with South Africa for decades thereafter. At the time South African exports to Austra-
lia included diamonds - industrial and gem, asbestos, fish, peanut oil and (of all things) 
127 A9421, 112/3, Pt. 1, Chapman/Brook, 2 May 1963. 
128 Crocker, Travelling back, p. 192. 
129 AA, A1838/2, 201/10/.2, Supplement No. 2 to Trade Policy Report No. 9/1955, p. 1. 
130 D.F. Nicholson, Australia's trade relations: an outline history of Australia's overseas trading 
arrangements (Melbourne, 1955), p. 210. 
131 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/2, Guidance notes for Australian High Commission, 22 May 1959, p. 1. 
132 R.H. Wagenberg, Commonwealth reactions to South Africa's racial policy 1948-1961 (Unpub-
lished PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1966), p. 78. 
133 AA, A9421/1, 202112/1, 'Draft reply to Questionnaire A/AC.14/L.4'. 
134 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/2, Supplement No. 2 to Trade Policy Report No. 9/1955, p. 1. 
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wattle bark extract. 135 Apart from trade there was also the matter of Australian 
investment in South Africa which related primarily to the establishment of branches or 
subsidiaries of existing Australian companies. 
In 1957 the High Commission estimated that Australian capital invested in this 
way amounted to £A5 million or £A6 million. The companies concerned included 
Henry Jones & Co. (canning and jam-making), Sydney Clow & Co. (motor vehicle 
distributors), National Mutual Life Assurance Co. and Queensland Insurance Co. The 
climate for medium term investment was considered attractive. Rembrandt Tobacco 
maintained the only large South African subsidiary in Australia. Interestingly, South 
Africa was seen as a 'potential minor source of investment funds, mainly from persons 
insuring against future political upheavals in Southern Africa'. 136 
Trade representation usually, though this is not essential, goes hand in hand 
with diplomatic representation, the trade people enjoying the benefit of diplomatic 
ranks and diplomatic privileges. In order to close the ears of the diplomatic corps to 
the siren call of Johannesburg, however, South Africa required recipients of diplomatic 
privileges to reside in Pretoria and to move to Cape Town for the Parliamentary ses-
sion. Living in Johannesburg and, at least initially in Cape Town, the Australian Trade 
Commissioners had no diplomatic status and received 'only very limited consular 
privileges'. 137 
Late in 1954 Forsyth told Hodgson that 'Existing legislation does not provide 
for the grant of customs privileges to persons holding the designations of Commercial 
Counsellor or Commercial Secretary unless they are resident and function in Pretoria 
and are accorded diplomatic status'.138 Another Australian in an anomalous position 
was the young Consular Officer or Attache in Cape Town. For four years the High 
Commission laboured to have him accorded privileges beyond those relating to first 
entry until, in 1957, he was granted duty-free importation of goods for his own use. 139 
Living and working as they did in Canberra the South Africans did not have 
that problem. Nor would they have experienced it if individual sections, even the High 
135 Ibid., Guidance notes for Australian High Commission, 22 May 1959, p. 2. 
136 Ibid., 774/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 584, Gilchrist/DEA, 13 November 1957. 
137 AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Hodgson/Casey, 12 October 1953. 
138 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Forsyth/Hodgson, 23 November 1954. 
139 AA, Al838/l, 1348/l, Annual Report 1957, Part A, p. 12, para. ll(b). 
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Commission itself, were established in Sydney or Melbourne, because the Australian 
government did not insist on diplomatic missions basing themselves in the Federal 
Capital. It could hardly do that when (in the early 1950s) most government depart-
ments still had their headquarters in Sydney or in Melbourne. (See Chapter Six). Even 
so, when the State Information Office, perhaps on the initiative of E.M. Rhoodie who 
took up the post of Information Attache in the High Commission in October 1957, 
thought of basing him in Sydney, Gilchrist made use of the opportunity to suggest that 
he 
press his Department of Ex1emal Affairs to grant the Australian 
Attache in Cape Town full diplomatic or consular privilege; 
otherwise, he might find that we had decided to apply strict reci-
procity in his case and thus exclude him from privilege except on 
initial entry. 140 
In the event, on the recommendation of J.K. Uys, the second High Commissioner, the 
Information Attache remained in Canberra. 
The establishment of relations on a residential basis marked a high point in 
Australian-South African bilateral relations. Another one was the establishment of the 
air link in 1952, also on Australia's initiative. The original motivation had been the need 
for alternative air communications with the United Kingdom in the event of war in the 
Middle East, eg. 
We have ... long recognised the importance of South Africa to 
Australia as constituting the main link in one of our life-lines to 
the United Kingdom. We have recently taken concrete steps to 
establish an air route between Australia and South Africa. This 
route, having [a] stop at Cocos Island, is important not only in 
peacetime by bringing the two countries closer together commer-
cially and culturally but also as a means for close co-operation in 
time of war. 141 
The Australian airline Qantas had a monopoly on the route, known as the Wal-
laby Service, until 1957 when South African Airways (SAA) commenced its own fort-
nightly service to Perth. The five year delay was partly connected with the reluctance 
of the Australian Civil Aviation authorities to grant SAA landing rights at Perth, the 
desired terminus. That for two reasons: the weight of the DC 7Bs SAA proposed using 
140 AA, AI838, 224/3, Memo. 251, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 June 1957. 
141 AA AI838, 201/10/7, Pt. I, Undated notes, presumably for a speech on the occasion of Viljoen's 
departure. 
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on the route and the fact that no foreign airline was then flying into Perth. The second 
objection had less to do with SAA than a reluctance to grant cabotage rights in Perth 
to the British airline BOAC - the right to pick up passengers in there and fly them to 
another point in Australia.142 
For years Qantas and SAA, which entered into a pool arrangement, flew the 
route at a loss. In Qantas's first year of operations it lost £A150 000. The total loss for 
1954/55 was 'something in excess of £150 000'.143 By September 1958 South African 
Airways was losing £A8000 per month and Qantas £A5000. 144 Qantas welcomed the 
SAA flight as a way of reducing its own losses and the partnership arrangement was 
for years loss sharing rather than profit sharing. Qantas's 1963/64 estimates anticipated 
a total revenue of £570 000 with operating costs of around £507 000 which did not, 
however, take account of fixed charges estimated at £176 000. The loss had been an-
ticipated. In 1950 the Minister for Air told Menzies that the government would prob-
ably have to subsidise Qantas by up to £Al 00 000 annually.145 
The historian of Qantas wrote later that the service 'was important in political 
and strategic terms but initially attracted low traffic density and, without a subsidy on 
the mail rate, sustained regular losses'. A later volume of his work called the service 
'politically valuable', 146 presumably meaning for Australia. It may have started that 
way, but before long South Africa was the principal beneficiary of whatever political 
advantage there was. The longer range of jet aircraft was probably among the reasons 
why, by 1963, the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee could not 'envisage circum-
stances in which the air fields and facilities of the Republic of South Africa would be of 
significance to Australia in wartime'.147 In 1946, however, it had been held that for 
'strategic reasons alone ... it would seem vital for Australia that South Africa should 
remain within the Commonwealth'.148 
142 AA, Al838/l, 716/50/6/1, Pt. 2, 0. 10497, 5 August 1956 and 0. 13828, 17 October 1956. BOAC 
then had Darwin/Sydney cabotage rights, a less valuable route. 
143 Ibid., Fogarty/DEA, 4 April 1956. 
144 Ibid., Pt. 3, Gilchrist/DEA, 18 September 1958. Schoeman was his source. 
145 
'The Airlink', David Tothil/'s South African Opinion JI (Canberra, 1991), p. 119. The article first 
appeared in the 29-30 November 1991 edition of The Weekend Australian. It was based on original 
Australian documents. 
146 J. Gunn, Challenging Horizons: Qantas 1939-1954 (St. Lucia, Qld., 1987), p. 329 and High 
Corridors: Qantas 1954-1970 (St. Lucia, 1988), p. 186. 
147 AA, A942 l, 224/1, agendum 41/1963, 'The strategic significance of the Republic of South Africa 
up to 1973', p. 6, para. 20. 
148 AA, A1067/l, M46/21/7, 'Nole on South African-Indian relations', 25 June 1946, p. 3. 
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By the early 1960s Qantas itself was questioning the value of the service in 
both commercial and political terms. In respect of the latter it feared that continuing to 
fly the South African route would impact negatively on its 'highly important Kangaroo 
route service to London via Asia and the Middle East' not to mention its 'service to 
Manila, Hong Kong and Tokyo'. 
These services ... pass through areas in which there is a deeply felt 
antagonism to South Africa because of the 'apartheid' policy. 
Qantas is seriously concerned that restrictions could be placed on 
these services as a reprisal for the Qantas services continuing to 
operate to South Africa and in partnership with South African 
Airways. 149 
Both the Department of External Affairs and Australia's Ambassador to South 
Africa, J.C.G. Kevin, took fright, the latter recommending against a Qantas withdrawal 
from the South African route even for commercial reasons. Garfield Barwick, the 
Minister of External Affairs, suggested to Menzies that Qantas confine any discussions 
with South Africa to 'financial and civil aviation considerations alone'. 150 The South 
African authorities should not be given the impression that the Australian government 
'had sought to terminate the Qantas service because of pressure of the Afro/ Asian 
bloc'. 151 
The inaugural flights in 1952 and 1957 provided each country's Minister for air 
transportation, the South African Ministers of Transport, P.O. Sauer and B.J. 
Schoeman, and the Australian Ministers for Civil Aviation or Air, H.L. Anthony and S. 
Paltridge, with the opportunity to visit the other. Sauer and Anthony did so in 1952 
and Schoeman and Paltridge in 1957. Groups of journalists were also included in the 
passenger lists for these flights on the (perhaps mistaken) assumption that press cov-
erage promoted bilateral understanding. The tendency, however, was to focus on each 
country's exotica, political exotica in South Africa's case. (See Chapter Five.) 
The establishment of the air link led to the expansion of Australian territory152 
because of the need for a refuelling stop between Perth and Mauritius. Although the 
route from Sydney and Melbourne to Cape Town via Kerguelen Island in the Southern 
Indian Ocean, a French possession, was shorter, that via the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, 
149 AA, A942 l/2, 53/1, Pt. 2, Anderson/DEA, 17 September 1963, p. 3, para. 11. 
150 Ibid., Kevin/Harry, 25 October 1963. 
151 Ibid., Barwick/Menzies, 25 September 1963. 
152 See BCB, Vol. 13, 27/4, Uys/SEA, 23 June 1955. 
157 
Chapter Three: The High Commissions 
in latitude 12° 5' S and longitude 90° 55' E, was more suitable. Chifley himself had 
called it 'the best route having regard to strategic, political, operational, commercial 
and migration aspects'. 153 During the First World War North Cocos was the scene of a 
naval engagement between the Australian cruiser Sydney and the German light cruiser 
Emden which brought about the latter's destruction. 154 
Apart from their situation in a more temperate zone, the islands were a British 
possession administered by the Straits Settlement at Singapore and, after negotiations, 
the United Kingdom transferred them to Australia. The Australian Treasury insisted on 
that before it would approve expenditure on upgrading the wartime airstrip to receive 
four-engined propeller-driven transcontinental aircraft. Before Australia took posses-
sion, most of the population was relocated, supposedly voluntarily, to Borneo, a 
development which failed to attract United Nations attention. If it had, the infelicitous 
reference in a later publication to shipping out 'the surplus native population'155 would 
not have been favourably received. Nor would the recommendation of Australia's Ac-
ting Commissioner in Singapore, Critchley, who undertook an inspection in loco in 
August/September 1951, against the employment of local islanders on the airstrip. 
He argued that the Governor of Singapore should be supported 'as far as prac-
ticable in moving Cocos Islanders to North Borneo and import suitable labour on an 
appropriate contract basis'. 156 Contemporary British fears that the transfer of sover-
eignty would not be well received in 'the South Asian Dominions because it would be 
represented as a deal in colonial peoples' were not born out by events. 157 In later years, 
inspired by its Afro-Asian members, the UN would be hypersensitive to such issues. 
When the jet airliners of the 1960s bypassed the islands, their importance declined. 
Another high point, if for the South Africans more than for the Australians, was 
the visit Menzies and his wife and daughter paid South Africa in July 1953 after the 
coronation of Queen Elizabeth II as guests of the South African government. The 
153 AA, Al838/l, 716/27/7/1, Pt. 1, Chifley/McLarty, 2 December 1948. 
154 E. Scott, A Short History of Australia (Seventh ed., revised by H. Burton. Melbourne, 1964 
(1916)), p. 358. 
155 B. Carroll, Australian Aviators: an illustrated history (North Ryde, NSW, 1980), p. 141. An item 
in The If/est Australian (Perth) of 15 December 1949 ('Cocos natives migrate to Borneo') held that the 
islands could comfortably maintain only 600 persons. Their population was then 1800. 
156 AA, A2910/l, 406/5/13, Pt. 1, Critchley/DEA, 4 September 1951, p. 4. 
157 AA, Al838/l, &16/27/7/1, Pt. 1, 'For the Secretary: Cocos Islands', 26 October 1950. 
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invitation was of two years' standing.158 It was the first visit by an Australian Prime 
Minister since W.M. Hughes had touched at Cape Town and Durban in August 1919 
on his return to Australia after the Paris Peace Conference. Although a draft of a 
background memorandum K. T. Kelly of the Australian High Commission prepared for 
Menzies held that he was the first Australian Prime Minister ever to visit South 
Africa, 159 it was in fact the third such visit. Besides Hughes, Andrew Fisher spent two 
months in the country in 1910 on the occasion of the Union celebrations. 160 
Early in June 195 7 the ship bearing Menzies to the United Kingdom called for 
some hours at Cape Town. Menzies was shown the Simonstown naval dockyard and 
Strijdom entertained him to lunch at Groote Schuur. He also had a meeting with Roy 
Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation. 161 The continuing 
erosion of South Africa's respectability towards the end of the 1950s prompted him to 
sidestep a further invitation early in Verwoerd's premiership. 162 To this day, no serving 
South African head of government has visited Australia. 
The 1953 visit was marred, not so much for Menzies himself as for his fellow-
countrymen, by remarks Malan made in the course of an extempore speech at the lunch 
he hosted at the Mount Nelson Hotel in Cape Town on 9 July 1953. 163 He was 
158 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/11/1, Lee/Official Sec., Cape Town, 26 May 1952. See also the attachments 
to McKenna/Lee, 16 May 1952, on the same file. 
159 AA, A9421/l, 202/l, Pt. 1, Memo. 185, Kelly/SEA, 24 June 1953, p. 9. Hodgson had caught up 
with the facts by the time he reported on the "isit. AA, Al838/2, 201/10/11/l, Hodgson/Minister for 
External Affairs, 4 August 1953, para. 2. 
16° Fisher was accompanied by the Canadian Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, R.E. Lemieux, the 
New Zealand Minister of Education, G.O. Fowlds, and the Melbourne journalist Ambrose Pratt. In 
November and December 1910 The Age (Melbourne) published Pratt's reports on their travels under 
the general series title 'South Africa through Australian eyes'. The reports were later published in 
book form, ie., A. Pratt, The Real South Africa. London, 1912. Pratt's work influenced Charles van 
Onselen in his choice of sub-titles for volumes one and two of his work Studies in the Social and 
Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914 (Johannesburg, 1982), ie. New Babylon and New 
Nineveh. 
161 See AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1957, 4/57, Hodgson/Minister of External Affairs, 14 June 1957. 
Hodgson retired less than three weeks later. 
162 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1111, Heydon/Davis, 27 May 1959. See also various items of correspond-
ence between 1959 and 1961 on BCB, Vol. 12, 25/11. 
163 The Mount Nelson Hotel has provided a backdrop for several watermark episodes in the history of 
Australian/South African bilateral relations. At a banquet he hosted at the Mount Nelson for the new 
South African Governor-General, Viscount Gladstone on 9 December 1910, Fisher said: 'We 
Australians - and I speak as the representative of 4 1/2 millions of people - look upon South Africa as 
holding the keys of the East and West. The geographical position of your country renders it of vital 
importance to the Commonwealth [of Australia] that those who occupy South Africa and guide the 
destinies of the Union should maintain British Imperial ideals in their broadest sense inviolate.' AA, 
A2/l, 11/3154. 
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reported to have said the time might come when India (white South Africa's particular 
international bogeyman at the time) would be 'knocking on Australia's door' and if it 
did Menzies could depend on it that South Africa would be Australia's friend. 164 Kelly 
of the High Commission doubted 'whether at the outset of this speech' Malan 'intended 
to make any direct reference to the future relations of India and Australia'. But the 
press naturally seized on this aspect of his speech and it achieved wide publicity in 
South Africa, India, Pakistan and Australia. Excepting some Afrikaans-language 
reporting the reaction was generally negative. 
The Australian historian Fred Alexander, who had spent a sabbatical in the 
Union in 1950, called Malan's remarks an 'extraordinary gaffe'. 165 A correspondent for 
The Herald (Melbourne) said that having a public meal with Malan was 'becoming for 
Commonwealth statesmen what having supper with the Borgias used to be for bygone 
Italian politicians. They never know what they might be asked to swallow - politi-
cally'.166 The Times (London) was more relaxed. Reporting the day Menzies sailed for 
home (10 July), its South African correspondent said that the 'most cordial relations' 
were established between him and Malan at the Coronation conference of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers. It was 'obvious that both Governments are eager for 
the closest cooperation. Dr. Malan went so far in an after-luncheon speech ... as to say 
that if Australia found Asian nations knocking at her door in the future she could count 
on South African friendship'.167 
The British High Commissioner, Sir John Le Rougetel, was also relatively 
relaxed, as was Sir Walter Crocker, Australia's High Commissioner in New Delhi. The 
day after the event, in a personal letter to his colleague at the Commonwealth Rela-
tions Office and eventual successor, Sir Percivale Liesching, Le Rougetel said Malan's 
theme was 
as usual, the importance of preserving white civilisation in South 
Africa. He combined this with the suggestion that South Africa 
164 AA, Al838/2, 169/11/128 Part 1, Kelly/DEA, 15 July 1953. See also BCB, Vol. 11, 20/8, 
Nel/Secretary for External Affairs, 17 July 1953; Die Burger, 10 July 1953 (report & editorial); Rand 
Daily Mail, 11 (report & editorial) & 13 July 1953 (cartoon); The Star (Johannesburg), IO 
(photograph & report) & 11 July (editorial); The Canberra Times, 10, 11, 13 & 14 July; The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 12 July; The West Australian (Perth), 11 July. See also the reports from the 
Australian High Commissioner in New Delhi on AA, Al838/2, 169/11/128 Pt. 1 for an indication of 
how Malan's speech was received in India. 
165 The West Australian (Perth), 20 July 1953. 
166 The Herald (Melbourne), 13 July 1953. 
167 The Times, 11July1953. 
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and Australia were the 'twin sisters of the South' in that they had 
similar and almost simultaneous origins and were confronted with 
similar problems, in particular the thrust of Indian penetration. He 
described Australia, perhaps not very happily, as being divided 
from the rest of Asia by two oceans. 168 
Crocker reported on 14 July that for the first .time in a long time, Australia, more par-
ticularly its immigration policy, was featuring 'as an item of leading interest in the 
Indian press'. However, the reactions were relatively mild and even revealed 'some 
measure of understanding of the Australian position'.169 
That remarks similar to Malan's made by W.M. Hughes in Durban twenty-five 
years earlier, though he refrained from identifying potential enemies, passed without 
comment, points to the difference in political climate. Hughes was reported to have 
said at the Durban Club in August 1919: 'As comrade nations we can depend on each 
other. If South Africa is in danger let her cry out and Australia will come and stand at 
her side. If perchance Australia needs help we will send a shrill "Coo-ee" across the 
leagues of ocean and you will come quickly to her aid. •170 But by 1953 another world 
war had intervened and attitudes had changed. India had taken its place in the interna-
tional firmament and South Africa was deeply enmeshed in its (India-inspired) troubles 
with the League of Nations' successor171, the United Nations. It was, in short, a 
different world. 
As Le Rougetel implied, the purpose of Malan's speech was to demonstrate 
affinity and fraternity with Australia. Paul Sauer had done that the previous year on the 
occasion of his visit to Australia as would Ben Schoeman during his visit in 1957. 
Sauer said: 
I found in Australia two close bonds with South Africa - first, on 
the economic side, their strong backing for a higher gold price, 
and second, keen sympathy and understanding of the Australians 
towards South Africa's efforts at keeping the southern part of 
South Africa white, just as Australia on the southern fringe of 
Asia aims at keeping the continent European. 172 
168 PRO, DO 35/5035, Le Rougetel/Liesching, 10 July 1953. I am grateful to Prof AW. Martin for 
sending me a copy of his transcription of this letter. 
169 AA, A4231/2, India 1953, Despatch No. 18, Crocker/Casey, 14 July 1953. 
170 The West Australian (Perth), 13 August 1919. · 
171 In politics if not in law. 
172 AA. Al838/2, 201/10/1 Pt. l, Extract from South African press telegram dated 20 September 
1952. 
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Five years later Schoeman said in a broadcast over ABC radio: 
the really significant thing about our relationship is that we share 
a common racial, social and spiritual ancestry ... Descended, as we 
are, from the same kind of people, it is only natural that we should 
be attached to similar standards and values in our ways of life. The 
civilisation of the West is our common heritage. 173 
That was after a paragraph had been excised from his text on the recommendation of 
the South African High Commissioner, Hamilton. The Director of the State 
Information Office, P.J.G. Meiring, had sent Hamilton an advance copy of Schoeman's 
remarks, saying that Eric Louw had already approved the text. 174 The paragraph read: 
I think a fair comparison between our respective situations is that 
Australia is a continent on an island and South Africa is an island 
on a continent. What I mean by that is that in many respects we in 
South Africa have closer links with the people of Australia than 
we have with vast masses of people in Africa. In the same way, 
Australians have a closer affinity to South Africans than to the 
teeming masses who inhabit your 'hinterland' in South-East 
Asia. 175 
Hamilton thought the speech 'an excellent bit of work, striking, with one exception, 
just the right notes'. The 'discordant' note was the reference 'to the "teeming masses" of 
South East Asia'. That the idea was 'true in itself might not make it less embarrassing 
to the Australian Government, which in recent years has been making a sustained effort 
to get onto good terms with the governments to the north' .176 
Believing the Schoeman visit to have negative connotations, Gilchrist 
approached it cautiously: 
we shall watch for, and report, any decision by Schoeman to visit 
Australia on the inaugural flight, since a general election in South 
Africa may be only four or five months beyond November, such a 
visit could have political implications which we might wish to 
play down. If he did decide to come over, I would hope that any 
Australian public references could be kept as far as possible to the 
sphere of transportation, without political overtones. 177 
173 BCB, Vol. 13, 27/4 (Vol. II), Australian Broadcasting Commission, Guest of Honour, Hon. B.J. 
Schoeman, 20 November 1957. 
174 Ibid., Meiring/Hamilton, 19 October 1957. 
175 Ibid., Notes for broadcast speech by the Hon. Mr. B.J. Schoeman (Australia: November 1957.) 
176 Ibid., Hamilton/Meiring, 28 October 1957. 
177 AA, Al838/1, 716/50/6/1, Pt.2, Memo.425, Gilchrist/DEA, 22 August 1957. 
162 
Chapter Three: The High Commissions 
What gave rise to that was an interview between Schoeman, Gilchrist and two Qantas 
representatives. Gilchrist's notes recorded Schoeman saying it was 'important for the 
Union to have closer relations with Australia, as a friendly country; he referred to Aus-
tralian support of South Africa in the United Nations'. 178 Gilchrist subsequently 
expressed satisfaction that Schoeman's itinerary did not include Canberra because 'such 
a visit could have political overtones'. 179 
Some of his senior departmental colleagues thought his views unduly negative. 
He had drawn up a set of notes to facilitate the consideration of 'what political advan-
tage may be gained, and what political disadvantage may be avoided, by Mr. 
Schoeman's forthcoming visit'. The Chief of Protocol, AR. Cutler, 180 minuted on the 
covering letter that he did not 'wish to be involved, as he considers that to brief, say, 
DCA181 & PM's182 with material of this nature on a primarily non-political occasion, 
would not be appropriate'. 183 
Around that time Gilchrist also poured cold water on the idea of the South 
African Prime Minister, J.G. Strijdom, paying a goodwill visit to Australia. Hodgson 
had suggested that in a press interview on the occasion of his retirement. The South 
African press made something of it, prompting Gilchrist's comment to Canberra that he 
regarded 'any invitation during the next twelve months to Mr. Strijdom to visit Austra-
lia as very ill-timed' on account of the approaching South African general election. Af-
ter the election, however, there 'might be some value in then inviting him to Australia, 
in the hope of broadening his outlook on Commonwealth and racial matters'. 184 
If South African governments from Malan's time at least until the mid- l 960s 
came to regard Australia as their best friend internationally, the feeling was never 
reciprocated. And perhaps because of the government's lack of experience in interna-
tional affairs, it did not initially demonstrate its feeling of friendship in the most 
obvious way, by appointing a High Commissioner to Australia. 185 Thus a two year five 
178 Jbid., Record of conversation, 16 August 1957. 
179 AA, Al838/l, 716/50/6/1, Pt.2, Annex to memo. 541, 19 October 1957, p.5. 
180 See Chapter Two, p. 90 above. 
181 Department of Civil Aviation. 
182 Prime Minister's Department. 
183 Jbid., Handwritten note on Memo. No.541, Gilchrist/DEA, 19 October 1957. 
184 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/10/1, Pt.I, Memo. 247, Gilchrist/DEA, 13 July 1957. 
185 Despite Malan having told the House of Assembly in 1952 that the High Commissioner's post in 
Australia was 'one of importance'. HA Deb., Vol. 78, 24 April 1952, Col. 4325. 
163 
Chapter Three: The High Commissions 
month interregnum ensued after Viljoen's departure in October 1951, when the High 
Commission was in the charge of Gert Nel, a Second Secretary with thirteen years 
departmental experience and two posts behind him. 
The lengthy absence of a substantive head of mission points to a lack of sub-
stance in a diplomatic relationship. As AR. Cutler, then Australian Chief of Protocol, 
later Governor of New South Wales, observed in respect of the last of the three 
Australian interregnums up to 1961: 'no matter what we do or say the non-appoint-
ment of a High Commissioner basically indicates that the country is not very important 
to us. Therefore my view is that if we regard South Africa seriously, the sooner a High 
Commissioner is appointed the better'. 186 After Nel, the South Africans took care to 
leave no lengthy gaps and three relatively senior career officials were appointed to 
head the mission up to 1961: Uys, AM. Hamilton and H.H. Woodward. 187 
The three interregnums on the Australian side were: November 194 7 to August 
1948; August 1950 to July 1952; and July 1957 to April 1959. The first, caused by 
Knowles's death, saw his Official Secretary, M.H. Marshall, take charge of the mission 
until August 1948. He also acted as High Commissioner from May 1950 to April 1951. 
From that month until July 1952, the High Commission was in the charge consecu-
tively of a Counsellor, J.P. Quinn and a First Secretary, K.T. Kelly. Two other First 
Secretaries, H. Gilchrist and L.E. Phillips, acted as High Commissioner between July 
1957 and April 1959. Besides Knowles, the High Commissioners during the period 
were A Stirling (August 1948 to May 1950), W.R. Hodgson (July 1952 to July 1957) 
and O.L. Davis (April 1959 to June 1962). Davis was succeeded by J.C.G. Kevin, who 
served as Ambassador until his death in 1968. 
Having invested much time and money not to mention emotional capital in the 
careers of its senior officers, bringing them to a level where they are considered worthy 
of head of mission status, Departments of Foreign Affairs are not unnaturally inclined 
to behave as if only the doings of their substantive heads of mission have significance. 
That is even more the case with political appointees. Junior officials who may find 
themselves temporarily heading a mission tend to be viewed in the light of pre- and 
186 AA, Al838/l, 1500/2118/4, Cutler/Kevin, 20 February 1958. He was responding to Gilchrist's rec-
ommendation that the nomination be delayed until after the April 1958 South African general elec-
tion. In the event it was delayed until the follo\\ing year. Memo. 77, Gilchrist/DEA, 24 January 1958. 
187 There was a three month gap between Uys and Hamilton and one of six weeks between Hamilton 
and Woodward. 
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post-castaway 'admirable Crichtons'188 and waived aside as being of little importance. 
Normally that would be the case because interregnums between Ambassadors tend to 
be short, a few weeks or months at most. 
Diplomatic service is an hierarchical occupation - the higher the rank, the 
higher the pay and the more attention outsiders, especially the media, pay a diplomat. 
Yet high rank and high salaries are not measures of achievement. What departments 
tend to overlook is that foreigners regard whoever is the head of mission as the per-
sonification of his government and country. And when a Charge d'Affaires serves in 
that capacity for years securing in the process the confidence of the receiving govern-
ment, the latter tends to regard him as the equal of a substantive head of mission irre-
spective of his position in the order of precedence. 189 
So it was that Nelon the South African side and Marshall, Quinn, and Gilchrist 
on the Australian side, however they were regarded by their own departments, 190 were 
accepted by the receiving government as full representatives of their governments and 
countries. As Acting High Commissioner, together with the Canadian High Commis-
sioner, T.W.L. MacDermot, Marshall accompanied Dr Verwoerd on his first official 
visit as Minister of Native Affairs to the Transkei and Ciskei. The State Information 
Office's press telegram reporting their comments on their return to Cape Town held 
that this was the first time any High Commissioner had visited these areas. Both 
expressed views which would have appalled a later generation of their countries' 
diplomats. On the strength of them, however, the South African government would 
have considered the visits excellent value. The press telegram reported Marshall 
saying: 
the trip was not only interesting, but its educational value could 
hardly be overrated. 'This inspection tour has helped me consider-
ably in better understanding the complexity of the native problem', 
he said. He now appreciates what great efforts were being made to 
improve the natives' way of living and living conditions, and to 
educate the natives, especially in regard to agriculture. 'What 
made a very profound impression on me is the quality of the agri-
cultural soil being made available to the natives', he said. Not only 
the landscape beauty of the soil, but also the richness of it was not-
able. The Transkei and Ciskei made Mr. Marshall recall the rich-
188 After J.M. Barrie's butler of that name. 
189 Charges d' Affaires ad interim come third after Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
and Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary (known simply as Ministers). 
19° From the Australian side Quinn would have been the best thought-ofofthe three. 
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ness of the soil in Southern Victoria in Australia. The soil was not 
only rich, but also well watered. 
Mr. Marshall spoke highly of the Department of Native Affairs 
went about their task. 'They are sincere and enthusiastic in the 
execution of their duties', he said. He had been told that results 
which officials saw of their labours were not always as encour-
aging as they would like them to be. Nevertheless, he had found 
proof of tangible favourable reactions in certain areas. In regard to 
the officials, Mr. Marshall further said that here one apparently 
was not confronted with persons who were in the Department of 
Native Affairs solely for the purpose of livelihood. It was striking 
that these men were infused with an ideal and were working for a 
cause to the best of their abilities. They and the Minister were sin-
cere and earnest in what they were doing for the natives. Yet, 'it 
would appear that as far as the natives were concerned there was, 
to a certain extent, suspicion as to what the European was trying to 
do for them. That suspicion may perhaps be attributed to the less 
advanced stage of development of the native compared to the 
European. The unadvanced mind often by nature was inclined to 
be suspicious of those things to which he was not accustomed', Mr. 
Marshall said. 
In conclusion, Mr. Marshall added that he was extremely grateful 
to the South African Government and Dr Verwoerd (Minister of 
Native Affairs) for being invited to visit these native areas as a 
guest of Dr. Verwoerd. He appreciated it very highly that he was 
put in a position to visit the natives in their real home.191 
If Nel and Gilchrist were not substantive heads of mission, their performance 
en paste was comparable to those who were. On the Australian side, Gilchrist was the 
most active of all heads of mission after Knowles and, not excluding Knowles, prob-
ably the most articulate. 192 Nel in effect succeeded Viljoen and from a practical point 
of view the Australians tended to consider him in his two year five month stint as Ac-
ting High Commissioner (a month longer than Viljoen's) as superior to Viljoen in all 
but rank. There was, however, the question of Australia's status as receiving country 
and they welcomed Uys's appointment. Casey himself announced it. 193 Indeed, at the 
Cabinet lunch for Uys gratification was expressed at his seniority: 'The fact that your 
country has seen fit to appoint to Australia one of its most senior career diplomats is a 
191 AA, Al838/l, 201/2/5, Pt. 2, State Informa:.ion Office/High Commissioner, Canberra, press tele-
gram No. 207, 13 April 1951. 
192 Australians may believe that such an accolade should more properly be bestowed on Quinn or 
Woolcott or even Kelly. However, one can go only by the evidence to hand. 
193 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, DEA, Canberra, PR 101, IO November 1953; The Canberra Times, 11 
November 1953. 
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great compliment to us'. 194 The euphoria wore off and the Australians were relieved 
when Hamilton succeeded Uys three-and-a-half years later. 
Yet, in the absence of significant issues in bilateral relations requiring the atten-
tion of a more experienced and senior officer, the forty year old Nel (when he took 
over as head of mission) was a man for all seasons and what the situation required. A 
bonus from the departmental point of view was that he could not afford to be tempera-
mental, which in any event was not in his nature.195 Nonetheless, in keeping with the 
myopia about 'unanointed' heads of mission and despite having informed Pretoria of the 
compliments paid Nel (see Chapter Two), Uys wrote in the year of his arrival: 
for the first time since the establishment of this office, a career of-
ficer is Head of this Mission. As can be rightly expected, he 
reports extensively, as the mail schedules for the past months will 
prove. He also actively takes part in the numerous administrative 
duties of the office, not to mention his representative activities in 
and outside Canberra, all of which place extra duties on the secre-
tarial and typing staff. 196 
We come now to the internal working of a diplomatic mission. Especially in 
respect of foreign language posts, Sole emphasises the 
key role of the locally recruited staff. If one has an efficient, loyal 
and dedicated local staff, it makes all the difference in the world -
not only to the efficiency of the mission, but even more to the im-
age of the Embassy. This is absolutely vital. However necessary it 
may be at times to economise on South African staff, one should 
never be penny pinching on local staff. On the contrary, one 
should attract the highest possible calibre of personneI. 197 
That is in fact applicable not only to foreign language ones but to all posts. 198 For with 
the exception of the missions of the former communist countries which filled all their 
posts with home-based staff, 199 no mission can function without locally-recruited or 
194 AA, Al838/238, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, 'Draft speech of welcome to the High Commissioner for the 
Union of South Africa', 1954. 
195 As mentioned in Chapter Two, the worm turned eventually. 
196 BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2, Uys/SEA, 1 October 1954. He was explaining his staff difficulties. 
197 Reminiscences, p. 155. 
198 See Clark, C01ps Diplomatique, pp. 66-67. 
199 That was certainly the case with the Soviet Consulate in South Africa until the time of its closure 
in 1956. See HA Deb., Vol. 85, 3 May 1954, Col. 4405. 
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locally-engaged staff 200 While they are usually nationals of the rece1vmg state, 
nationals of the sending state sometimes obtain temporary employment in that way. 
Locally-recruited staff usually outnumber transferred or home-based officers 
who are costly to maintain in diplomatic splendour. Apart from their salaries and 
allowances to enable them to associate on an equal footing with the elite of the count-
ries where they are stationed, and for the same reason, the housing costs of the home-
based are usually very high. In 1988 two thousand locally-engaged staff were working 
in Australia's overseas missions and eight hundred Australia-based staff, a 60/40 ratio. 
At the same time 1770 officers were serving with the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade in Canberra. 201 In 1995 2530 British diplomats abroad were supported by 
7400 locally-engaged staff,202 a ratio of 34/66. 
If this was not always the practice, some countries now rely on locally-
recruited staff to perform functions previously undertaken by transferred officers, 
thereby holding the numbers of the latter to a minimum. This is in order to reduce 
costs. The conditions of service for locally-engaged people vary from country to coun-
try. They accord with local legislation and practice, but are often superior to those laid 
down for the workforce of the country concerned. Many mission employees are mar-
ried women or otherwise birds of passage who work in an Embassy for a few years 
before moving on. 
That was very much the case with the local staff in the Australian and South 
African High Commissions during the period under consideration. Their functions were 
the traditional ones of archivist or registry clerk, typist, chauffeur, messenger, 
accountant and gardener. Perks attaching to employment with the Australian High 
Commission included (in 1959) a 'disturbance allowance' of some £SAIS monthly to 
compensate for the annual move to Cape Town for the Parliamentary session.203 That 
effectively increased monthly salaries. Another one was that the biannual trek was 
undertaken in the luxury ~Jue Train. 
At times there was a considerable turnover, involving transferred staff as well. 
Thus the Australian High Commission's annual report for 1957 indicated that the turn-
200 
'Locally-recruited' is South African terminology; 'locally-engaged' Australian. 
201 I. Castles, ed., Year Book Australia 1988, No. 71, Canberra, 1988. 
202 The Gla.sgow Herald, 3 July 1995. ('Diplomats on last round of cocktails?') 
203 AA, Al838/1, 1348/5, 'Post Report: South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) February 1959', p. 11. 
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over since the end of 1956 had been such that only two people were still on strength a 
year later - one home-based officer, the acting High Commissioner (Gilchrist), and one 
locally recruited typist, Miss M.J. McCraw,2°4 who had been with the High 
Commission for five years. One locally-engaged stenographer, Miss C.M.L. Mellor, 
who spent fifteen months with the High Commission in 1956-57, resigned to marry 
Ray Swart MP. Gilchrist was the best man. She was a 'serious member' of the Black 
Sash and Gilchrist was concerned that this would compromise the High Commission's 
diplomatic standing. But 'she was discreet•.2os 
Including one who was employed at the Trade Commission in Johannesburg in 
1954, it has been possible so far to identify fifty locally-engaged employees of the 
Australian High Commission between 1946 and 1961. (See Appendix I below). At 
least two, Misses S. Stuart and G.M. Wheaton, were Australian citizens.206 The 
turnover was less at the South African High Commission in Canberra. Seventeen 
locally-recruited staff have so far been identified as working there between 1949 and 
1961. Appendix I also lists both countries' home-based officers. In some instances, 
locally-recruited employees make a career of their service with an Embassy. That was 
not the case with either the Australians or the South Africans in the 1940s and 1950s. 
In Buenos Aires, however, one employee worked for the South African mission, which 
was initially a Consulate-General then a Legation then an Embassy, for forty-three 
years, from its opening in 193 9 until his own retirement in 1982. And at the South 
African High Commission in London the local staff are members of the South African 
Public Service. 
In the beginning a locally-recruited temporary clerical assistant supervised the 
Australian High Commission's record system, apart from which he undertook coding 
and cypher work. That was considered unsatisfactory even in the relaxed atmosphere 
then prevailing and the 'early appointment from Australia of a permanent Cypher Clerk' 
was requested. 207 That did not come to pass and until 1953 the locally-engaged Aus-
tralian, Miss Wheaton, seems to have been occupied with coding and cyphering. 208 
Coding and cyphering were undertaken subsequently by the High Commissioner's Aus-
2o4 Ibid., 1348/I, Pt. I, Annual Report 1957, Part A, p. 1. 
205 Letter, 15 December 19i4. 
206 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 4 April 1995; AA, Al838/1, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Memo. 73, Hodgson/DEA, 4 
March 1953. 
201 Ibid., Marshall/DEA, 12 December 1947. 
Kevin 
208 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. l, Memo. 73, Hodgson/DEA, 4 March 1953. 
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tralia-based Secretary-Typist, by the Third Secretary and, during Parliamentary Ses-
sions, by the Attache who was stationed permanently in Cape Town. Such duties were 
performed for the South Africans by the equivalent of the Australian Secretary-Typist, 
the Woman Clerk/Typist (later the Foreign Assistant) and by the Third Secretary. In 
Canberra, the first Woman Clerk/Typist, Miss J.M. Richards, left the country a month 
before Viljoen, and for the next two-and-a-half years the only South African staff in the 
High Commission were Nel and Killen who had therefore also to attend to coding and 
cyphering. (Not that it was excessive.) 
Both countries had the other's police or security service 'vet' prospective local 
employees. In Canberra that was the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO), a creation of the Chifley government.209 Of particular interest was a candid-
ate's association with communists and other left-wingers and his or her political beliefs, 
not to mention membership of the Communist Party. In July 1957 the Australian High 
Commission engaged a new clerk archivist pending the receipt of her security report, 
only to suspend then dismiss her when the report showed that for nine months in Eng-
land two years previously she had been a member of the British Communist Party. 210 In 
1953 the Australians complained about incompetence and indiscretion in the investiga-
tion of the backgrounds of two appointees to the Trade Commissioner's Office in 
Johannesburg. 21 1 
The Australians also had to contend with something not faced by their South 
African counterparts - the domestic political loyalties of their locally-engaged staff 
Thus Kelly complained to Kevin, the head of administration in Canberra, that he had 
two typists 'both excellent girls, extremely efficient and hardworking and, I think, loyal 
to us'. One was 'strongly United Party and anti-Nationalist'; the other 'strongly nation-
alist and anti-UP.' The result was that he found 'it impossible to dictate' his 'off-the-
record comments on an entrancing political situation, confidential remarks made to me 
by other diplomatic officers or by politicians or even to dictate a measured appreciation 
of the situation'. 212 That is why Embassies have home-based Foreign Assistants. The 
last Australia-based confidential Secretary/Typist, Miss S.A Richardson, had left six 
months after the last High Commissioner up to that point, Stirling, and her successor, 
209 The High Commission would write discreetly to PO Box 36, Canberra. See, eg., BCB, Vol. 2, 6/3 
(Vol. II), file copy of letter signed by J.C. Bosch dated 11January1961 and ASIO's reply dated 1 Feb-
ruary 1961 signed by W.M. Phillipps, the organisation's ACT Regional Director. 
210 Ibid., 1348/1, Pt.I, Annual Report 1957, Part A, p. 9, para. 8. 
211 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Forsyth/Commissioner of the South African Police, 27 July 1953. 
212 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. I, Kelly/Kevin, 23 May 1952. 
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Miss B. S. Tyler, arrived two years later, in October 1952, to work for the next High 
Commissioner, Hodgson. The myopia was therefore not confined to the South Afri-
cans. 
Each country's domestic and international situations influenced the activities of 
the other's diplomats. The South Africans, who were required to promote 'a sympa-
thetic understanding of the Union's problems', 213 did not, as did the Australians, have 
to negotiate the minefield of a divided white society let alone the cleavage between 
white and non-white. The Australian role was more traditional. As The Canberra 
Times put it at the time: '(1) To collect first-hand information about the country, (2) to 
analyse and evaluate these facts, and (3) to report them, long with political, economic 
and social trends, to the home government. •21 4 In one respect, however, the Australian 
High Commission may have fallen short, at least to latter-day eyes. Because of the 
sensitivity of the South African government, its contacts with non-whites other than in 
the master and servant role were at best attenuated. The same applied to other diplo-
matic missions at the time. 
That did not matter at the time because contact with non-whites was not the 
maJor issue it became later when foreign governments required their diplomatic 
representatives to maintain extensive contacts with them215 even to the extent of 
placing government officials in a secondary position. That marked how far the South 
African government's diplomatic relations had by then diverged from normal practice. 
For, as Lord Strang observes, the 'prime duty of an embassy is to do business with the 
government, whatever kind of government it may be, and whether or not it is a 
government which enjoys the support of the people'. 21 6 Sir Llewellyn Woodward 
concurs: 'Even in a parliamentary democracy ... a diplomat has to remember that his 
first duty is to maintain good relations with the Government rather than to cultivate 
members of the Opposition. In particular, he must avoid giving cause for suspicion that 
he is using his position for purposes of political intrigue'.217 
213 BTS, 1/25/lA, Vol. 1, Forsyth/Viljoen, 19 May 1949. 
214 The Canberra Times, 24 June 1959. 
215 See, for example, The National Times (Australia), 7 July 1979. (N. Ashford, 'How South Africa 
tried to blacken an Australian'). 
216 Lord Strang, The Diplomatic Career (London, 1962), p. 19. 
217 L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London, 1962), p. xxv, footnote 
2. 
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Addressing the forty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1987 as Australian Permanent Representative, Richard Woolcott referred to hisser-
vice in South Africa in the 1950s: 
In 1956 I came to know people like Oliver Tambo, Professor Z.K. 
Matthews and Father Trevor Huddleston. 
While it was more difficult, I also had interesting discussions with 
some black leaders and others in 1983.218 
In fact, it was easier in 1983; in 1956, Father Huddleston excepted, it was 
practically impossible and no documentary evidence has been found to support Wool-
cott's claim. Despite Hodgson's view that he had 'already done some original work at 
this post on the development of non-European political activities',219 what evidence 
there is, tends to be against it. 22o In support of his contention Hodgson cited Wool-
cott's nine page report 'The African National Congress and Native Political Activities', 
which went out over the former's name in February 1956. Appended to this were bio-
graphical notes on 'some leading Africans' including Z.K. Matthews and Oliver Tambo. 
These reveal no evidence of personal contact.221 Nor does Hodgson's despatch at the 
end of that year on 'The Mass Arrest of the Treason Suspects' which was drafted by 
Woolcott and Gilchrist. 222 Woolcott left the country permanently a month later. 
Prefacing the earlier notes was the comment that it was 'very difficult indeed to 
obtain much biographical information on the native political leaders in the Union'. The 
only source was 'occasional references to personalities in the non-European press and 
rare personal contacts'. Specifically in respect of Tambo, Woolcott wrote that little was 
known about him 'but the Institute of Race Relations has stated that although he is 
militant he believes in the nonviolent achievement of Congress objective[s]'. 
218 UNGA 42: Plenary: Item 33: Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa: State-
ment by H.E. Mr Richard Woolcott, AO., Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Na-
tions (New York, 17 November 1987), p. 4. 
219 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Memo. 336, Hodgson/Department of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 
1956. 
220 See, for example, AA, A1838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 6, 'Notes for South African file (Prepared by H. 
Gilchrist early in 1959), South Africa: Social contacts with non-Europeans'; Al838/2, 201/8, Memo. 
96, Nicholson/DEA, 21 February 1959; and Nl838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 341, Davis/DEA, 3 
August 1959. 
221 AA, A4231/2, Hodgson/DEA, Despatch 3/56, 23 February 1956, Annex B. Gilchrist told this 
writer in 1992 that in 1956 Woolcott would have 'known of rather than 'known' Tambo and Mat-
thews. 
222 AA, A423 l/2, Pretoria Despatches, Ministerial Despatch 24/56, 13 December 1956. 
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Two years after Woolcott's departure his successor, Nicholson, reported that 
the Australian mission's contacts with non-Europeans were of a similar nature but less 
extensive than those of the United Kingdom High Commission. The latter's reports on 
non-European political movements were 'based principally on contacts made at First 
Secretary level quite openly at the offices of a few selected non-European leaders and 
newspaper editors'.223 If, however, 'race relations deteriorate further in the Union, it 
would be more important for the Mission to make broader contacts with non-Euro-
peans'. Nicholson mentioned a difference of opinion in the Canadian High Commission 
with the High Commissioner (J.J. Hurley - see Chapter One, pp. 65-66) seemingly 
'anxious not to offend the Union Government in any way', while his staff was 'willing to 
increase its contacts with, and knowledge of, non-Europeans'.224 
Interestingly, in May of the same year (1959) in Cape Town, L.E. Phillips had a 
discussion with three Africans at the home of an English Quaker couple, the Radleys, 
whom Nicholson, then a Third Secretary, had met in Durban at a conference of the 
South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA). The men were Joseph Nkatlo of the 
Liberal Party, Thomas Ngwenya of the ANC and Nana Mahomo of the PAC. Phillips 
recorded the occasion in a file note but refrained from reporting it to Canberra and 
possibly also to his High Commissioner, until mid-August. 
Perhaps Davis's report of early August on the need for 'discreet contact with 
Coloured and African groups for the purpose of disseminating information about Aus-
tralia or where possible picking up information on the local scene', was the catalyst. In 
the event, Phillips reported that the discussion revolved mainly 'around the divergent 
policies and aims of the ANC and the Africanists'. Mahomo strongly criticised the 
Congress of Democrats, alleging that 'they buy their way in and exert a rigid control of 
executive positions and are thus stultifying the A.N.C.' All three Africans 'expressed 
223 J.O. Wright was the First Secretaries concerned. A copy of a report on African political activity he 
prepared for the then British High Commissioner, Sir Percivale Liesching, is in the Australian 
Archives. The report had been passed to the Australian High Commission on an eyes only basis but 
they copied it. Gilchrist's covering letter to Canberra claimed tru:t the report drew on material in 
Woolcott's nine page report mentioned above. It also held that 'contact by members of the diplomatic 
corps with representative non-Europeans in the Union now presents some difficulty' which was likely 
to increase. See Liesching/Home, No. 12, 12 June 1958 attached to AA, A9421/1, 20217, Memo. 393, 
Gilchrist/DEA, 20 June 1958. 
224 AA, Al838/2, 201/8, Memo. 96, Nicholson/DEA, 21February1959. 
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their disappointment at Australia's continued support of South Africa in the United 
Nations'. 225 
In his own report Davis was critical of the American approach: 'the American 
Ambassador, Mr. Phillip K. Crowe, has quite openly made calls on African leaders, 
including the banned ex-chief Luthuli. It seems to me that this course is unwise as it 
will undoubtedly antagonise the South African Government and it will give Luthuli a 
false impression of his own position'. 226 Even then the Americans needed to assuage 
the feelings of a domestic constituency. The Australians did not have that problem. 
Officially their emphasis was twofold: firstly, not to give offence to the South African 
government; and secondly, making contact with non-whites would be primarily to 
provide them with information about Australia and only secondarily to gain a different 
perspective on South African political developments. Phillips's meeting fell into the 
latter category. 
Davis's instructions had included the following paragraph: 
An aspect of Mission information work which may assume 
increasing significance is the provision of information to non-
White individuals and organizations. However, in view of the 
Union Government's susceptibilities regarding social and political 
contacts between Whites and non-Whites, this work doubtless 
poses practical problems and can be carried out only with great 
circumspection. A assessment of this problem by the Mission 
would be of some political interest to Department.227 
Gilchrist, who complained to the writer in 1994 that 'it was made almost 
impossible to have any informative dialogue with black people',228 wrote at the time 
that Australia 'would probably not welcome sustained social contact between the dip-
lomatic representatives of some countries and, let us say, the Melanesian villagers 
around Rabaul or Madang, or with the aborigines in Darwin'.229 
225 AA, A9421/l, 202/12/l, Memo 371, Phillips/DEA, 12 August 1959, paras. 2, 5; 'Meeting with 
Africans, 22nd May, 1959'. 
226 AA, Nl838/l, 1348/l, Pt. 1, Memo. 341, Davis/DEA, 3 August 1959. 
227 Ibid., 201/10/6/l, Pt. 1, Memo. 140, Heydon/High Commissioner, 22 May 1959, Annex, 
'Guidance notes for Australian High Commission', 22 May 1959, p. 5, para. 20. 
228 Letter, 15 December 1994. 
229 AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 6, 'South Africa: social contacts with non-Europeans', p. 3. 
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In the 1950s few people would have believed that an ANC-led government 
under Nelson Mandela would be in the saddle in South Africa by 1994;230 nor that the 
Australian Trust Territory of Papua New Guinea would achieve independence by 
197 5. In fact, independence was not contemplated at all. In respect of the three High 
Commission Territories in Southern Africa, 'it was quite misleading', the British High 
Commissioner, Sir John Maud, told Davis in December 1961, to suggest that the 
United Kingdom 'had in mind any period of years by which the Territories would have 
gained independence'. Indeed, 'No one in his senses would try to fix a date for inde-
pendence in relation to the High Commission Territories'.231 That was five years before 
Botswana and Lesotho joined the United Nations as independent states followed by 
Swaziland two years later. 
Always on the look-out for friends, beleaguered governments such as South 
Africa's in the 1950s keep an eye open for well-disposed foreign diplomats, striving to 
turn potential friends into actual ones. That is not to say that they resort to the meth-
ods of blackmail and extortion attributed to the former communist governments of 
Eastern Europe. At least, the South African government of the 1950s did not do so. 
Also well-known is the phenomenon that the longer a representative is stationed in a 
foreign capital, the more likely he is to be influenced by the concerns of the receiving 
government rather than by those of his own. While their international situation was 
different, the Australians were not exempt from such preoccupations. Thus in com-
menting on Hamilton's appointment in 1957 Australian officials stressed that he and his 
wife were 'very well disposed towards Australia•.232 
Eric Louw placed a premium on. what he called 'objective reporting' both by 
media and by diplomats stationed in South Africa. 233 On that basis, those Australian 
officials who would have qualified for the accolade 'objective' were Marshall, Quinn, 
Kelly, Hodgson and Kevin. They would then have qualified also for the further acco-
lade 'friend of South Africa'. If not a friend such as these, Stirling was certainly one by 
virtue of his efforts to learn Afrikaans, always a way to Nationalist hearts. Knowles 
died before South Africa's need for friends became pressing. Davis tried to be neutral 
but with a bias towards keeping South Africa a monarchy and within the. Common-
230 Those who professed to believe this would occur much earlier would have been influenced by their 
hearts not their heads. 
231 AA, A1838/2, 15517/14, Pt. 1, Memo. 714, Davis/DEA, 11 December 1961, Attachment, Record 
of conversation Davis/Maud, 8 December 1961, pp. 1-2, para. 4. 
232 AA, AI838ff54, 1500/l/30/8, Kevin/Osborne, 30 August 1957. 
233 See, for example, The Times (London), 5 May 1960. 
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wealth. But the most articulate, productive and perhaps effective of them all, Gilchrist, 
was hostile not only towards National Party politicians and policies but, one has the 
impression, towards white South Africans in general. (It is only fair to say that he 
denies this.) Nonetheless, from his own recent account it seems that most of his con-
tacts were on the other side of politics. 234 
Infusing much of his reporting, his hostility, presumably the product of liberal 
inclinations compounded by the attitudes prevalent in the circles in which he moved, 
was to some extent neutralised in Canberra by men such as AR. Cutler, the Chief of 
Protocol. Cutler's comment about the need to appoint a High Commissioner if 
Australia took South Africa seriously (seep. 164 above) was in rebuttal of Gilchrist 
who recommended that an appointment be deferred until after the 1958 South African 
general election. Cutler had also earlier rejected Gilchrist's proposals about the 
Schoeman visit. 235 B.G. Dexter, P.R. Killen's brother-in-law, was another in Canberra 
whose comments revealed a relatively sympathetic understanding of the white South 
African predicament. 
It must be said of Gilchrist that his intentions were good if one-sided for he 
tested his ideas only on United Party luminaries and in terms which accorded with their 
political agenda. Reference was made in the Introduction (in another context) to 
Gilchrist's correspondence with Laurence Gandar, Editor of the Rand Daily Mail 
(Johannesburg). That had to do with his proposal, which Gandar wanted him to 
develop in the form of an article, concerning 'some sort of federation of black-majority 
and white-majority provinces, or even the separation of Natal and the Eastern Cape 
from the rest'. 236 A file note of 16 March 1959 expanded on what he had proposed in 
one of his last formal despatches before his return to Australia in January.237 
He envisaged a National Convention; the setting up of 'a federation of four or 
five predominantly White constituent States and about the same number of predomi-
nantly Black constituent States' which would evolve along their 'own preferred social 
lines'; and a multi-racial federal legislature. Regional devolution, he thought, 'could 
234 Letter, 15 December 1994, paras. 12-13. 
235 AA., Al838/l, 716/50/6/l, Pt. 2, Handwritten note on Memo. No. 541, Gilchrist/DEA, 19 October 
1957. 
236 H. Gilchrist, letter, 15 December 1994. 
237 AA, Al838/l, 201/112, Pt. 3, a 'Note on regional devolution as a political device in South Africa', 
16 March 1959 and A4231/2, South Africa 1958, 16/58, Gilchrist/Minister of External Affairs, 22 
December 1958. 
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provide a "cushion" or useful transitional stage to reduce tension during those difficult 
years before the ultimate choice between integration and partition'. Partition would 
mean white secession, 'writing-off Natal and Eastern Cape' and letting them and 
'Basutoland and Swaziland form a Black State on their own (nothing less in size would 
be economically viable, even with massive foreign economic aid)'. 
He felt Australia should encourage that line of thought 'without appearing to 
interfere gratuitously in South African domestic affairs'. The best way of proceeding, 
he thought, would be to have 'a distinguished Australian legal authority' - for example, 
Zelman Cowen (Governor-General of Australia in the late 1970s) - go to South Africa 
to lecture on the 'Australian experience of federation'. That could serve 'as an external 
focus around which constructive ideas of South African relevance might emerge from 
the minds of South Africans themselves'. 238 At the end of March Gilchrist put up a 
submission to that effect to his superiors, recommending that the High Commission be 
informed. 239 The department did so four months later, Barrie Dexter drafting the 
letter. 240 This displayed hesitation - the fear of being accused of interfering with South 
Africa's domestic affairs would have loomed large: 
Our feeling on the proposal is that, while there may be a good case 
for it in principle, we would need to have a fairly positive 
approach from some South African body before we could take it 
further. 
Accordingly we should like you, if and when convenient oppor-
tunities present themselves to you and without committing any 
Australian authority, to bear the possibility of such a visit in kind 
in any discussions that may arise.241 
Conscious that it paid no heed to government thinking, Davis, then in South 
Africa for just over four months, poured cold water on the proposal, saying he saw lit-
tle merit in it. The federal idea was not acceptable to the government nor, as Gilchrist 
himself had pointed out in his December 1958 despatch, did Sir de Villiers Graaff or 
Mrs Helen Suzman see much value in it. Its progressive element had split with the 
United Party leaving behind a strong conservative element which would insist on white 
supremacy. And for so long as the two major Parties were determined to maintain 
white supremacy, constitutional changes were not 'going to alter the position'. In any 
238 Ibid. 
239 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1111, Gilchrist/Assistant Sec. (Div. IV), 31March1959. 
240 Ibid., Memo. 178, Hill/ Australian High Commission, Pretoria, 28 July 1959. 
241 Ibid. 
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case, Davis doubted that Australia's constitutional experience was relevant to South 
Africa which faced 'completely different problems'. He accordingly recommended that 
the matter should not be raised again. 242 
242 Ibid., Memo. 432, Davis/DEA, 14 September 1959. 
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There is and no doubt always will be a debate about the value of political or 
non-career appointees as opposed to professional diplomats as heads of mission. 1 The 
British work mainly through professionals, believing that their interests are best served 
that way. (Bruce Lockhart said of the first post-Second World War Permanent Under-
secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Orme Sargent, that he 'would sooner have the big-
gest F.O. "dud" than the best outsider'). 2 Hambloch's observations are not inappro-
priate: 'it is the amateur ambassador who sometimes imperils international relations. 
Previous careers in other callings do not always fit the amateur diplomatist to 
appreciate that ivory towers have their uses'. 3 In South Africa's case, it was and is a 
matter of talent and personality. AL. Geyer in the 1950s and Carel de Wet (twice) in 
the 1960s and 1970s were most successful High Commissioners in London (at least as 
seen from a white South African perspective), as were Te Water, Waterson, Heaton 
Nicholls and Leif Egeland before them, all of them political appointees. Deneys Reitz 
was less so. Australia has found itself in a similar position. As Crocker says, 'What 
matters is the quality of representation. The best Ambassador is always more than a 
civil servant. '4 
Alfred Stirling, for eight years Australian liaison officer in London and, from 
1948 to 1950, the second Australian High Commissioner to South Africa, wrote in 
retirement that S.M. Bruce, a former Prime Minister of Australia (1923-29) and High 
Commissioner in London between 1933 and 1945, 'found a succession of South Africa 
High Commissioners', all non-career men, easily the best of his allies in the Common-
wealth'. 5 While his relations with Te Water, a fellow-Cambridge man, were good, they 
were more intimate with Waterson and Heaton Nicholls. A South African for whom 
1 Clare Boothe Luce and Alan Watt addressed this issue, the former in 'The Ambassadorial Issue: 
Professionals or Amateurs?', Foreign Affairs (US), October 1957, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 105-21 and the 
latter in 'Australia and the Ambassadorial Issue', The Australian Quarterly, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, 
December 1964, pp. 11-18. See also Lyall, 'Australia's Overseas Representation and Government 
Patronage', Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 2, August 1969, pp. 120-43 and 'Politically appointed 
diplomats: do they work?', The Bulletin (Australia), 30 April 1991, pp. 38-42, 44. 
2 Young, ed., The diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. 2, p. 520. 
3 Hambloch, British Consul, p. 130. 
4 Crocker, Australian Ambassador, p. 63. 
5 Stirling, Lord Bruce, p. 213. See also Cumpston, Lord Bruce ofAfelbourne, p. 245. 
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Bruce 'developed a great respect' was Dr Gie, the Minister in Stockholm6 especially in 
respect of his 'close-up information on Russia and Germany'.7 In pre-war days the 
British Ambassador to Nazi Germany, Sir Nevile Henderson, also thought highly of 
Gie, writing later of his 'South African colleague, with whom I was on terms of the 
closest and friendliest co-operation throughout the whole of my residence in Berlin and 
whose balanced and sound judgment I always highly value~'. 8 
Because of a shortage of trained senior officials at the beginning of the period 
both the Australians and the South Africans placed greater reliance on non-career 
appointees then than they did later. Even after they had built up a corps of trained offi-
cers, both countries used diplomatic postings from time to time, as they still do, as a 
device for removing unwanted government-supporting politicians from the political ar-
ena. The appointments of Blaar Coetzee and T.W. White fell into that category. (See 
the Introduction, p. 4 above). Eric Louw was, however, on record saying he was 'loath 
to fill up ... vacancies with political appointees, because of the very discouraging effect 
that this would have on the career officers in the Department'. 9 
The years 1946-1961 saw Australia and South Africa initially represented in 
each other's capital by one non-career appointee apiece, then by a slew of career offi-
cials.10 With one brief South African exception in the early 1980s, 11 career officials 
have prevailed ever since. The two non-career appointees had been senior Public Ser-
vants and became diplomats after heading other government departments. Immediately 
before his appointment in April 1946, the Australian Sir George Shaw Knowles had for 
fourteen years simultaneously worn the three hats of Commonwealth Solicitor-Gen-
eral, Head of the Attorney-General's Department and Parliamentary Draftsman. Dr 
P.R. Viljoen, who opened South Africa's High Commission in Canberra in June 1949, 
6 Stirling, Lord Bruce, p. 283. 
7 Ibid., p. 206. 
8 N. Henderson, Failure of a Mission: Berlin 1937-1939 (New York, 1940), p. 39. 
9 AA, Al838/I, 201/10/6, Pt. I, Memo. 27, Gilchrist/DEA, 10 January 1959, attachment (Record of 
conversation Louw/Gilchrist, 5 January 1959). Louw was referring specifically to vacancies in Cairo, 
Berne and Santiago. He had tried 'unobtrusively' to close the Legation in Chile 'which ... should never 
have been opened' but the Chileans had 'made an awful fuss, and threatened to withdraw their 
representation from South Africa'. In the hope of'coriciliat[ing] them, with a -view to influencing them 
favourably regarding the "South African" items' at the UN General Assembly, Gert Nel was sent there 
from Madrid. 
10 A list of Australian and South African heads of mission and their personnel including as many 
locally recruited staff as could be identified, is given in Appendix I. 
11 Dr Denis Worrall (1983-84). 
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had been High Commissioner to Canada from 1945. Before that he was Secretary for 
Agriculture for twelve years. 
In the euphoria of entering into relations and opening missions, both govern-
ments probably wanted to demonstrate by means of those particular appointments, 
separated though they were by a three year gap, that they took the new-found relation-
ship seriously. In either case it is a moot point whether suitably qualified senior career 
officers were not then available. 12 More subterraneously, however, from the Australian 
side it seems that Evatt, as Attorney-General, wanted to rid himself of Knowles (as he 
did of Hodgson in his other department)13 in favour of someone like K.H. Bailey with 
whom he could work better. 14 Knowles would have retired under normal circum-
stances at the age of sixty-five in March 194 7. Evatt also offered Bailey External 
Affairs but he declined. 15 At External Affairs Evatt was probably already aiming to 
appoint the brilliant, youthful and ideologically sound J.W. Burton, which he did after 
first having the administratively experienced W.E. Dunk oversee the massive depart-
mental expansion that was planned.16 (Renouf calls Burton - 'a left-wing Labor Party 
man' - 'strong on policy and weak on management'.)17 
That is not to say Evatt was unappreciative of Knowles's talents. He cabled 
Canberra before the San Francisco Conference which drafted the United Nations 
Charter (he was in London at the time) strongly recommending 'that Knowles be 
requested to fly to San Francisco so as to be available there in conjunction with Bailey. 
Knowles has already made several suggestions which have been valuable. He is very 
well acquainted with the charter of the League of Nations and his skill in drafting is 
12 In respect of the Australians, Hudson says not. See his 'The Department of Foreign Affairs: 1935-
1985', Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 56, No. 11, November 1985, p. 1068. See also Lyall, 
'Australia's Overseas Representation and Government Patronage', Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
August 1969, p. 124. 
l3 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 179; p. 10. 'National Gallery: The unfussy auditor: 
First steps in Sir William Dunk's climb to the top of the Public Service', Nation (Australia), No. 20, 
20 June 1959, p. 10. Mr Mervyn Knowles may disagree with this. Letter, 26 February 1994 and text of 
remarks made on the occasion of the inauguration of the Knowles Building in National Circuit, 
Canberra, on 10 November 1987. I am grateful to Mr Knowles for sending me a copy of his remarks. 
14 See A. Dalziel, Evatt the enigma (Melbourne 1967), pp. 29-30. 
15 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 179. 
16 AA, A447/1, Al945/2291, Makin/Secretary, Public Service Board, 25 September 1945; A571/62, 
45/244, Dunk/ Acting Minister, 27 September 1945 (attached to draft internal Treasury submission to 
the Acting Assistant Secretary concerning the 'Re-organisation of Department of E:\.iernal Affairs', 16 
October 1945); Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 179-80. Details of the proposed 
reorganisation are set out in tabular form in A447/1, Al945/2291, 'Department of External Affairs. 
Proposed Reorganisation', 11October1945. 
17 Renouf, The Champagne Trail, p. 11. 
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unsurpassed'. 18 Curtin rejected this appeal on grounds that Knowles's services were 
'indispensable in Canberra for the parliamentary session'. 19 Knowles's detailed analysis 
of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which formed the basis of the UN Charter, prepared 
at Evatt's request, had already been cabled to London. 2° Knowles was, in fact, a Public 
Service lawyer of formidable qualities and it is fitting that his memory should be pre-
served in a legal setting, through the Knowles Building which houses part of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's department in Canberra and Knowles Place where 
the Canberra Law Courts are situated. 
Knowles also contributed to the development of early Canberra. Before the 
Melbourne-based public servants commenced their trek to the ACT in the late 1920s, 
he chaired a committee to keep an eye on their interests. And he became known later 
as 'the father of the University movement in Canberra' for his work in that 
connection.21 His entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography (Vol. 9, p. 623) was 
written by former Prime Minister E.G. Whitlam whose father, H.F.E. Whitlam was, as 
Crown Solicitor, Knowles's subordinate when he was Solicitor-General. 
Viljoen had already reached retirement age by the time of his appointment to 
Australia in February 1949. While he was probably the best available man at that par-
ticular juncture, there may have been other reasons for his appointment to Canada four 
years earlier. C.J. Burchell, the Canadian High Commissioner in South Africa, thought 
so, believing him to be a scape-goat for the poor food distribution system in South Af-
rica during the later stages of the war. 'It appears that the sole reason for appointing 
this man to Canada is to get him out of the Civil Service ... and out of the country'. On 
the other hand, Forsyth said that Viljoen was not being 'stellenbosched'.22 Burchell's 
letter serves an example of the gossip that diplomats relay to their head offices. In it 
18 W.J. Hudson & W. Way, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, Vol. VIII: 1945 
(Canberra, 1989), pp. 131-32. Knowles had been an adviser to the Australian delegations to the First 
and Fifth sessions of the League of Nations Assembly. Hudson, Australia and the League of Nations, 
pp. 193-94. 
19 Hudson & Way, eds., Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Vol. VIII, p. 132, fn. 4. 
20 Hudson, Australia and the New ·world Order, p. 44. 
21 The Canberra Times, 24 November 1947; Knowies, 'Canberra in the early government period', 
Canberra Historical Journal, New Series, No. 19, March 1987, p. 7. 
22 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 3, ForS)th/Assistant Secretary, 10 February 1945. During the Anglo-Boer War 
incompetent British officers were sent to the main base camp at Stellenbosch, therefore 
'Stellenbosched'. See Kipling's poem on the theme. Rudyard Kipling's Verse: Definitive Edition 
(London, 1989 (1940)), pp. 477-78. 
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Viljoen was also described as the 'father of the Control Board system'23 and was said to 
have been blackballed for membership of the Civil Service Club in Cape Town! 24 N.A. 
Robertson, the Under Secretary of State, told Burchell that there were no grounds on 
which an objection could be based to Viljoen's selection.25 
Burchell also claimed that Viljoen had 'rather strong Nationalist sympathies' 
and that he was a 'ranking member of the Broederbond'. 26 Both of these allegations are 
nonsensical, though General Kemp did appoint Viljoen Secretary for Agriculture 
during his time as Minister. As a boy he had been a member of Kemp's commando in 
the Anglo-Boer War. 27 News of Viljoen's appointment went down well in Australia. 
Menzies told the House of Representatives that he was very highly regarded in 
Canada. 28 Viljoen's Australian colleague in Ottawa, F.M. Forde,29 had earlier reported 
on him favourably, saying that he had the highest regard for Viljoen whom he 
considered to be 'one of the outstanding personalities in diplomatic life in Ottawa'. 
Viljoen, 'a follower of General Smuts' made 
no secret of his advocacy of a close link between South Africa and 
the remainder of the British Commonwealth. He has stated in 
public speeches in my hearing that the treatment which South Af-
rica received from the United Kingdom Government after the Boer 
War was such that he is a convinced Imperialist.3° 
Viljoen in fact did quite well in Canada after an early gaffe demonstrating a 
shaky grasp of protocol when he attached himself to his Australian colleague's courtesy 
call on the Governor of Quebec.31 When he left Canada early in 1949 the British High 
Commissioner, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, organised a farewell banquet for him and 
23 He was Chairman of the National Marketing Board from 1937 to 1945 and a member of the 
National Food Council from 1940 to 1945. DSAB, Vol. IV, p. 746. See also Tothill, The 1943 General 
Election, pp. 138-39. 
24 CA, DEA Records, File 167(S), Burchell/Robertson, 6 November 1944. See also Tennyson, 
Canadian Relations with South Africa, p. 105. 
25 CA, DEA Records, File 167(S), Robertson/Burchell, 27 November 1944. 
26 Ibid., Burchell/Robertson, 27 October 1944. 
27 DSAB, Vol. IV, p. 745. 
28 CPD, Vol. 201, 15 February 1949, p. 234. 
29 A former Deputy Leader of the ALP, Deputy Prime Minister and, for a few days after Curtin's 
death in 1945, Prime Minister. In 1935 Clirtin had defeated him by only one vote for the leadership of 
the ALP. F. Alexander, From Curtin to Menzies and after: continuity or confrontation? (Melbourne, 
1973), p. 3. 
30 AA, Al838fT17, 1500/1/30/1, Forde/DEA, 8 January 1949. There were, of course, few diplomats 
in Canada at the time. 
31 Stirling, Lord Bruce, pp. 411-12. Stirling preceded Forde. 
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even composed a poem in honour of the occasion. 32 Clutterbuck had been Deputy 
High Commissioner in South Africa in 193933 and probably met Viljoen then. He was 
designated High Commissioner to Australia in 1952.34 (In the old Commonwealth, at 
least so far as the British and the Canadians were concerned, it was almost customary 
for their representatives to serve in a junior capacity in South Africa and Australia be-
fore becoming heads of mission in one or the other or both). 35 The appointment was 
not consummated and Sir Stephen Holmes went to Australia. Clutterbuck became 
High Commissioner to India and later Permanent Under-Secretary at the Common-
wealth Relations Office. 
On paper Viljoen was the ideal envoy to an agricultural and pastoral country 
such as Australia. He was a qualified veterinarian, obtaining the MR.CVS at the Royal 
Veterinary College in London in 1912 and his doctorate in Veterinary Medicine at 
Berne, Switzerland, in 1921. During the First World War he was awarded the Military 
Cross for his work with the horses used in the 1915 German South-West Africa cam-
paign - none died of disease. He was successively Professor of Veterinary Science at 
the Transvaal University College ( 1919), Deputy Director, Veterinary Services (1920), 
Chief of Veterinary Field Services ( 1926), Deputy Director of Onderstepoort (1927), 
Under-Secretary for Agriculture (1931) and Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry 
(1933). Yet his best years lay behind him when he came to Australia and once there he 
gave few signs of what his entry in the Dictionary of South African Biography36 calls 
his 'exceptional intellectual talents' and 'extraordinary capacity for work'. One has, 
however, no reason to doubt these descriptions. After all, his MR.CVS and doctorate 
rested on a base of very little formal schooling. 
He was in indifferent health when he arrived in Australia and within six months 
he was hospitalised for more than three weeks in Canberra and Sydney for an abnormal 
32 I am indebted to Mrs L. Turbati of the South African High Commission, Ottawa, for sending me a 
copy of a letter dated 13 September 1993 addressed by L. Lang to the then Ambassador, forwarding a 
copy of the poem. Mrs Turbati, letter, 3 February 1994. It is an execrable poem! 
33 Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, 
No. 20-1939, p. 1201. 
34 The Canberra Times, 23 February 1952; J. Barder, 'Early British, Diplomatic Representation in 
Australia' (Unpublished, March 1993), pp. 13-14 .. 
35 Ben Cockram was a case in point. He was Political Secretary at the British High Commi!>sion in 
South Africa from 1939 to 1941 and Deputy High Commissioner in Canberra in the early 1950s. 
After his retirement he returned to South Africa as first Professor of International Relations at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. His daughter Gail-Maryse is the author of, ia., South West African 
Mandate. Cape Town, 1976. 
36 Vol. IV, p. 746. 
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heart rhythm. The condition was brought on by over-exertion when he had to change a 
car wheel while returning to Canberra from a visit to Wagga Wagga in southern New 
South Wales. (His term fell partly inside and partly outside the era of chauffeur-driven 
cars for heads of mission.) He was tired after 'an extremely heavy weekend meeting 
people, inspecting local institutions, attending two dinners and addressing two public 
meetings on South Africa'. The weather was also 'extremely hot' and the car was 
standing in an awkward position on wet ground. 37 
Seeking to encourage, Forsyth spoke flatteringly when in July 1950 Viljoen 
gave notice of his intention to return to South Africa the following June, pleading 
Canberra's isolation: 'It will be a pity to lose you for Australia. All reports go to show 
that you have both done jolly well there'.38 In reply, Viljoen quoted a letter he had 
received from Jooste, then Ambassador to the United States: 'Mr. Menzies spoke in 
the most glowing terms of yourself and Mrs. Viljoen and went out of his way to assure 
me how much he valued your friendship'. 39Six months after his retirement Malan told 
the House of Assembly that Viljoen had done 'excellent work'. 40 Even so, considered 
retrospectively, his term was one of the least successful. 
Viljoen did not, as the D;c1;oru11y of South Afrkan Bfography suggests, return 
to South Africa for health reasons. 41 Having lobbied for and obtained an extension of 
his term for a year, he subsequently cut it short by eight months. He had brought his 
pregnant younger daughter and her two children to Canberra during her husband's 
service with the South African squadron in Korea. When his son-in-law returned to 
Pretoria after an accident he felt that his daughter should join him. He did not want her 
to travel alone and he was unwilling to pay for his wife or himself to accompany her 
out of his own pocket. (This predated the establishment of the direct air link by more 
than a year). 42 
Sole's feeling mentioned in the previous chapter (p. 146) that he lacked influ-
ence points to an important difference between career officers and non-career diplo-
37 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 7, Viljoen/Forsyth, 3 February 1950. The technical description of his condition 
was 'chronic rheumatic endocarditis and rnitral regurgitation' according to the specialist's report 
attached to this letter. · 
38 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 7, Fors)th/Viljoen, 15 August 1950. 
39 Ibid., Viljoen/ForS)th, 29 August 1950. 
40 HA Deb., Vol. 78, 24 April 1952, Col. 4325. 
41 Vol. IV, p. 746. 
42 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 7, Fors)th/Viljoen, 4 July 1951. 
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mats, including non-career appointees, even if they are former Public Servants. In the 
case of the last-mentioned the bureaucracy feels obliged to 'look smart and hop to it', 
whereas the former tend to be fobbed off because, after all, they are just Public Ser-
vants and often junior to the administrative officials they are petitioning. The records 
of the Knowles and Viljoen appointments provide ample evidence of the truth of this 
proposition. 
If there is a lack of attention paid him before his departure, the middle-ranking 
Public Service head of mission may also find that his head office ignores him at his 
post. Keith Officer's complaint as Australian Ambassador in Paris in the early 1950s43 
about the 'absence of guidance from Canberra' and that replies to his memoranda were 
seldom received, will probably strike a chord among foreign service officers generally. 
It is the sort of situation which supports the analogy drawn by a Canadian ambassador 
between a foreign service officer and a cultivated mushroom. 44 Senior Public Servants, 
however, command the status and authority (not the mention the experience and skills) 
to evade such treatment. 
It was also mentioned in Chapter Three (p. 147) that senior Public Servants are 
probably even more sensitive than politicians to what they consider to be their rights. 
Viljoen in particular regularly bombarded Forsyth with personal letters about his situa-
tion from the beginning of his term in Canada until he left Australia six years later. The 
many subjects covered included his allowances when on conference duty and, particu-
larly, recovering the amounts he had disbursed in tips to ship's personnel on ocean voy-
ages. 45 Also, through Forsyth he prevailed on the authorities to pay his cook's trans-
portation costs from Canada to Australia and back to Canada when she could not 
adjust to life in Canberra. (The cook was in his personal employ.) He was also someth-
ing of a Hamlet in respect of the duration of his terms in both Ottawa and Canberra. 
He qualifies for the description 'prima donna', a term not infrequently applied to tem-
peramental South African diplomats. 
43 Specifically in respect of his Embassy's information work. AA, A4231/2, UN, NY 1951/52, 
Ministerial Despatch No. 11, 25 February 1952. 
44 
'They keep him in the dark and every now and then they dump a load of [excrement] on him', a 
remark made in the writer's presence. 
45 While serving in Canada he led the South African delegations to the annual conferences of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization at Quebec (1945), Copenhagen (1946), Rome (1946) and Geneva 
(1947). DSAB, Vol. IV, p. 746. Tips to ships' personnel, then considered of some importance, 
regularly formed the subject of correspondence between the Department of External Affairs, the 
Public Service Commission and the Treasury. 
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Despite a heavy schedule Forsyth personally, occasionally his immediate 
deputy, responded patiently and sometimes at length to these communications. No 
career foreign service officer would have dared burden his head of department that 
way if only for fear of jeopardising his career. Even given the department's small size at 
the time, its head would not have considered it incumbent upon himself to respond per-
sonally to subordinates about such matters. Forsyth's replies to Viljoen revealed a 
wealth of administrative experience. It is difficult to conceive of Jooste, admirable 
official though he was in many respects, emulating Forsyth in that regard. 
If Knowles appeared less concerned about his personal circumstances than Vil-
joen, he knew his worth and he did not hesitate to state his requirements to Dunk, then 
the Secretary and by far his junior in the Public Service. He experienced no difficulty in 
having his son, Mervyn, detached from the Department of Post War Reconstruction 
where he was working on temporary transfer from the Department of Commerce and 
Agriculture, to accompany him to South Africa as Third Secretary46 and he engaged 
his own typist. Subsequently, however, he did not succeed in having Mervyn's wife 
Beth taken on strength as an additional typist. 47 
O.C.W. Fuhrman, a member of the Commonwealth Public Service since 
1921, 48 accompanied Knowles to South Africa in the key post of Official Secretary or 
second-in-command. It was a three month assignment to get the High Commission off 
and running pending the arrival of the newly-recruited substantive Official Secretary, 
M.H. Marshall. Fuhrman had served in the First World War, attaining the rank of 
major and in accordance with the practice of the time he retained the title in civilian 
life. As mentioned in Chapter Two (p. 86, footnote 34), he had been Secretary to 
Australia's delegations to sessions of the League of Nations Assembly between 1922 
and 1937, with a break in 1928. He was then employed by the Prime Minister's 
department and worked at the Australian High Commission in London. Most of the 
administrative burden of Australia's League work fell on his shoulders. 49 Knowles met 
46 AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Dunk/Secretary, PSB, 16 May 1946. This was not as 'nepotistic' as it 
may seem. There was a shortage of trained junior staff at the time and Mervyn Knowles had gained 
administrative experience in the army and the Departments Commerce and Agriculture and Post-War 
Reconstruction. M.J.S. Knowles CV. 
47 Ibid., I. 22063, 6 September 1946 and 0. 17688, 12 September 1946. Mr Mervyn Knowles 
indicates that the suggestion came from Fuhrman. Letter, 11 September 1995. 
48 AA, Al67/l, S46/238, 'Department of External Affairs: Seniority of Officers', n.d. His Public 
Service seniority number was 1627. 
49 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 76. 
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Fuhrman when he attended the Fifth Assembly in 1924. Knowles himself had 
previously been an adviser to the delegation to the First Assembly in 1920. 
Knowles was unlikely to have requested Fuhrman's services for South Africa 
on the strength of their past association for, according to Mervyn Knowles, their 
relations at the League of Nations had not been especially friendly. Mervyn Knowles 
sketches the circumstances ofFuhrman's temporary posting: 
By the time it came to opening the South African post there was a 
lack of experienced staff at External Affairs and with a High 
Commissioner Designate without experience in a post it was 
decided to post Fuhrman. He, for his part, was feeling that he was 
overdue for a posting as head of mission himse1P0 and thus agreed 
to take a short-term assignment, there being mutual doubt as to 
how well he and GSK [Sir George Knowles] would 'hit it off'. In 
the event, both had mellowed and they got along extremely well 
and there was, I know, genuine regret on [the side of] both parties 
... when the time for parting came.51 
The forty-seven year old Melville Henry Marshall, a career civil servant though 
not a career foreign service officer, replaced Fuhrman. Marshall had joined the 
Commonwealth Public Service in 1916, working in the Tax Branch of the Treasury 
until 1927. Thereafter he spent six years as economic adviser to the Development and 
Migration Commission, rejoining the Tax Branch in 1935. From 1940 to early 1942 he 
was Deputy Collector General of Taxes in the Federated Malay States. He returned to 
Australia after the Japanese invasion again working in the Tax Branch. When it was 
advertised in the Public Service early in 1946 he applied for the post of Official 
Secretary (equivalent to First Secretary) in the newly created High Commission in 
South Africa. By that time he held a Bachelor of Commerce degree from Melbourne 
University and was a grade six Tax Assessor. 
The advertisement drew a 'disappointing' five applications, including one from 
C.T. Moodie, already a member of External Affairs, who would go to South Africa as 
Ambassador some twenty-five years later. Marshall was appointed. 52 Dunk told 
Knowles later that while he was 'quite inexperienced' he struck him as 'a man of some 
50 He had transferred to External Affairs from the Department of Social Services in March 1946 at a 
salary of £856 per annum. He was promoted to First Secretary in April. On returning from South 
Africa he was appointed Consul-General in Shanghai (1947-48) then Australian Minister to Israel 
(1949-53). He died in November 1961. Current Notes, Vol. 32, No. 11, November 1961. 
51 M.J.S. Knowles, Jetter, 22 July 1994. 
52 AA, Al067/l, S46/199, Dunk/PSB, 25 June 1946. 
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intelligence and should therefore soon assimilate the duties of his position'. 53 Dunk 
summed him up correctly. Apart from occasionally committing what a later generation 
of Australian officials would have viewed as political gaffes (such as publicly 
identifying himself closely with white South African aspirations - there again that was 
what the job was perceived to entail at the time) he was a good representative and his 
work attracted favourable comment from visiting Australian dignitaries such as Sir Earl 
Page in 1948. 54 On the other hand, Mervyn Knowles feels that he behaved 
discourteously towards his mother between Sir George's death and her departure ten 
weeks later. 55 
If Nel was a man for all seasons in Canberra and what the situation required 
(Chapter Three, p. 167), Marshall held his end up well in the particular context in 
which he found himself in South Africa. It is evident from his reporting that he enjoyed 
his work, though his previous background in taxation (his neat, underlined signature 
suggests the accountant) left him ill-equipped to handle an increasingly sensitive 
relationship from the political point of view. He said in a radio broadcast on the 
occasion of Australia Day 1951: 
Australians who have been privileged to live in South Africa 
cannot fail to be impressed by the great similarity between out two 
countries - geographically, climatically, economically, our peoples 
and our outlook on life. We are basically farming peoples with the 
same love for the land and the freedom of the wide open spaces. 
We grow similar products; we fight similar diseases; we suffer 
great lack of water in portions of our territories and surpluses in 
others. We have similar problems in handling our huge territory 
from a central administration .... 
Our defence presents similar problems because of our isolation 
from other western civilisations and by reason of our lengthy coast 
lines. Australia has always felt that South Africa's security and in-
tegrity are vital to Australia's life-line to Europe. Consequently 
any threat to that life-line has caused an immediate response on 
the part of Australia. 56 
53 AA, Al838/l, 1348/l, Pt. 1, Dunk/Knowles, 5 December 1946. Mervyn Knowles, who worked 
with him for a year in South Africa, feels that Marshall 'was not entirely out of his depth in diplomatic 
life' as a result of his experiences in Malaya. Letter, 16 March 1995. 
54 CPD, Vol. 197, 5 May 1948, p. 1407. See also Vol. 211, 29 November 1950, p. 3298. 
55 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 16 March 1995. For example, she had specifically to ask for the use of the 
High Commission's second car whenever she wanted to go somewhere. 
56 
'Australia Day Jubilee Celebration, 1951. National Broadcast made by Mr M.H. Marshall', p. 3. 
Attached to AA, A423 l/2, Cape Town 1951, 2/51, Marshall/Minister of State for External Affairs, 30 
January 1951. 
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That about epitomised the situation for Australian diplomats in South Africa 
until Gilchrist's arrival in 1955. Marshall was in charge of the High Commission from 
the time of Knowles's death in November 194 7 until Stirling arrived in August 1948 
and then for almost a year in 1950-51 after Stirling's departure. Marshall returned to 
Canberra in 1951. He was posted to New Zealand as Official Secretary in 1953 and to 
San Francisco in 1955 as Consul-General. In 1960 he went back to Canberra and spent 
the two years until his retirement in 1962 in the department's Information Branch. He 
died three years later. 57 
Photographs of Marshall and his wife at the 1951 Australia Day dinner in the 
company respectively of Mr and Mrs B.J. Schoeman and Mrs and Mrs J.G. Strijdom 
appeared in Die Burger and The Cape Times on 29 January 1951. 58 
The appointments of Stirling (1948-50), Quinn (1951-52) and Kelly (1952-
55)59 suggest that the Australian authorities were influenced by the need for officers 
who could communicate in Afrikaans. All three were linguists besides which Stirling 
and Quinn had previous experience in or with The Netherlands. Quinn had been 
Charge d'A:ffaires there (1948-50) and Stirling Counsellor on the staff of the non-
resident Minister, S.M. Bruce, during the war. Bruce, Stirling and the Dutch 
government were then resident in London. At that time Stirling spoke no Dutch but he 
had already learned to read the language fairly easily. 60 He said that when in South 
Africa he worked hard to learn Afrikaans, becoming 'fairly fluent' and reading 'widely 
in its very interesting literature'.61 Not only that but he translated Afrikaans poetry. 
Against the background of the number of diplomats (not to mention South 
African English-speakers) who did not learn Afrikaans, Stirling made a favourable 
impression on his Afrikaans-speaking interlocutors. Piet Beukes, who interviewed him 
in October 1948 for eleven small newspapers in the Unie-Volkspers group including 
Die Suiderstem and Ons Land, reported that 
57 Undated departmental biography included among a batch Mr Chris Taylor of DF AT forwarded to 
Ms Sylvia Mackay under cover of his letter 94/9081, 11 January 1995 and Who's Who in Australia, 
XVIth Ed., 1959. 
58 Attached to AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1951, No. 2/51, Marshall/Minister of State, 30 January 
1951. 
59 Kelly acted as High Commissioner for four months between April and August 1952. See Appendix 
I. 
60 A.T. Stirling, On the Fringe of Diplomacy (Melbourne, 1973), p. 50. 
61 Ibid., p. 51. 
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he set a new record for learning Afrikaans: He arrived in South 
Africa by plane from America on 23 August 1948 and a month 
later he was already able to enjoy Afrikaans novels, poems and 
plays. He went further. Before the end of September he had 
translated four of Uys Krige's best-known poems into English and 
everyone who has read his translations acknowledges that he 
captured the deepest feelings of the poems. 
This person who honoured Afrikaans and South Africa is none 
other than Mr Alfred Stirling, Australia's High Commissioner in 
the Union who succeeded Sir George Knowles.62 
Beukes's article juxtaposed one of Krige's poems Die Einde van die Pad' with 
Stirling's translation 'The End of the Road'. Stirling later included poem and translation 
in his memoir On the Fringe of Diplomacy (pp. 36-39.) The next year Die Burger's 
'Van alle kante' ('From all sides') column reported that Stirling was the only foreign 
representative in the Union who had taken the trouble to learn Afrikaans. The 
newspaper had received from him a 'perfect letter in Afrikaans' about the Australian 
origins of Pretoria'·s jacaranda trees. 63 Stirling also visited various Afrikaans-language 
universities. 64 
A former permanent head of the Australian Department of External Affairs, 
J.K. Waller, called Stirling 
a very interesting character. A man of the widest possible culture, 
he had a high facility for absorbing new languages and an 
unusually fine memory. He never seemed to forget anything; he 
could see an opera once and sing half the arias in it. He was a man 
of considerable charm and private means, had long been interested 
in international affairs and had taken good degrees at Melbourne 
and Oxford. On paper he should have been one of the most 
brilliant people that External Affairs ever saw. He had all the 
paper qualifications - knowledge, linguistics, integrity, all of these 
things. But he seemed to lack a hard political nose. He was 
knowledgeable about the internal politics of the many countries in 
which he served, got on very well with the governments to which 
he was [p. 4] accredited and was universally admired. He was the 
kind of Australian representative that one would be proud of. For 
instance, when he was in South Africa he learnt Afrikaans and 
translated a lot of Afrikaans poetry into English. no mean 
achievement. And yet, many people with far fewer qualifications 
62 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, Marshall/DEA, 22 October 1948, attachment, P. Beukes, 
'Australian learns Afrikaans in a month'. Die Suiderstem etc., 16 October 1948. (Original in 
Afrikaans). Marshall's covering letter consists largely ofa translation of the article. 
63 Die Burger, 7 March 1949. One assumes the wording should have been 'a letter in perfect 
Afrikaans' but 'perfect letter in Afrikaans' was how it appeared in the original. 
64 Die Transvaler, 20 November 1948. A copy with translation is on AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1. 
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have turned out to be better Foreign Service Office officers. I 
always retained an immense affection for Stirling because he was 
very kind to me in those days; he was twelve or thirteen years 
older than I, and I was, and have always been, very grateful for his 
friendship. He had been Menzies' private secretary, and I think he 
read or the Bar in Menzies' Chambers. Menzies had a great 
affection for him, but it was a slightly contemptuous affection. 65 
A fact Waller omits to mention but it may, if only subconsciously, inform his 
comments, is that Stirling's mother and sister Dorothy accompanied him to his posts, 
the latter acting as his official hostess. Stirling never married and he was particularly 
solicitous of his mother, delaying his arrival in South Africa by almost two months 
because of her ill-health in Washington, their last post.. 
Although he had been accepted in 1929 for the junior of two new External 
Affairs posts it was contemplated establishing in the Prime Minister's Department, 66 
Stirling's career with the Department of External Affairs commenced only in 1936. For 
the two previous years he had been Menzies's Private Secretary when the latter was 
Commonwealth Attorney-General. Contemporary South African foreign service 
officers would have envied him his career. But for the year 1936-37 when he headed 
the department's Political Section, it lay entirely abroad - London (1937-45, External 
Affairs Officer); Canada (1945-47, High Commissioner); Washington (1947-48, 
Minister); South Africa (1948-50, High Commissioner); The Netherlands (1950-55, 
Ambassador); France (1955-59, Ambassador); Philippines (1959-62, Ambassador); 
Italy (1962-67, Ambassador, also to Greece 1964-67). He died in 1981, two months 
short of his seventy-ninth birthday.67 
Photographs of Stirling appear in the Rand Daily Mail of 5 November 194868 
and Die Suiderstem and other Unie-Volkspers newspapers of 16 October 1948. 
Stirling's de facto successor in South Africa, Marshall, was himself succeeded 
by the 'highly regarded'69 John Paul Quinn who was considered to be one of the most 
promising Australian foreign service officers of his generation until his untimely death 
65 Waller, A Diplomatic Life, pp. 3-4. 
66 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 84. The matter fell through when the government lost 
the 1929 election. 
67 Undated departmental biography included among a batch Mr Chris Taylor of DFAT forwarded to 
Ms Sylvia Mackay under cover of his letter 94/9081, 11 January 1995 and Tf710's VT710 in Australia, 
XX:Ist Ed., 1974, p. 945. 
68 Copy on AA, A1838/1, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1. 
69 W.J. Hudson, written comments, June 1995. 
192 
Chapter Four: Australians & South Africans 
in an air crash near Rabat, Morocco, in September 1961 at the age of 42. Menzies who 
was then both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs paid tribute to him: 
John Quinn has passed from us at the height of his powers and 
with the promise of adding greatly to his already considerable 
achievements in the service of Australia. 
He combined great intellectual power, complete integrity of 
character, and a sympathetic approach to his fellows. 
He showed great courage during his internment in Sumatra and 
Singapore, and recovered to give outstanding service both at home 
in the Department of Ex1ernal Affairs and abroad as a 
representative of Australia. 70 
Quinn joined the Department of External Affairs in 1940. He had graduated 
from the University of Sydney in 193 8 with First Class Honours in French and German 
and was awarded a French Government Travelling Scholarship which he took up at the 
University of the Sorbonne. The war cut short his studies and he returned to Australia. 
He was posted to Singapore in 1941 as Third Secretary at the Australian Commission. 
After the fall of Singapore the Australians tried to escape to Sumatra but were 
captured. In vain did the Commissioner, V. G. Bowden, a businessman, plead 
diplomatic immunity in accordance with his instructions. The Japanese shot him before 
Quinn's eyes, interning Quinn himself who spent the rest of the war in captivity, 
experiencing much hardship.71 
The Dutch and English prisoners in the Sumatra prisoner-of-war camp taught 
each other their respective languages. Quinn possessed 'superb linguistic gifts' and he 
emerged from captivity with what Stirling calls 'a flawless knowledge of Dutch'. 72 This 
was of considerable help to him during his two-year posting as Charge d'Affaires in 
The Hague (1948-50) at a difficult time in view of Australia's support for Indonesian 
independence. From there he proceeded to London as External Affairs Officer with the 
rank of Counsellor, thence to South Africa where he spent just over a year as Acting 
High Commissioner, celebrating his thirty-third birthday in Cape Town on 26 February 
1952. He was then appointed Australian Minister to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. He 
7° Current Notes, September 1961, p. 56. A photograph of Quinn presenting his credentials as 
Ambassador to President Nasser of the United Arab Republic appears at p. 57; John Paul Quinn, p. 
27. . 
71 See Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 75. 
72 Stirling, On the Fringe of Diplomacy, p. 52. See also R.H. Scott in John Paul Quinn, pp. 8-10. 
Quinn had achieved interpreter standard in French, German and Dutch. 
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returned to Canberra in 1954 as Assistant Secretary in charge of the South and South 
East Asia Branch. After serving some six years in that capacity he became Minister, 
later Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, unfortunately perishing in the aforesaid 
air crash. 
Some seven years after Quinn's death a former subordinate, R.W. Furlonger, 
wrote that 'uniquely' among 'first-class linguists, he also had a first-class political mind 
of great subtlety and comprehension'. 73 There is not much evidence of that from the 
few despatches Quinn sent from South Africa. (See Appendix Five below, p. 485). He 
was there at the beginning of the constitutional crisis triggered by the removal of Cape 
Coloured voters from the common role. Yet from the present vantage point his reports 
are pedestrian and routine. They show no evidence of research and they are altogether 
lacking in the penetration and depth evident, for example, in the German Rudolf 
Asmis's report on Australian Aborigines. (See Chapter Seven below, p. 349.) 
Kelly, another linguist, died in Canberra in July 1994 at the age of eighty-four, 
eight days after the nineteenth anniversary of his retirement. He had joined External 
Affairs in 1945 at the ripe age of thirty-five after thirteen years with the Victorian Edu-
cation Department and the Crown Solicitor's office in Melbourne (1928-41 - he held a 
BA LLB degree) and three years as a Lieutenant in naval intelligence (1942-45). His 
obituarist says he was fluent in French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and he had a 
working knowledge of German, Afrikaans, Hindi, Chinese, Burmese, Javanese and 
Khmer. 74 He was head of mission in South Africa in succession to Quinn for only four 
months in 1952 and it is not clear (to this writer) whether it had already been decided 
to send W.R. Hodgson to South Africa on a final posting before retirement by the time 
Kelly took up duty there. 
It was mentioned in the Introduction above (p. 23) that Dr W.J. Hudson, Head 
of the Historical Documents Branch in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, had broken down the personnel of the Australian department into factions 
such as Masons, Marxists and Catholics. Kelly was leader of the Catholic faction. By 
the time of his death he was 'a kind of Catholic intellectual icon'75 and 'a favourite son 
73 John Paul Quinn, p. 17. 
74 J.J. Eddy, 'Intellectual turned cultured diplomat', The Australian, 22 July 1994. See also The Can-
berra Times, 15 July 1994. 
75 H. Gilchrist, letter, 15 December 1994, para. 7. 
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in Catholic circles'. 76 It was hardly surprising, therefore, that two bishops presided over 
his well-attended funeral. 77 at which 'many tributes were paid to his scholarship'.78 
Juddery writes that in his youth Kelly 
had been a founder of the society at the University of Melbourne 
which gave birth to Catholic Action: indeed, another member of 
the group once told this writer that Archbishop Mannix's choice of 
B.A. Santamaria over Kellv to run what became 'The Movement' 
astounded most of their colieagues. 79 
In view of his and the Movement's part in bringing about the split in the 
Australian Labor Party of 195580 (which in effect kept Labor out of office until 1972), 
Santamaria is an important figure in Australian political history. He writes of Kelly and 
the Campion Society (named after the Sixteenth Century English Jesuit martyr 
Edmund Campion): 
The most influential of the new figures in the society ... was Kevin 
T. Kelly ... To an effervescent intellect, always bubbling with new 
insights, there was added a fine speaking ability which made him 
formidable in controversy and in all ways an inspiring figure to his 
Campion colleagues. 81 
The Catholic Evidence Guild, which 'provided a battery of trained speakers on Catholic 
doctrine and philosophy for Melbourne's Y arra Bank on a Sunday afternoon', was a 
off-shoot of the Campion Society. Kelly was 'without doubt its most able and challeng-
ing speaker'. 82 
76 Ms Moira Smythe, letter, 23 May 1995. 
77 Ibid. 
78 H. Gilchrist, letter, 15 December 1994, para. 7. 
79 Juddery, At the Centre, p. 101. He was the first Master of the Catholic Evidence Guild, among the 
eight founders of the Campion Society, and prominent among the founders of the Catholic Worker. 
John J. Eddy, s.j., 'Kevin Thomas Kelly', 18 July 1994. Eddy's piece in the Australian four days later 
was drawn from this. I am indebted to Ms Moira Smythe for both versions. Archbishop Mannix asked 
Santamaria to be one of two members of the National Secretariat of Catholic Action. B.A. Santamaria, 
Santamaria: Against the Tide (Melbourne, 1981), p. 3. 
' 
80 See R. Murray, The Split: Australian Labor in the Fifties (Sydney, 1984 (1970)). 
81 Santamaria, Against the Tide, p. 15. Manning Clark records having heard a 'magnificent debate' 
that he would 'never forget' at Melbourne University in April 1937 involving Santamaria and Kelly 
among others. RM. Crawford, C.M.H. Clark and G. Blainey, Making History (Ringwood, Vic., 
1985), p. 57. 
82 Santamaria, Against the Tide, p. 16. 
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Seemingly straight-faced, Juddery said of him shortly before his retirement after 
three decades in foreign service: 
Kelly's brilliance was not in question. In 1971 . . . he sent to 
Canberra from Europe a summary of the situation of that continent 
which, for brevity and insight, is claimed by those fortunate 
enough to have read it (it was, of course, secret) to rank with the 
masterpieces of world literature. 83 
Gilchrist, who does not project as a gullible man, writes: 
Once he [Kelly] told me that he was writing 13 books; at another 
time, that he was writing an Australian history as a counter-blast 
to Manning Clark's. 84 But he does not appear to have published 
anything, except possibly a monograph on the French Revolution, 
read to the Newman Society.85 
Such comments may lend perspective to Kelly. Assuming their accuracy, one 
wonders whether he made a mistake following a foreign service career. For foreign 
service is not generally a vehicle for effervescent intellects and fine speaking abilities let 
alone brilliance. (See Chapter Two above, p. 107.) The British Foreign Office and 
Diplomatic Service may once have been one. The South African and Australian 
departments probably never were except that the latter attracted exceptional 
individuals like Hasluck and Burton in its early years. 
It was suggested in Chapter One (p. 78) that what counts in the bureaucratic 
milieu is the ability and the connections to manipulate the system to personal 
advantage. Kelly's posts suggest he was deficient in those areas. The panegyric deliv-
ered after his death held that his advice (apparently in the context of the collapse of the 
Portuguese Empire) 'was not often appreciated because it seemed unwelcome news. In 
some ways he was the man who knew too much'. He was also said frequently to have 
'faced opposition or misunderstanding from men of lesser intelligence and lower prin-
ciple'. Yet '[a]lways his erudition came to the fore, not always to the satisfaction of 
shallower minds'. 86 Not exactly a description of a man capable of bending the Public 
Service machine to his will. 
83 Juddery, At the Centre, p. 101. 
84 See Chapter Two above, p. 80, footnote 120. 
85 H. Gilchrist, letter, 15 December 1994, para. 7. 
86 John J. Eddy, s.j., 'Kevin Thomas Kelly', 18 July 1994. 
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As with Quinn, Kelly's reporting from South Africa displays little evidence of 
intellectual depth. Nor does it support the contention of his obituarist that he 'noted, as 
well as the inadmissibility of the principle, the hypocrisy of apartheid'. 87 If so, that 
would have been in retrospect because as a member of the Australian High 
Commission in South Africa from April 1952 to May 1955, Kelly was quite supportive 
of apartheid. (See Chapter Seven below, pp. 346-49.) 
The reality of Kelly's diplomatic career contrasts strikingly with public 
perceptions of it. The contrast between his relatively mediocre foreign service record, 88 
and the tributes to his intellectual brilliance by prominent outsiders not to mention his 
eminence in Catholic organisations, make Kelly an enigmatic and intriguing figure. It 
may indirectly also say something about the standing of Catholics in Australian society. 
Time and the requirements of space do not permit the exploration of this proposition in 
the detail it requires. 
A recent photograph accompanied Kelly's obituary in The Australian of 22 July 
1994. 
Gilchrist tells the story he heard from Woolcott about Kelly, Hodgson and a 
long despatch on 'bag day' (which, like pay day, has its own dynamics): 
Hodgson returned from a very wet lunch at the Mount Nelson 
Hotel on bag-closure afternoon and was handed an erudite 16-page 
despatch drafted by Kelly on the removal of Coloured voters from 
the Cape common roll. At about page 12 Hoddy, tiring, said 'It's 
bloody long, Kelly'. KTK replied: 'Well, a lot of work has gone 
into it, Colonel'. A bright thought then lit up Hoddy's face and he 
said: I don't suppose ya know what the Test cricket score is?' 'No', 
admitted the First Secretary. Hoddy then called Third Secretary 
Woolcott in: 'Woolcott, do you know the latest score from The 
Wanderers?' Woolcott: 'Yes, sir, 4 for 161, with Burke on (so-
many) and Benaud on (so-many), and the bowling analysis' (more 
detail). Hoddy turned pitilessly on Kelly and said: 'There you are, 
Kelly -- 16 bloody pages, but ya don't know the cricket score'. 89 
87 Eddy, 'Intellectual turned cultured diplomat', The Australian, 22 July 1994. 
88 In his thirty year career he occupied only two not exactly top flight ambassadorial posts for a total 
of about seven years (Buenos Aires (1964-66) and Lisbon (1970-74)). 
89 H. Gilchrist, letter, 20 January 1995. A nice story but inaccurate. There was no Australian cricket 
tour of South Africa during Woolcott's time and none of the formal despatches emanating from the 
high commission at the time fit the description. See Appendix V below, pp. 486-87. 
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That brings us to Hodgson himself9° whose appointment to South Africa, as is 
often the case in foreign service, had less to do the perceived requirements of that post 
than with the situation at his previous post. (In any case, the South African post had 
been vacant since Stirling's departure two years earlier and the South Africans were 
undoubtedly delighted to receive any High Commissioner at all let alone one so 
experienced and distinguished as Hodgson.) From 1949 he had been British 
Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council for Japan. But when the Japanese 
Peace Treaty entered into force in 1952 it was felt that he could not appropriately stay 
on as Australian Ambassador. According to Watt: 
Past membership of the Allied Council in Japan was scarcely the 
best background for an Australian Ambassador to Tokyo. A clean 
break with the past was desirable, and a different kind of person 
should be sent to try to develop a new relationship between the two 
countries. In 1952 such a change was in fact made, though it 
involved overriding Hodgson's own wish.91 
Besides Tokyo, Hodgson's diplomatic posts prior to South Africa were Ottawa 
(1945) as Acting High Commissioner and Paris (1945-49) as Minister then 
Ambassador. He retired in 1957 dying of cancer in a Sydney hospital just over six 
months later after a major operation.92 He was involved with the United Nations in its 
early stages, attending the San Francisco Conference which drafted the Charter, 
representing Australia at the UN Preparatory Commission and the First Session of the 
General Assembly, in the Security Council and in the Commission of Human Rights. 
He was also an Australian delegate to the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. 
It was in the Security Council in December 1948 that he made his famous 
intervention accusing the Dutch inter alia of duplicity in their dealings with the 
Indonesians. Again according to Watt, 'the Australian representative in the [UN] 
Security Council, Lt Col W.R. Hodgson, delivered a bitter attack upon Dutch policy ... 
and demanded the expulsion of the Netherlands from the United Nations'.93 Geoffrey 
Sawer said in that regard: 'Although the indignation of the Australian Government at 
90 Lt Col William Roy Hodgson, usually known to his friends as Hoddy. Supporters among his 
subordinates 'were pleased to call themselves 'Hoddo's Horse'. Edwards, Prime Ministers and 
Diplomats, p, 107. 
91 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 189. 
92 The Canberra Times, 10 January 1958. His obituary appeared in the newspaper's 25 January 
edition. 
93 Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, p. 251. 
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the duplicity which the Dutch had displayed was generous and understandable, it 
hardly excused the language in which the Australian representative condemned them'.94 
What Hodgson actually said at the Security Council's three hundred-and-
ninetieth meeting on 23 December 1948 was: 'We thus have the first clear-cut 
deliberate violation of the Charter by a Member. As I shall show, two other decisions 
were violated, and the consequences must be - if the Council faces up to the matter -
expulsion from the United Nations'.95 (This wording does not seem linguistically 
extravagant.) However, he was apparently 'taken to task for exceeding his 
instructions'.96 Yet today, almost fifty years after the event, his name features on a 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade list 'of Australians who aided the cause of 
Indonesian independence above and beyond simply doing their jobs and with some 
sense of personal commitment. 97 
Hodgson's name will live in the history of Australian diplomacy because he was 
the first Secretary for External Affairs after the department split from the Prime Min-
ister's department in 1935, ie., the first permanent head of an independent Australian 
'foreign office'. Because of this, and largely related to it, there exist more published 
references to him than to any of the Australian diplomatic representatives in South 
Africa, including Knowles. 98 After Tange, who held the post for eleven years (1954-
65), Hodgson, who held it for ten (1935-45, nine of them substantive; one at the end 
nominal) was also by far the longest-serving permanent head of the department to date, 
the other terms ranging from eighteen months to five years. 
As Secretary, Watt writes, Hodgson 'contributed substantially to the 
development of a professional diplomatic service' in Australia. 99 Although Evatt is 
generally given the credit for the diplomatic cadet scheme, the idea may conceivably 
have originated with Hodgson who in any event set the scheme up and presided over 
its early development. Waller sa:w him in a different light: 
94 G. Sawer, 'The United Nations', G. Greenwood & N. Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs 1950-
55 (Melbourne, 1957), p. 109. 
95 SCOR, Third Year, No. 133, p. 7. 
96 Ms Moira Smythe, e:mail message, 11September1995. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Other examples are Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, especially the section 'W.R. 
Hodgson and the Department of External Affairs', pp. 104-09 and various references in Hasluck, 
Diplomatic Witness. 
99 ADB, Vol. 9, pp. 321-22. 
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He had a quick mind, but a very simple one; he was essentially a 
soldier, and I think that had his health allowed, he would have 
been a very good soldier. His soldierly qualities went with quite a 
lot of brusquerie and he was not an easy or particularly compan-
ionable person. But he was good with paper; you could give him a 
submission and if it was foolish he picked the foolishness very 
quickly and set you on the right track. 
I've never known how he was chosen as Secretary of External 
Affairs but he was basically quite unsuited for the purpose. Not 
just because he was undiplomatic, if I may use that tired word, but 
there was no sensitivity about him and I think sensitivity is a thing 
which anyone in foreign service needs to possess. He was a blunt, 
straightfonvard soldier with a gammie [sic] leg and complete lack 
of imagination. I think another sort of man would have developed 
the Department much more rapidly than he was prepared to do. He 
didn't see the future that lay ahead of Foreign Affairs; he didn't see 
the opportunity in the climate of the day to recruit and train the 
people who would be needed in five or ten years' time. Beyond his 
capacity to write crisp prose and to collate other people's crisp 
prose he didn't really contribute anything to the development of 
the Department or the Senrice; indeed I think in many ways he 
was a bad influence. He was a kind-hearted man and so on, but his 
outlook was much too limited for someone embarking on a task of 
that kind. 100 
Hodgson was not just the bluff military man. After the wound to his leg at 
Gallipoli in 1915 effectively excluded him from an active military career, he took an 
LLB degree at Melbourne University and acquired accountancy qualifications, 
becoming an Associate of the Federal Institute of Accountants (Australia) and an 
Associate of the Australasian Institute of Cost Accountants. 101 At the time he was 
Director of Military Intelligence, serving as such from 1918 to 1934. Watt says he was 
a 'voracious reader1102 and 'a connoisseur of old silver and Chinese porcelain'. 103 
Apparently the disposition of his collection of silver gave rise to some controversy 
after his death. 104 In 1932 he applied unsuccessfully for the post of Liaison Officer in 
London. 105 
100 Waller, A Diplomatic Life, pp. 2-3. 
101 AA, A3299/l, Folder 1, 'Historical Summary of the Department of External Affairs', p. 9. 
102 The writer would occasionally encounter him in the Pretoria Public Library in 1954. See Tothill, 
'Practising Diplomacy: A Working Diplomat's View', World Review (Australia), Vol. 29, No. 1, 
March 1990, p. 26. 
103 ADB, Vol. 9, p. 322. 
104 H. Gilchrist, letter, 20 January 1995. 
105 ADB, Vol. 9, p. 321. 
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Like Viljoen, therefore, Hodgson had seen better days by the time of his arrival 
in South Africa at the age of sixty in 1952. Writing of a Casey reprimand, Hudson 
refrains from identifying Hodgson by name: 
When one of his heads of mission, a man formerly of significant 
military and public service rank, gave rise to gossip in Canberra 
and overseas because of noisy drinking bouts, he came down hard, 
but with courtesy and concern: the man had known pain daily 
since being wounded at Gallipoli.106 
As Renouf records, the drinking bouts started well before Casey became Minister and, 
after the death of his wife in Paris in 1946, he also became enamoured of women. 107 
In South Africa there were mixed feelings about Hodgson. He seemed to be 
viewed more positively by South Africans than by fellow Australians. In 1972 Prime 
Minister B.J. Vorster, who became an l\1P during Hodgson's term (and perhaps 
recalling an alcoholic or amatory escapade) called him 'quite a card'. 108 Dr Joan Rydon, 
who lived in Cape Town for some years in the 1950s while her husband taught at the 
University of Cape Town, says that 'Colonel Hodgson used to come [to meetings of 
the Australian-New Zealand Association] and I remember him as having predilections 
for drink and for pinching female bottoms. He used to come with a Mrs Alexander 
with whom I think he was living.•109 
A.J. Oxley, who met Gilchrist in Athens before his term in South Africa and 
who has kept in touch with him down the years, recalls that he 'had a tough time here 
as First Secretary under a difficult and somewhat alcoholic Head of Mission. '110 But 
Eric Louw liked Hodgson whom, he said when proposing the toast at the 1958 Aus-
tralia Day reception, 'was on his way back to live at the Cape when he fell ill and died. 
He had been a true friend of South Africa. •1 11 And Sole calls him 'a good friend whom I 
106 Hudson, Casey, p. 232. Perhaps this occurred during Hodgson's time in South Africa because 
Casey had been Minister for just over a year when Hodgson went to South Africa. 
107 Champagne Trail, pp. 24, 31. So far as is known, none of the South Africans had a drinking 
problem. J.K. Uys and E.M. Rhoodie were lifelong abstainers while the others appear to have been 
moderate drinkers. ' 
108 AA, A9421/l, 20111, Pt. 1, C.T. Moodie, Record of conversation MoodieNorster, 27 September, 
1972, p. 3, para. 10. Vorster became an MP during Hodgson's term. 
109 Dr Joan Rydon, letter, 9 December 1992. 
110 A.J. Oxley, letter, 29 December 1990. 
111 The Cape Argus, 28 January 1958. 
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regarded as the shrewdest head of the Australian Department of External Affairs I had 
ever met, despite his rather rough exterior. •112 
The aforementioned Mrs Alexander was in fact Enid Alexander, the widow of 
the United Party :MP Morris Alexander. Born Enid Asenath Baumberg in Sydney, she 
had been associated with the provision of children's programmes to the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission before her marriage to Alexander in 1935. Hodgson 
probably met her in her capacity as estate agent concerned with obtaining rented 
accommodation for the diplomatic corps on its annual trek to Cape Town for the 
parliamentary session. They enjoyed a close if quarrelsome relationship. On his death 
she inherited his newly imported Austin car and possibly a legacy. Quick action on the 
part of Nicholson, the Third Secretary, prevented her from laying hands on a large 
quantity of liquor Hodgson had saved from official stock and stored in a garage in 
Cape Town. This prompted her to complain strongly to the High Commission and to 
the Department in Canberra. l13 Mrs Alexander's abrasive personality led to the 
Australia and New Zealand Association in Cape Town splitting in two. 
In Pretoria Hodgson lived at the Assembly Hotel on the comer of Van der Walt 
and Visagie Streets, a short block across and three longer ones up from the High 
Commission's premises in Central House at the comer of Central and Pretorius Streets. 
It was there in 1956 that, 'somewhat incapacitated', he fell in a corridor, breaking his 
right arm, 'making it impossible for him to sign documents'. Gilchrist says this was 
concealed from the department for at least a month. 114 
The Cape Times and the Cape Argus of 27 January 1955 published photo-
graphs of Hodgson at that year's Australia Day reception. 
Nine other Australian diplomats served in South Africa between 1945 and 
1961: J.H. Brook (1960-64) as Third Secretary, Second Secretary and Acting First 
Secretary; O.L. Davis (1959-62) as High Commissioner and Ambassador; K. Desmond 
(1948-51) as Third Secretary and Second Secretary; H. Gilchrist (1955-59) as First 
112 D.B. Sole, letter, 6 September 1990. It is not known to which period this refers, whether to 
Hodgson's time as Secretary or in South Africa. Sole also met Watt and Plimsoll, perhaps other 
permanent heads too. 
113 Most of the information in this paragraph was derived from Hugh Gilchrist's letter of 20 January 
1995. See also E. Alexander, Morris Alexander: A Biography. Cape Town & Johannesburg, 1953. 
114 Letter, 20 January 1995. 
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Secretary and Acting High Commissioner; I.E. Nicholson (1957-59) as Third Secre-
tary; L.E. Phillips (1959-60) as First Secretary; Miss E.A. Warren (1951-54 as Third 
Secretary; and R.A. Woolcott (1954-57) as Third Secretary and Second Secretary. 
Brook, Desmond, Nicholson, Miss Warren and Woolcott were products of the diplo-
matic cadet scheme. In his career Woolcott clearly outshone his peers but Brook and 
Nicholson also became ambassadors. In terms of leaving a 'paper trail' Desmond was 
practically invisible in South Africa while Miss Warren, who was not, left the service in 
the early 1960s when she married. 
Of the others, by the time of his retirement in the mid-1970s Davis was among 
the most experienced of all Australian foreign service officers, having served in a 
multitude of posts before his arrival in South Africa and thereafter. Most of his career 
lay abroad. Gilchrist, who in a sense is from the Australian side, as Nel is from the 
South African one, the protagonist of this study, also occupied several ambassadorial 
posts as well as senior positions in the department in Canberra before his retirement in 
1979. The Cape Argus of 28 January 1958 published a photograph of him and his wife 
at the 195 8 Australia Day reception. If not an historian by training (he holds a BA LLB 
degree from Sydney University), he has devoted some of his retirement years to 
writing historical works including a two volume study of Australian/Greek relations 
(Australians and Greeks - he was Ambassador to Greece from 1968 to 1972.) Of a 
literary bent, he edited the Sydney University newspaper Honi Soit in the 1930s and 
was a member of the Students Representative Council. Upon joining the Department 
of External Affairs he edited Current Notes for a while. The present study has 
undoubtedly been enriched by his help. 
One who falls outside the period, J.C.G. Kevin (1962-68), who served as 
Ambassador until his relatively early death in South Africa at the age of fifty-eight, was 
probably the most influential and knowledgeable among Australian diplomats in terms 
of his own department because of his position in the 1950s as Assistant Secretary in 
charge of Administration and personnel. Watt, who says that Kevin was not his first 
choice for the job, as it were supplies a job description: 'For several years Kevin held 
this thankless post, dealing with such mundane matters as salaries, allowances, move-
ment of staff, housing, leave, health, family educat~onal problems etc. '115 What 
probably recommended Kevin for the post was his wartime experience with the 
115 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 165. 
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Security Service as head of its Organisation Section from 1942. 116 Before the war he 
had spent five years with the Australian High Commission in London. 117 He joined 
External Affairs after the war serving as Official Secretary at the Australia High 
Commission in India in 194 7 and 1948 thereby receiving exposure to negative attitudes 
towards the South African government's racial policies. He served subsequently in 
Indonesia and as Australian High Commissioner to Ceylon (1959-61) and to Pakistan 
(1961-62). 
It was mentioned in Chapter Two that Australian Ministers sang Nel's praises 
to Uys at the traditional Cabinet lunch given incoming heads of mission. He was, they 
said, 'always up with the job'. 118 It was, in fact, Nel who was indirectly responsible not 
only for Uys's appointment to Australia but also those of his immediate successors, 
Hamilton and Woodward. More than a year after he commenced acting as High 
Commissioner he wrote Spies a personal letter giving his views of the importance to 
South Africa of its representation in Australia. He assumed that because the High 
Commissioner's post had been vacant for fourteen months, the department could then 
be considering an appointment. 119 Senior posts in the Australian Public Service, 
including External Affairs (whose Secretary, Arthur Tange, was younger than he 
was)120 were held by relatively young officials. It would, therefore, be appropriate to 
appoint one of the departmental Counsellors. If preference were to be given someone 
from outside the service, his age should be equivalent to that of a Counsellor121 -
between forty-five and fifty. Viljoen was sixty-two and infirm when he arrived in Can-
berra. Nel had told Spies previously: 
Australia is very, very big and Canberra is very, very small, but 
entertainment is on a large scale. In order to participate properly 
requires the powers of a young or at least an energetic person. 
Unfortunately Dr Viljoen was never in the best of health in Can-
berra and it must sometimes have affected him severely. 122 
116 F. Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia, (Sydney, 1983), pp. 288, 292-93. 
117 
'Death of Mr Charles Kevin', Current Notes, Vol. 39, No. 2, p. 63. 
118 BTS, Uys, Vol. 5, Uys/SEA, 8 July 1954. (Original in Afrikaans). 
119 BTS, 84/5/45,, Vol. 2, Nel/Spies, 28 February 1953. (Original in Afrikaans). A copy is also on 
BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1. 
l20 BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Nel/Uys, 7 December 1953, p. 2. (Original in Afrikaans). 
121 BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2, NeVSpies, 28 February 1953. 
122 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, Spies/Ne!, 21November1951, pp. 6-7. Handwritten. (Original in Afrikaans). 
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Spies passed Nel's letter of 21 November to Forsyth who seized on it with alacrity: 
'Thank you! This letter will be brought to the attention of PM if the question of 
appointment again comes under discussion.'123 
Nel's suggestion was probably decisive. The department tended to follow the 
line of least resistance and when an appointment was made for the first time it followed 
almost automatically that all succeeding appointees would be officials of similar rank if 
not background. Also mentioned in Chapter Two was that Jones declined the appoint-
ment and the promotion, whereupon the department turned to Uys who had been ear-
marked for Ottawa. He had been a foreign service officer for twenty-five years. Leslie 
Blackwell, then about to retire from the Bench, had expressed an interest in the post 
but was told that the government was provisionally committed in respect of it. That 
may imply that a politician was under consideration or it may simply have been a way 
of putting him off 
Johann Kunz Uys was born in Swellendam, Cape Province, on 14 June 1907. 
His first job after graduating from Stellenbosch University in 1927 with a B Com 
degree was Second Grade Clerk in the library of the Department of Agriculture. He 
spent nine months there, joining the Department of External Affairs on 21 September 
1928 as the first Probationer Diplomat. He worked at Head Office for the next four-
and-a-half years. There followed a three-year posting to Washington (1933-37), a 
year-and-a-half at Head Office (1937-38) and almost three years in The Hague and 
London ( 193 8-41) - he was moved to London after the Dutch collapse in May 1940. 
From August 1941 to February 1943 he was seconded to the Department of 
Trade and Industry in Pretoria, serving under H.J. van Eck as Secretary of the Indus-
trial and Agricultural Requirements Commission. He then returned to External Affairs 
moving in December 1943 to Elizabethville in the then Belgian Congo. He was Consul 
there until December 1945. He spent the next four years as First Secretary in The 
Hague, returning to Pretoria where he remained until his departure for Canberra in 
February 1954. 124 His rank of Counsellor in Pretoria was a senior one and he was in 
charge of the Economic, Trade and General Division.125 To Uys's satisfaction one of 
his Cadets in the General Sub-Division, C.R. Roberts, succeeded Killen in Canberra in 
123 BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2, Nel/Spies, 28 February 1953. Handwritten copy of Forsyth's comment, 9 
March 1953. Spies conveyed ForS)th's thanks to Nel in BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Spies/Nel, 13 March 1953. 
124 BTS, Uys, Vol. 6, Curriculum Vitae. 
125 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 14, Uys/Secretary, 16 April 1951. 
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mid-1954 - like many people, Uys felt comfortable with men he had worked with pre-
viously. He would, however, have been less happy at the news that Roberts had 
resigned the service in June 1959 and was remaining in Australia. (He became a 
Commonwealth Public Servant, working in the Department of the Interior.) 
Uys can certainly be viewed through the filter of Crocker's aphorism that the 
'best Ambassador is always more than a civil servant'. 126 He was a supreme .civil 
servant and for that reason an indifferent diplomat, at least in respect of his 
effectiveness in the diplomatic milieu. That was never a hindrance in a career which 
took him to a Deputy-Secretaryship in the department (1960-65) and as head of 
mission twice to the Federal Republic of Germany (1957-60; 1965-69) and to Australia 
(1954-57; 1969-71), his only ambassadorial posts. Uys is, in fact, the only South 
African to have served as head of mission twice in the same posts. 127 He was valued 
for his head office accomplishments, spending more than eighteen years of his forty-
four year foreign service career at head office, an unusually lengthy span for members 
of the early department. 
Uys was the epitome of the vurige (fiery) Afrikaner in the sense that he tended 
to see the world through Afrikaner spectacles, weighing it against Afrikaner values. 
For him, only Afrikaners could be within the Covenant, though English-speaking South 
Africans could achieve a degree of righteousness by virtue of their command of Afri-
kaans and by an attitude of homage towards what he regarded as South Africa's domi-
nant culture. That was an ethnic rather than a political position and, like his 'Public 
Servantness', it never harmed his career, at least not when perhaps it could - the years 
of Smuts's second Prime Ministership. Ironically, his daughter's marriage to an Aus-
tralian made him an object of suspicion to similarly ethnocentric Afrikaners. 128 
Despite revelling in Afrikaner ethnicity (perhaps because of it) he did not espe-
cially endear himself to his Afrikaans-speaking subordinates. One, the future Foreign 
Minister, RF. Botha, never a man to sit back and await guidance or direction from 
seniors, was later inclined to reminisce about his experiences with Uys under whom he 
served in West Germany from January to October 1960. Finding Botha's raw enthu-
126 Crocker, Australian Ambassador, p. 63. 
127 So far as is known, Carel de Wet is the only other South African to have been head of mission 
twice at the same post, London (1964-67; 1972-76). It is, however, common practice in diplomatic 
service for officers to serve in missions in a subordinate capacity before returning years later to head 
them. 
128 Sole, Reminiscences, p.211. 
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siasm hard to deal with, Uys would sometimes remonstrate ineffectually, apparently 
more in sorrow than in anger, 'Remember, Botha, leadership moves from the top 
downwards!'l29 
Botha does not agree with the above assessment of the ethnic Uys. He writes: 
He was not an example of what I considered to be a forward-
looking Afrikaner. . . . It did not matter who was in power. It did 
not matter whether you were English or Afrikaans speaking. What 
mattered was his obsession to stay within the rules and to give the 
most restrictive interpretation to the rules. Politics did not matter. 
The rules. The regulations. He found his security within the letter 
of the rules. Prescriptions. An Ambassador abroad could not buy at 
. State expense an ashtray if the transaction was not fully motivated 
and prior approval obtained. It was as simple as that. He was a 
pipe smoker. I remember seeing a page on file with a hole burnt in 
the middle. He encircled the hole with his pen adding at the 
bottom of the page ... 'Much to my regret a spark from my pipe fell 
on the paper. I accept responsibility.' That epitomises Johann 
Kunz Uys. 130 
Sole, whose section head Uys was when he joined the department in 1938, also 
emphasises his attachment to the regulations, saying that he 'had a heart of gold in per-
sonal relationships but otherwise had very much of a civil service mentality; everything 
had to be done according to the book; he was inclined to look askance at 
innovation'. 131 Uys's successor as Deputy-Secretary, Sole says of his experiences as his 
subordinate in Pretoria in the 1960s: 
I did not normally work through him but directly to Jooste, which 
was just as well because he was incapable of taking a decision on 
anything of importance and was a stickler for acting strictly 
according to the book. When he happened to be acting head of the 
department in Jooste's absence, I was always having confronta-
tions with him about the policy submissions I had to route through 
him to the Minister. 
The absence of rapport between Sole and Uys on official matters does not 
surprise those who knew them. As his reminiscences show, Sole is a man of intellectual 
depth. During his career he often found it difficult to suppress a desire to dominate his 
surroundings including his superiors, oj!icial as well as political. A soup9on of intellec-
129 
'Onthou, Botha, leiding kom van bo, af!' R.F. Botha, letter, 2 November 1994. 
l30 Ibid. It seems that the incident of the hole in the paper occurred when Uys was in Australia and 
Botha a cadet at Head Office. The report concerned did not come to the writer's notice. 
131 Reminiscences, p. 18. See also p. 232. 
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tual arrogance was never far from the surface. He certainly never gave the impression 
by word or deed that he regarded the pronouncements of his superiors as engraved on 
tablets of stone. Nor, as was Uys, was he especially deferential towards politicians. 
If Australian Ministers were complimentary about Nel, a retrospective on Uys's 
first term in Canberra suggests they were less likely to have been so about Uys himself 
They greeted Hamilton with a sigh of relief and no doubt heartily endorsed the opinion 
in the Australian High Commission's 1957 annual report that he 'was of much higher 
calibre than his predecessors'. 132 Hamilton rightly describes Uys as 'immensely 
conscientious' and less accurately as possessing 'limited intellectual and aesthetic stand-
ards'.133 Thatwas in connection with the official residence which was planned and built 
during Uys's first term. In fact, apart from its furnishing (many of Uys's acquisitions -
or at least items purchased when he was High Commissioner - remained in place up to 
the 1990s) his principal contribution to the residence was choosing its site. (See 
Chapter Six). 
A hard-worker, a man of integrity, completely incorrupt and by no means 
unintelligent, Uys lacked subtlety and imagination not to mention political judgement. 
His reporting showed him to have been not infrequently out of his depth. Comments by 
his Australian interlocutors tended to show him in that light. Thus the Adviser on 
Commonwealth Relations in the Australian Department of External Affairs, J.E. 
Oldham, 134 recorded him asking soon after his arrival: 
whether it was better to be factual in putting South Africa's case 
and problems to the people of Australia. I said that I had recently 
heard an address by Mr. Nel to the Canberra Branch of the 
A.I.I.A., 135 and the view of the audience, which ... was a worth-
while one, was that they enjoyed the factual way Mr. Nel had 
spoken. Mr. Uys then stated that he was shortly to address a 
Rotary Club meeting outside Canberra and what line should he 
take. I said that Australians desired facts, rather than suave 
explanations. He asked me as to the Canberra Branch of the 
Rotary Club and I said it was an excellent high-grade body. He 
132 AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, PU, Annual Report 1957, Part B, p. 8, para. 39. 
133 A.M. Hamilton, letter, 2 October 1993. 
134 An imposing title for a rather inconsequential job, Casey having decreed that Oldham should not 
again serve abroad. Information obtained from Dr W.J. Hudson who refers discreetly to the Oldham 
case in Casey, p. 232. 
135 Australian Institute of International Affairs. 
208 
Chapter Four: Australians & South Africans 
said he did not intend to make any further speeches other than the 
Rotary one until he had seen more of the country. 136 
Administratively, though, Uys enjoyed the confidence and respect of his depart-
ment and subordinates. Refreshingly, he took full responsibility when mistakes were 
made and defended his subordinates. His mea culpa for the spark-produced hole which 
attracted R.F. Botha's attention was a somewhat extreme example. A more orthodox 
one was the way he handled a reprimand from Jooste over a memorandum setting out 
visa requirements. Roberts, the Third Secretary, prepared this pursuant to head office 
instructions and sent it to airlines, shipping lines and travel agents. The reason for the 
reprimand was that the memorandum revealed that some visa applications had to be 
referred to the Department of the Interior and that there were automatic restrictions 
against certain classes of people including Cypriots, Mauritians and Maltese. In all 
innocence a copy was sent to head office. 137 Jooste said that External Affairs and Inte-
rior were both extremely concerned about the extent of confidential information 
thereby made available to outsiders. 138 
Uys rose to the occasion: 
I accept full responsibility for everything that was done because I 
was the first to read your circular, to give instructions what had to 
be done and to satisfy myself that the memorandum that was 
drawn up contained no information of a confidential nature. 139 
He was a kind man. In January 1955 The Canbe1Ta Times140 recorded him 
hosting a dinner party in honour of a locally-engaged staff member, Valerie Town-
shend, who had resigned to get married after five-and-a-half years with the High 
Commission. A key to his rise as a foreign service officer may have been the awe in 
which he held his superiors, especially the politicians. While he just about scaled the 
heights in foreign service, he was more suited to the home civil service where he may 
conceivably have risen to head a department. 
In retrospect, Uys's career confirms the soundness of the advice given the 
young David Kelly: 'the main thing, especially in the early stages of the career, [is] to 
136 AA, Alo38, 201/1017, Pt. 1, J.E. Oldham, 'Record of conversation with the High Commissioner 
for South Africa on 1 April 1954'. 
137 BCB, Vol. 12, 24/2, Roberts/SEA, 20 February 1957. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
138 Ibid., Jooste/High Commissioner, Canberra, 14 March 1957. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
139 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 28 March 1957. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
140 27 January. 
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please one's superiors'. 141 The historian of the German diplomatic service has said that 
of young German diplomats before 1914: 'For a novice diplomat, nothing was more 
vital than an ability to ingratiate himself with his initial chief of mission'. 142 Even more 
to the point is what an army colleague told Kelly: 'Whatever the General wants -
'owever damn silly - you give that priority over everything else!'143 Good advice, for 
the measure of a foreign service officer is not what foreigners think of him but how he 
is perceived by his departmental superiors if a career official and by his head of govern-
ment and foreign minister if a politician. The same applies to foreign ministers. The 
corollary is what The Economist calls Cradock's first law of diplomacy: 'it is not the 
other side you need to worry about but your own'. 144 
There were probably two reasons why Uys secured a second term in Australia. 
Firstly, the elder of his two daughters, Anna, had remained there (in Melbourne) after 
her marriage shortly before her parents departed for West Germany in June 1957. 
However, while he was fond of his daughter, perhaps the main reason was that he 
wanted to occupy the official residence, having left Australia on the eve of its comple-
tion. (See Chapter Six). His second term in Canberra was his last overseas posting be-
fore his retirement in 1972. He died in 1978. His death was mourned by the Canberra 
YMCA on whose Board of Directors he had served in the 1950s and whose meetings 
he sometimes hosted at his residence. The President of the YMCA told the then 
Ambassador, A.J. Oxley, that the Association was 'very grateful for the assistance' Uys 
had given it and 'regarded it as a privilege to have known him'. 145 
The twenty year-old Anna Uys's wedding on 23 March 1957 to Flt Lt Ian 
Sutherland of the Royal Australian Air Force was one of the events of the Canberra 
season. The Governor-General and the Prime Minister and their wives were among the 
three hundred guests at the reception held at the Hotel Canberra. 146 Uys's Australian 
file contains a query from Casey to the Chief of Protocol, F.H. Stuart, whether, since 
141 Kelly, The Ruling Few, p. 78. 
142 Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, p. 148. 
143 Kelly, The Ruling Few, p. 78. 
144 The Economist, Vol. 331, No. 7859, 16 April 1994, p. 105. Most diplomats command a fund of 
stories in support of this proposition. The Cradock referred to was a former British Ambassador to the 
Peoples' Republic of China and foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. A book 
review in a later edition of The Economist (Vol. 333, No. 7883, 1 October 1994, p. 114) held that in 
1989 the American Embassy in London cabled the State Department that Cradock was "'one of the 
most powerful and least understood men" in the British government'. 
145 BTS, Uys, Vol. 6, Duminy/Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 8 September 1978, forwarding 
Arscott/Oxley, 31 August 1978. 
146 The Canberra Times, 20, 23 & 25 March 1957 and The Herald (Melbourne), 23 March 1957. 
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he and fellow-minister Philip McBride could not be present, they were expected 'to 
give a wedding present either individually or jointly with other ministers'. The 
conventional Stuart replied that it was accepted practice if asked to a wedding to give 
a present. Plimsoll, Waller and himself of the department could not attend but were 
sending cheques. 147 (The marriage subsequently ended in divorce.) Uys visited his 
daughter, son-in-law and grandchildren in London on his way back to South Africa 
after the 1961 session of the United Nations General Assembly. 148 Sutherland. was 
attached to the Australian High Commission at the time.149 
Other highlights, at least for Uys, during his first term were the Australian leg 
of the 1956 Springbok rugby tour of Australia and New Zealand and that year's 
Olympic games in Melbourne. Uys was responsible for the addition of the opening, 
Canberra match to the Springbok team's schedule. He was approached by the New 
South Wales Rugby Union and he took the matter up with Dr Danie Craven, the South 
African team's manager. D.P. Olivier, the Official Secretary at the High Commission, 
who coached and captained the Northern Suburbs team, was Vice-Captain of the ACT 
team on that occasion. 150 The Springbok team arrived in Canberra on the morning of 
15 May, played the match in the afternoon (which it won by 41 to 6) and attended 
Uys's reception at the Hotel Canberra that evening. This was in effect his annual Union 
Day reception which Eric Louw allowed him to hold early. It was also attended by the 
visiting South African Women's hockey team. The year 1956 was, therefore, a rather 
sporting one for Uys. 
The 1950s were a less profligate time in South African diplomacy than the 
present one. Louw decreed that meeting the various South African teams on arrival at 
Sydney was not a legitimate object of official expenditure. Nor was Uys's attendance of 
the rugby tests!1 51 There would probably be an outcry if such standards were applied 
today. The Australians did things differently. Stirling flew to Durban from Pretoria to 
meet the 1949 Australian cricket team on arrival and gave a lunch in its honour which 
147 AA, A1838!f20, 1500/1/30/5, Inward & outward teletype messages 414 & 478 of 7 & 8 March 
1957 respectively. 
148 BTS, 136/2/3/16, Vol. 1, Uys/Fourie, 15 January 1962. 
149 Information supplied to Ms Sylvia Mackay by Air Vice-Marshal Sutherland. 
150 Australians had difficulty with Olivier's nickname 'Daantjie'. In reporting on the rugby matches he 
played in, The Canberra Times would sometimes refer to him as 'Dankey' or 'Danky'. 
151 BCB, Vol. 21, 44/1, Spies/High Commissioner, Canberra, 27 April 1956 (original in Afrikaans) 
and BTS, 4/3/32, Vol. 2, Spies/High Commissioner, Canberra, 13 August 1956. 
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was attended by members of the Durban establishment.152 Then still in office, Evatt 
took a personal interest in the 1949 team and sent O.C.W. Fuhrman to Sydney to brief 
the manager and its members before their departure for Perth where they were to 
board the s.s. Nestor for South Africa.153 Evatt was also instrumental in overcoming 
the reluctance of his colleague, the Minister of Customs, to grant a licence to the 
team's manager, E.A. Dwyer, to buy an American car (a Buick) in South Africa and 
import it into Australia after the tour.154 
Two months before the opening of the Olympic games Uys received a letter 
from W.S. Kent Hughes, a Federal I\1P, who was President of the Organising Com-
mittee for the 1956 games, about Ira Emery, the Australian-born General Manager of 
the South African team. Emery had managed the South African team at the 193 8 
Empire Games in Sydney. Kent Hughes said his purpose in writing was to solicit Uys's 
assistance to avoid a repetition of the 'several very unpleasant incidents as between the 
South Africans and the Jamaican team on the very vexed racial question' in 1938. One 
incident had been 
entirely due to the lack of tact on the part of Mr. Emery, and even 
this is an understatement. I realise that on this occasion he was 
probably covering himself in that he was endeavouring to avoid 
any criticism on his return home. On the other hand, it was most 
embarrassing for all the other managers who were also present at 
this particular function.155 
Uys wrote in vague terms to Pretoria156 and probably played no part in bringing 
this about, but Emery's report on the 1956 games, which he co-authored with his 
Assistant General Manager, F.H. Braun, recorded that the South African team shared a 
dining room with Nigerian, Kenyan, Ugandan, Canadian and Irish athletes: 'A friendly 
atmosphere prevailed ... and this was due entirely to the tact and friendliness of our 
team members shown towards the African competitors'. 157 
152 Including the mayor, the editors of the local newspapers, the senior military officer and the 
Australian-born judge of the Natal division of the Supreme Court, Leslie Blackwell. AA, A423 l/2, 
Pretoria 1949, No. 8/49, Stirling/Minister of State, 18 October 1949. 
153 AA, Al838!T204, 201/10/11/3, Fuhrman/Secretary, 19 September 1949. 
154 See various items on Al838!T204, 201/10/11/3, including Dwyer/Evatt, 23 August 1949 and 0. 
12073, 26 September 1949. 
155 BCB, Vol. 21, 44/1 (Secret), Kent Hughes/Uys, 29 August 1956. 
156 Ibid., Uys/DEA, 6 September 1956. 
157 Ibid., 'Joint report of the General Manager and Assistant General Manager for publication', p. 4. 
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The contrast between Hamilton and Uys suggests that the early Department of 
External Affairs was something of a 'broad church'. As individuals and officials the men 
could hardly have been less alike - Uys the bald, dour, unimaginative Afrikaner public 
servant and the balding, prematurely white-haired, English-speaking, Oxford-educated 
Hamilton, a 'cheerful and incessant conversationalist'l 58 with a slight stammer. 
Hamilton was almost forty-eight and Uys almost forty-seven when they arrived in 
Canberra, their first head of mission post, but Hamilton's white hair made him s.eem 
much older. 159 Reporting the announcement of Hamilton's appointment, Gilchrist said 
the comparison with Uys, who was 'regarded by most of his departmental colleagues 
here as a pleasant fellow but not a very bright one', suggested Louw attached 'greater 
political importance to the post in Canberra than previously. It is also possible that he 
felt that the appointment of an officer with a non-Afrikaner background would be a 
desirable variation, since the two previous High Commissioners have been 
Afrikaners'. 160 
That may have been so but the records give no indication of the reason for 
Uys's appointment to West Germany, the senior post, and Hamilton's to Australia. 
Louw may not have initiated the matter because he may not, at that time, have known 
either of them personally. Jooste knew them both well. The Public Service Commission 
was naturally involved. Hamilton was an inspired choice for rarely are foreign diplomat 
and host country so well matched. Gilchrist predicted correctly that the Hamiltons 
would be 'very popular in Australia'.1 61 In fact, of all South African ambassadorial 
couples in Canberra in the forty-six year history of the post (by 1995) they may well 
have been the most successful. Perhaps Hamilton's greatest asset was his wife, the 
former Emily Cardross Grant, an Anglican clergyman's daughter and a graduate of the 
University of Cape Town with a Master's degree in child psychology. She was always 
known as Jill and he had met her on board ship when returning to South Africa from 
England in the l 930s.162 
158 AA, A1838/T54, 1500/1/30/8, Memo. 397, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 August 1957. 
159 He looked positively decrepit in the photograph in the 15 October 1959 issue of The Border 
Morning Mail (Albury). The photograph accompanying Crouch's 20 January 1959 article in the Rand 
Daily Mail (Johannesburg), taken when Hamilton had just turned forty-nine, gives the impression of a 
man some fifteen years older. 
160 AA, A1838/T54, 1500/1/30/8, Memo. 300, Gilchrist/DEA, 17 May 1957. 
l61 Ibid., Memo. 397, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 August 1957. 
162 Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo), 22 January 1973. 
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Just about wherever he went, so did she and they spent almost as much time 
travelling as all of his predecessors combined, in the process visiting most parts of 
Australia, even Cairns in the far north of Queensland, a thousand miles from Brisbane 
and almost as distant from that city as it is from Adelaide. As Hamilton himself puts it, 
they traversed the country 'from Cairns to Hobart and from Sydney to Perth'. 163 Not 
altogether flatteringly did Wally Crouch, a young Australian journalist who had 
worked in South Africa, call him the 'walkabout envoy'. Crouch disliked white South 
Africans and his use of the term in that context in a South African newspaper may have 
been a private joke. 164 The travelling was in pursuit of what Hamilton conceived to be 
his 'chief task', the 'political and public relations side', what could also be called the 
representational side: 
I have reported regularly to the Department on my travels outside 
Canberra. These have involved a great deal of heavy going both in 
the actual travel and in speech-making and in contacts with 
groups and individuals. The South African flag has appeared in 
places where it had never been seen before! 165 
Under the auspices of the Australian government the Hamiltons also went to 
New Guinea. En route to Australia to take up his post Hamilton represented the South 
African government at the Malayan Independence celebrations and in January/February 
1958 in Colombo at the celebration of the tenth anniversary of Ceylon's Independence 
and at the unveiling of the Commonwealth War Memorial in Rangoon, Burma. Viljoen, 
who complained about his limited opportunities for travel (see Chapter Six), would 
have been disconcerted if he had known of Hamilton's mobility. Even so, Viljoen's and 
particularly Nel's representations about the need for internal travel would have helped 
set the parameters of the job from which Hamilton benefited. 
A product of Rondebosch Boys' High School, Cape Town and Jeppe Boys' 
High School, Johannesburg, Hamilton read History and English at the University of the 
163 Hamilton, Antipodean Days, p. 2. There is no other record of him having visited Tasmania. His 
immediate predecessor, Uys, visited only the States of New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. 
BTS, Olivier, PL M, Vol. 2, Uys/SEA, 29 May 1957. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
164 See Gilchrist's notes on their conversation in Durban in July 1957. AA, Al83 l, 201/2/5, Pt. 6, 
Annex to Memo. 367, 19 July 1957; and Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 20 January 1959, 'The 
Walkabout Envoy - the name Australians give our aml>assador'. The term 'walkabout', derived from 
perceived Aboriginal behaviour, has pejorative connotations in Australia implying shiftlessness and 
unreliability. The reference to Hamilton having succeeded 'Mr Stanley Uys', who was then the 
political correspondent of the Sunday Times (Johannesburg), may also have been a private joke. 
Crouch later joined the staff of The Bulletin (Australia). 
165 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
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Witwatersrand (Wits), graduating in 1931 with first class Honours in History. An Ain-
sworth Scholarship took him to New College, Oxford, where he read Politics, Phi-
losophy and Economics, going down with a second class degree in 1934. Thereafter he 
qualified for a diploma at the Geneva School of International Studies, later working in 
the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva for six months. At Wits he had been 
among W.M. Macmillan's 'best pupils', whose number also included C. W. de Kiewiet 
and Lucy Sutherland, who were allowed to assist their professor sort through the pa-
pers of the missionary Dr John Philip, later destroyed in a 1931 fire. 166 At Wits one of 
his teachers was Margaret Hodgson, later Margaret Ballinger, whom he was to host 
when she came to Canberra in September 1960 to deliver that year's Dyason lecture. 167 
Anthony Albert Mordaunt Hamiltonl68 was born in Paarl on 9 December 1909 
to an anglicised Afrikaner mother and an Australian father. The Cape Civil Service had 
recruited his father in Victoria just after the Anglo-Boer war. Stationed at Paarl, 
Hamilton pere married the daughter of an old Cape Dutch family. 169 Anthony Hamilton 
joined the Department of External Affairs on 3 October 1944 as a Legation Secretary, 
a rank converted later to Second Secretary, at the age of almost thirty-five at a salary 
of £600 per annum. This was brought up by means of a personal non-pensionable 
allowance to £800, the maximum of the Second Secretary's scale. He had received 
£800 as locally-recruited press officer and political adviser at the British High Com-
mission, 170 a capacity in which he was employed from 193 9. He claimed to have 
written 'most of the political and economic despatches emanating from that Office' in 
that period. 171 That may have been an exaggeration.172 Even so, his well-argued moti-
166 W.M. Macmillan, My South African Years (Cape Town 1975), pp. 163, 218. 
167 An annual event between 1949 and 1977, the Dyason Lectures provided a prestigious forum. 
Earlier lecturers included Bertrand Russell, Salvador de Madariaga, Julian Huxley, William 0. 
Douglas, Kenneth Younger, Arnold Toynbee, Gunnar Myrdal and Kingsley Martin. The Canberra 
Times, 6 November 1958 and 8 October 1959. Mrs Helen Suzman was the 1975 lecturer. For the text 
of Margaret Ballinger's 1960 lecture, 'South Africa: A problem in race relations - challenge and 
response', see Australian Outlook, Vol. 15, No. l, April 1961, pp. 5-28. Although the abolition of 
natives' representation had by that time brought about her retirement from politics, Mrs Ballinger was 
quite cautious in what she told her audiences. So was Mrs Suzman. Macmillan includes A.L. Geyer 
and Margaret Hodgson among 'three quite remarkable students' of his at Rhodes University College 
before the First World War. My South African Years, p. 115. Hamilton says the Macmillans stayed 
with him when he was Ambassador in Madrid in the 1960s. Letter, 28 October 1993. 
168 He dropped the name Albert as an adult. 
169 A.M. Hamilton, letter, 2 October 1993. 
170 In other words he was not, as Prof Muller claimed in an early draft chapter of the official history, a 
member of the British diplomatic service before joining the South African one. 
171 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, 'Anthony Albert Mordaunt Hamilton', 1944. 
172 His report on the Malayan independence celebrations, which the department circulated to all 
missions, is an example of his reporting. BTS, 91/8/1, Vol. 10, Circular Minute A.46 of 1957, 18 
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vation of the proposal he made within days of joining the department for the establish-
ment of a political section confirms his experience in the field.173 His link with Jooste, 
his first boss, dated from that time. He later served briefly under Jooste in Washington, 
DC. 
For three years before joining the British High Commission he wrote leading 
articles on international and economic subjects for the Cape Times. That brought him 
to the attention of General Smuts whom, he says, encouraged him to take the job at 
the High Commission. 174 Before that for a year he had assisted Sir Howard d'Egville, 
the longtime Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. 175 In 
1944 he discussed possible employment with the Argus company176 but External 
Affairs was 'very keen on getting' him and urged the Public Service Commission to 
give him 'as high an allowance or salary as possible'.177 A week after he joined it the 
department supplied the Commission with pro f orma reasons for his appointment 
which Dunk could have taken over without amendment to motivate his own out-of-
pattern appointments to the Australian department: 
The anticipated post-war reopening and extension of the Union's 
diplomatic representation abroad necessitates the addition to the 
nucleus of staff trained in diplomatic duties of a certain number of 
officers in the higher graded posts. Mr. Hamilton was considered 
to be the best qualified candidate available for appointment to the 
post in question. 178 
That contradicted the department's previous line that the 'Diplomatic and Con-
sular service was a specialised service and that in respect of promotion, for example, 
preference should be given to officials who were already in that service'. 179 Be that as 
it may, it was a lucky break for Hamilton because nine years earlier he had been among 
October 1957. Another example is his personal letter to Scholtz of 20 November 1959 which is 
interesting for its content, ie., the light it throws on various subjects including E.M. Rhoodie, the 
illness of P.LT Snyman's wife, and the site of the future chancery. BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III. 
173 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III., Hamilton/Assistant Secretary, 7 October 1944, 'Establishment of a 
Political Section in the Department'. 
174 A.M. Hamilton, letter, 28 October 1993 
175 Ibid. Also BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, 'Anthony Albert Mordaunt Hamilton', 1944. Sir Howard d'Egville 
was Secretary-General of the' Commonwealth Parliamentary Association from 1911 to 1960. Hall, 
Commonwealth, p. xiv. 
176 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, Hamilton/Forsyth, 14 August 1944. 
177 Ibid., Pohl/Swart, 12 May 1944. 
178 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. I, Pohl/Secretary, PSC, 11October1944. 
179 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 3, Muller/v.d. Walt, 11March1937. (Original in Afrikaans). 
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sixty-four applicants for the position of Probationer Diplomat and had been rejected. 180 
He had applied from London while working for the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association. The four men who were accepted at that time included J.E. Bruce and 
R.H. Coaton who subsequently made their careers in the foreign service. 
The holder of a BA and a B Com, Coaton had been a Clerical Assistant, Grade 
II, in the Department of Commerce and Industries, while External Affairs was Bruce's 
first job. 181 G.J.J.F. Steyn, a member of the 'Sole generation', was rejected then but 
accepted two years later. 182 Quite likely Hamilton and Piet Beukes, who applied from 
England in 1936 (see Chapter Two), were at a disadvantage for not being in South Af-
rica when they submitted their applications. Charles te Water interviewed them both. 
He described Hamilton as 'above the average intelligence; well-educated and good 
address and manner'. His teacher at Oxford, Paves, had said that 'while he must admit 
Hamilton has not quite first class mind has nevertheless qualities which ought to stand 
him in good stead in diplomacy'. 183 They did. In any case, he did better for himself as a 
late entrant than if he had joined the department in his mid-twenties. For instance, on 
entry he was paid a higher salary than either Coaton or Bruce who were promoted to 
Second Secretary only in 1946, the former on I January and the latter on 1 October. 184 
At the time of his promotion, Bruce's salary was £440185 and Coaton's would have 
been similar. 
Gregory Clark, a former Australian foreign service officer, stresses the import-
ance to the sending country of a close relationship between its Ambassador and the 
head of government of the receiving country. 186 That was how it was in early modern 
diplomacy. Towards the end of his embassy in the second decade of the seventeenth 
century, the Spanish Ambassador to the Court of England's King James I, Don Diego 
180 A list of the six'ty-four applicants is attached to BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, Secretary, PSC/SEA, 24 
September 1935. 
181 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, Secretary, PSC/SEA, 22 November 1935. 
182 See Chapter Two, p. 80, fn 3. 
183 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, Telegram No. 410, Te Water/SEA, 5 November 1935. A departmental 
memorandum early the next year described Coaton as 'extremely able, and in all respects suitable for a 
post of attache'. There were 'few officials of the rank of Second Grade Clerk who were in general so 
suitable as he for the purposes of our diplomatic services'. BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 2, Muller/Under-
secretary, 2 April 1936. (Original in Afrikaans). 
184 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 11, Departmental personnel around April 1947. 
185 Ibid., Salary and other particulars regarding Montgomery, Viljoen, Van Heerden, Sole, Bruce, 
Stewart, Botha and Burger. 
186 G. Clark, 'The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs - What's wrong with our Diplomats', The 
Australian Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, June 1975, especially pp. 27-28. 
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Sarmiento de Acuna, Count of Gondomar, had achieved the position of 'the dictator of 
England's foreign policy, the chosen companion of the king's leisure hours, and his 
closest friend'. 187 While, as Mattingly says, it 'would be hard to name an ambassador 
before or since who had attained such a position, or exerted by sheer personal force 
such influence upon the affairs of Europe', close relationships between ambassadors 
and heads of state were not uncommon in nineteenth century diplomacy. 
David Kelly tells of the British Ambassador in Berlin on whom the Kaiser 
called during a walk, finding him in holed pyjamas. The Kaiser would refer to the inci-
dent with amusement at their subsequent meetings. That was the sort of relationship 
Ambassadors were expected to cultivate.188 These days, as it was perhaps in the 1950s, 
that is the counsel of perfection. But that is what Hamilton achieved and he deserves 
full marks for that aspect of his work in Australia. He was also on a friendly footing 
with the External Affairs Minister, Casey, whom he had met before he arrived in Aus-
tralia. Suggesting that theirs was a close relationship, though Hamilton does not refer 
to it in his reporting, is that Casey put him up for honorary membership of the principal 
clubs in the six state capitals.189 
Hamilton told Scholtz in a personal letter two years into his Canberra posting 
that he had made it his 
special job to cultivate a close relationship withe the Prime Min-
ister and many members of the Cabinet. In all modesty I am sure 
that I can say that I have established a closer relationship with 
these Ministers than any other member of the Diplomatic Corps; 
and I have done more than any other head of mission to entertain 
the members of Parliament and the press. 
187 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 266. Truly does Mattingly remark: 'Only years of daily 
contacts, of careful study and preparation could have achieved so much. Gondomar's success illus-
trates the potential of the resident ambassador at its highest.' 
188 Kelly, The Ruling Few, pp. 117-18. 
189 ie., Adelaide Club, Weld Club (Perth), Queensland Club, Melbourne Club, Tasmanian Club, 
Union Club (Sydney). AA, Al838ff54, 1500/1/30/8, Casey/Mitchell etc., 29 November 1957. 
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And prophetically: 
All this, I am sure, is of. the greatest importance for the job; and, 
even if we don't see startling and dramatic results from it, it is 
obviously important in setting the tone of our relations and 
inducing a sympathetic approach to our affairs, which at moments 
of crisis could still be of special value to us.190 
It was, during the Sharpeville crisis the following year when he could report: 
I have been immensely encouraged by the reactions of very many 
responsible people. Apart from the staunch friendship of the Prime 
Minister I have had messages or personal expressions of sympathy 
from the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. McEwen, most other mem-
bers of the Cabinet, numerous Members of the Liberal and Coun-
try Parties in Parliament and a great number of friends all over 
Australia. 
Even the Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, took 'the unusual step' of 
telephoning to assure him that 'he was not trying to make difficulties for us'. He was 
bound to express the Labour view on the shootings and South Africa's racial policies 
but would try to be 'helpful and constructive'. His speech was in fact relatively mild. 191 
Later, Calwell invited Hamilton 'into his office' and said that he did not want him 'to 
think that he was unfriendly to South Africa. He knew how much the Republics had 
suffered in the South African war and understood how complex our problem was'. 192 
In respect of Menzies, Hamilton was helped by the fact that the Prime Minister 
liked and felt comfortable in the company of diplomats, a fact which AW. Martin, the 
Menzies biographer, confirms: 'I think it is pretty clear that he had a close a relaxed 
friendship with many of them, especially the Americans. The two of whom there is 
clearest evidence for this are Amos Peaslee and Bill Battle. '193 Sir Stephen Holmes, 
Lord Carrington's predecessor, also seems to have enjoyed a friendly relationship with 
the Prime Minister. He told a 1978 conference after Menzies death that he was 
a man of immense kindness. He would frequently call by phone 
and invite one to come over to his office for a drink; long conver-
190 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
191 BTS, 136/3/10, Vol. 1, Cypher OTP telegram No. P.8, High Commissioner, Canberra/SEA, 31 
March 1960. 
192 BTS, 136/3/10, Vol. 7, second page, the only on file, of two page report by Hamilton probably 
dated 1 April 1960. 
193 Letter, 26 June 1995. Field-Marshal Sir William Slim was Governor-General of Australia from 
1952 to 1959. 
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sations would follow. The relationship had in some measure con-
tinued subsequently. He had felt moved to write to Menzies on 
occasion and had never failed to receive replies from the Prime 
Minister. 194 
Conversely, Menzies was less at home with politicians, especially those of his own 
party, perhaps because he saw them as potential rivals. (Some say that perception lay 
behind his appointments of Casey and Spender and possibly also Latham to important 
posts outside politics. 195 However, Miller contradicts this: 'Menzies has been likened to 
the banyan tree, in the shade of which nothing else can grow, but this has always 
seemed unfair to me.')196 
Robert Kennedy, a member of Menzies' staff until early 1961, gives perspective 
to the Menzies/Hamilton relationship: 
To be invited to the Lodge is an honor; to be invited to dinner is to 
walk with the mighty. Few people receive the accolade, because 
the Prime Minister is not a gregarious soul ... 
He dines out only when he has to, or on rare occasions because he 
wants to. He holds a dinner party at the Lodge usually only when 
he has to ... Only one member of Cabinet can qualify as a regular 
diner at the Lodge: the amiable and earthily-arnusing Athol 
Townley who, more than anybody else in Australia, has made a 
fine art of knowing how far to go with the Prime Minister - whois 
so perfect an actor, so accomplished a listener, that many fall into 
the trap of going beyond the bounds of what the Prime Minister 
considers a reasonable thing. Many a promising political career 
has foundered on this rock. 197 
Such evidence as there is suggests that, apart from his liking for individual 
South African diplomats and even Eric Louw (see Chapter One), Menzies also liked 
(white) South Africans in general. This proposition is, however, difficult to document. 
After Sharpeville Hamilton told Jooste that Menzies had 
shown a massive friendship for South Africa in these last anxious 
weeks .. . It has cost him a great deal in the way of bitter personal 
194 Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Sir Robert Menzies: Australian Minister and Commonwealth 
Statesman, Report of a conference, 14 June 1978, p. 19. 
195 See Edwards, Prime Afinisters and Diplomats, p. 122; Lyall, 'Australia's Overseas Representation 
and Government Patronage', Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 2, August 1969, pp. 126-27; and 
Chapter One, pp. 74-75 above. 
196 J.D.B. Miller, Sir Robert Afenzies: Australian A1inister and Commonwealth Statesman, Report of 
a conference, 14 June 1978, p. 25 
197 Quoted in C. Hazlehurst, Menzies Obsen1ed {Sydney, 1979), p. 366. 
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attacks from people who normally support him, widespread criti-
cism in the press and, quite tangibly, as he said to me, at least 
1,000 votes in the by-election in Mr. Casey's former constituency 
near Melbourne. He has had floods of abusive letters, one corres-
pondent charging him with 'hypocrisy and cowardice'! He found 
some ironic amusement in this: as a politician, he thought it was 
going a bit far to be called a coward when he would have found it 
so much easier, and politically profitable, to have gone along with 
the violent of opinion. (Incidentally, his Cabinet colleagues, Mr. 
Menzies told me, were quite divided on the subject, but he had 
been able to persuade the waverers!)198 
A. W. Martin writes: 
On the interesting question ... whether ... Menzies had some kind 
of special 'liking for (white) South Africans in general' I am afraid 
I have little evidence ... He clearly got on well with Viljoen and 
Hamilton. I would expect there to be in Uys' despatches remarks 
which offer clues to the relationship there; 199 and were there any 
other ambassadors in his time? These are, of course, particular 
people, and I have no way of knowing how many others - if any -
of your countrymen he knew personally. Beyond that I'd guess that 
his general sympathy with South African whites (especially of 
British stock) stemmed from his regard for South Africa as one of 
the original countries of the Commonwealth, which had stood 
beside Britain in the two world wars and which shared traditional 
British institutions. He was also something of an old-fashioned 
racist and colonialist (though not more so than most Empire men 
of his class and generation) and, as you would know, not intrinsi-
cally sympathetic to black or brown independence movements: 
'native' self-rule was something he was inclined to accept slowly 
and half-heartedly, though of course he was to good a politician to 
say much about it. 200 
Linking up with this is H.H. Woodward's contemporary observation that 
Menzies had 'very little sympathy' for the Commonwealth's 'new non-White members'. 
For him the value of the post-1961 Commonwealth lay 'only in the common bond of 
the Crown which unites the surviving old Commonwealth together in the acceptance of 
common traditions'. 20 I 
Hamilton was also fortunate to be able to move immediately on arrival into a 
residence strategically situated between the Prime Ministerial Lodge and the Parlia-
ment building, within walking distance of both and probably not more than five min-
198 BCB, Vol. 20, 32/13, Hamilton/Jooste, 22 April 1960. 
199 Uys's despatches do not suggest a personal friendship with Menzies. 
200 Prof AW. Martin, letter, 27 August 1995. 
201 BCB, Vol. 2, S6/4, Vol. VII, Woodward/Acting SEA, 11January1963, p. 2. 
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utes from the first-mentioned. (See Chapter Six.) Geography therefore undoubtedly 
contributed to his relationship of easy familiarity with Menzies who would often stop 
by on his way home from parliament, sometimes arriving unannounced. One time he 
did so was in March 1960 to discuss the day's debate in Parliament on the Sharpeville 
shootings and to give Hamilton 'moral support'. 202 Michael Landale, the son of the 
contemporary Chief of Protocol W. G.A. Landale, and in 1994 himself a senior officer 
in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, a friend of the younger of the .two 
Hamilton daughters and then in his teens, recalls opening the door to the Prime Min-
ister one afternoon. 203 Hamilton's predecessors, Viljoen and Uys, were less fortunately 
housed, living some distance off the route between The Lodge and Parliament. There 
were, however, other factors which would have told against them in Menzies' eyes. 
Michael Landale describes the Menzies/Hamilton relationship as 'a close, per-
sonal one. I am sure it was Anthony Hamilton's judgement, historical perspectives and 
great good humour that appealed to the Prime Minister'.204 From what Hamilton him-
self says, one deduces that it was a matter of personal chemistry205 besides which they 
shared a Scottish background. Not to be overlooked is that Jill Hamilton also struck a 
chord with Menzies and his wife Dame Pattie. Circumstances permitting, the families 
settled into an informal routine of turn about Sunday suppers, which would have 
amazed the Canberra political establishment if they had known of it. The Hamiltons 
were included in intimate dinners at The Lodge such as, for example, when Menzies 
entertained the new Governor-General, Lord Dunrossil, on the day of his swearing-in. 
Only one other couple was present. 206 
Hamilton was, of course, not alone in cultivating the Australian head of gov-
ernment. Davis (Canada) and Johnson (US) had done so when John Curtin was Prime 
Minister in the 1940s. 207 Canberra's small size facilitated such connections, as it did 
throughout the 1950s. That is not to suggest that Hamilton, as is sometimes the case 
with foreign diplomats, was an eminence grise or Rasputin in respect of Australian 
domestic politics. Quite clearly he was not. 
202 BCB, Vol. 20, 32/13, Hamilton/SEA, 1April1960. 
203 Letter, 28 January 1994. He writes: 'I am not sure if the visit was une>..-pected. Perhaps the timing 
was'. The daughter concerned, Catherine, is the wife of the Editor of the Sunday Times 
(Johannesburg), Ken Owen. 
204 M. Landale, letter, 28 January 1994. 
205 See, for example, his Antipodean Days. 
206 BTS, 112511, Vol. 1, Hamilton/SEA, Cape Town, 9 February 1960. Hamilton singles this dinner 
out for special mention in his memoir Antipodean Days (p. 1). 
207 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, pp. 159-60. 
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Not unnaturally, Menzies was loath to see his friend go and news of his 
impending departure for Stockholm, which Hamilton conveyed to him personally in 
January 1961, caused something of a stir in official Canberra. At the time Hamilton 
reported Menzies's reaction to Tange, the Secretary for External Affairs, and to 
Bunting, the Secretary of the Prime Minister's department. Menzies had taken over the 
External Affairs portfolio on Casey's retirement a year previously. He was, Tange 
noted Hamilton saying, 'upset at the news and had commented that the decision. was 
poor timing. He had said that he was considering writing to Jooste'. 208 The way 
Hamilton recalled this three decades later was that 'Mr Menzies burst out: "Your 
Government has done many stupid things. This is the most stupid. I'll send a message 
to Louw! "'209 Presumably the first version is definitive. Both imply that even so experi-
enced an operator as Menzies, if only momentarily, overlooked the here today, gone 
tomorrow nature of foreign service where the place of individual envoys in the wider 
scheme of things is akin to that of 'the king is dead; long live the king'. There again, 
one does not have his side of the story. 
Hamilton himself had queried his reassignment to Stockholm, cabling the 
department on 6 January 1961: 'I think that I could still do useful work here especially 
in view of imminent constitutional change and Australian elections later this year'. 210 
Jooste drafted the departmental response, noting in Afrikaans on the draft: 'Approved 
by PM': 
Government believe that your services required more urgently in 
Stockholm where our position continues to be most difficult des-
pite excellent work done by Bruce. You have been specially selec-
ted for post and in making change great importance attached by 
Union Government to continuation of our good relations with Aus-
tralia, which is due also to manner in which you carried out your 
mission, is not being overlooked. 211 
Hamilton showed this to Tange. To Menzies he had already poured cold water on the 
idea of his term being extended, saying that his family looked forward to going to 
Stockholm. In any case it was probably too late too change. That would have deflated 
Menzies. 
2cs AA, Al838/265, 1500/1/30/11, Record of conversation Tange/Hamilton, 6 January 1961. See also 
File note E.J. Bunting, 10 January; Bunting/Tange, 10 January and Tange/Minister, 11 January. 
209 Hamilton, Antipodean Days, p. 7. 
210 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Cypher OTP telegram No. 1, High Commissioner, Canberra/SEA, 6 
January 1961. 
211 Ibid., Cypher OTP telegram No. 1, SEA/High Commissioner, Canberra, 9 January 1961 and draft. 
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It is not unusual for influential people who have been close to a diplomatic 
envoy to regret his departure and to want to take the matter up with his govern-
ment. 212 Albeit unusual for a head of government-cum-foreign minister, Menzies's atti-
tude would have fallen into that category. It is also not every career official who 
receives from his head of department an accolade such as that which Jooste bestowed 
on Hamilton. At this juncture it is difficult to assess the value of the relationship to 
Menzies. He did not mention it in either of his autobiographical works, Afternoon 
Light (1967)213 and The Measure of the Years (1970) although there are references to 
it in his unpublished papers. 214 Perhaps for him it was light relief from the cares of 
office, a manifestation of what Crocker called 'a characteristic which became 
increasingly marked with the years - to get recreation from boon companions, most of 
whom, like himself, could hold their liquor if not their tongues'. 215 
Herbert Hans Woodward succeeded Hamilton in Canberra. It was during his 
term that South Africa left the Commonwealth. He was therefore South Africa's last 
High Commissioner and first Ambassador to Australia. In age he was two years 
Hamilton's junior (he was born on 19 November 1911) but he had seven more years 
experience in the department which he joined in 193 7 after eight years in Customs and 
Excise. He was posted to Brussels less than a year later thence to Washington after the 
fall of Belgium in 1940.216 Spending the next eight years in Washington, he was 
transferred to Ottawa in December 1948 and back to Pretoria in September 1951. He 
married a Canadian, Kathleen McNeish, in 1944. The holder of a B .Com, Woodward 
was engaged on a Masters degree when he joined External Affairs but he did not 
complete it. 
212 In the old diplomacy, although rare, it was not unknown for Heads of State to insist on the 
appointment of specific individuals as envoys to them. Cecil cites the example of the Czar of Russia 
insisting on General von Werder even though the German Emperor preferred someone else. Emperor 
Wilhelm complied so as not to give offence. Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, p. 171. 
213 In 1967 Hamilton wrote to the editor of The Times (London) about a misprint in an extract from 
Afternoon Light. Copies of the correspondence, including also a copy of a letter from Menzies to 
Hamilton is on BTS, 1/25/3, Vol. 2. See also The Times, 18 October & 18 December 1967. 
214 Hamilton and Menzies corresponded after the former left Australia. The Menzies Papers held by 
the National Library of Australia, reference ANL, MS. 493611/14/116, contain some of the 
correspondence. I am obliged to Prof A.W. Martin of Canberra, Menzies' biographer, for sending me 
copies. 
215 Travelling back, p. 185. The Hamilton/Menzies association was a family one. Ability to hold 
liquor would not have come into it. 
216 See Fourie, Brandpunte, pp. 14, 16 for references to him in that period. 
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On the same level as Coaton and Bruce, he found himself at a disadvantage vis-
a-vis Hamilton when the latter joined the department in 1944, being promoted to Sec-
ond Secretary only in 1946. He lacked Hamilton's rapport with the head of the depart-
ment, a sine qua non for success as it still is. His wife's Afrikaans or the lack of it was 
among the factors impeding the later stages of his career as also, perhaps, the fact that 
a former subordinate, B.G. Fourie, was then the head of the department. In the mid-
1950s, however, Woodward was in the ascendant. On the occasion of his appointment 
to Cairo, for example, Louw described him to Gilchrist as 'a very good man'. 217 Can-
berra was Woodward's third head of mission post after Nairobi (1955-59) and Cairo 
(1959-61) where he was Commissioner and Minister respectively. His posting to Nai-
robi was indicative of the role chance plays in diplomatic affairs as well of the power 
South African Cabinet Ministers then enjoyed over Public Servants. 
He succeeded J.K. Christie whom, having fallen foul of Eric Louw, was 
removed from his post at short notice and transferred to the Department of Commerce 
and Industries218 soon after Louw became Minister of External Affairs in January 
195 5. At first it seemed that Christie would be appointed Superintendent of the Guano 
Islands off South Africa's east coast! The file contains no indication of Louw's reasons. 
A note from Forsyth to Spies recorded cryptically: 'Apparently this decision is based 
upon complaints, the nature and source of which I do not know'. A postscript sug-
gested that he knew more than he was prepared to put in writing: 
I understand Mr. Christie travelled on the same boat with the 
Minister as a fellow passenger as far as Mombasa last October, I 
think. Did Mr. Christie return from leave in the Union at about 
that time? If not, in what circumstances was he on the boat?219 
It was, however, common knowledge in the Department of External Affairs in 
the late 1950s that Christie, sailing tourist class, had 01nitted to pay his respects to 
Louw, a Cabinet Minister, albeit heading another department (Finance), who was a 
first class passenger on the same vessel. In the end matters probably worked out as 
Louw intended because Christie returned to the department after his forced departure, 
taking Woodward's place in Pretoria as Counsellor in charge of the International 
217 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6, Pt. 1, Memo. 27, Gilchrist/DEA, 19 January 19::9, attachment, Record of 
conversation Gilchrist/Louw, 5 January 1959. Gilchrist departed South Africa on 9 January and the 
report was signed by his successor, Phillips. 
218 In which he had spent almost a decade, serving i.a. in London and Singapore, before he joined 
External Affairs in 1944. He had worked in the Department of Labour between 1924 and 1935. 
219 BTS, Christie, Forsyth/Under Secretary, 24 January 1955. 
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Organisations, Africa and Coding Sections. 220 Just over a year later he was transferred 
on promotion to Berne, Switzerland, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary221 and subsequently to Lourern;:o Marques as Consul-General. He retired on 
grounds of health in 1960, three years prematurely. 
Quite likely because the facts supported him, Woodward's role in the 
Tambo/Segal visa fiasco did him no harm. After Sharpeville Oliver Tambo, Deputy 
President-General of the African National Congress (ANC) and Ronald Segal, Editor 
of the quarterly magazine Africa South, fled the country without passports or valid 
travel documents with the intention of going to New York to address the United Na-
tions Security Council. For the South African authorities they were 'agitators'222 and 
earnest attempts were made to have them returned under the Fugitive Offenders Act. 
These efforts were probably foredoomed to failure because the men's route took them 
initially through British-controlled territory and, as Maud, the British High Commis-
sioner, told Jooste at the time, that the British government would most likely be 
acutely embarrassed if it should be asked to return them to the Union. 223 
At the end of March and during the first half of April 1960 H.L.T. Taswell, the 
South African High Commissioner in Salisbury in the then Central African Federation, 
did what he could when Jooste asked him to intercede with the federal authorities to 
prevent the men, who later joined forces with another fugitive, Yussuf Dadoo, from 
entering the Federation.224.When they did so, he tried to have them returned to South 
Africa. Taswell's best efforts were unavailing. The Rhodesia Herald (18 April 1960) 
called the process, not that it was necessarily aware of his role, 'A Gilbertian tale'. In 
June the American Ambassador, Philip Crowe, complained separately to the depart-
ment and to Louw personally that 'he had tried very hard to persuade the State 
Department not to grant Tambo a visa on the grounds that he was a communist, the 
Ambassador specifically saying that he had no doubt on this point'. 225 
22o BTS, S4/5/48, ScholtzJChristie, 23 November 1955. 
221 Ibid., Jooste/Christie, 15 April 1947. 
222 BTS 136/3/10, Vol. 1, DEA/Permanent Delegation, New York, No. 35, 31March1960. 
223 Ibid., Vol. 2, File Note by G.P. Jooste, 1 April 1960. 
224 See various items on BTS, 136/3/10, Vols. 1, 2, and 3 including Jooste's note of 31 March 1960 on 
Vol. 1 on his telephone conversation with Taswell and the latter's account of his actions (attached to 
Taswell/DEA, 19 April 1960). 
225 BTS, 136/3/10, Vol. 5, Unsigned note to Stewart, 6 June 1960. 
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But, having done his best, the South African Legation in Cairo had let him 
down because in effect it denied that Tambo was a communist. He had thereupon been 
granted a United States visa. According to Louw's note of his conversation with 
Crowe a week later, the latter had wanted to help in the Tambo case but his efforts 
were frustrated by the South African Minister in Cairo who told his United States col-
league there that 'he had no reason to object if the American government wanted to 
help Tambo get to the United States'.226 At that time Crowe was himself under attack 
in Die Transvaler for his contacts with the extra-Parliamentary Opposition. Louw sub-
sequently issued a statement repudiating the newspaper. 227 In the first week of July a 
file note had Woodward denying the allegation. More importantly, however, the note 
referred to the existence of a secret American document, possibly a Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) report, claiming that the South African government had never 
called Tambo a communist. There was also America's 'own revolutionary origins and 
consequent policy of keeping its doors open to political refugees'.228 
Six years earlier Uys, whose assistant Woodward had been in the Economic, 
International Trade and General Division at Head Office, had described him as 
tall and thin but commensurately built; hair light-brown and 
slightly gre)ing; fine, sharp and well formed features with nice 
smile and friendly glance; calm appearance and restful attitude, a 
type who immediately gives the impression that he is someone of 
his profession. 
He was then a forty-two year old First Secretary. Uys was impressed by him: 
Given his versatile administrative experience, ability to remain 
calm under pressure and talent for working well with colleagues 
and the public irrespective of rank or position, I am of the opinion 
that Mr Woodward can be employed to best advantage as a gen-
eralist. Particular characteristics of his which have always struck 
me are his ability to think, display sound judgement and to accept 
responsibility, characteristics which would qualify him for practi-
cally any post where versatility is required. 229 
226 Ibid., Louw/Acting Secretary, 17 June 1960. (Original in Afrikaans). 
227 Die Transvaler, 26 March 1960; AA, Al838/2, 201/8, Memo. 155, Davis/DEA, 4 April 1960. 
228 BTS, 136/3/10, Vol. 5, file note in Afrikaans, possibly drafted by KE. Pakendorff, on Oliver 
Tambo, 6 July 1960. 
229 A rather inconsequential description. BTS, Woodward, PL, Vol. 2, Staff Report, 29 June 1954. 
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Forsyth supported Uys's 'assessment and report ... in its entirety'.230 Woodward's Aus-
tralian colleague in Cairo, Quinn, who may have met him in Pretoria during his term as 
Acting High Commissioner in 1951-52 - they overlapped for six months - reported on 
him thus: 
Since my arrival I have had fairly frequent contacts with Wood-
ward who is English speaking (from Natal) career officer with 
good presence. Canadian born wife and two school age daughters. 
Political views similar to Hamilton's but he is temperamentally 
more reserved and less sanguine. Slightly hard of hearing. I know 
no reason why he should not be suitable for position. 231 
The Woodward family arrived in Australia under dramatic circumstances - Mrs 
Woodward was taken to hospital when the ship on which they were travelling, the s. s. 
Arcadia, berthed at Fremantle, Western Australia, leaving her husband and daughters 
to continue the voyage to Sydney. She joined them in Canberra later, crossing the con-
tinent by train. 232 It was during Woodward's term that the first Commercial Represen-
tative was appointed to the Embassy ( 1961) as well as the first Military Attache 
( 1963). Hamilton had suggested the addition of these posts to the establishment. 233 In 
respect of the Military Attache, his November 1959 motivation was the classic one of 
the white bastions which gave the two countries' 'strategic positions . . . fundamental 
points of similarity': 'We are determined to maintain a white nation at the foot of the 
African continent; the Australians must survive in an Asian environment'. In that con-
nection he reported 'informal hints' from the heads of the army and the airforce 'that 
this is something that they themselves would like and that if we showed an interest they 
would put the matter up to their Ministers•.234 
Word came back from Pretoria that the Minister of Defence, F.C. Erasmus, 
was not interested, both for reasons of cost-cutting and shortage of personneJ.235 Four 
years later, however, Erasmus's successor J.J. Fouche thought it a good idea and 
23o Ibid. 
231 AA, A1838/265, 1500/1/30/11, I. 884, 11January1961. 
232 Ibid., EA Canberra 888, 6 April 1961; EA Canberra 1079, 10 April 1971. 
233 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959; BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1 (alternatively 
BTS, Vol. 229, 1/25/5, Vol. I), Hamilton/SEA, 20 November 1959; BCB, Vol. 9, 15/34, Vol. 1, 
Hamilton/SEA, 19 August 1960. 
234 BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Hamilton/SEA, 20 November 1959. 
235 Ibid., Botha/South African Ambassador, Canberra, 26 March 1962. (Original in Afrikaans). 
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Woodward was instructed to take the matter up with the Australian authorities. 236 If 
they would perhaps have been receptive in 1959, that was by no means the case in 
1963 after Sharpeville and three years of the newly-independent African states flexing 
their muscles at the United Nations. Australian External Affairs officials accordingly 
made it clear, informally, that they wanted the South Africans to drop the proposal. 
Their grounds were that the appointment might be 'misinterpreted' by the Australian 
public, that the Australian armed services envisaged no gain from it and that it would 
be 'unwelcome to Australia's African Commonwealth associates'. 237 The next month, 
July 1963, a ten-year projection prepared for the Chiefs of Staff of South Africa's 
strategic significance to Australia concluded that this would be minimal. 238 
Woodward's cable was shown to Verwoerd who commented acidly that 
'Australia was clearly out to create an Asian image for itself . But no one knew how it 
was going to reconcile that with its White Australia policy. It was following the same 
road as all the others, namely, courting Afro-Asian goodwill (as well as US support) 
and to do that it had to give in more and more to demands that would affect its immi-
gration policy'. He feared that Australia could not learn from what was going on else-
where partly because of the strength of its Labor Party. 239 
Woodward persevered and on his own initiative discussed the matter with 
Menzies personally on the afternoon of 10 June. Menzies said he had no knowledge of 
the request which 'had not been discussed in Cabinet or reported to him in any way'. 
He accepted Woodward's view that the departmental attitude amounted to 'the begin-
ning of punitive action against South Africa'. He 'was personally opposed to the im-
position of sanctions in any form'. While he had made known 'his doubts on the 
wisdom of South Africa's policy toward the non-Whites', this 'did not qualify his own 
desire that relations between Australia and South Africa should continue on the friend-
liest terms'. He saw no objection to the appointment, thought Australia should recipro-
cate and undertook to raise the matter in cabinet. As for the Department of External 
Affairs, its officials were 
236 BTS, 4/2/32/4, Vol. 1, De Villiers/Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 18 March 1963. (Original in 
Afrikaans); Cypher OTP telegram No 3, Secretary for Foreign Affairs/South African Embassy, 
Canberra, 4 April 1963. 
237 BTS, 4/2/32/4, Vol. 1, Cypher OTP telegram No 8, South African Embassy, Canberra/Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1963. 
238 AA, A9421/l, 224/1, 'The strategic significance of the Republic of South Africa up to 1973', 
attached to Minute by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at a meeting held on 26 July 1963. 
239 BTS, 412/32/4, Vol. 1, Verwoerd's handwritten comment dated 10 June 1963; also separately tran-
scribed on the same file. 
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to his regret, inclined to act at times, like a bevy of frightened 
clerks who scurried for shelter when the Afro-Asian states men-
tioned a racial issue in the United Nations and elsewhere. These 
tactics, he said, solved very little. They merely whetted the appe-
tite of those who opposed South African policies. Within the 
Commonwealth family he found the demands of new members to 
be both dangerous and des1!'1ctive. 240 
Woodward subsequently made written representations to Menzies241 who indicated 
that he had discussed the matter with his Cabinet colleagues and that Woodward could 
'shortly expect a favourable reply'. 242 And a few days later Woodward reported receipt 
of an External Affairs note that the appointment of a Military Attache was acceptable 
to the Australian government. 243 
Woodward had a flair for expressing himself in English and his reports were 
perceptive. One, on his interview with the President of the United Arab Republic, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, after presenting his credentials on 4 March 1959 was, on Jooste's 
instructions, given to the Australian department.244 (Australian/UAR diplomatic rela-
tions were severed after the Suez crisis. Quinn was the first Australian Minister after 
their restoration). He had, however, a tendency to obfuscate when challenged. His re-
ply to Jooste's request in September 1961 for an explanation of remarks attributed to 
him by the Australian press certainly falls into that category. He was, Jooste said, 
reported to have said that many white South Africans were much in favour of returning 
to the Commonwealth and that he 'would personally welcome South Africa's re-
entry'. 245 Clearly political dynamite in the South Africa of the day: Verwoerd had told a 
National Party Congress at Vryheid that it was 'an unrealistic and foolish idea that 
South Africa should return' to what was now 'an Afro-Asian Commonwealth of which 
Britain [was] a member'.246 
Jooste wanted the facts telegraphed immediately with an explanation followed 
by a full report by airmail. What he got was a telegram six days later purporting to 
240 Ibid., Woodward/SEA, 11 June 1963. 
241 AA, Al838/275, 1500/1/30/15, Woodward/Menzies, 25 July 1963. 
242 BTS 4/2/32/4, Vol. 1, Woodward/Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 23 August 1963. 
243 Ibid., 28 August 1963. 
244 BCB, Vol. 20, 32/3 (Vol. II), Woodward/SEA, 4 February 1959; Jooste/Harnilton, 14 March 1959; 
and Harnilton/Jooste, 23 April 1959. 
245 BCB, Vol. 12, 25/11, Cypher telegram No. 18, Jooste/Woodward, 12 September 1961. The Age 
(Melbourne), 12 September 1961, carries a report on Woodward's remarks. 
246 The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1961. 
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paraphrase Woodward's remarks on a question and answer basis, seemingly con-
structed from memory, and contradicting the essence of the charge. 247 Inter alia 
because Woodward did not issue a rebuttal to the press and because of his delay in 
replying, one assumes the facts were as Jooste stated. 
The following sentence in Woodward's 9 March 1962 report on the aftermath 
of the Australian federal elections provoked a departmental reaction, possibly because 
- albeit accurate - it contradicted the conventional wisdom: 'As I see it, this country has 
little direct interest in the African continent, apart from its Commonwealth affili-
ations'. 248 Sole wrote him a personal letter saying that his report had been 'passed on to 
higher quarters'249 which had asked for further comment on that sentence: 'Could you 
expand on this in more detail and relate it to previous reports from your mission on 
Australian interest in Africa e.g. Australian representation at the Tanganyika independ-
ence celebrations and the visit of Mr. K.C.O. Shann to several African countries'.250 
Despite 'higher quarters' continuing to hammer on the issue, Uys himself 
demanding to know from Woodward what he meant, the latter's replies would have left 
his interrogators none the wiser. Yet he was right, as Sole, if he remembered the inci-
dent, would have had to acknowledge. Reporting on his week-long visit to Australia in 
1967, the excuse for which was provided by an inaugural flight, and after discussions 
with senior External Affairs officials and others, including Plimsoll, the Secretary, 
Mcintyre, the Deputy Secretary, and O.L. Davis, Sole wrote: 
Australia has no real interest in African problems and wants to 
free herself of any preoccupation with the complexities of Africa 
as far as this is feasible. In her approach to African problems Aus-
tralia must perforce be guided by her position as a White outpost 
in Asia who must at all costs maintain good relations with her 
247 BCB, Vol. 12, 25/11, Cypher telegram No. 16, Woodward/Jooste, 18 September 1961. The few 
telegrams exchanged on the South African side between Pretoria and Canberra up to September 
indicates as nothing else can the low degree of actual significance attached to the residential 
diplomatic relationship. 
248 BCB, Vol. 3, 615, Vol. IV, Woodward/Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 9 March 1962. 
249 Presumably Uys who, having had personal experience of Australia, may have been affronted by 
this casual dismissal of Africa's importance and by implication that of South Africa. 
250 BCB, Vol. 3, 6/5, Vol. IV, Sole/Woodward, 19 April 1962. 
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Asian neighbours. . . . Australia holds no brief whatever for the 
African countries, and the so-called Commonwealth ties with 
Commonwealth African countries do not mean a thing. 251 
251 BTS, 1125/3, Vol. 2, 'Visit to Australia, May 4-11, 1967: Some Notes and Impressions', p. 3. He 
mentions the visit in his Reminiscences (pp. 241-42) saying 'Australia was at that time not nearly so 
anti-South African as today and the visit pwvided a most invaluable insight into Australian thinking 
about Southern Africa and Africa generally'. 
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Anthony Hamilton was undoubtedly one of white South Africa's most 
successful career diplomats a man perceived, even two decades into retirement, to 
have brought lustre to the occupation. Yet a generation after they had worked together 
in Canberra his reputation was attacked by his Information Officer there, E.M. 
Rhoodie, who served in the High Commission for two-and-a-half years between 
November 1957 and June 1960. Rhoodie wrote in 1983 that Hamilton was 'a prime 
example of men at senior level in Foreign Affairs who did not want to promote South 
Africa's case, who deliberately kept the lowest possible profile, and who did not want 
to rock the boat'. Not only could Hamilton and his wife barely speak Afrikaans (see 
Chapter Two), but his 'political hostility towards the government of Dr Verwoerd 
could hardly be contained'. 1 
The Information post on the establishment of the South African High Commis-
sion in Canberra was created in 1951 when Christo Albertyn Smith, holding an M Sc in 
Botany from the University of Stellenbosch and married to an Australian from Tas-
mania, was appointed Information Officer at a salary of £940 per annum, ie., more 
than Nel was paid. 2 Viljoen had recommended the creation of the post on account of 
the many requests for information about South Africa that he received and the invita-
tions to him and 'even the staff to give lectures. It is interesting that Smith's appoint-
ment should have predated by more than a decade the appointment of Trade and Mili-
tary personnel to the staff of the High Commission. Smith had commenced his career 
in the Department of Agriculture but in 1934 became Agricultural Editor of the Natal 
Witness in which capacity he worked until 1941. From 1942 to 1945 he was Editor 
and Co-Editor of The Farmer (Pietermaritzburg). From 1946 the State Information 
Office3 employed him continuously in various journalistic grades. 4 
1 Rhoodie, The real information scandal, p. 44. 
2 BTS, 4/2/32/2, Vol. 1, Secretary to the Interior/SEA, 12 September 1951 (Original in Afrikaans). At 
that time State Information resorted under the Department of the Interior. Nel's basic annual salary 
was then £780. BTS, Nel, Vol. 3, Staff report, 24 October 1950. 
3 So named until 1 June 1958 whereupon it became the South African Information Service. In 1961 
this was transformed into the Department of Information, a move which in no way enhanced its 
efficiency and probably resulted from domestic political pressure. The fact that Verwoerd did not like 
Piel Meiring may have played a role. 
4 BTS, 4/2/32/2, Vol. L Du Plessis/SEA, 25 July 1951 (Original in Afrikaans). 
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His health prevented him from taking up the appointment in 1951. 5 Two years 
later, however, he was fit enough to go to Australia and the post was again added to 
the establishment. 6 The title 'Information Officer' was settled on after the Australians 
objected to him being named 'Director of Information', a title held by the head of the 
Australian Information Service. 7 In 1961 the post was renamed Information Attache. 
Smith held the job for just under three years until his death in Canberra on 23 
November 1956. He had already been reassigned elsewhere.8 (To the Central African 
Federation.) From time to time he wrote or helped Uys, with his speeches. At least on 
paper he was, as Viljoen was, well-qualified to serve in an agricultural country. When 
he died, Australian External Affairs sent a wreath and a message of condolence and the 
Secretary, Tange, wrote to his widow.9 
The statement Smith provided Uys at the latter's request on the work of his 
office for the year l April 1954 to 31 March 1955 gives an indication of the nature and 
extent of his activities in Canberra.10 Its contents hardly justified the expense of main-
taining him there. For his principal concern was the number of films ( 131) and bro-
chures (215 7 copies of eleven separate items) distributed as well as the number of 
reports he sent to his head office (10). In Australian missions locally-engaged per-
sonnel were in charge of distributing films and brochures11 as they were later in South 
African missions. Smith said he was not in a position to indicate 'the interest which 
Australians show in South Africa' because 'a canvas[s]' had yet to be made 'of the big 
cities and the larger towns'. (He had been in Canberra for almost eighteen months.)12 
The contemporary white South African attitude towards interracial ('mixed') 
dancing was cited in Chapter Two (p. 101) as an example of the foreign service 
reflecting the mores of white society at large. Another example is Smith's alarm over a 
5 Ibid., Du Plessis/SEA, 17 October 1951 (Original in Afrikaans). 
6 Ibid., Acting Director/SEA, 17 August 1951 (Original in Afrikaans); BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Spies/Acting 
High Commissioner, Canberra, 27 August 1953. 
7 See various items within the date range November 1953 to March 1954 on BTS, 4/2/32/2, Vol. 1. 
8 AA, Al838ffl3, 1500/1/30/3, South African High Commission/DEA, 11 October 1956. 
9 As Assistant Secretary (Administration) Waller authorised expenditure ofup to three guineas for the 
purpose. A wreath was also sent by the Acting Minister for External Affairs. AA, Al838ffl3, 
1500/1/30/3, Body/Accountant, 27 November 1956; Tange!Mrs Smith, 2~ November 1956. 
10 Attached to BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Smith/High Commissioner, 10 May 1955. 
11 See, eg., Keith Officer's eleven page Ministerial Despatch No. 11 of 25 February 1952 fro:n Paris. 
AA, A4231/2, UN, NY 1951/52. The Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly (1951-52) had been 
held in Paris. Officer was a member of the Australian delegation which was probably why his 
despatch is in the UN volume. His approach to the subject was more sophisticated than Uys's or 
Smith's. 
12 Contrast with Kevin's analysis of the press in India - p. 243 below. 
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Moral Rearmament (MRA) film, 'Afiican Tale', shown in Canberra in July 1955. He 
reported his impressions to his Director, P.J.G. Meiring. He said the implications were 
most disturbing. Indeed, the message of the M.R.A., as conveyed 
by the film can only be said to be a complete contradiction of our 
Government's policy of Apartheid in that white and non-white are 
called to meet on the same social plane as equals ... 13 
He added ('nowise by way of any form of criticism') that the film depicted the 
Governor-General attending a MRA event in the Cape Town City Hall. Sir Godfrey 
Huggins was a principal guest at a similar affair in Salisbury. In Johannesburg, several 
scenes in the film 'showed Afrikaners on the platform of M.}l.A. in open advocacy of 
its objectives'. (Italics added.) 
Translate these as one might like, one inescapable deduction must 
logically be made, and that is, ultimately, complete social equality 
of white and anybody non-white. 
. . . this highly dangerous doctrine a:ff ords the easiest possible 
channel for Communism to slide into all parts of Africa, without 
Russia lifting a single finger to promote its objectives by 
'preparing the ground' .... 
I would not go so far as to say that the film deliberately sets out to 
'preach' social equality . . . but I do believe that it most certainly 
leads logically to the inference of social equality of white and other 
colours. 14 
Uys sent the letter to his own department saying that Smith had drafted it after 
discussion with him and that its contents carried his approval. Besides alerting the 
department to a possible approach by Meiring, he wanted to bring pertinently to the 
attention of the Union authorities the fact that MRA activities could in the long term 
be dangerous for the Union 'with its multiracial composition'. 15 Smith told Meiring in a 
later letter that the film had not been favourably received in Canberra. In vain had 
MRA people (who would have included Kim E. Beazley, Minister of Education in the 
Whitlam government of the early 1970s) tried to have in included in the bi-weekly par-
liamentary film programme.16 
13 No hint there of the later concept of'separate but equal'. 
14 BCB, Vol. 8, 8/12/ST, Smith/Meiring, 21 July 1955. 
15 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 21July1955. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
16 Ibid., Smith/Meiring, 25 August 1955. 
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If that was an exciting happening for Uys on the information front in 1955, an-
other was the High Commission's subscription, on Smith's initiative, to a press cutting 
service. Uys reported on the first cuttings received with particular reference to South 
Africa's mini walk-out from the 1955 UN General Assembly. 17 And in May of that year 
Dr Peter Wiener, Head of Current Affairs at St Peter's College, Adelaide (a high 
school) and five of his students had visited him at the official residence. Wiener was an 
acquaintance of the Minister of External Affairs, R. G. Casey, which probably explains 
the alacrity with which Uys responded to his initial approach in January. Wiener said 
he wanted to take fifteen [scaled down later to five] of his 'Leaving Honours students 
... on a political study-tour to Canberra': 
I was wondering whether you might conceivably be prepared to 
receive us and to talk to us informally about the political condi-
tions prevailing in the Union of South Africa, especially about 
South Africa's relations with India, 'Apartheid', the possibility of 
becoming a Republic, and also perhaps answer some of the many 
questions [the] boys have to ask about your country.1 8 
Talks of this nature were given in later years in most countries where South 
Africa was represented, by junior officials whether members oflnformation or Foreign 
Affairs. They were routine occasions. Uys did not see this as an everyday occurrence. 
' He handled it personally, even notifying Pretoria of it: 'I presume there will be no 
objection to my giving the proposed talk in which I shall confine myself to officially 
published statements. Any material which the Department may care to supply for the 
talk will be gladly received'. 19 Pretoria sent him publications which were mostly already 
available in the High Commission. He was accordingly rather reproachful in his 
acknowledgment: 
your co-operation is greatly appreciated even though there was no 
mention in your letter or in the publications to the Union's rela-
tions with India, a question which Dr Wiener mentioned as one of 
the subjects for discussion. However, there is no need for you to 
trouble yourself further about the matter. The main thing is that 
you have no objection to the proposed discussion. There is enough 
data here, everything official, also to cover the Indian question. 20 
17 BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. II, Uys/SEA, 30 November 1955. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
l8 BCB, Vol. 5, 6/8/l, Wiener/Uys, 15 January 1955. 
19 Ibid., endorsement on Dys/Wiener, 19 January 1955. 
20 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 19 April 1955. (Original in Afrikaans). 
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The session with Wiener and his boys took the form of a pre-dinner discussion at Uys's 
residence which was continued at dinner and after dinner. Olivier, the Official Secre-
tary (second-in-command) substituted for Smith who was indisposed. Also present was 
AD. Campbell, a newly-appointed Cadet from Adelaide in the Australian Department 
of External Affairs. 21 
Eschel Mostert Rhoodie, Smith's successor, though there was a ten month gap 
between them, was undoubtedly the post's most dynamic and inspired occupant until it 
was abolished in the 1980s. Indeed, he was probably the best Information Officer in the 
history of the white South African government's attempts to put a positive 'spin' on its 
policies and activities. His work certainly supported notions that Information was a 
defined Public Service career direction. The premature and bizarre termination of his 
career in the late 1970s lends interest to his early activities. Australia was the first of 
his three overseas assignments extending over a period of fourteen years. His work 
there, which had a formative influence on his thinking, was a prelude to his activities in 
Washington, New York and The Hague. The last-mentioned centre served as a spring-
board for his meteoric six year career as Secretary for Information. 
His actions live after him. The Citizen newspaper, one of his creations, is still 
published and until recently (1995) the composition of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs was a memorial to his failure. 22 Rhoodie proved something of a prophet, 
writing in 1983: 'It would be a supreme irony if The Rand Daily Mail were now to 
fold, or to become, say, a financial newspaper, while The Citizen went from strength to 
strength as a middle of the road non-party newspaper as we always said it would be. '23 
He was right on most counts. 
21 Ibid., handwritten note by Uys, 11 May 1955, on Olivier/Wiener, 22 April 1955. See also BTS, 
1125/8, Vol. 1, PR 2, 6 January 1955, 'External Affairs Cadetships: Six Appointments'. I.E. Nicholson 
who succeeded RA. Woolcott in South Africa in 1957 was in the same group. 
22 The Department of Information was disbanded and its staff absorbed by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs which operated for some years as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information. 
23 The real information scandal, p. 339. Perskor bought The Citizen at the time of the Information 
Scandal. For details of its founding see The real information scandal, pp. 314-39. Under its third 
editor, M.A. Johnson (September 1976 -), it is now held to be a better newspaper than The Star 
(Johannesburg), until recently conside1ed to be South Africa's best English-language newspaper. That 
is the opinion of Ken Owen, Editor of the Sunday Times (Johannesburg) who, as Argus Group 
representative in Washington DC in the 1970s, strongly criticised the activities of Rhoodie and his 
department. See Owen's article 'Is the new SA killing the press?' in Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 6 
August 1995 edition. The newspaper's 10 September 1995 edition ('Citizen eclipses The Star') 
indicated that, at 588 000, The Citizen's readership had overtaken that of The Star at 553 000. 
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Stationed in Canberra between the ages of twenty-four and twenty-six, 
Rhoodie brought to bear a maturity beyond his years in his approach to his job. He was 
hyperactive in that area, yet had time to coach and captain Northern Suburbs Rugby 
Union team, doing the same for the Australian Capital Territory team - he had been a 
provincial player in South Africa. 24 At other times he played tennis and, quite likely, 
cricket, then filled in gaps in his time with his MA on the New South Wales prison 
system25 and early work on his PhD on the prison systems of select Commonwealth 
countries, both in the field of criminology. (His father was a superintendent of prisons.) 
He was appointed Secretary for Information at the age of thirty-nine in 1972, crashing 
in ruins six years later as a principal in the so-called Information Scandal. He fled ab-
road, was extradited by France and sentenced to twelve years in prison but released on 
appeal. 
Until his death from a heart attack at the age of sixty in July 1993 while playing 
tennis he had lived for at least a decade in Atlanta, Ga. Having already published sev-
eral books, one a 928 page exculpation of his role in the information scandal, called 
The real information scandal (Pretoria, 1983), he was at the time of his death in the 
process of bringing out another blockbuster (2400 pages of manuscript), to be called 
Cultures in Conflict: A Global Su11Jey of the Upsurge of Ethnic Linguistic Racial and 
Religious Strife.26 
Both Gilchrist, then Acting High Commissioner, and his department took 
Rhoodie's work and that of the State Information Office which employed him, 
seriously. While speaking highly of the professionalism of State Information under Piet 
Meiring, Gilchrist thought it faced an impossible task. 'The Service is right up to date 
with recent [technical] developments and has little to learn from any other country' and 
'Technically the work of the South African Information Service is admirable; on a 
£350,000 budget it is astonishingly good. Its global impact, however, is obviously 
small, and in Asia and Africa almost nil'. 27 Asked by Canberra for his comments on 
24 The real information scandal, pp. 570-71, 885. As with D.P. Olivier before him, G.C. Nel's suc-
cessor, who had also been North's captain/coach, Rhoodie's name was often mentioned in The Can-
berra Times' reports of club rugby matches. Thus, 'Rhoodie, for Norths, was by far the best player on 
the field, continually making openings for the outside backs to score'. The Canberra Times, 21 April 
1958. As with Olivier, the newspaper had difficulty with his first name, rendering this phonetically 
firstly as 'Escull' then as 'Eschelle'. 
25 E.M. Rhoodie, Gevangenisstelsel van New South Wales. MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1959. 
26 Dr E.M. Rhoodie, undated letter, 1993. 
27 AA, A423 l/2, South Africa 1958, Despatch No. 12/58, Gilchrist/ Acting Minister of External 
Affairs, pp. l, 7. 
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Rhoodie's first article 'Survive and provide in South Africa' (The Daily Telegraph 
(Sydney), 6 February 1958), Gilchrist reported initially that while 'most of the physical 
facts' in the article were true, they did not tell 'the full story'. If 'the social services 
provided for non-Europeans in the Union' were 'more extensive than those provided 
elsewhere in Africa south of the Sahara' there had been 'a substantial diminution of 
non-European political rights ... over the last fifty years or more'. 28 He followed up 
three weeks later at a length greater than that of Rhoodie's original article. 29 
Australia was a fertile field for Rhoodie's talents. Already in 1946 the precursor 
of the State Information Office, the Bureau of Information, had asked External Affairs 
whether the Union government intended appointing a representative in Australia 
through which the bureau could supply the Australian public with 'accurate informa-
tion'. Local South African reporting on the 'distortions' about the country evident in the 
Australian press had prompted that. 30 The news item accompanying this approach said 
that three Malans were rolled into one: 'Words spoken by the late Senator F.S. Malan 
when he visited Australia in 1934 are attributed to Dr D.F. Malan, and are illustrated 
by a photograph of Mr C.W. Malan, former Minister of Railways, who died early in 
1933'.31 If those were the extent of the 'distortions', there would have been had little to 
worry about. 
Other 'distortions' were more disturbing. Well before Rhoodie's time Labor 
Members of the Commonwealth House of Representatives and Senate were drawing 
attention to the dark side of the South African scene. Sir Earle Page of the Country 
Party had, after his 1948 visit, stressed South Africa's importance to Australia 'in 
maintaining our communications with the Mother Country and with Europe'.32 He even 
suggested that South Africa be drawn into the 'Anzac pact between Australia and New 
Zealand'.33 Three years later, however, Senator Donald Grant (New South Wales), 
who claimed that two of his sisters lived in Natal, and with whom Rhoodie would 
28 AA, A1838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 217, Gilchrist/DEA, 8 April 1958. 
29 Ibid., Memo. 269, Gilchrist/DEA, 28 April 1958, Annexures A & B. 
30 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 1, Baber/Acting SEA, 12 December 1946. 
31 The Cape Times, 29 November 1946. 
32 CPD, Vol. 197, 5 May 1948, p. 1405. A print of his speech but not of the adjournment debate of 
which it formed part is on BTS, l/25/2A, Vol. 1. The debate was on his motion: 'The importance of 
improving the existing means of communication and consultation with other portions of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, especially between those in the southern hemisphere - Australia, South 
Africa and New Zealand.' 
33 CPD, Vol. 197, p. 1422. 
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cross swords later,34 also considered South Africa important but for quite different 
reasons. He told the Senate on the occasion of its 1951 debate on the External Affairs 
vote and at a time when the High Commissioner's post was vacant, that South Africa 
was: 
one of the most important countries in the world to-day. There 
may be a flare up there at any moment. Dr. Malan is likely to seize 
the British protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland, and 
Bechuanaland. In view of the delicate situation there, Australia 
should be represented in South Africa by the best man that we can 
obtain. . . . Anybody who has studied the problems confronting 
South Africa knows that the Dutch have been intermingling with 
the natives for more than 300 years. . .. About 60 per cent of the 
white population of South Africa are Boers. Predikants and Boer 
Brothers go about trying to get all the jobs for the Boers. All of 
these problems are very important, when linked with other 
problems concerning the coloured peoples throughout the world. 
They are very important to us. If we had a good man there, who 
could study the problems of the coloured people on the spot, he 
could keep the Australian Government well informed. Some 
people contend that the coloured peoples should be wiped out 
altogether. We are trying to prevent the coloured problem from 
arising in Australia. 35 
Events such as the Treason Trial were grist to the mill. A few months before Rhoodie's 
arrival Senator W.E. Aylett (Tasmania) let loose as follows: 
if there is not a dictator in South Africa, I have never seen a dicta-
torship anywhere. No other country has a worse dictatorship than 
has South Africa, and no other country is using its dictatorship to 
a more intolerable degree than is South Africa. If the authorities 
there thought that one said something which savoured of 
racialism, they would charge him, and they are charging people by 
the hundreds. I venture to say that the bone has just been pointed 
at people, 36 that they have been herded into compounds, and have 
to stand trial for treason. That is followed by cries of 'this is Euro-
pean territory; out you get'. They e~-pect the Indian people there to 
suffer it without saying an)1hing in retaliation. South Africa, a 
country with a white population of 2,500,000, has for years 
insulted India with a population of 350,000,000.37 
34 See, eg., letters from Grant in The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 & 16 April 1958. See also The Star 
(Johannesburg), 2 April 1958 (report: 'Au:iitralian Senator's view: Union elections so democratic that 
majority is voteless'), 11 April 1958 (letter: A.D. Keet, 'Can Australia criticize our colour policy?') 
and AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 229, Gilchrist/DEA, 12 April 1958. 
35 CPD, Vol. 215, 22 November 1951, pp. 2484-85. 
36 An Aboriginal curse, meaning a death sentence. 
37 CPD, Senate, Vol. S. 11 - New Series, 28 August 1957, p. 58. 
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And one of Aylett's colleagues, Senator O'Byrne told the Senate early in Rhoodie's 
term that J.G. Strijdom had 
put a lot of Africans in concentration camps for treason, because 
they disagreed with his policy. I think that one of the churches 
there has even found it necessary to alter the Bible to read that 
God created the white man and then created the black man for the 
benefit of the white man. That sort of thing is tolerated in that part 
of the British Commonwealth. If ever a nation should be ex")lelled 
from the United Nations, it is South Africa. What can we expect 
from those people?38 
As for the press, there were no formally-accredited journalists from either 
country in the other and use was generally made of news agency reports or those filed 
by the occasional 'stringer'. From time to time journalists visiting the countries on 
inaugural flights filed reports of a gee-whizz nature. The coverage given South Africa 
by the Australian press, scant though it may generally have been, greatly outweighed 
what appeared about Australia in the South African papers. It tended to be negative 
and apocalyptic and in some cases strangely suggestive of the 1990s. 
Under the headline 'A city of fear', the New Year's Day 1955 edition of The 
Sydney Morning Herald carried a report by a special correspondent on what today 
would be known as the security aspects of living in Johannesburg: 'There's one busi-
ness always booming in Johannesburg - burglar-proofing. Every white householder 
looks at life through bars'. 'Petting parties in cars', the reader was told, 'are unknown in 
Johannesburg. What couple would bother to see the moon rise over the veldt when 
there's a chance of being dragged from the car, clubbed, knifed, and left for dead, with 
clothes and wallet missing?' If in the succeeding forty years security measures have 
improved in proportion to the deterioration of the situation, the basic problem remains. 
Douglas Wilkie, a guest on the 1952 Qantas inaugural flight, contributed a se-
ries of articles to The Sun and The Herald in Melbourne. He focused in the second 
article on 'South Africa's White Problem', calling himself a Boer War veteran after a 
fortnight in South Africa. 'The war is still being fought. There was never more than an 
armistice.' The caption of the accompanying photograph said of the group of veterans 
('oudstryders') depicted: 'Typical Boer veterans at a recent national commem0rative 
gathering. Note their stubborn appearance.'39 In another of his articles the Voortrekker 
38 CPD, Senate, Vol. S. 13 - New Series, 19 August 1958, p. 82. 
39 The Sun (Melbourne). 25 September 1952. 
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Monument was not unnaturally a 'Memorial to Fear'. While the monument'stheme and 
the 'reverence it inspires' were understandable, the treatment of the theme was 'fright-
ening'. Wilkie found it strange that the monument's Wagnerian proportions were 'larger 
than any monument erected in any country to the dead of two world wars'. 40 
The Sun's readers were told the same day (24 September 1952) that it was 'one 
minute to midnight'. In the absence of a change of political direction in South Africa 
'within the next few months', 'all hope of racial reconciliation' would be lost and a 
'cauldron of hate [would] boil over into all comers of Africa and Asia'. 'The problems 
which South Africa fails to solve within its borders will become more difficult to solve 
by nations like Australia, which have racial problems outside their borders.' Sensitive to 
world opinion, Afrikaners were not 'amused by rebukes from an Australia which did its 
best to exterminate its own Blacks as long as they were regarded as a social "menace" 
or economic obstruction'. 
Forwarding these reports to Pretoria, Nel commented that 'while fault could be 
found with various allegations, considered generally, the articles revealed a better 
grasp of and a more sympathetic attitude towards our problems. In contrast to the 
everyday news reports and opinions which are reflected in the local press, this was 
therefore encouraging'. 41 Wilkie's third article, 'The black side of S. Africa', probably 
contributed to this comment. Wilkie had written that the 
Bantu tribesman ... is not ripe for immediate entry into a modem 
European society, nor for the responsible application of such skills 
as he may learn from the White. He is still a savage .. . and not 
always the noble savage whom Rider Haggard glamorised. 
In the rare instances that he is allowed to complete a University 
course he often - but not always - lapses into instability of char-
acter'. 42 
He said that apartheid or segregation was not new. It was not 'peculiar to Malan's 
Nationalists, nor even to the Whites'. For it was 'welcomed, in principle, by many 
intelligent Blacks, as a desirable pattern of social development at this phase of history'. 
An interesting feature of this article was its prescient forecast of later developments. 
40 The Herald (Melbourne), 27 September 1952. 
41 BCB, Vol. 13, 27/4, NeVSecretary for External Affairs, 16 October 1952. (Translation.) That was 
in the pre-photocopy days and Ne! asked for the cuttings to be returned after perusal, also by the State 
Information Office. They were, however, placed on a head office file. 
42 The Sun (Melbourne), 26 September 1952. 
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Some Afrikaner intellectuals, Wilkie wrote, were urging 'the return of the Blacks to 
their reserves and the creation of all-black secondary industries, in a sort of self-
sufficient Bantustan'. 43 
The Australians were in their own way as interested in the information function 
of their overseas missions as the South Africans were in theirs. From time to time 
Australians and South Africans tended to attribute negative reporting about aspects of 
their situations to similar causes. Australian complaints in 1948 and 1949 about Reuter 
reports on the White Australia Policy44 which appeared in the Indian press from time 
to time were couched in terms similar to those that would used by South African offi-
cials concerning news agency treatment of the South African situation. 45 
J.C.G. Kevin, then Acting High Commissioner in New Delhi, reported in 
November 1948 on 'Australian migration policy and the Indian press'. The Rhoodie 
generation of South African Information Officers would not have disagreed with his 
approach or conclusions. Sketching the nature of the problem, he said: 
It can be stated briefly that factual Australian news appearing in 
the Indian press generally comes to it through the medium of Reu-
ters .... Where news derives from Reuters ... it goes first to London 
where it is liable to be edited before being passed on to India. 
Reuters seem to be well aware of the news value in India, and no 
doubt in Asia as a whole, of any references to 'White Australia' or 
anything that savours of restricted migration. Incidents under 
these headings are almost invariably given a good coverage by 
their representatives, and there is no discernible tendency to write 
any story down. These reports appear in due course in the Indian 
press.46 
The new High Commissioner, H.R. Gollan, took up the theme after his arrival. 
He wrote in February 1949 that references in the Indian press to Australia's migration 
policy generally emanated from Reuters and often incorporated the expression 'White 
43 Jbid. 
44 
'White Australia' was colloquial terminology. Official references to the policy were more 
euphemistic - immigration policy or immigration restriction policy. In a South African context, one is 
reminded of 'separate development' for 'apartheid'. For a discussion of the White Australia Policy see 
my article 'White man's country: an aspect of mid-twentieth-century Australia', Kleio, Vol. XXVII, 
1995, pp. 165-95. 
45See AA, A4231/2, India 1949, Departmental Despatches 7/49 and 21149 dated 10 February and 19 
May. For a later perspective on India and the White Australia Policy see A4231/2, India 1954, 
Despatch 1, Crocker/Casey, 8 January 1954. 
46 Departmental Despatch 70/48, 11 November 1948. 
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Australia'. Such reports caused anxiety because 'their frequency and phrasing' - the 
reference to 'White Australia' in their titles and texts not to mention 'in the Australian 
comments which they carry' - aroused 'adverse comment among Indians and in Indian 
newspapers'. 47 The damage caused was cumulative. If the reports persisted 
our relations with India are likely to be prejudiced. It is not 
without significance that Australia is now being specifically 
named with South Africa when the question of racial discrimina-
tion is ventilated in the Indian press or in some Indian forum. The 
racial issue itself is being brought more and more to the fore. 48 
His proposed solution was unrealistic: 
The initial remedy would seem ... to be for Reuters, when selecting 
their material for Asian consumption, to weigh the damaging 
effect to Australia generally against the news value of any par-
ticular item. Reuters is now partly an Australian concern and some 
patriotic obligation presumably attaches to it. . . . both in the 
selecting of items and in the compilation of the reports themselves 
Reuters might endeavour to guard against imbalance. 49 
With the possible exception of the Afrikaans-language press during the apartheid years, 
appeals to journalistic patriotism are not generally successful. 
Where the Australians differed from the South Africans was that Casey insisted 
that public information activities abroad should be controlled by his department and the 
head of mission's supervisory role was to be direct. 50 He was helped by the closure of 
the wartime Department of Information in 1950.51 Eric Louw would have spared the 
South African Department of External Affairs later anguish if he had done likewise. At 
least in the mid-I 950s under Strijdom he could perhaps have carried it off. 
Casey argued that external information activities should be 'aimed consciously 
at the improvement of Australia's external relations'. 52 They should in particular serve 
the purposes of 
47 Ibid., 7/49, IO February 1949. 
48 Ibid., 21149, 19 May 1949. 
49 Ibid., 7149, 10 February 1949. 
50 AA, A5818/2, Vol. 11, Submission No. 489, 23 November 1959, pp. 1-2, paras. 3-4. 
51 The Canberra Times, 9 March 1950. It was replaced by a News and Information Bureau in the 
Department of the Interior. 
52 Ibid., p. L para. 2. 
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(i) ensuring that Australian foreign and domestic policies are 
understood and, to the greatest degree possible, accepted in other 
countries; 
(ii) reducing misconceptions about policies important to Austra-
lia's international relations (e.g., in relation to immigration, self-
determination in dependent territories, military alliances, dis-
armament and nuclear weapons); 
(iii) conducting, under appropriate safeguards, counter-propa-
ganda, and distributing material for the countering of subversion, 
in countries where Australian security interests are involved; 
(iv) countering the impact of communism by the exposure of com-
munist propaganda, and by the exposition of Western policies, 
especially in the Asian area. 53 
Such a definition could have covered what the South Africans had in mind. 
It had originally been the intention of the Australian Department of Information 
to send a press attache to South Africa. 54 That fell through but from their side, com-
mencing with Knowles, various Australian heads of mission recommended the 
appointment of an Information Officer to their staff Gilchrist did so in November and 
December 1957. He wrote in November:55 'South Africans and Rhodesians tend to 
regard Australia as just a big sheep country full of rabbits and kangaroos, and physi-
cally and socially as much the same as the Union and the Federation.' Australia's 
achievements needed to be filmed. In view of the 'insatiable demand' for Australian 
documentary films, 'a great opportunity' existed in South Africa 'to promote a better 
picture of Australia'. An information officer based in Pretoria was becoming increas-
ingly necessary and provision should be made for one in the 1958/59 estimates. He said 
in December:56 
Extreme policies of the Union Government in certain fields have 
inclined a substantial number of residents in South Africa to look 
around for a new home elsewhere. This trend is likely to increase 
if the present Government is returned in the general election in 
1958, as seems most probable. Factual information about social 
and economic conditions in Australia and about its policies could 
do much, unobtrusively, to persuade suitable potential emigrants 
to go to Australia, rather than to England or Rhodesia. 
53 Ibid., p. 2, para. 4. 
54 AA, Al838/l, 1348/10, Bonney/Dunk, 3 May 1946 and 0. 19709, 15 October 1946. 
55 Ibid., 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 605, p. 2, para. 8. 
56 Ibid., 1348/10, Memo. 668, Gilchrist/DEA, 17 December 1957, p. 2, para. 3(d). 
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Canberra's view was that while there was no doubt such a job to be done in 
South Africa 'the same job is to be done in countries of greater importance to us; in 
fact, the job to be done is greater elsewhere'.57 A departmental submission held that if 
there was 'money to create a new post of Information Officer, we should give first 
consideration to the needs of South and South-East Asia'. 58 
In retrospect and influenced by Rhoodie's later attitude one may be tempte.d to 
view the Hamilton/Rhoodie association of the 1950s as an early manifestation of the 
friction which developed between the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information 
in the 1970s. However, the men seem to have got on well enough at the time. Oldham 
of the Australian External Affairs department quoted Rhoodie early in 1959 to the 
effect that 'the South African High Commissioner's Office has now a very congenial 
atmosphere as the High Commissioner and his assistants get on very well, a point 
which Mr. Rhoodie mentioned was important at a small post'. 59 In the Foreword to his 
doctoral thesis Rhoodie expressed his appreciation inter alia to the High Commis-
sioner in Canberra for allowing him 'the necessary time off during 1957-62 to visit the 
countries included in the survey'. 60 Hamilton, though, was guarded in his reference to 
Rhoodie in a contemporary letter to Scholtz: 
Rhoodie has done a good job here and has got our information 
work onto a sound basis; but I do not object particularly to the idea 
of his leaving, since we could look after such routine matters as 
the distribution of information material and films, and I would 
find it less complicated to handle the public relations side 
myself.61 
It was not a matter of Hamilton 'hardly' containing his hostility towards the 
Verwoerd government. (Seep. 233 above.) He did not contain it at all. According to 
Rhoodie, Hamilton once told Menzies in his presence that it was 'time these damned 
Nationalists realise that they are not going to get away with their stupidities'.62 That 
observation would hardly have come as a surprise to Australian External Affairs 
57 Ibid., A. Renouf, Handwritten note, 20 January 1958 and D.O. Hay/Australian High Commission, 
Pretoria, 8 May 1958. 
58 Ibid., 201/10/6/1 Pt. 1, Morris/Kevin, 17 February 1958. 
59 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, Record of conversation Oldham/Snyman, 27 January 1959, p. 2, 
para. 7. Snyman had succeeded Olivier earlier that month. 
60 E.M. Rhoodie, The Prison System of Certain Commonwealth Countries: A Criminological Survey 
Against the Background of the Cornerstones for a Progressive Correctional Policy. D.Phil. thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 1964. 
61 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
62 Rhoodie, The real information scandal, p. 43. 
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officials because Hamilton's views were known even before he arrived in the country. 
A file note a week before he reached Sydney claimed that he had 'on a number of 
occasions made observations to members of our Embassy in Washington implying a 
lack of sympathy with the more extreme policies of his own Government'. 63 That came 
from a June 1957 report from the Australian Embassy in Washington. The Hamiltons, 
it was said, had 'maintained close relations' with various members of the Embassy, 
were 'very well disposed towards Australia' and were looking forward to their posting. 
Both were of British stock and apparently had 'no facility in speaking or writing Afri-
kaans'. 64 Gilchrist reported in August after he and his wife entertained the Hamiltons to 
lunch: 
Hamilton is a self-confessed 'Smuts man', and regards himself as 
an atypical South African official but 'a good South African' for all 
that. ... In conversation Hamilton has made perfectly clear his own 
view that few racial problems (in South Africa or elsewhere) are 
improved by legislation, and he would be relieved - both person-
ally and professionally - to see the disappearance of a good deal of 
the Nationalist Government's apartheid legislation and a return to 
the earlier more flexible system of customary racial separation:65 
And Hamilton told Davis in Pretoria during a visit in November 1961 that 'it was well 
known in the South African Government that he . . . strongly disagreed with Govern-
ment policy'. 66 
In allegedly maintaining a low profile Hamilton was, Rhoodie said, rarely 'seen 
or heard to address any meetings to promote South Africa's case, either on radio or 
television'. He also 'spent so much of his time in the garden' that 'his son Tim used to· 
say to us: "My father is the highest paid gardener in Australia".' Rhoodie reported 
Hamilton's attitude to members of the South African delegation to the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association's 1959 meeting in Canberra. He was nonplussed when Piet 
Meiring wrote a few weeks later that Eric Louw was not concerned about Hamilton's 
political beliefs nor that he 'spent only three to four hours of his day at the office'.67 
(Louw knew it was more important Hamilton should enjoy access to the highest levels 
of the Australian government). 
63 AA, Al838ff54, 1500/1/30/8, file note dated 30 August 1957 by J.C.G. Kevin headed 'South 
African High Commissioner to Australia: A.M. Hamilton'. 
64 AA, Al838, 201/10/7, Pt. 1, Memo. 744/57, M.R. Booker/DEA, 11June1957. Hamilton had taken 
Afrikaans for Matric besides passing the Afrikaanse Taaleksamen, lower grade. 
65 Ibid., Memo. 397, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 August 1957. 
66 AA, A9421/l, 221/1, Record of conversation Davis/Hamilton, 16 November 1961. 
67 Rhoodie, The real information scandal, pp. 43-44. 
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Of Rhoodie's charges only one, that Hamilton was out of sympathy with the 
National Party government, has substance and it would have been more professional if 
he had kept his views to himself. Ideally, it should have been said of him as it was of 
J.P. Quinn as Australian Charge d'Affaires in The Hague between 1948 and 1950: 
'While remaining completely loyal to his Government's policy, [he] was able to present 
it to the Dutch in a way that, whil[e] not making it any more acceptable, reduced the 
offensive impact; and his own high personal standing with the Dutch was never 
impaired'. 68 (Of course, the policy objects were different. Australian policy was to 
promote the cause of Indonesian independence at a time when the Dutch were still 
dragging their feet on it.) 
However, given the general opprobrium in which the South African 
government was held even then, Hamilton's attitude did not induce in his Australian 
interlocutors the contempt which normally would be the case in such circumstances. 
Instead, they seem to have considered his attitude commendable and a few months 
after his arrival the Australian High Commission said he was 'of much higher calibre 
than his predecessors'. 69 Canberra agreed with that assessment. Oldham, the 
Commonwealth Relations Adviser, called him 'one of the ablest diplomats sent to 
Australia'. He had 'a difficult task to perform' but carried it out 'with considerable skill'. 
He was also sufficiently wide in outlook to see what was 'ultimately the best for his 
country'.70 That was a measure of how the National Party government was perceived 
abroad. 
In respect of the other charges, Hamilton's profile was probably higher than 
that of any head of mission in Canberra at the time. And while the garden may, as he 
said later, have been his 'chief recreation', 71 it was also very much part of his job. It 
could hardly have been otherwise in circumstances where the Australian Prime Min-
ister himself 'spoke enthusiastically about the new residence, which is very close to his 
own and which he passes frequently each day. He said that he had been watching its 
building with great interest'. 72 
68 R. W. Furlonger in John Paul Quinn, p. 16. By way of contrast, refer to the Australian Trade 
Commissioner's comments in Chapter One above (p. 66) about the Canadian High Commissioner J.J. 
Hurley. Furlonger's reference to Quinn bearing the 'burden of defending an unpopular policy in a 
hostile and self-righteous environment' will strike a chord with South Africans who have tried to do 
the same in Australia. 
69 AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt.I, Annual Report 1957, Part B, p. 8. See Chapter Four. 
70 AA, A942 l, 223/l/1, Record of conversation Oldham/Hamilton, 17 September 1959.p. 2, para. 6. 
71 Hamilton, Antipodean Days 1957- to '61, p. 7. 
72 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, Hamilton/SEA, 20 September 1957. 
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Hamilton's remark about being the highest paid gardener in Australia was a 
joke but Rhoodie took it literally. 73 And while Sir Francis Bertie's attitude to the press 
was outmoded even in his own day, 74 the practice of diplomats taking to the airwaves 
to put their point of view was not evident in the Australia of the time. Indeed, as late as 
1978 it was held that 'On rare occasions a Canberra-based diplomat will actually speak 
out on some contentious issue, as when the British High Commissioner accepted an 
invitation to appear on television in 1977 to defend his country against statements.that 
it was in a state of" economic collapse". '75 Dr Joan Ry don, one-time Professor of Polit-
ics at La Trobe University, Melbourne, says that 
There was little discussion of public affairs on radio or television 
in the 50s or 60s. There would have been little opportunity for any 
diplomat to use the media to promote his country .... When televi-
sion crune, there was even less emphasis on current affairs and I 
know of no attempt by diplomats to make use of it. 76 
It was apparently not at that time policy for even British diplomats 'to engage 
in public debate through letters to the press'.77 That did not deter Gilchrist who, per-
haps influenced by Thomas Boydell's contemporary letters to Australian newspapers 
(seep. 255 et seq. below), replied to what his annual report for 1957 said was 'a highly 
inaccurate article' in The Star (Johannesburg) 'about the status and treatment of the 
Australian Aborigines'. 78 That only one article and one letter to a newspaper's letters' 
page should have been considered worthy of a separate paragraph in the annual report 
was indicative of the rareness of the matter. 
73 Rhoodie, The real information scandal, p. 44; Hamilton, letter, 2 October 1993. 
74 Bertie, later Lord Bertie of Thame, was British Ambassador to France from 1905 to 1918. He is 
said to have runazed Lloyd George by the disparaging way he treated the editor of Le Matin, boasting 
that 'he had never given an interview nor made a statement to the press and had no wish even to make 
the acquaintance of the editor'. Gladwyn, The Paris Embassy, p. 172. 
75 G. Barrow, Canberra's Embassies (Canberra, 1978), pp. 6-7. 
76 Letter, 4 December 1994. Rhoodie, however, claimed to have made television appearances in Aus-
tralia. The real information scandal, p. 884. 
77 The Times (London), 11 February 1964. ('Diplomatists anger cycle makers: "Unwilling to beat 
drum for U.K".') 
78 AA, A1838/1, 1348/l, Pt.I, Annual Report 1957, Part B, p. 8, para. 41. A copy of the report is also 
on A1838/T184, 201/7/1, Pt. 2. The article complained of, 'Soul-searching in Australia: "Abos" want 
a place in their country's life', appeared in The Star's 27 November 1957 edition and Gilchrist's reply 
in the newspaper's 9 December edition. ('Australia's 74,00 Aborigines are not neglected'). Gilchrist 
said in the annual report that he replied to the article 'factually and in a quiet manner'. In retrospect 
the article, which charged discrimination against Aborigines, was not noticeably inaccurate. See, eg., 
Tothill, 'White man's country: an aspect of mid-twentieth-century Australia', Kleio, Vol. XXVll, 
1995, pp. 178-90. 
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Even rarer, no doubt, was the spirited defence one of Gilchrist's erstwhile col-
leagues in South Africa, Miss Betty Sybil Tyler, who had been Hodgson's Secretary, 
put up for Dr Verwoerd in 1958 in The West Australian (Perth). The newspaper had 
profiled Verwoerd on his accession to the Prime Ministership under the headline Ver-
woerd Hates Blacks, British. 79 Ignoring his allegedly anti-British feelings, Miss Tyler 
denied that Verwoerd hated black people. He was, she said, well-liked by tribal chiefs. 
If he did not have black servants in his home that was 'partly because, for absolute 
cleanliness, he prefers Europeans and also because he does not regard the African 
merely as a servant of the white man as many people in South Africa seem to'. Besides 
The living conditions of South Africa's 10,000,000 non-Europeans 
have shown great improvement while he has held the portfolio of 
Native Affairs and millions of pounds have been spent on housing, 
hospitals and schooling. Millions more are being set aside for 
exclusively non-European universities. 80 
Rhoodie could hardly have put it better! (Gilchrist said recently that he was not aware 
of Sybil Tyler's political views!)81 
Only seven years before Hamilton's term Forsyth had congratulated Viljoen for 
not writing directly to the Sunday Sun (Sydney) concerning its publication of an 
immigrant's criticism of the South African government in December 1950: 
You were quite right not to correspond directly with the news-
paper. That is an action which is justified only in exceptional 
cases. Thus the High Commissioner in London for example wrote 
personal letters to newspapers on one or two occasions about so 
important an aspect of the Union's policy as South West Africa.82 
Instead, Viljoen had drawn the offending article to the attention of Alan Watt, 
the Secretary for External Affairs, and put his own gloss on it. 83 In vain, therefore, did 
Mrs A. Kerr of Mount Hawthorn, Perth, look to him to correct what she considered to 
be journalistic misrepresentations in the press: 'I hoped the South African High Com-
missioner would reply through The Press to all adverse references to South Africa but 
am disappointed that I have not read any statement from him'. Instead she had to con-
79 The Hest Australian (Perth), 3 September 1958. 
80 Ibid., 8 September 1958. 
81 Letter, 22 February 1995. 
82 BCB, Vol. 11, 20/8, ForSjth/High Commissioner, Canberra, 15 February 1951. 
83 AA, Al838/2, 201/120/1, P. 1, Viljoen/Watt, 20 December 1950. Watt was then Secretary for 
External Affairs. 
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tent herself with Nel's (meaningless) assurance that 'instances of this nature' did not 
escape Viljoen's notice 'and appropriate action is taken'. 84 
Viljoen's hesitation in information matters was further revealed by his attitude 
towards criticism of the Group Areas Act in the 'Daily News Review' issued by the 
Indian Information Officer in Canberra. He told Forsyth 'he is merely quoting from 
Indian publications and not submitting any remarks of his own. I do not feel that l can 
therefore attack him in any way or deal with the matter in Canberra'. (He would not 
have been expected to attack the Indian Information Officer; merely rebut what was 
being said about the Group Areas Act. As later generations of South African officials 
discovered, this was no easy task.) Nonetheless, he asked whether he should issue a 
statement 'to counteract the impression conveyed by these extracts from Indian 
newspapers'. Forsyth agreed that no action should be taken, adding that an Information 
Officer would soon be attached to Viljoen's staff He would then be able 'to deal 
positively with the matter in his newsletter and other publications'. 85 (In respect of 
Smith, a case of wishful thinking.) 
That was not an approach Eric Louw, known for hard-hitting correspondence 
with newspapers, would have endorsed. Nor did it accord with Bodenstein's 1938 (and 
presumably by that time forgotten) directive, on Hertzog's instructions, that missions 
should assume responsibility in their areas of jurisdiction for 'the tracing, and 
correction where necessary, of inaccurate reports about South Africa which may 
appear in newspapers, periodicals and other publications'. That had to do with the 
establishment of an Information Office in the Prime Minister's department. In cases 
where it was not possible to react immediately, the Information Office would, m 
consultation with the department concerned, furnish the necessary correction. 86 
Louw's own style was not beyond reproach as Gilchrist had Hodgson point out 
in a January 1957 report: 'It is perhaps regrettable, but hardly surprising, that Mr. 
Louw should have written such an angry letter to the London 'Times' this week'87 At 
84 The exact nature of the report cbmplained of is not known because Nel returned it to Mrs Kerr. 
BCB, Vol. 11, 20/8, Mrs Kerr/Ne!, 7 September 1949 and Nel/Mrs Kerr, 16 September. 
85 BCB, Vol. 11, 20/8, Viljoen/SEA, 13 April 1951 and Forsyth/Viljoen, 10 May 1951. 
86 BTS, 91/8/1, Vol. 1, Circular minute to all overseas offices, 24 January 1938. P.W.A. Mulder treats 
of the appointment of the first Information Officer in Die Suid-Afrikaanse Staatsinligtingsdiens, 1936-
1975, Chapter 2, pp. 10-18. 
87 7 January 1957. He was responding to a letter by Canon John Collins and Gerald Gardiner QC 
published in The Times on 28 December 1956. AA, Al838/Tl84, 20117/1, Pt. 1, Memo. No. 4, 
Hodgson/DEA, 12 January 1957. 
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the end of that year Louw defended separate development in a lengthy interview 
broadcast in Australia by the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC). 88 
Television reached Sydney and Melbourne, Australia's largest cities, only in 
1956, in time for the Olympic Games. Regular transmissions commenced in Sydney on 
17 September. 89 It had, however, Jong been the practice among political leaders to 
make use of commercial radio to convey their message.90 Uys gave a farewell broad-
cast on the ABC network, ie. non-commercial radio and Hamilton delivered at least 
one radio address, introducing the ABC programme marking Union Day 1959. 
Rhoodie could hardly have objected to the content of his message which was 
expressed more elegantly than he himself could have done: 
South Africa stands at the centre of the great problem of our times 
- the adjustment of race relationships between peoples of 
immensely different backgrounds and achievements. Such an 
adjustment will not be attained except by a long and complex pro-
cess; but white South Africans understand perfectly well that their 
future, as a community and a nation, is bound up with their suc-
cess in helping forward an adjustment which 'Will be fair to all the 
races that inhabit our beautiful and exciting country. At no time 
has the discussion of policy been so earnest, or so wide-ranging in 
its examination of fundamental factors. 
In the meanwhile great progress is being made in the welfare of 
our native peoples - in the housing schemes which are rapidly 
eliminating the slums of the great cities, in education and health 
services. Much of this is lost to sight in the controversy over poli-
cies. 91 
Nor could Rhoodie have objected to what Hamilton said in Cairns, Qld., during a visit 
in June 1959: 
The South African Government fully realised that the time must 
inevitably come when the native people there would demand a 
share in running their own affairs ... the South African Govern-
ment did believe - and had said so time and time again - that there 
was no limit to the development of the natives in their country. If 
that development was not controlled - remembering that outbreaks 
of nationalism tended to go to extremes - the white population in 
88 The Star (Johannesburg), 4 December 1957. 
89 The Canberra Times, 17 September 1956. 
90 Dr Joan Rydon, letter, 4 December 1994; BTS, 4/2/32/1, Vol. 1, Hamilton/Louw, 31July1958. 
91 AA, Al838, 201/10/7, Pt. 1, 'Radio address by the High Commissioner for South Africa, Mr. AM. 
Hamilton, Union Day, 1959'. 
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South Africa (numbering only three million people in the entire 
country) would be absolutely swamped.92 
However, earlier during the same visit to Queensland Hamilton was reported to have 
said - it is not clear whether he volunteered this - that he had two views on apartheid, 
personal and official. His personal view was that he did not know whether it would 
work or not. Officially, the government believed that it 'will work, will enable the races 
to live together, and open the way for the native to develop to the extent of his capa-
bility'. 93 
Hamilton told the present writer in 1993 that Rhoodie could not forgive him 
'for making him cut down on his highly provocative letters 'to the press and editing 
them when I let them through'. 94 If that was so, he let quite a few through. Rhoodie's 
first article, 'Survive and provide in South Africa', (see p. 239 above) was published 
when Hamilton was out of the country visiting Ceylon and Burma. It had been inspired 
by articles which Crouch, then stringing from South Africa, had published in The Daily 
Telegraph (Sydney). On the basis of their message and as shown by the corres-
pondence they generated, Rhoodie's letters were certainly provocative to a liberal 
audience. But so were the South African government's domestic policies which the 
letters set out to elucidate. A full exposure of these policies to a sophisticated audience 
which included former South Africans, some of whom had left the country for political 
reasons, could hardly have avoided being considered provocative. 
Be that as it may, Rhoodie's modus operandi was not provocative. In Australia 
he was not, as a later generation of Information officials would have said, 'pro-active'. 
He did not generally take the initiative but reacted to what had already appeared in the 
press. He also responded to editorials in various newspapers such as, for example, The 
Sydney Morning Heralds 'The Abyss In South Africa' (18 March 1958) and 'Die Stem 
Van Suid Afrika' (21April1958) on the outcome of the 1958 general election, and The 
Canberra Times' 'Justice on Trial' (5 August 1958) about the Treason Trial. Then he 
reacted to an article W.A.P. (Peter) Phillips contributed to The Advertiser (Adelaide) 
92 The Cairns Post, 17 June 1959. Interestingly, under the headline 'Problems of segregation: Not 
always fully appreciated', there appeared in that newspaper the next day a report on remarks made by 
the visiting assistant chief chemist of Shell, South Africa, R.C. Hickman, who seemed fully 
conversant with what its proponents would have considered the 'positive' aspects of apartheid. Like 
Boydell, he claimed that the 'South African native himself actually wanted the policy of segregation'. 
93 The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 9 June 1959. 
94 Letter, 2 October 1993. 
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after the 1958 general election, 'Tyranny looms in South Africa'.95 That led to an 
exchange of letters with Phillips in The Advertiser. 
Phillips was a British-born historian who had lectured in the Department of 
Politics and Government at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) from 1953 to 
1957.96 His background was not then generally known. He had served with the British 
forces in North Africa during the war, was captured at Tobruk and spent time in Italian 
and German prisoner-of-war camps.97 An incorrigible escaper whom, according to 
himself, had been involved with the French Resistance, he was eventually sent to 
German concentration camps where he was treated with the same degree of brutality 
as other inmates. 98 He mentions in his book, The Tragedy of Nazi Germany, having 
stood helplessly by while his best friend was beaten and kicked to death before his 
eyes.99 
He emigrated to Australia after the war, reading for an undergraduate degree in 
History and English at the University of Western Australia in Perth. He was awarded a 
Hackett Studentship for 1951, worth £ 1000 annually, which he used to read history at 
Balliol College, Oxford. 100 There he encountered both G.H.L. le May who was to offer 
him a job at Wits when he went down from Oxford and Hugh Stretton who would be 
his Head of Department at the University of Adelaide where he taught from 1957 until 
the time of his retirement twenty-three years later. IOI During his Wits years Phillips 
wrote articles of general academic interest for The Forum and various South African 
newspapers. 102 Though of liberal bent he seems, so far as one can tell, to have 
95 The Advertiser (Adelaide), 22 April 1958. 
96 The present writer interviewed him at his home outside Adelaide in November 1992. 
97 The News (Adelaide), 20 June 1959. 
98 He does not identify the camps but internal evidence - his reference to Irma Grese (see K.G. Feig, 
Hitler's Death Camps: The sanity of madness (New York/London, 1979), pp. 137, 188, 381-82) - sug-
gests they were Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen in 1944-45. 
99 W.A.P. Phillips, The Tragedy of Nazi Gennany (London, 1969), p. 3. In the Preface he acknow-
ledged having been encouraged to \\Tite the book ia. by the historian Blainey and his wife. Blainey 
acknowledged Phillips's observations in respect of the typescript of his article 'Lost Causes of the 
Jameson Raid', The Economic History Review, second series, Vol. XVIII, 1965, p. 366, fn. 2. In the 
mid to late 1960s Phillips supervised Janet Robertson's doctoral thesis which was published under the 
title Liberalism in South Africa 1948-1963 (Oxford, 1971). J.P. Brits has described this as a particu-
larly useful work. Brits, Op die vooraand van apartheid, p. x. Phillips and Robertson subsequently 
married. 
100 The West Australian (Perth), 20 December 1950; The News (Adelaide), 20 June 1959; and infor-
mation obtained from Dr Hugh Stretton of Adelaide. 
IOI Information supplied by Dr Hugh Stretton. 
102 Infonnation supplied by W.A.P. Phillips. For his output in The Forum see Vol. 4, No. 12, March 
1956, pp. 38-40; Vol. 5, No. 3, June 1956, pp. 30-33; No. 5, August 1956, pp. 36-39; No. 6, Sep-
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refrained from assuming a confrontational posture towards the government. He was 
less inhibited back in Australia. He was also a leading light in the 1959 campaign to 
nobble ex-Senator Tommy Boydell, then engaged on his third and last visit to Austra-
lia. 
One of the ironies about Boydell was that his origins, background and political 
affiliations were quite similar to those of working class English migrants to AustraJia -
William Morris Hughes and Andrew Fisher are examples - who became leaders of the 
Australian labour movement. He could as well have emigrated to Australia and become 
a labour luminary there instead of being viewed in his old age by Australian and South 
African liberals as a reactionary racist (as were, in fact, the surviving founder members 
of the Australian labour movement). A South Australian newspaper called him 'the 
Billy Hughes of South Africa'. 103 (He had met Hughes when he visited Australia in 
1911.) 
In retrospect, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Boydell saga is what 
should have impelled a man of his age to undertake a series of exhausting overseas 
speaking tours as a self-appointed propagandist for South Africa (but one carrying Eric 
Louw's blessing) over a six year period (1953-1959), between his seventy-first and 
seventy-seventh years. To use an overworked cliche, men years his junior would have 
found his schedule daunting. If nothing else, his itinerary demonstrated his abundant, 
even demonic energy. In 1959 a Western Australian journalist saw him as 'A warm, 
smiling, little man of 5ft. 6in., with grey hair, twinkJing eyes and an infectious smile, 
he's a bounding bundle of super-charged energy.'104 He visited England and the United 
States in 1953, the US again in 1955, Australia in 1956, 1957 and 1959, Ghana in 
1957, and Sweden, Denmark and England in 1958. 105 In Australia between September 
tember 1956, pp. 35-37; No. 7, October 1956, pp. 43-46; No. 8, November 1956, pp. 38-41; No. 9, 
December 1956, pp. 45-49; No. 10, January 1957, pp. 12-15; No. 11, February 1957, pp. 32-35; No. 
12, March 1957, pp. 43-46; Vol. 6, No. 1, April 1957, pp. 30-33; No. 2, May 1957, pp. 7-10; No. 3, 
June 1957, pp. 15-18; No. 5, August 1957, pp. 20-24; No. 6, September 1957, pp. 30-32; No. 7, Octo-
ber 1957, pp. 26-30; No. 8, November 1957, pp. 20-22; No. 9, December 1957, pp. 31-33; No. 10, 
January 1958, pp. 28-31; No. 11, February 1958, pp. 26-28; No. 12, March 1958, pp. 26-28; Vol. 7, 
No. 1, April 1958, pp. 17-19; No. 3, June 1958, pp. 17-19; No. 4, July 1958, pp. 26-29; No. 5, August 
1958, pp. 28-30; No. 6, September 1958, pp. 26-28; No. 7, October 1958, pp. 18-21; No. 8, November 
1958, pp. 20-23. 
103 The Advertiser (Adelaide), 1 April 1959. 
1o4 Sunday Times (Perth), 22 March 1959. 
105 DSAB, Vol. IV, pp. 53-54. 
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and December 1956 he delivered according to one count forty-two lectures106 and 
according to another some twenty-seven. 107 
His 1957 tour was shorter, basically from 11 November to 10 December. Both 
his published account and his itinerary agree that he gave eighteen lectures, six in Can-
berra and twelve in Sydney. 108 The claim he made to his audiences that he paid his own 
way was misleading. While he may have paid his living expenses, he was usually suc-
cessful in persuading airlines and other organisations to pay for his travel. There is, 
however, no evidence that he was subsidised by the South African State Information 
Office or its successor, the South African Information Service. Also, the High Com-
mission in Canberra was not directly connected with his arrangements although when 
he visited Canberra it seems to have helped out with typing assistance. When the offi-
cial residence was nearing completion he made a suggestion to Uys regarding the let-
tering to be used for the year 1956 which is inscribed on the front gable, indeed that 
the year be put on the gable.109 
Boydell's 1956 and 1957 visits to Australia were relatively uncontroversial 
because he confined himself mainly to Rotary clubs. But his 1959 programme, which 
was co-ordinated by the (Australian) Commonwealth Department of Education, took 
him into schools in Western Australia, South Australia and New South Wales. That 
was different and the controversy surrounding his tour mushroomed until the New 
South Wales Minister of Education, R.J. Heffron, representing an ALP government, 
found himself unable to resist the political pressure and denied him further access to 
that state's schools. Boydell thereupon called his tour off. The publicity attendant upon 
his 1959 visit and its premature end had the unintended effect of providing South 
Africa's critics in Australia with a dummy run for the Sharpeville shootings the 
following year and South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth in 1961.110 
106 The Star (Johannesburg), 22 December 1956. That would have been roughly the same lecture 
forty-two times. 
107 AA, Al361/l, 4/15/37, 'The Hon. Thos. Boydell's Lecture Tour in Australia - 1956'. 
108 The Star (Johannesburg), 9 December 1957 and AA, A1361/l, 4/15/37, 'The Hon. Thos. Boydell's 
Lecture Tour - 1957. Second Tour'. 
109 BCB, Vol. 21, 44/1, Boydell/Uys, 21October1956; Uys/Boydell, 12 October [sic] 1956. 
110 See J.M. Tilby, Public opinion in Australia on South Africa's racial policies 1959-61. 
Unpublished B.A. Honours thesis, University of Adelaide, 1963. I an indebted to Mrs P. Stretton of 
Adelaide for drawing my attention to this thesis and to Dr Janet Phillips, of Flinders University, 
Adelaide, for arranging for me to see a copy. 
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In 1963 J.M. Tilby, a South Australian honours student, sought vainly to 
apportion responsibility for Boydell's 1959 tour. 111 Preparations were already in train 
for it before Boydell commenced his 1957 tour and were carried further by Boydell 
himself before he left Australia in December 1957. Archival papers reveal that Robert 
Menzies played a key role.112 Uys had taken Boydell to see him in 1956. 113 In July 
1957 the Vice-Chairman of The Australian Club in Cape Town, S.W. Deane, wrote to 
him asking if the 'Australian Department of Education' could arrange and pay for in-
ternal transport for a lecture tour by Boydell of universities and high schools. Menzies 
said he would have the matter 'looked into'. 
The Secretary of his department, A.S. Brown, referred it to the Director of the 
Commonwealth Department of Education, W.J. Weeden, who believed initially that 
'the Government might save itself embarrassment by not offering a contribution 
towards the tour'. Later Menzies himself arranged for Boydell to speak to Weeden as a 
result of which the latter contacted the New South Wales, South Australian and 
Western Australian Departments of Education promoting the idea of a lecture tour. 
(Secondary Education was a State rather than a Federal matter.) Weeden described 
Boydell as 'an elderly man but exceedingly energetic and seems to have an interesting 
story about South Africa'. Inasmuch as Weeden commenced with a reference to Men-
zies: 'Some days ago the Prime Minister suggested to me that I may be able to give 
some assistance to the Honourable Thomas Boydell who wishes to arrange a lecture 
tour of Australian secondary schools and universities', it was not surprising that their 
response was positive. 114 After Weeden made the introductions, Boydell communi-
cated with the State Education Departments direct. 
Eighteen months later, when the ALP's Clyde Cameron enquired in the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives whether Boydell's lectures 'to South Aus-
tralian schools in support of South African racial laws' were 'sponsored by the 
Commonwealth Office ofEducation•11s Weeden's suggested reply, while admitting that 
contact had been made with them, denied either that pressure was exerted on State 
111 Appendix I of Tilby's thesis (pp. 157-58) contains a list of questions she put to the South 
Australian Education Department and the Commonwealth Office of Education. The latter who, as will 
be seen below, was greatly involved in the arrangements for the tour, returned an evasive reply. 
112 See various items on AA, A1361/l/, 4/15/37 - the Commonwealth Office of Education file held by 
the Australian Archives at Mitchell, ACT. 
ll3 The Canberra Times, 18 October 1956. 
114 AA, Al361/l, 4/15/37, Weeden/Robertson, 2 December 1957. 
115 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. House of Representatives. Notices of Motion 
and Orders of the Day. No. 26, Question 22, 7 May 1959, p. 171. 
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Education Departments or that topics were suggested on which Boydell might 
speak. 116 Weeden told Tilby in 1963 that Boydell had approached his office for help in 
1957, was referred to the States, and that he, Weeden, was not aware of the arrange-
ments made for him. He was therefore 'not in a position to answer any of the questions 
posed in your letter'. These had included (1) 'From whom did the Department hear of 
Mr. Boydell, and on whose approval was his tour arranged?' and (4) 'Did the Depart-
ment know what Boydell intended to speak on?'117 
At least vis-a-vis Tilby Weeden was economical with the truth for copies of all 
Boydell's detailed programmes are on the Commonwealth Office of Education file at 
the Australian Archives. And he assumed responsibility for the 'overall organisation' of 
Boydell's tour in New South Wales at the request of that State's Education Depart-
ment. His note of a telephone conversation with H.S. Wyndham, the NSW Director of 
Education. in September 1958 recorded that the latter was sending him 'a long letter 
asking us to arrange the itinerary for New South Wales'. 118 
For Gilchrist in Pretoria Boydell was at first 'a cheerful, quick-witted and prac-
tised speaker (although inclined to be garrulous), but we regard his explanations of the 
working of apartheid in South Africa as both idealistic and over-simplified'. 119 He was 
obviously annoyed when it appeared (which Weeden denied) that, without consultation 
with himself, Boydell had been invited officially to lecture in Australia. His attitude 
thereupon hardened: 'Boydell's comments on South Africa ... seem to be highly propa-
gandistic in favour of the National Party, and often lack objectivity and balance'. 120 He 
said later that Boydell was 
so near to being an official propagandist for the present Union 
Government that his lectures are undistinguishable from official 
propaganda ... He paints a broad picture in his talks, and is enter-
taining and brisk in his delivery, but is much less impressive when 
pinned down to details by an informed questioner. The main point 
... is that the States concerned might as well have hired someone 
on the payroll of the South African State Information Office. 
116 AA, Al361/l, 4/15/37, Weeden/Prime Minister's Department, 8 May 1959. 
117 Tilby, Public opinion in Australia on South Africa's racial policies, Appendix I, pp. 157-58. 
118 AA, Al361/l, 4/15/37, Record of telephone conversation Wyndham/Weeden, 19 September 1958; 
letter Wyndham/Weeden, 25 September 1958. 
119 AA, Al838/l, 201/2/5, Pt. 6, Memo. 651, Gilchrist/DEA, 11 December 1957, forwarding a copy 
ofBoydell's article in The Star (Johannesburg), 9 December 1957. 
12° AA, Al838/2, 201/10/10/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 187, Gilchrist/DEA, 21March1958. 
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However, it would be unwise 'to express any public criticism of statements by South 
African official or quasi-official propagandists'. Australia might itself want to appoint 
an Information Officer in South Africa, or accredit an Australian lecturer, and nothing 
should be done to 'prejudice the work of our own representatives'. 121 
His comments were drawn to Weeden's attention, who not unnaturally asked 
whether any action should be taken. A certain naivety marked External Affairs's 
response. No action was required except to mention 'in confidence' to the State Edu-
cation Departments that Boydell was unlikely to give balanced account, but that they 
'should not let it be known that they view Boydell's lecture tour with some reserva-
tion'122 (if that was indeed the case). Boydell commenced his 1959 tour in Western 
Australia early in March. On the twentieth of that month the Director of Education 
there, Dr T.I. Robertson, warned his New South Wales counterpart, H.S. Wyndham, 
that he had been 
embarrassed by protests from the World Council of Churches and 
from individual ministers on the grounds that Mr. Boydell is 
making a defence of the apartheid policy in South Africa. He is 
quite fanatical on this subject and gets worked up about it. I have 
requested him to tone down his references in schools. The attitude 
of the clergymen is that he is presenting a case which is not toler-
ated in Australia ... 
On other aspects of South African life he is most informative and 
very helpful. He is a very fluent speaker and holds his audiences 
very well indeed. 
I thought I should warn you in case you felt you should have a 
word with him before he embarks on his tour. If you can keep him 
off racial relations and deal more with trade and industrial devel-
opment, etc. I think his visit will be well worth while. 123 
There lay the rub. Boydell's topic was 'South Africa: its peoples and its prob-
lems'. He had come to Australia to promote apartheid, not trade and industrial devel-
opment. When he could not do that, his tour came to an end. Curiously, at the height 
121 Jbid., Memo. 279, 7 May 1958. 
122 AA, Al361/l, 4/15,37, Cutts/Director, Commonwealth Office of Education, 23 May 1958. T.W. 
Cutts was Australian Ambassador to South Africa in the early 1970s. 
123 AA, Al361, 4/15/37, Robertson/Wyndham, 20 March 1959. Wyndham was a prominent educa-
tionist. He held the NSW job from 1952 to 1968. An historian writes that he 'went down in history as 
the author of a challenging experiment affecting the relationship between secondary and tertiary edu-
cation. The Wyndham Scheme of 1961, it has been said, made concessions to elitist pretensions while 
providing a means of comprehensive secondary education along American lines'. Alexander, From 
Curtin to Afenzies, p. 210. 
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of the furore The Sydney Morning Herald editorialised on the subject: 'The ties this 
country has with South Africa are as firm as ever they were. Both countries have real 
affinities and a deep sense of friendship', a statement qualified in the next sentence: 'But 
these have not prevented the growth here since the war of the strongest feelings of 
aversion to the racialist policies of the Governments of Dr Malan, Mr Strijdom, and Dr 
Verwoerd'. 124 
In 1963, perhaps inspired by W.A.P. Phillips - at any rate she interviewed him 
at length - Tilby devoted part of her BA (Hons) Thesis (what South African history 
departments would call a Long Essay) to the Boydell affair, outlining Phillips's role in 
it. 125 Eric Louw had blamed Phillips for Boydell's troubles claiming, wrongly, that he 
had taught history at the University of Natal. 126 But three decades later the feeling in 
Adelaide was that Boydell would have been in trouble even without Phillips. That is 
undoubtedly so, given the hostile clerical attitude to him in Western Australia. At the 
end of the day the significance of the Boy dell affair was greater in the context of South 
African domestic politics than any positive impact it had on South African-Australian 
relations. In fact, by ending in controversy its impact was ultimately negative, high-
lighting the fact that South Africa was a controversial country. That was not infre-
quently the outcome of overseas information campaigns. 
Boydell, a practised writer of letters to Australian newspapers, was probably 
Rhoodie's role model. His 1957 tour was under way when Rhoodie arrived in Austra-
lia. An aspect of Rhoodie's letters to editors which, at this remove, can only be the 
subject of speculation was that all but two of those that could be traced were published 
in 1958, within a year of his arrival in Australia.127 Whether Hamilton succeeded in 
124 The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 May 1959. (Editorial: 'School Lectures On Apartheid.) 
125 Tilby, Public opinion in Australia on South Africa's racial policies, pp. 25-42. 
126 Sen Deb., 1959, Cols. 4670-85; The News (Adelaide), 19 June 1959. 
127 Rhoodie's articles and letters: 
The Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 6 February 1958 (Article); 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March 1958 (Letter); 10 April 1958 (Letter); 16 April 1958 (Article); 
25 April 1958 (Letter); 9 May 1958 (Letter); 
The Canberra Times, 16 April 1958 (Article); 6 August 1958 (Article); 
The Advertiser (Adelaide), 6 May 1958 (Letter); 22 May 1958 (Letter); 21October1958 (Letter); 13 
November 1958 (Letter); 19 May 1959 (Letter); 
The West Australian (Perth), 19 June 1959 (Letter); 
The Advertiser (Adelaide), 21March1960 (Letter). 
His critics: 
The Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 20 February 1958 (Letter: RT. Gooding); 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 31March1958 (Letters: M.M. Braham; G. Hartenstein); 2 April 1958 
(Letter: Senator D. Grant); 12 April 1958 (Letter: R. Gooding); 15 April 1958 (Letter: L.C. Rodd); 16 
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putting a stop to the letters or for whatever reason, only two seem to have been pub-
lished after 1958. One, in 1959, responded to a Phillips letter about the lack of African 
support for apartheid and that when the Boydell affair was gathering momentum. 
Boydell had earlier replied to the same letter.1 28 The other, Rhoodie's last, took issue 
with an editorial in Ihe Advertiser (Adelaide) of 11March1960. 
The newspaper published his letter on the day of Sharpeville, 21 March .. In it 
Rhoodie expressed the conventional wisdom of the time: 'white South Africans fear 
that any policy which would subject them to a vast black majority would mean 
inevitably their extinction as a nation, and endanger their economic or even physical 
survival as individuals'. (A year later W.C. Naude, then Ambassador to the United 
States, was reported in the Australian press as having articulated the rather more 
sophisticated view that the government's policy 'was to remove prejudice and to create 
harmony in the nation').129 
The fire-storm set off by Sharpeville would not have been dampened by letters 
to the editor. There are, in fact, times when even the most dynamic public relations 
officer must fold his tents and steal silently away and that was one of them. Rhoodie 
did so literally three months later when he was transferred to Washington. 
As was to be expected in the climate of the times Rhoodie's message was, as in-
deed was Hamilton's if more subtly expressed, white supremacist in content. For 
example, 
If South Africa were to yield to the opinion of others and accept a 
status of integration or partnership with the non-whites (who out-
number the whites by four to one), the white South African nation, 
after 300 years of strenuous effort for the establishment of a West-
ern civilisation at the foot of the African continent, would be com-
mitting national suicide .... 
April 1958 (Letter: Senator D. Grant); 12 April 1958 (Letter: R. Gooding); 16 April 1958 (Letter: 
Senator D. Grant); 18 April 1958 (Letter: M.M. Braham); 28 April 1958 (Letter: J. and V. Fallding); 
8 May 1958 (Letter: M.M. Braham); 13 May 1958 (Letter: L. Langford-Smith); The Advertiser 
(Adelaide), 22 April 1958 (Article: W.A.P. Phillips); 12 May 1958 (Letter: Phillips); 22 May 1958 
(Letter: Phillips); 5 June 1958 (Letter: Phillips); 23 October 1958 (Letter: Phillips); 26 November 
1958 (Letter: Phillips); 9 May 1959 (Letter: Phillips). 
128 See The Advertiser (Adelaide), 9 May 1959 (Letter: Phillips); 18 May (Letter: Boydell); 19 May 
(Letter: Rhoodie). 
129 The Canberra Times, l l April 1961. It is interesting that this should have been picked up in 
Australia. 
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Surely it is naive to expect a highly civilised white nation to accept 
a policy of full partnership with the overwhelming number of 
underdeveloped Bantu, thereby handing over the reins of govern-
ment to another nation?130 
Hamilton sought to explain South African complexities by projecting that 
country's ratio of white to non-white on to Australia, saying at the commencement of a 
visit to Western Australia in April 1958: 'It is the same as if there were 40,000,000 
aborigines here and 10,000,000 whites'. Therefore, 'Australia should be one of the few 
countries in the world capable of understanding the position in South Africa', 131 an idea 
successive South African heads of mission would seek to convey to Australians until 
the 1990s. 
Before Rhoodie's death this writer asked him and Hamilton for their views of 
each other during their time together in Canberra. Rhoodie said: 132 
I'm sure Tony Hamilton was happy to see me go. Apart from gar-
dening he did excel at entertaining other diplomats - but he did 
become good friends with Menzies. But I think it was more 
important that Menzies opened a S.A. Information exhibit in Par-
liament House133 than plant a tree in Tony Hamilton's garden! As 
for his PRO work - he avoided the media and TV like the plague. 
Hamilton wrote: 134 
As for Rhoodie, he was a pain in the neck from his arrival. He was 
attractive and talented, and dangerously ambitious. I knew he was 
trying to undermine me "With Verwoerd; but V later complimented 
me on my achievement in Australia and said that it was my urgent 
advice from [Stockholm] that had persuaded him to grant Luthuli 
his passport to go to Oslo for the Nobel Prize.135 
In retrospect, it is legitimate to ask why Hamilton as Rhoodie's head of mission 
did not write the letters or at least have them go out over his name. After all, in the 
eyes of the Australian authorities, he was responsible for the activities of his subordi-
nates. Perhaps he wanted to maintain a posture of deniability; perhaps heads of mission 
130 The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 1958. 
131 The West Australian (Perth), 9 September 1958. 
132 Dr E.M. Rhoodie, undated letler, 1993. He may subsequently have wanted to express himself more 
elegantly but death intervened. 
133 See The real information scandal, p. 571. 
134 AM. Hamilton, letter, 2 October 1993. 
135 See Davis's record of his conversation with Hamilton in November 1961. AA, A9421/l, 221/1, 
Record of conversation Davis/Hamilton, 16 November 1961. 
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did not do that sort of thing at the time. (Most of them had no need to.) Perhaps, as 
Rhoodie implied, he did not want to be associated in the public mind with the white 
supremacist policies of the National Party government. But that did not prevent him 
from expressing the white supremacist point of view in his public statements and more 
subtly than Rhoodie could. 
As his report on the Malayan Independence celebrations shows, Hamilton was 
a captive of the prejudices of his day: 
The test will come if, in Malay hands, the administrative machine 
runs down and the economy of the country begins to suffer. The 
Malays are a pleasant and easy-going people, and none of their 
leaders gives the impression of any great drive or determination. 
The deplorable condition of the airport at Djarkarta, observed even 
at a superficial glance, was striking indication of what can happen 
when the firm hand of the European administrator is withdrawn. It 
would be an optimistic observer who could be sure that the Malays 
have an inherent quality which would preserve them from the 
Indonesian fate ... 136 
Quite likely what he objected to was not so much the policies as the fact that 
they were the product of a rampant Afrikaner Nationalism. He was a good, even an 
excellent public speaker. If he did not make use of the media to the extent Rhoodie 
considered appropriate three decades later, that would have been because of factors 
other than lack of confidence in his ability to do so, including the fact that was not the 
practice of the day. 
It is also legitimate to speculate how Rhoodie would have fared with Uys 
whom he missed by some four months. Hamilton called Rhoodie 'a pain in the neck'. 
Uys may not have found him so, though Rhoodie would not have enjoyed the same 
degree of latitude under Uys as he did under Hamilton. For one thing, while he would 
have agreed wholeheartedly with their content, the idea of himself or a member of his 
staff writing letters to newspapers would probably have offended Uys's sense of pro-
priety. Sole tells us he was 'a stickler for acting strictly according to the book'137 and 
writing letters to newspapers was hardly South African diplomatic orthodoxy at that 
time. Politicians like Louw did that and were criticised for it. 
136 BTS, 9118/1, Vol. 10, Circular minute A46of1957, 18 October 1957, p. 6. 
137 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 232. 
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Less than a week before Uys departed for West Germany he wrote in the 
course of a lengthy reply to an enquiry from the State Information Office about the 
best location for its Information Officer in Australia: 
The best policy that this Mission can therefore follow, and indeed 
follows, is to say or do nothing in public that would embarrass the 
Australian Government and instead of reacting on every occasion 
that presents itself, rather to supply positive information especially 
where it touches on co-operation between the Union and Austra-
lia.138 
That could have been the key to Uys's attitude. Rhoodie would have welcomed Uys's 
suggestion in the same letter that the Information Attache accompany the new High 
Commissioner on his introductory official visits to the Australian States, 139 but it 
would have horrified Hamilton (and others) and it did not come to pass. As for 
location, while Rhoodie was telling the Australians he was thinking of establishing him-
self in Sydney, 140 Uys came down firmly in favour of Canberra. 
The perception of lackadaisical heads of mission unwilling to promote or 
defend apartheid entered white South African political mythology during Rhoodie's 
term as Secretary for Information. It persisted for years and was not without founda-
tion. But the matter was never as clear cut and unambiguous as it may have seemed. 
What Embassies do abroad is dependent upon both formal instruments and unwritten 
convention. Receiving countries set the parameters of what they consider acceptable 
behaviour. In 1964 the then Deputy Leader of the Opposition and future Prime Min-
ister of Australia, E.G. Whitlam, asserted in the Australian House of Representatives 
that the South African Embassy was 'sending to Australian newspapers letters in 
defence of the policies of apartheid over names and addresses which do not appear in 
the telephone directories or on the electoral rolls'. 141 He pointed out that 
138 BTS, 41213212, Vol. I, Uys/Director, State Information Office, 4 June 1957. p. 7, para. 24. 
(Original in Afrikaans). 
139 Ibid., p. 8, para. 30. 
140 AA, Al838, 224/3, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 June 1957. 
141 The charge may have been exaggerated at the time but the Rhoodie Department of Information 
was capable of that and worse. Reuter's report on the incident was picked up by SAP A and inspired 
the Department of foreign Affairs to approach the Embassy for an immediate report of the 'true 
position'. The Embassy denied the allegation. BCB, Vol. 2, 6/3, (Vol. II), Cypher OTP telegrams Nos. 
17 and 14, DFNEmbassy, Canberra, 22 October and Embassy, Canberra/Foreign Affairs, 26 October 
1964. The Embassy was later cleared by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, the same Billy Mackie 
Snedden who had been rejected by External Affairs in the early 1950s. Van Niekerk/SF A, 20 
November 1964. 
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On some occasions in the past the Government has acted to 
restrain foreign missions from sending through the mails or to 
newspapers, propaganda which would arouse dissensions among 
Australians or ill will towards third countries. 142 
The Australian government's attitude towards particular incidents reflected its 
political complexion. The Rhoodie approach may have encountered resistance under an 
ALP government. In 1971 even a Liberal Party External Affairs Minister advised the 
newly-arrived South African Ambassador (J.B. Mills) 'to adopt a quiet posture'. 143 
While Uys's desire not to embarrass the Australian government was well-founded, in 
the last resort that government itself would have taken steps against an offending mis-
sion. Not only in Australia, however, the prospect of that may have counted for less 
with some South African heads of mission than that they were victims of a latterday 
manifestation of Sir Francis Bertie's attitude and of their own inability, by virtue of a 
lack of the local language or self-confidence, to take to the airwaves. At bottom, how-
ever, is the degree of media culture in a given country. Few countries compare in that 
regard with the United States or Australia. 
Sir Nicholas Henderson who represented the British government in France and 
the United States among other places remarks on the difference in approach needed in 
those countries. In the United States Ambassadors are required 'to make frequent 
speeches and press and TV appearances'. Failure to promote his country's case publicly 
would be regarded 'as a sign of lack of conviction' in it. But in Paris speeches of that 
nature 
are not expected of him. Indeed it would be thought odd and might 
prove counter-productive with the French government for a for-
eign diplomat in Paris to appear to be advancing his country's 
cause in public or to be thought to be pressurising Congress or 
public opinion. An Ambassador in France is called upon from 
time to time to make speeches; but he is not ex-pected to use them 
as a means of exerting influence on the French authorities. 144 
142 BCB, Vol. 2, 6/3, (Vol. II), Cypher OTP telegram, Embassy, Canberra/Foreign Affairs, 22 Octo-
ber 1964. See, for example, CPD, Vol. 201, 17 February 1949, p. 439. In reference to the activities of 
the Irish legation, Gullett said there were 'legations in Australia which are publishing and circulating 
propaganda, some of which is of the most controversial nature, and liable to cause a certain degree of 
unnecessary discord here'. He asked Evatt whether such action was correct. The Canberra Times of 19 
February 1949 carries an interesting editorial on the subject under the headline 'Diplomatic 
Misbehaviour'. 
143 AA, A1838, 201/10/7, Pt. L Record of conversation Moodie/Mills, 22 July 1971. 
144 Henderson, Mandarin, pp. 287-88. 
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In South Africa's case, the point of following a high profile approach was 
twofold. There was, firstly, the expectation that it would succeed in the long term and, 
secondly, government supporters were expecting action and had to be given it. The 
members of the 1961 Trade Mission to Australia and New Zealand were not unique 
among travelling South Africans to take note of the hostile press the government was 
receiving abroad and to draw their impressions to the attention of the authorities on 
their return to South Africa: 
we were struck by the bad press South Africa was receiving in 
these countries, with particular reference to the separate develop-
ment policies being followed by the South African Government. 
Since the advent of the Republic and its departur~ from the 
Commonwealth, the press would appear to have thrown any 
restraint, that there might have been previously, to the wind and 
has stepped up the tempo of its attacks. 
A feature of press criticism - in some case amounting almost to 
vilification - was the appearance in newspapers of anti-South 
African articles emanating from correspondents in South Af-
rica. 145 
Nor was the Trade Mission's suggested palliative unique, the employment of outside 
public relations 'experts'. 
There was a belief in governing circles that the government's problem in its 
international relations was caused not by the nature of its domestic policies but by 
wrong perceptions of them. That persisted from the 1950s practically to the time of the 
white handover of power in the 1990s. The solution was to project the right percep-
tions whereupon the problem would disappear. The real problem, therefore, was one 
of presentation not of content. All would be well once the correct formula was found. 
It was an approach fuelled from time to time by prominent visitors from abroad such as 
the Chairman of Australia's Macquarie Broadcasting Service who told Woodward in 
1962 that 'South Africa undoubtedly has a "quality product" to sell. It is a pity it is so 
badly merchandised and advertised outside of the country'. 146 That was a manifestation 
of J.C.G. Kevin's feeling referred to later (see Chapter Seven) that the government had 
'no gift of communication and seem[ ed] incapable of putting its case to the world in its 
least unfavourable light'.147 
145 BTS, 1/25/3, Vol. 1, Andrews/Director, State Information Service, 19 June 1961. 
146 BCB, Vol. 5, 6/10 (S), Ogilvy/Woodward, 11October1962. 
147 AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. 1, High Commission paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 13, para. 53. 
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In the end, however, Information was a domestic political sacred cow and that 
department's influence lay more in the realm of domestic politics than in anything it 
could achieve by way of changing perceptions abroad. Indeed, domestic political con-
siderations quite likely dictated the bureaucratisation of an efficient and streamlined 
operation such as the State Information Office by turning it into a department of state 
in the early 1960s with its own Minister and Secretary. Piet Meiring who headed the 
operation until then was clearly more effective professionally than any of the ~hree 
secretaries of department who succeeded him - W.C. du Plessis, B.G. Fourie and F.G. 
Barrie - until Esche! Rhoodie's appointment in 1972 transformed the situation. If, how-
ever, Verwoerd's intention was to merely to enhance the status of the information 
effort, whatever may have been achieved in that area was at the expense of profes-
sional efficiency. 
At the height of the rivalry between the Departments of Information and For-
eign Affairs in the mid-1970s speculation was rife that the Minister of Information, Dr 
C.P. Mulder, would add Foreign Affairs to his other portfolios with Rhoodie taking 
over from B.G. Fourie as Secretary. 148 That way, preferred Information officials would 
enjoy a fast-track to Ambassadorial status. As it happened some officers, though 
perhaps not those Rhoodie would have wished to see advanced, became Ambassadors 
through force of circumstances. For an unexpected by-product of the so-called 
Information Scandal of the 1970s, which brought about the collapse of the Department 
of Information and its merger with the Department of Foreign Affairs, 149 not to 
. 
mention the fall of Mulder, Rhoodie and Vorster, was the career opportunities it 
opened up for middle-ranking Information officials. 
The face of the Department of Foreign Affairs changed. Not only did it become 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, a title it held for some years, but 
·Information officers were thereafter completely interchangeable with their Foreign 
Affairs colleagues. Some were eventually appointed Ambassadors abroad, positions to 
which they could normally not have aspired. At time of writing (1995), Ambassadorial 
posts occupied by one-time Information officials from the mid to late 1980s to the mid-
1990s have included Athens, Bangkok, Brasilia, Brussels, Helsinki, Lisbon, Madrid, 
148 See, eg., J.H.P. Serfontein, 'US trip may help SA's diplomacy'; 'U.S. visit was a triumph for 
Mulder'; 'Foreign policy row: Mulder and Muller face showdown'; and 'Growing row over foreign 
policy', Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 3, 10 & 24 February 1974. 
149 After an intermediate period when Information was renamed the Bureau of National and 
International Communication. 
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Manama, Mbabane, Maseru, Montevideo, Prague, Santiago, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Vienna 
and Warsaw and Chicago, Houston and Los Angeles among Consulates-General. In 
that way were career opportunities for Information officers enhanced and those for 
foreign service officers reduced. 
At least one British Information officer, Robert Marett, became an Ambassador 
through what he termed 'the back door'. He saw himself as 'living proof that it is pos-
sible for a back-door entrant to survive tolerably well in the Diplomatic Service; and 
that the stigma of having been an Information Officer for most of one's career is not a 
fatal bar to higher office in the Service•.15o The British experience differed from the 
South African one because the various mergers which produced today's Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Diplomatic Service were career-enhancing rather than 
career-limiting for Foreign Office officials. The latter were the chief beneficiaries of the 
mergers because the former Foreign Office establishment by and large controlled the 
new Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Thus the former's Permanent Under-Secre-
tary took charge of the new department while his counterpart at the former Common-
wealth Relations Office became High Commissioner to Australia. 
It was not a case of there being fewer jobs than people. Indeed, the balance 
tilted the other way. There were as many overseas posts to fill but fewer people to fill 
them because many former Commonwealth Relations Office officials opted to move to 
other Whitehall departments. And officials competing for Foreign and Commonwealth 
and Diplomatic Service posts from outside the old diplomatic system were few in 
number. Some had been Home Civil Servants in the old Colonial Office; others had 
been members of the old Overseas Colonial Service (serving the colonial governments 
in the colonial territories) and were distinct from the British Home Civil Service. 151 
It is a fallacy to attribute to individual representatives or even to foreign ser-
vices as a whole the power to improve relations between countries. It was, however, 
one which contributed to the rivalry between the Departments of Information and 
Foreign Affairs in the 1970s up to the time of the former's absorption by the latter. 152 
Apart from personal animosities, the rivalry had to do with different perceptions of 
what South African representatives should be doing abroad. Although Rhoodie as 
Secretary for Information and Mulder, his Minister, were brought low, that did not 
150 R. Marett, Through the back door (London, 1968), p. 216. 
151 I am indebted to Sir Brian Barder for this information. e-mail message, 29 September 1995. 
152 B.G. Fourie gives his perspective of the feud in Brandpunte, pp. 60-68. 
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mean the Department of Foreign Affairs won the war. Its 'victory' derived from 
domestic political circumstances, not from the superiority of its personnel or 
approach. 153 Geldenhuys attributes the attitude of Foreign Affairs officials of the day in 
part to professional jealousy154 and there is something in that. 
Apart from their unwillingness to do so, few if any of contemporary Foreign 
Affairs senior officials were equipped to use the media to convey the government's 
message. Not for them the high profile stance of Sir Anthony Parsons at the United 
Nations and Sir Nicholas Henderson in Washington who put the Thatcher govern-
ment's case to the American public before and during the 1982 Falklands/M:alvinas 
war. 155 And because they were unable to manipulate the media, many South African 
officials tended to conceive of the diplomat's role as being to have as little as possible 
to do with it. 156 That conditioned their attitude, not fear of what Sir Eric Phipps called 
'those limelight effects that momentarily flatter, but ultimately consume, the reputation 
of a public servant'.157 
More recently Sir Robin Renwick, British Ambassador to South Africa at the 
time of Nelson Mandela's release from prison in February 1990, manipulated the media 
so well it might have been thought it was the United Kingdom not Canada or Australia 
who was leading the Commonwealth offensive against the Botha government. That is 
ironic because until complete normalisation of relations with South Africa after the 27 
April 1994 general election, the United Kingdom, especially under Margaret Thatcher, 
was odd country out on the South African issue in Commonwealth circles. Obviously, 
therefore, Renwick's term was highly successful from his and his government's point of 
view. 158 His services were recognised by his appointment to Washington DC, quite 
likely the premier ambassadorial post in the gift of the British government. 159 
153 The personnel of the two departments were quite similar in calibre. 
154 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 111. 
155 Sir Nicholas Henderson was another who established a close relationship with the head of the gov-
ernment to which he was accredited, in this case President Reagan. See Henderson's diaries and The 
Jfleekly Telegraph, Plus, Issue 150, 1994, pp. I, VIII-IX. He would have obtained a good grounding in 
media work during his time as press attache to the British mission in Vienna in the early 1950s. 
A.J.P. Taylor, A Personal History (London, 1983), p. 200. 
156 Successful diplomatic or political manipulation of the media requires active solicitation of 
interviews, not sitting back waiting for approaches. If on a lesser scale, it is much the same as a book 
promotion tour. 
157 The Times (London), 31May1941. (Letter: 'Hereditary Diplomats.) 
158 The Star (Johannesburg), 20 June 1995. ('Business Report', p. I ('Ex-ambassador joins merchant 
bank). 
159 See the Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), Vol. 11, No. 36, September 1-7, 1995, for a perspective 
on his activities in Washington. (Martin Walker, 'Robin Renwick - ambassador extraordinaire'). 
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His effective use of the media puts Renwick among the great Ambassadors of 
his time. The same is true of his senior colleagues Parsons and Hendetson in their day 
and Gladwyn Jebb at the United Nations in the 1950s. In times of crisis an ability to 
manipulate the media is now as much a sine qua non of diplomacy as it is of politics 
and government. 
As long ago as 1941 The Round Table referred to an Ambassador as a p1,Iblic 
figure, contrasting Sir Ronald Lindsay, 'a successful ambassador of the older type', 
with his successor in Washington, Lord Lothian, who 'embodied the idea of speaking 
to the whole nation on behalf of Great Britain'. Lindsay (who was not liked in the 
United States - see Chapter One) 
as far as possible avoided public speaking. He had had little direct 
dealing with the press. His mission, he considered, was from Gov-
ernment to Government. It was accordingly his duty to establish 
close and confidential relations with the political leaders of the 
country; and he undoubtedly performed this duty very well. 
Lothian, on the other hand (the former Philip Kerr, once a member of Milner's 
'Kindergarten' in South Africa and himself the first editor of The Round Table - 1910-
16) 
without neglect of or detriment to his relations with the official 
hierarchy, made himself a public figure well-known by reputation 
over the whole of the United States, and personally acquainted 
with an exceptionally large number of politicians and journalists. 
When he died, he was popularly acclaimed as a great ambassador. 
It is probable that history -will endorse the contemporary verdict, 
and Lord Lothian may be regarded as a pattern for future ambas-
sadors not only in Washington but in other capitals. 160 
The Round Table qualified its observations about Lindsay and Lothian with a 
reference to 'horses for courses' - 'what we may call the new school of ambassador will 
not be suitable for every post', It should not, therefore, 
be taken for granted that there will be no further need for the older 
type of diplomatist, who believes that the more inconspicuously he 
does his work the more he is likely to achieve results, and that 
excursions into anything like an address to the nation may be 
160 The Round Table, No. 125, December 1941, p. 49. The fact that he died in office would have con-
tributed to the contemporal)' verdict. Watt says Lothian settled in well in Washington 'despite his 
earlier reputation as one who ... favoured appeasement of nazi Germany'. A Christian Scientist, 
Lothian refused medical attention during his last illness. Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 37. 
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unwelcome to the Government with whom he is dealing and detri-
mental to his own purposes.161 
Among South Africans, Eric Louw and R.F. Botha can be placed among di-
plomatists of the new school; Hilgard Muller and most of the ancien regime's heads of 
mission pertained to the old. 162 The latter were unlikely to have taken a conscious 
decision that the best results would be achieved by 'quiet diplomacy'. More likely, as 
suggested, their personalities combined with a perceived inability to manipulate the 
media determined their approach. That was too bad because the government's interna-
tional situation in the decades leading up to the 1990s was such that it might have 
gained kudos from its western interlocutors if more of its representatives had adopted 
a high profile, go-for-broke approach. 
That was what Rhoodie had in mind and he quoted the late Senator Edmund 
Muskie to the effect that 'if South African Ambassadors in the US acted like successive 
Israeli Ambassadors did, their [country's] voice would also be much better heard in 
high council'. Muskie said he 'had never even seen' the then South African Ambas-
sador. Rhoodie accordingly applauded the R.F. Botha approach: 
To his credit Pik Botha immediately aimed for the top of the totem 
pole in the USA. He was not going to maintain a low profile. He 
was not going to be a State Department yes-man. He was going to 
rock the boat, and rock it he did to such an extent in one year he 
made more public appearances, gave more speeches and appeared 
more on TV than [his predecessor] did in five years. For the first 
time the American administration took note of what South Africa's 
Ambassador said. For the first time millions of Americans realised 
South Africa actually had an Ambassador in Washington and that 
he had some points worth considering. 163 
Lothian and the South Africans had specific situations to address and they 
would have been helped by media interest in what they had to say. An on-going 
problem (if it can be called that) for Australian representatives is the relatively uncon-
161 The Round Table, No. 125, December 1941, p. 50. 
162 P.H. Philip, Consul in New Zealand in the late 1960s, early 1970s was 'new' rather than 'old' as 
was H.L.T. Taswell, Ambassador to the United States 1966-71. In respect of Philip, father of the 
publisher David Philip, see The Argus (Cape Town), 15 September 1972. 
163 Rhoodie, The real information scandal, p. 48. With R.F. Botha, Rhoodie was among the most cre-
ative South African Public Servants of his generation. Botha was a year older and more cautious. Yet 
Talleyrand's famous admonition N'ayez pas de zele (Not too much zeal) is not inappropriate when one 
thinks of them as junior officials. That may have been what Uys had in mind when he tried to rein 
Botha in. (See Chapter Four.) 
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troversial nature of their country. Not altogether tongue-in-the-cheek did a Canadian 
historian write of Australian history: 
The children of Israel grumbled when they were required to make 
bricks without straw. The historians of Australia confront a task of 
similar difficulty. Australia's past is in large part devoid of those 
events which infuse cohesiveness and drama into other national 
histories. 164 
What better evidence than that foreign universities should have to 'be paid to offer 
Australian courses'?165 (Emphasis in original.) In drawing attention to that, the Scot-
tish-born Donald Denoon, an immigrant to Australia with African experience, found it 
'puzzling': 
the experience of 16 million [ie. in 1986] relatively happy Austral-
ians should be as riveting as (say) that of 16 million relatively 
unhappy Tanzanians. Tanzanians, however, fit securely within the 
conceptual framework of the 'third world', and therefore do not 
need to pay people to study them.166 
The reverse could have applied to South Africa. It is not stretching credibility 
to suggest that previous South African governments would have welcomed an oppor-
tunity to pay foreigners not to study South Africa if the outcome of their work was 
going to be politically negative, as it invariably was. 
The Australian federal government injects vast sums into the Institute of Sport 
in Canberra in the belief that the prowess of the young sportsmen and women it trains 
focuses favourable attention on the country. From the time of its creation by the Fraser 
Liberal Party/National Party government in 1981, the institute has received some 
$A500 million of federal money.167 A 1995 news item held that the government would 
164 K.A. MacKirdy, 'Australia', R.W. Winks, ed., The Historiography of the British Empire-
Commonwealth: Trends, Interpretations, and Resources (Durham, N.C., 1966), p. 137. 
165 D. Denoon, 'The isolation of Australian history', Historical Studies, Vol. 22, No. 87, October 
1986, p. 254. In 1976 the Australian government endowed a Chair in Australian Studies at Harvard 
University by means of a one-time grant of $1 million. And from 1982 to July 1988 the government 
funded the Australian Studies Centre at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, by an annual 
grant of $160 000. I am indebted to Dr ioan Rydon for this information. 
166 
'The isolation of Australian history', Historical Studies, Vol. 22, No. 87, October 1986, ·p. 254. 
Born in Scotland in 1940, Denoon immigrated with his parents to South Africa in 1948. He received 
his secondary schooling at Michaelhouse thereafter reading for a BA (Hons) degree at the University, 
of Natal, graduating in 1961. After taking his PhD degree at Cambridge University four years later, he 
taught for six years at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda (1966-72). Denoon CV. 
167 The Economist, Vol. 333, No. 7894, 17 December 1994, p. 87. 
272 
Chapter Five: Information 
spend $A350 million to secure even more medals than before at the 1996 and 2000 
Olympic Games. 168 There is also an important domestic political dimension to that: 
Australian voters are perceived to be influenced in favour of the governing party by 
Australian successes in international arenas. It is, however, a perception which runs 
counter to Australian anti-elitist traditions because the Institute caters only to the 
sporting elite (ie. in terms of ability.) 
The task of Australian representatives abroad is to raise the level of interna-
tional consciousness about their country, not an easy one in the absence of issues that 
would automatically draw attention to it. As Minister in Washington in 1940, Casey 
considered it part of his task to make Australia 'as widely and as favourably known as 
possible' and 'as quickly' as he could. He mentioned that to Cordell Hull, the Secretary 
of State, asking whether it 'was legitimate and right'. Hull said it was 'completely right' 
and recommended he contact a public relations counsel, Earl Newsom, in New York. 
Newsom advised him 'most effectively and sympathetically', getting [him] 'coast-to-
coast broadcast time on a hundred radio stations and much else'. 169 
Casey's public relations campaign in the United States is considered to have 
succeeded handsomely. 170 Yet, at least in respect of the public relations counsel, he 
encountered resistance in his own legation. Watt, for one, though younger than Casey 
a diplomat of the old school, disapproved of his approach. He claimed thirty years later 
that Casey 
was inclined to take more seriously than his staff the recommenda-
tion of one alleged e>.1Jer1 who advised the insertion in American 
Newspapers of paid advertisements proclaiming the need for 
closer U.S.-Australia relations. The State Department was particu-
larly sensitive to any such appeals to American public opinion 
over the heads of the American Administration, and made it clear 
that the latter would not be amused if such a publicity campaign 
were adopted by the Australian Legation. l 71 
168 Jnternational Herald Tribune, 22 February 1995. 
169 R.G. Casey, Personal Experience 1939-1946 (London, 1962), p. 12. The Australian War 
Memorial in Canberra has a copy of Newsom's eighty-four-page 'Summary of Findings and 
Recommendations' which he forwarded to Casey under cover of his letter dated 1 October 1940. 
A WM 254 [ 1]. Dr Siracusa of the University of Queensland put me on to this. · 
17° C. Bridge, 'R.G. Casey, Australia's First Washington Legation, and the Origins of the Pacific War, 
1940-42', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1982, p. 182. 
171 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 37. For a retrospective on Watt's 'prickly' personality, see Peter 
Hastings' piece in The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 1988, marking Watt's death a week 
earlier at the age of eighty-seven. 
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Even so, it was the Secretary of State himself who suggested that Casey consult a 
public relations counsel. Against the background of the contemporary assessment of 
Lord Lothian in relation to Sir Ronald Lindsay as well as Sir Nicholas Henderson's 
more recent opinion, there can be little doubt Casey was right. 
From Alfred Stirling's reporting during his brief term in South Africa (1948-50) 
one is conscious of the publicity value to Australia of the 1948 Qantas proving flight 
and of the tours of its tennis team in 1949 and cricket team in 1949-50. 172 Stirling said 
the tennis team's visit 'created great interest and ... materially helped to keep Australia 
well in the forefront of the news'. The cricketers 'made numerous friends for Australia 
and kept our country well in the forefront of public interest!. Forwarding newspaper 
articles to Canberra in January 1949, Marshall said they illustrated 'the greatly 
increased interest in Australia which the South African press is taking'. 173 That had 
been triggered by Evatt's visit at the beginning of the month. Menzies's visit four years 
later had the same effect. After Stirling's departure, Marshall wrote of the visit by the 
Australian soccer team: 'Following so closely on the visits of the Australian Tennis and 
Cricket T earns the tour kept Australia well in the news of this country'. 174 
That was the point for Stirling and Marshall who used the visits and tours as an 
arm of their diplomacy, riding as it were on the backs of the visitors to consolidate and 
extend their official contacts. In the same way, Hodgson benefited from the Menzies 
visit of 1953. He wrote afterwards that it gave him 'an opportunity of making many 
fresh contacts and acquiring valuable information about current events in South Af-
rica'.175 Not only Australian diplomats were conscious of sport as an arm of diplomacy. 
Dwyer, the manager of the cricket team, prefaced his request for Evatt's intercession in 
respect of the car he wanted to buy in South Africa (see Chapter Four) with: 
as I will be asked to speak at many public functions I have been 
wondering whether there is any particular subject you or your 
Department would like me to refer to, or to exclude from my 
remarks. Should that be the case I would like to seek the advice of 
one of your officers prior to our departure ... 176 
172 AA, A4231/2, South Africa, Ministerial despatches 31/48, 30 November 1948; 8/49, 18 October 
1949; 8/50, 3 April 1949; and Departmental Despatch 10/49, 25 May 1949. 
173 AA, Al838/238, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, Marshall/DEA, 20 January 1949. 
174 AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1950, Departmental Despatch 13/50, 8 August 1950. 
175 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1111, Hodgson/Minister for External Affairs, 4 August 1953. 
176 AA, Al838!f204, 201/10/11/3, Dwyer/Evatt, 23 August 1949. 
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He said he would be 'on duty for Australia in South Africa' and Evatt's 'intimate 
association with Australian cricket' would have made him 'aware of the importance of 
the duties' he would have to perform. Despite his ulterior motive, Dwyer's request for.a 
briefing made sense and could be approved on its merits. The way he formulated it 
hinted at previous experience. No evidence is to hand of similar contact between the 
various South African teams and the authorities before the formers' departure for Aus-
tralia. Uys, though, was aware of their value to the contact side of his work. 
The Australians seem to have been more conscious than the South Africans of 
the value of the public relations gesture. There are several examples, including the fol-
lowing somewhat negative one on the South African side. W.M. Hughes, Australia's 
First World War Prime Minister, died in 1952 at the age of ninety. 177 He had served for 
more than fifty years in the Commonwealth House of Representatives following on 
seven in the New South Wales Assembly. His state funeral drew 100 000 people. 178 
Though reported prominently in South African English-language mommg news-
papers, 179 his death passed unheeded in official circles. 
Seeking ex post facto approval for his actions, Nel as South Africa's Acting 
High Commissioner in Canberra, reported personally to Forsyth that Hughes was 'a 
highly revered man in Australia. Messages of condolence from all over the world 
including the Commonwealth countries were received'. Because the 'absence of a mes-
sage from the Union ... was rather conspicuous', Nel said he had written a letter 
'expressing regret on the passing on of this great Australian'. He had also ordered a 
wreath in the government's name and had attended the funeral in Sydney. He hoped 
that his actions met 'with the approval of the Government and the Department'. 180 
The department's Chief Clerk, E.J.L. Scholtz, drafted Forsyth's reply: 
I fully endorse the action taken by you on the occasion of the 
passing of Mr. W.M. Hughes. The many preoccupations at Head 
Office make it difficult for us to keep abreast of evel)-thing which 
177 At some point in his career he subtracted two years from his age, giving the year of his birth as 
1864. Thus his obituary (see ia. The Times (London), 28 October 1952) gives his date of birth as 25 
September 1864. His entry in the ADB, Vol. 9, p. 393 supplies the correct year, 1862, as does C.A 
Hughes inMr Prime Minister: Australian Prime Ministers 1901-1972 (Melbourne, 1976), p. 55. 
178 Hughes, Australian Prime Ministers, p. 63. 
179 See Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), The Cape Times and The Natal Mercury, of 28 October 
1952. 
180 Nel, Vol. 3, 4/16, Nel/Forsyth, 22 November 1952. It is interesting that the correspondence 
should be on Nel's personal file, not on one of the subject files. 
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is happening abroad and it is gratifying to know that our Missions 
can be relied upon to act with discretion. 181 
There is more to this than meets the eye. Nel would have solicited ex post facto 
approval to avoid being held personally liable for the expenditure he had incurred. By 
contrast, the death of Smuts (who was of course perceived to be a world figure as 
Hughes was not) was marked in Australia by a brief but fitting tribute by Menzies. ('It 
was never my personal honour to meet Field Marshal Smuts, but it is quite safe to say 
within the English speaking world he was one of the very great men of this century. He 
was in the most accurate sense a world figure and had a profound influence on the 
thinking of free men wherever they live.)182 Nel erred in expecting his department 
automatically to have noted Hughes's death. The onus was ori him to ensure that head 
office knew of it and to propose the sending of a message of condolence. But the fact 
that the department did not itself initiate action is indicative of the insignificant place 
Australia then occupied in South African official thinking. 
Demonstrating his greater experience, Stirling had drawn his department's 
attention to the inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument in December 1949, sug-
gesting that 
a message from the Australian Government paying tribute to the 
courage and achievement of the great Trek pioneers (either direct 
to the Department of External Affairs, or through this office to 
relay to Pretoria not later than 15th December) would be very wel-
come here. 183 
Canberra left it to him, with felicitous results: 
181 Ibid., P.M. 3/3/167, Forsyth/Net, 3 December 1951 [sic]. 
182 
'Death of Field Marshal Rt. Hon. J.C. Smuts: Statement by Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. RG. 
Menzies, K.C., M.P., 12th September, 1950', Current Notes, Vol. 21, No. 9, September 1950, p. 655. 
Menzies commenced his Smuts Memorial Lecture at Cambridge University on 16 May 1960, 'The 
changing Commonwealth', with: 'Jan Christian Smuts was one of the most remarkable men in modern 
history. He was a scholar in the finest sense; a soldier of remarkable distinction; a South African 
statesman who made an imperishable contribution to the history and institutions of his own land; a 
Commonwealth Statesman whose towering abilities made him a commanding figure, the trusted 
confidant and adviser of the giant of the age, Winston Churchill; a world leader "the very wind of 
whose name" - if I may borrow that great phrase spoken by J.M. Barrie about the Scots - "has swept to 
the ultimate seas".' Office of the High Commissioner for Australia in the United Kingdom, Australian 
News and Information Bureau, 'The first Smuts Memorial Lecture by the Right Honourable RG. 
Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P. Prime Minster of Australia' etc. 
!83 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, I. 18308, 12 December 1949. 
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Union Government sends cordial thanks for greetings 'message 
read to vast assembly and this evidence of the interest of the Aus-
tralian Nation was received with acclamation by all those who 
heard it'. 184 
The Viljoens' departure for Australia by ship on 20 May 1949 had also pro-
vided Stirling with an opportunity for a public relations gesture. Besides seeing them 
off at the docks, he had earlier given a lunch in their honour at the Mount Nelson 
Hotel attended inter alia by the American Ambassador, the Canadian High Cominis-
sioner, the President and Honorary Secretary of the Australian Association in Cape 
Town, External Affairs officials, members of Viljoen's staff and of his own, 'and a large 
number of Australians who were to be fellow passengers of the High Commissioner in 
the "Dominion Monarch", including the Australian Tennis Team'. 185 The next day Stirl-
ing hosted a lunch for Dr and Mrs Malan on the occasion of their return from the 1949 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference. The guests included F.C. Erasmus, the 
Minister of Defence, Dr A.L. Geyer, Editor-in-Chief ofNasionale Pers, the Moderator 
of the Dutch Reformed Church, Dr. A.J. van der Merwe, Viljoen and Gert Nel, all with 
wives. 186 
As revealed by the points Stirling believed could appropriately be included in 
Percy Spender's first policy speech, 187 those were times when the development of 
favourable white South African perceptions of Australia was considered a worthy 
objective of Australian diplomacy. He thought the speech should refer 
to the very friendly relationship and spirit of co-operation existing 
between Australia and South Africa under the Malan no less than 
the Smuts Government. This has been shown, on the South 
African side, not only in the political sphere (e.g. Dr. Malan's 
early appointment of a High Commissioner to Australia) but also 
by the generous welcome and assistance extended to representative 
Australians. . .. 
Further development of this spirit of co-operation between these 
two close neighbors in the 'Southern Commonwealth' is essential. 
While each country has very special political and social problems 
of its own, they have a great deal in common, geographically, cli-
matically, economically, and as a result many common problems. 
184 Ibid., 0. 15458, 14 December 1949 and I. 19133, 30 December 1949. 
185 AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1949, Ministerial Despatch No. 6/49, Stirling/Minister of State, 25 
May 1949. 
186 Ibid. 
187 None of them were. CPD, Vol. 206, 9 March 1950, pp. 621-40. A print of the speech appears as 
Foreign Policy. Ministerial Statement, 9th March, 1950 (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, No. 19 [Group E.]-F. 3152]). Spender later included the text as an appendix to his Politics 
and a Man (Sydney, 1972), pp. 307-29. 
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First, there are similar problems of defence because of our relative 
isolation and long coastlines, and the preservation of South Africa 
is vital to the maintenance of our communications with Europe. 
Internally, we produce similar agricultural products notably wool, 
wine and dried and canned fruits; we have similar problems of 
water conservation and soil erosion; we have to fight similar dis-
eases.188 
In his first interview with an Afrikaans language newspaper he had said that South 
Africa and Australia should do more to get to know each other especially by means of 
the intercession of their poets and writers.189 Within half a decade it would be South 
African politicians and officials rather than Australians who would draw attention to 
the points of similarity and the need for co-operation. 
Reporting on the cricket team's arrival, Stirling commented happily how its 
members were 'seizing opportunities to get into contact with individual [white] South 
Africans'. He heartily commended Dwyer's determination to make the tour 'an out-
standing success for Commonwealth friendship'. 
In 1954 Hodgson alerted Menzies to Malan's pending retirement recom-
mending that he send him a message.190 Menzies complied: 
Personal to Malan. Your impending retirement moves me to send 
my greetings and good wishes for a good rest after arduous 
labours. My wife and I greatly enjoyed our South African visit and 
have the warmest memories of the kindness of your wife and your-
seif. 191 
The objective of standing well with the South African government receded as 
the 1950s advanced and South Africa's disenfranchised non-Whites, Indians in the van-
guard, intensified their politics of protest to the concomitant deterioration of the South 
African government's position at the United Nations. (See Chapter Eight.) Gilchrist's 
term probably marked the watershed. Before him Australians courted the good opinion 
of the South African government and of white South Africans in general. After him 
what courting was done was done by South Africans of Australians. 
l88 AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1950, 1/50, Stirling/Minister of State, 11January1950. 
189 P. Beukes, 'Australian learns Afrikaans in a month', attached to AA, A1838/1, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, 
Marshall/DEA, 22 October 1948. 
l90 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, I. 12276, 1November1954. 
191 Ibid., 010529, 3 November 1954. 
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BACKDROPS 
The first task of every new diplomatic mission is to find suitable office (known 
as the chancery) and residential accommodation. 1 The second is, having moved in, to 
administer it. 'Suitable' is the operative word because a diplomat's idea of what is 
suitable, predicated upon his and his head office's perception of his country's prestige, 
may not be shared by most of his tax-paying fellow-countrymen, at least not in a 
democratic country. In the event of the government owning the property the admin-
istrative tasks are probably more onerous than in the case of rented accommodation. In 
the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s when staffs were small, a major part of what a South 
African mission did, taking up practically all of the time of the most junior diplomatic 
officer, was to administer itself (The 'we're here because we're here because we're 
here' syndrome in foreign service should not be dismissed lightly.)2 
Encouraged to build chanceries and residences in the style of their countries, 
the diplomatic community helped Canberra to its present eminence on the domestic 
tourism circuit. 3 While the new Parliament building may have displaced it from its posi-
tion thirty years ago as Canberra's main tourist attraction,4 Embassy Row is today still 
a priority for some visitors. In 1992/93 1 301 944 domestic and 254 182 foreign 
tourists visited Canberra, injecting $A580 million into the ACT economy. Eight per 
cent or 123 483 these indicated that they had looked at the Embassies. 5 The Canberra 
Rotary Club's principal fund-raising activity is to organise open days at selected 
Embassies. On payment of a fee, members of the public are given a guided tour of the 
residence or chancery concerned. But for security reasons during the downswing in 
official relations, the South African buildings would have been high on the list. 6 The 
absence of a defined Embassy Row in South Africa as well as the much larger size of 
1 See, for example, Stuart, Towards-coming-of-age, p. 243. 
2 According to Clark, 'one of the most cutting remarks any diplomat can make about another embassy 
is: "They spend most of their time administering themselves".' Corps Diplomatique, p. 67. 
3 In established and important capitals such as Washington, DC the countries concerned need no 
encouragement from the host government. See The Economist, Vol. 336, No. 7929, p. 75. ('Prestige 
on the Potomac'). 
4 R. Boyd, The Australian Ugliness (Revised edition, Melbourne, 1968 (1960)), p. 30. 
5 Information obtained from the ACT Tourism Commission by Ms S.J. Mackay and Y-T Chung of the 
South African High Commission, Canberra. 
6 In 1961 the South African residence was one of five on a tour organised by the Women's Committee 
for the National Heart Campaign which was estimated to have raised £300. The Canberra Times, 24 
April ('Embassies seen by 600') and 3 May 1961 (letter: 'Gratefully Theirs.') 
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Pretoria and Cape Town, if not working against foreign diplomats, was not especially 
advantageous to them. The early post-war shortage of accommodation in both cities 
was a liability. In November 1949, more than three years after the establishment of the 
High Commission Alfred Stirling, complained to Canberra that 'the general question of 
accommodation in this country, difficult in itself and complicated by the dual capital 
system, is very embarrassing to me in my work'. 7 
In September 1946 Knowles's temporary Official Secretary, Fuhrman, had 
reported that 'the housing and accommodation problems in South Africa are even more 
acute than in Australia. Rents are abnormally high~ the purchase prices of houses, when 
they are available for sale, are at least 100% higher than those obtaining in Australia, 
and, generally, the question of accommodation is particularly bad'. 8 That would have 
been because of unresolved war-time housing shortages. At the end of 1948 Stirling 
told Forsyth that the cost of living in Canberra was about twenty per cent lower than in 
Pretoria. 9 It did not remain so. In 19 54 the Chief Architect of the South African 
Department of Public Works said that Australian housing costs were almost double 
those in South Africa. 10 And Scholtz reported after his November 1957 visit that 'what 
appeared to be a normal suburban house of 5 rooms, and which would fetch between 
£4500 and £5000 in Pretoria, was up for sale for £A20,000 Australian or 
£S.A. l 5000'. I l 
The accommodation problem was probably the most troublesome Knowles 
encountered during his short stay in South Africa. It was compounded for him by the 
peculiar South African system of dual capitals. Well before his departure from 
Australia, Australian External Affairs asked the South African department to arrange 
hotel accommodation for him and his party in Cape Town for a few days then in 
Pretoria. 12 While it was Australian practice to arrange accommodation for new arrivals 
where they had no mission to do it for them, the request took South African officials 
by surprise. 'Are we to obtain accommodation?', queried W.D. van Schalkwyk on the 
file copy of the incoming cable. 'We have never done so before'. Forsyth instructed that 
7 AA, A4231/2, Departmental Despatch, 15 November 1949. 
8 AA, Al067/l, M46/21/l, Fuhrman/DEA, 22 September 1946. 
9 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 5, Cypher OTP telegram No. 95, Forsyth/Viljoen, 24 December 1948. 
IO Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 1 June 1954. 
11 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, Scholtz/Secretary, n.d. p.8. 
12 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Minister of External Affairs, Canberra/Minister of External Affairs, Pretoria, 
No. 51, 27 June 1946. On the Australian side, copies of this cable, 0. 12660, are on AA, Al838/l, 
1348/2, Pt. land Al066/l, M45/21/6. 
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accommodation be reserved in the Mount Nelson or Queens Hotels in Cape Town and 
in the Polleys or Union Hotels in Pretoria, the actual arrangements being left to the 
South African Railways and Harbours Tourist Bureau which bore the cost of the 
party's initial stay at the Mount Nelson Hotel. 13 
In Pretoria Knowles was booked into the Union Hotel on the north side of 
Church Street, a few yards down from Leyds Street and within walking distance of the 
Union Buildings on Meintjies Kop which, at that time, housed the Department of 
External Affairs (in its West Wing) and much of the Public Service besides. Knowles 
didn't know it then but the Union Hotel was to serve as his Pretoria office and resi-
dence for many months albeit not continuously because the accommodation was given 
up during the 194 7 parliamentary session. The High Commission again worked out of 
the hotel from 23 June to 25 July 194 7 before moving to its permanent 
accommodation. The hotel remained Knowles's residence until his death in November 
1947. 
The difficulties Viljoen was to experience paled to insignificance beside 
Knowles's. Knowles had the rougher time because he encountered the problem early in 
the post-war period. An important contributory factor in his case was that, unlike the 
Australians, the South Africans did not take it upon themselves to find accommodation 
for diplomatic representatives. They were aware of the resentment this caused. Thus 
Jooste commented to J.H. Hofmeyr, then Acting Prime Minister, about a letter 
Knowles had written the latter seeking his intervention: 14 'Whilst we have consistently 
endeavoured to keep aloof in these matters, I am afraid that our attitude is not 
appreciated by the foreign representatives who have in the past approached us, as in 
their countries apparently the authorities invariably requisition accommodation for 
external representatives where necessary•.1s 
Knowles wrote: 'I have, while at Pretoria, been working under difficulties under 
which, in my opinion, no representative of a member State of the British 
Commonwealth should expect to work. My staff has had to use a bedroom in the 
Union Hotel as one of its two office rooms and my Official Secretary has had three 
13 BTS, 130/10, Vol. I, Minister of External Affairs, Canberra/Minister of Ex1ernal Affairs, Pretoria, 
No. 51, 27 June 1946. M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 16 March 1995. 
14 BTS, 130/10, Knowles/Hofmeyr, 27 November 1946. A copy is annexed to AA, A4231/2, Pretoria, 
1-91, 1947, Cape Town Despatch No. 42/47, 28 April 1947. 
15 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Jooste/Acting Prime Minister, 28 November 1946. 
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persons working in his bedroom. He has, in point of strict fact, had a bed in one of the 
two offices - that is what it has amounted to!'16 
In reply, Hofmeyr warned that because policy was to give 'discharged volun-
teers ... priority in the allocation of accommodation it would be inappropriate for me to 
intervene directly and override the administrative machinery which the Government has 
established with the purpose of ensuring that returned volunteers are accorded. the 
treatment to which we stand committed'. 17 Nonetheless, because the position was 
especially bad in Cape Town, he instructed the Department of External Affairs to ask 
the Directorate of Demobilisation to see what it could do. In the result, at least as from 
18 20 January 1947, Knowles opened an office at 206 Dumbarton House, at the corner 
of Adderley and Church Streets which remained the Australian High Commission's 
Cape Town address until 30 April 1955. 19 For the period 23 December 1946 to 26 
January 1947 he occupied temporary accommodation at the Cape Town High School, 
Buitenkant Street. 20 
Almost fifty years later Mervyn Knowles gave his impressions of the 
atmosphere at Dumbarton House, then under construction: 
The builder had been persuaded to complete the suite on the 
second floor to accommodate the office. It was in absolute 
isolation with the open shell of the building behind, below and 
above it and access up two flights of rough concrete steps and 
along the full length of the building, wind, dust, planks and all. 
Apart from all the normal builder's noise you can imagine the 
disruption caused when they decided to remove, with jack-
hammers, a lift well - top to bottom - they decided was surplus to 
requirements. It took over three weeks! By the time of our return 
to Pretoria the office could be said to have been established - just 
in time to go to Pretoria and do it all again!21 
16 Ibid., Knowles/Hofmeyr, 27 November 1946, p.4, para. 6. A copy of the letter is annexed to Cape 
Town Despatch No. 42/47. 
17 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Hofmeyr/Knowles, 30 November 1946. Also annexed to Cape Town Despatch 
No. 42/47. 
18 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 16 March 1995. 
19 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Hodgson/SEA, 21 April 1955. With effect from 2 May 1955 it established 
itself at 1101, Regis House, Adderley Street thence, in 1960, at 1001 Colonial Mutual Building, 106 
Adderley Street. 
20 BTS, 130/10, Vol. I, Official Secretary/Secretary to the Prime Minister, 17 December 1946. 
21 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 16 March 1995. 
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But Pretoria continued to be a problem and Knowles found himself unable to 
make headway. He complained bitterly to Evatt on the very day (28 April 1947) he 
turned to Smuts for help: 
I have been very disappointed hitherto at the lack of responsibility 
exhibited by the Union Government in this matter of office 
accommodation for High Commissioners. It appears that the Gov-
ernment accepts no responsibility for the housing of High Com-
missioners. In this respect its attitude is in marked contrast to the 
attitude of the Australian Government concerning High Commis-
sioners, and I have not hesitated to inform the South African auth-
orities of the treatment accorded to High Commissioners by the 
Australian Government in the matters of office accommodation. 22 
Knowles said as much to Smuts in the letter he handed him: 'I should like to 
point out that in Canberra the Australian Government provides such office 
accommodation as High Commissioners desire, and I understand provides it rent 
free'. 23 Smuts 'perused the letter ... then said he would give directions that every pos-
sible effort be made to find suitable accommodation'. 24 He was as good as his word 
and doors opened. The 'open sesame' would have been these words in Forsyth's letter 
the next day to Eales, the Secretary for Public Works: 'General Smuts would be 
grateful for anything you could do to assist the Australian High Commissioner and his 
staff to procure suitable accommodation. '25 Knowles was appreciative of Smuts's 
influence. He noted in his diary during the negotiations a month later: 'this man is held 
in such reverence that when he gives such an instruction, the Public Service will do its 
utmost to ·carry it out'. 26 And when thanking Smuts he said he 'found the attitude of 
those with whom I had to deal much more sympathetic than had been the case'.27 
The Australians were allocated space in one of only two buildings then under 
construction in Pretoria - Central House, on the north-west comer of Central and Pre-
torius Streets. 28 This at first involved two separate groups of three rooms but, after 
22 AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1947, Despatch 42/47, 28 April 1947, p. 2, para. 6. From what one 
knows of Evatt, he may have taken pleasure in Knowles's situation. 
23 Knowles/Smuts, 28 April 1947. Annexed to AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1947, Despatch 42/47, 28 
April 1947. 
24 Despatch 42/47, 28 April 1947, p. 1, para. 4. 
25 BTS, 130/10, Vol. I, ForS)th/Eales, 29 April 1947. 
26 Diary entry, 6 June 1947, p. 387, accompanying Mr M.J.S. Knowles's letter of 16 March 1995. 
27 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Knowles/Smuts, 13 June 1947. 
28 For those who know Pretoria, between Van der Walt and Andries Streets. The building is still 
standing. 
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negotiations, was consolidated into six rooms together. 29 They moved in towards the 
end of July 194 7, 30 staying there for almost twelve years until they moved to 714 
North Vaal, 220 Vermeulen Street, in March 1959.31 Disillusionment had set in by the 
end of the period and the 1957 Annual Report described the Pretoria offices as 
'unsuitable (dirty, unsightly, inconvenient, badly-lit, ill-serviced, unhygienic, wasteful of 
staff time and insufficiently secure against intruders)'. 32 
That solved the problem of the chanceries but there remained the matter of 
residential accommodation. In Cape Town Knowles and his wife were accommodated 
at the Queens Hotel, Sea Point, where they found conditions degrees cooler and less 
windy than at the Mount Nelson.33 Eighteen months later Knowles's successor, 
Stirling, reported that he had found it 'quite impossible to secure even one room at the 
only city hotel in Capetown [sic] before the end of February'. While he had a room in a 
club for a few days from 28 December, there remained 'gaps for which I have no 
accommodation at all'. 34 A year after that, as mentioned, he complained of being 
embarrassed in his work by the accommodation question. 35 
Inasmuch as the Australian government purchased residential accommodation 
for its head of mission in Pretoria only in 1960 ( 12 Marais Street, Bailey's Muckleneuk 
on 1 March for £SA18 750)36 and in Cape Town in 1969 (Fair Acres, Belle Vue 
Avenue, Southern Cross Estate, Constantia on 29 January 1969) Stirling would have 
remained embarrassed until his departure the following year to take up his appointment 
as Ambassador to The Netherlands. Eighteen months after his arrival there, in response 
to Casey's request for his comment on a note on South Africa prepared by his former 
subordinate, M.H. Marshall, Stirling stressed 
the desirability of having an official residence either in Cape Town 
or Pretoria, preferably both. The U.K., U.S., France and, I think 
29 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 16 March 1995. His father's diary entries for 4 to 6 June 1947, which 
accompanied this communication, confirm Mr Knowles's view that the negotiations about the Cape 
Town and Pretoria accommodation were complex. 
30 The first despatch from Central House, 63/47, was dated 29 July 1947. 
31 The whole of North Vaal Building has for years accommodated sections of the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs. 
32 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/611, Pt. 1, Memo. Ill, Gilchrist/DEA, 15 February 1958, Part A of Mission 
Annual Report for 1957, p. 7. 
33 M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 16 March 1995. 
34 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, I. 20165, 21December1948. 
35 AA, A4231/2, Departmental Despatch, 15 November 1949. 
36 BTS, 90/6/25, Vol. 1, Davis/Jooste, 21 October 1959. See The Pretoria News, 8 March 1960. Both 
houses have accommodated the head of mission ever since. 
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Netherlands are among the governments which have houses in 
both capitals. Canada has a house in Pretoria. Although the 
division of the year between the two capitals is generally about 7 
months to 5 in favour of Pretoria, I would give the first priority for 
a house to Cape Town, despite the fact that hotel accommodation 
at the Cape is much better than in Pretoria. At the Cape, where 
Parliament meets and where there is a much larger population 
than in Pretoria, there is more opportunity for valuable contact 
with Ministers and Members of Parliament, journalists, 
professional men and two Universities. There is a large Australian 
colony and constant coming and going of Australian visitors.37 
Even so, for many years the Australians' residential accommodation was 
somewhat makeshift, being arranged on the basis of short term leases. In the absence 
of a permanent official residence, the annual Australia Day reception on 26 January, 
the major event on the Mission's calendar, was often held at the Kelvin Grove Club, 
Newlands, Cape Town. The 1949, 1950 and 1951 celebrations were considered 
sufficiently important to form the subject of despatches to the Minister of External 
Affairs, ie. Ministerial Despatches 3/49, 4/50 and 2/51 dated 27 January 1949, 27 
January 1950 and 30 January 1951. When in Pretoria, Stirling's successor as High 
Commissioner, Hodgson, a widower, resided at the Assembly Hotel on Van der Walt 
Street, as did his Third Secretary, Miss E.A. Warren. 
Even if, as the 1951 Australian Post report maintained, Cape Town was a 
summer resort, the dual capital system was at best a mixed blessing for those diplo-
mats, politicians and Public Servants on the Parliamentary Session circuit who had 
school-going children. The Post report spoke of 'the dislocation in accommodation 
arrangements and the education of children brought about by this twice-yearly 
movement between the two capitals'.38 And sketched the biannual scramble for 
housing: 
Unless one is successful in securing a house in Cape Town for the 
following session while one is still there (the same applying 
mutatis mutandis to Pretoria) househunting has to be carried on at 
a distance entirely by correspondence. It is useful but not always 
possible to have a reliable personal agent on the spot to inspect the 
premises and form a judgement as to their suitability before a lease 
is agreed upon. 39 
37 AA, A1838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Hague 61/52, Stirling/DEA, 7 March 1952. 
38 AA, Al838/1, 1348/5, 'Australian High Commissioner's Office in the Union of South Africa, 
Report on Post Conditions', 18 May 1951, p. 1, para. 2. 
39 Ibid., p. 6, para. 17. 
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In 1953 the opening of Parliament in July and Menzies's visit in June required 
the entire staff of the Australian High Commission to transfer to Cape Town 'not later 
than the fourth week in June'. Kelly, the Official Secretary, faced a potential financial 
disaster because he could not find a sub-tenant for the unexpired seven week portion 
of his Pretoria lease: 'this officer faces approximate loss of £100 for rental, £34 for 
wages of two servants and £25 for night watchman. While resident in hotel and on 
duty at Capetown he will not be able to meet this liability'.40 
The 1955 Post report devoted a three-and-a-half page, thirteen paragraph sec-
tion to 'The dual capital system and the housing problem' in which one of the points 
made was that 'uncertainty as to the frequency and duration of Parliamentary Sessions 
exercises a profound and disrupting influence, not only upon the work and estab-
lishments of diplomatic missions but also on the domestic lives of the diplomatists 
themselves'. 41 The 19 5 9 report sought to express the move in Australian terms, 
comparing it to moving a branch of the Department of External Affairs from Canberra 
to Adelaide every January and back every July. The move took up an inordinate 
amount of time and effort and cost around £Al800 (£SA1440) annually. 
Quotations must be sought for packing and transportation by a 
road haulage and storage firm, postal and other authorities notified 
of changes of official and private addresses, and numerous other 
administrative details arranged regarding transport, security, com-
munications and finance. . .. it is necessary to pack, move and 
unpack every file and the contents of the safes and strongrooms, as 
well as the typewriters, accounting equipment and much sta-
tionary. Special arrangements are made for listing and packing all 
material classified above 'Restricted' and for continuously 
guarding it in transit between the strongrooms in the two capi-
tals. 42 
On the domestic side, the same report mentioned that one officer with 
dependent children had eleven changes of residence in three years and another ten in 
three-and-a-half years besides which officers had 'from time to time been involved in 
unpleasant and protracted disputes arising out of telegraphic or long-distance 
agreements in which conditions were not made clear on both sides'. 43 That presumably 
40 AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, I. 6743, 20 May 1953. 
41 Ibid., 2011215, Pt. 5, 'Commonwealth of :Australia, Department of External Affairs, Post Report, 
Cape Town - Pretoria, South Africa, February, 1955', p. 6, para. 3. 
42 AA, Al838/1, 1348/5, 'Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External Affairs, Post Report: 
South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) February, 1959, p. 4. 
43 Ibid., p. 3. If that was a reference to the Woolcott/Eybers affair, it suggests that the compiler of the 
report did not accept Woolcott's version of events unreservedly. See below. 
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referred to the experience of the twenty-nine year old Dick Woolcott, then on his 
second overseas posting44 and about to commence his last six months in South Africa 
before reassignment to Australia, when he advertised in the flats or houses wanted 
column of the Pretoria News on 28 April 1956: 
Modern house 3 b rs, garage, servants' quarters wanted for 516 
months from the beginning of June. Please write Woolcott, Aus-
tralian High Commission, Cape Town. 
Thus Woolcott did not, as he claimed later, advertise for a 'modern, fully furnished 
house'. 45 In fact, imprecision in terminology on both sides in the month after Woolcott 
placed his advertisement contributed greatly to what happened. 
Four of the eight advertisements in that day's column were placed by represen-
tatives of Commonwealth governments - Woolcott, Listowel and Mills of the British 
High Commission, and an unnamed 'Canadian Government official' who wanted a 
'furnished bachelor flat'. 46 Dr G.W. Eybers of P.O. Box 80, Lynnwood, Pretoria, 
responded by letter the same day to Woolcott, Listowel and Mills, offering his house at 
143 Eastwood Street at a monthly rental of £42.10.0d. Therefore, but for the fact that. 
Woolcott was first with his telephone call asking for an option on the house, which 
Eybers granted,47 the matter may never have been drawn to the attention of the 
Department of External Affairs, hence to that of latterday researchers. 
Eybers was an experienced landlord whose house was at the upper end of the 
market and his tenants were accordingly people in a position to pay high rents. He had 
already let the same house to a German engineer employed by the South African Iron 
and Steel Corporation (Iscor), to a senior official in the British High Commission, to 
the Deputy Head of the Soviet Consulate-General and to the Consul-General himself 
until his departure from South Africa when the South African government closed the 
Consulate. 48 He later let it to the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. 49 Thus 
44 The first, to the Australian Embassy in Moscow, came to a premature end when relations between 
Australia and the Soviet Union were severed as a result of the Petrov Affair. Woolcott returned to 
Moscow after relations were restored in 1959, remaining there until June 1961. The Canberra Times, 
23 July 1959; Current Notes, June 1961, p. 68. He then moved to the Australian High Commission in 
Kuala Lumpur. 
45 For example, in his letter of 25 June 1956 to Eybers. BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2. 
46 The Pretoria News, 28 April 1956. 
47 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Eybers/Chiefof Protocol, 12 October 1956. 
48 BTS, 9016125, Vol. 1, Eybers/SEA, 21 April 1959. On 1 February 1956 Eric Louw requested the 
Soviet Acting Consul-General to close the consular offices including a consular agency in Cape Town 
287 
Chapter Six: Backdrops 
he was accustomed to dealing with diplomatic and important local house-seekers. 
Woolcott on the other hand was an experienced tenant, having in the two years he had 
been in South Africa already rented four houses - two in Pretoria and two in Cape 
Town - at rentals ranging from £35 to £45 monthly and, according to him, his relations 
with his landlords had been 'most cordial. 150 
Woolcott recognised the house immediately from Eybers's brief description of 
its location in his 28 April letter: 'Eastwood Street on the north side of Government 
Avenue with an East facing', and amplified it in his 3 May reply: 'We know Eastwood 
Street quite well as we lived at the top of Eastwood Street during the previous 
Parliamentary recess. From your letter I assume that your house is the third house up 
from Government Avenue, on the left-hand side of the road and that it was occupied 
by a member of the Russian Consulate, prior to their departure earlier this year.'51 He 
first raised the matter of furniture in that letter: 'We have no furniture of our own and 
we therefore require a fully furnished house.' He also mentioned appliances: 'I should 
also like to know whether all or some of the following items will go with the house -
refrigerator, electric stove, washing machine, iron, kettle, cutlery, blankets and kitchen 
utensils'. 52 
Eybers replied by telegram on 8 May: 'Prepared to meet you on points in your 
letter stop rental then fifty pounds writing'.53 He said in his follow-up letter the next 
day: 'I am to confirm my wire sent in reply to your Jetter of 3rd. inst. We will have the 
items mentioned therein ready for you if you will please let us know when you wish to 
enter the house.' He also described the furniture. 54 Woolcott accepted by telegram on 
14 May 'subject to confirmation that items listed end 2nd paragraph my letter 3rd May 
will be available as well as some crockery pleased to take house at £50 from 7th 
June'. 55 With the exception of the crockery, which was now mentioned for the first 
time, Eybers had already undertaken to supply the items mentioned. 
and to withdraw all staff and families from the Union by 1 March 1956. AA, Al838ffl84, 201/12, Pt. 
2, I. 2256, 10 February 1956. 
49 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2. Eybers/Woolcott, 6 July 1956. 
50 Ibid., Woolcott/Eybers, 11July1956. 
51 Ibid., 3 May 1956. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., Eybers/Woolcott, 8 May 1956. (Telegram.) 
54 Ibid., Eybers/Woolcott, 9 May 1956. 
55 Ibid., Woolcott/Eybers, 15 May 1956. (Telegram.) 
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Eleven days passed whereupon Woolcott telegraphically requested conf-
irmation. 56 Eybers replied by telegram on 28 May: 'Hereby confirm arrangements to let 
house for six months and supply items as per my letter ninth May also crockery usual 
lease conditions best regards'. 57 When the matter was subsequently referred to the 
State Attorney's Office it felt that Eybers had concluded the agreement by means of 
that telegram. 58 But presumably because he had second thoughts, Woolcott had a third 
party inspect the house on his behalf on 28 May who reported unfavourably. Woolcott 
and his family arrived from Cape Town on 8 June, ie. the day after he had offered to 
take the house, and he and his wife completed their inspection of it two days later, 
deciding that they would not take it. They notified Eybers accordingly by telephone on 
11 June, Woolcott's twenty-ninth birthday. 
Eybers suggested later that the Woolcotts found the two-storey house, which 
was larger than they had expected, unsuitable because of Mrs Woolcott's advanced 
pregnancy59 - Woolcott told him in June that his wife was to due to give birth 'within 
six weeks'. 60 (The child, a son, Robert, was born on 10 August. Apart from his 
difficulty with Eybers, 1956 was not a bad year for Woolcott. He was promoted to 
Second Secretary with effect from 24 May and his wife was granted a certificate of 
Australian naturalisation on 14 September.)61 He also stated a preference for 
Scandinavian furniture. Whatever his reason for rejecting the house, assuming it was 
not frivolous (the sense of fun referred to in an earlier chapter), it does not emerge 
clearly from the documentation. Nonetheless, it may be there was something in 
Eybers's view that 'he entered into his obligation with mental reservations: though he 
took the house, he would feel himself free, apparently, at a later date to refuse to take 
it if it was not entirely to his liking'. 62 
At this remove, however, as will be canvassed below, his reason as well as the 
facts of the case are of less interest than the attitude of the South African Department 
56 Ibid., Woolcott/Eybers, 25 May 1956. (Telegram.) 
57 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Eybers/Woolcott, 28 May 1956. (Telegram.) 
58 Ibid., State Attorney/SEA, 20 December 1956; BTS, 9016125, Vol. 1, State Attorney/DEA, 6 
November 1958. 
59 BTS, 9016125, Vol. 1, Eybers/SEA, 21April1959. She was pregnant with her second child. BTS, 
130/10, Vol. 2, Woolcott/Eybers, 11 July 1956. 
60 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, 25 June 1956. 
61 AA, Al838/l, 1500/2/18/3, Memo 18, 23 January 1957, Annex, p. 3. 
62 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Eybers/Australian High Commissioner, 20 July 1956. It is only fair to 
mention that Woolcott continues to hold that when he and his wife saw the house for the first time, 'it 
was clear that [it] and contents had been misrepresented to us in Cape Town'. Letter, 17 January 1995. 
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of External Affairs. More than three years passed from the day Woolcott rejected the 
house until the date of the last item on file - 24 August 1959 - a letter from the Chief 
of Protocol advising Eybers that because he was about to depart for the UN General 
Assembly session Eric Louw could not receive him but that Gerhardt Jooste, the 
Secretary for External Affairs, was prepared to do so. 63 Between those markers Eybers 
- perhaps because, as he said, his income was dependent on letting the house -
relentlessly sought to extract from Woolcott, who left South Africa permanently on 20 
January 1957,64 compensation for what he alleged was breach of contract. From his 
side Woolcott equally relentlessly denied the existence of a contract, citing in support 
of that contention an opinion he had obtained from the Pretoria firm of attorneys 
Hazelhurst, Galgut & Courtis. 
Aware of Woolcott's diplomatic status and even before his departure, Eybers 
put pressure on the Department of External Affairs to obtain satisfaction for him. In 
November 1956, presumably in order to cover itself, the department referred the 
matter to the Department of Justice: 'As Mr. Woolcott enjoys diplomatic immunity he 
of course cannot be summoned to court. The Department would nevertheless be glad if 
the Law Advisers could give an opinion whether Dr. Eybers would, in the absence of 
immunity of the other party, have had a case for damages and if so, to what extent'.65 
Early on Woolcott had himself referred to his diplomatic status and with an air of 
menace: 
while I have no wish whatever to take advantage of the immunity 
conferred upon me by my status as an accredited member of the 
staff of the Australian High Commissioner, especially as I am con-
fident that my case could stand on its own merits, it is most 
unlikely that I should be permitted, by my Government to take any 
part in a civil legal action. This position is consequent upon the 
Diplomatic Privileges Act (Act No. 71 of 1951) and I suggest that 
in your own interests you consult your. lawyer further about this 
Act under which any person who executes any legal process 
against a person entitled to diplomatic immunity is subject to a 
heavy fine. 66 
63 BTS, 90/6/25, Vol. 1, Maree/Eybers, 24 August 1959. 
64 He travelled on the Dominion Monarch. BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Hodgson/DEA, 13 November 1956. 
He would have taken leave after arriving in Australia because he got to Canberra only at the 
beginning of March. The Canberra Times, 6 March 1957. (Canberra Diary.) 
65 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Jones/Secretary for Justice, 3 November 1956. 
66 Ibid., Woolcott/Eybers, 25 June 1956. 
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Section 11(1) of the Act read: 'Any person who wilfully or without the 
exercise of reasonable care sues out, obtains or executes any legal process against a 
person who is entitled to immunity under section two, and whose name has been 
published in terms of sub-section (2) of section four whether as party, as attorney or as 
an officer concerned in issuing or executing such process, shall be guilty of an offence.' 
The penalties were listed in Section 11(2): Any person who contravenes etc 'shall be 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding three years or to both such fine and such imprisonment'. 
One will never know what the Australian government's position would have been 
because it was never asked to take a position. If it had been approached, it is always 
possible that its attitude may not have been as negative as Woolcott claimed. 
Section 3(2)(a) of the Act provided for a waiver of immunity and Section 3(1) 
that a person 'immune from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Union' could not escape liability 'in connection with any transaction entered into by him 
in his private and personal capacity'. Was this a transaction in Woolcott's private and 
personal capacity? When protesting to Eybers for having approached his High 
Commissioner direct, Woolcott told him that it was 'a personal matter between our-
selves'.67 And W.C. Naude, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs, collaborated with the Chief of Protocol, J.C.H. Maree, in May 1959 in drafting 
a letter to Eybers which incorporated the sentence: 'I may mention further that the 
transaction between you and Mr Woolcott was a private one, and that this department 
only intervenes in such cases when it appears that the normal judicial processes are not 
available to the claimant'. (Italics added.) 
Eybers was naturally free, Naude said, to approach Woolcott directly. (He was 
then two months from departing Canberra for the Soviet Union.)68 In any case the 
'usual channels are open to you, through which your attorneys, if you so prefer, could 
take the matter further', 69 a suggestion Eybers not unreasonably dismissed out of 
hand. 70 It is in retrospect regrettable that no one thought to test whether what the 
Department of External Affairs considered to be a 'private' and Woolcott a 'personal', 
transaction between E ybers and himself in fact fell within the scope of Section 3 ( 1) of 
the Act. 
67 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Woolcott/Eybers, 25 June 1956. 
68 He arrived in Moscow on 22 July 1959. The Canberra Times, 23 July 1959. 
69 BTS, 90/6/25, Vol. I, Naude/Eybers, 23 May 1959. (Translation.) 
70 Ibid., Eybers/SEA, 6 August 1959. 
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Even though N.J. Best, the Assistant Chief of Protocol, thought Eybers's case 
had merit, 71 and while there is nothing definite on file to that effect, one has a strong 
impression that the Department of External Affairs found this dispute embarrassing and 
wanted to restrict its involvement in it to the minimum. Either that or its behaviour 
bordered on incompetence. It was all very well for Jones to say 'As Mr. Woolcott 
enjoys diplomatic immunity he of course cannot be summoned to court'. Jones would 
have known that sending governments can and do lift the immunity of their diplomatic 
representatives to allow suit to be brought against them. In other words, diplomatic 
immunity is not immutable. Indeed, the Act provided for its waiver. It would have been 
easy enough for the department to instruct the High Commission in Canberra to ask 
the Australians whether they would be prepared to suspend Woolcott's immunity. In 
any event, there would have been no harm trying. 
Eybers was never advised that was an option and it was an angle he didn't 
know enough about to explore. Instead of briefing attorneys, he himself put his case to 
the department which had a vested interest in seeing it die. It was easy to put him 
down. He suspected as much, writing in 1959 that he could not understand 'why your 
Department wants summarily to dispose of the matter and render me absolutely no 
further assistance'. 72 Quite clearly Eric Louw, who wrote Casey annual letters of 
thanks for the Australian delegation's support on the South African items at the United 
Nations General Assembly,73 would not want a civil action brought against an 
Australian diplomat in a South African court with the attendant, and presumably 
negative, publicity in Australia. Indeed, Louw cabled Canberra and Pretoria from New 
York at the end ofNovember 1956: 
Please convey to Australian Government Union Government's 
sincere appreciation of statement by Casey in Assembly yesterday 
following my announcement regarding South Africa's relations 
with United Nations. 
Casey's statement is greatly valued as testimony to the warmth of 
friendship and depth of understanding between our two countries. 
I have already thanked Casey personally. 
71 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Best/N.J.J. Jooste, Note, 25 October 1956. 
72 BTS, 90/6/25, Vol. 1, Eybers/SEA, 21 April 1959. (Translation.) 
73 He also expressed his appreciation in public as in a radio interview reported by The Canberra 
Times on 5 December 1957. 
292 
Chapter Six: Backdrops 
To Pretoria only. A suitable word to Hodgson would also be appro-
priate. 74 
The Law Advisers passed Jones's original query to the State Attorney's Office 
which informed External Affairs on 20 December 1956 that the parties had indeed 
'concluded a legal and binding lease as from the 7th June at a rental of £50 per month' 
and expressing the opinion that Eybers was entitled to £100 damages in respect of 
beach of contract.(Made up of £40 rent for the period 7-30 June and £15 per month 
for four months being the difference between the £50 Woolcott was prepared to pay 
and the £35 Eybers actually received from the Chairman of the Public Service 
Commission who rented the house unfurnished.) Eleven days later, on the last day of 
the year, the Chief of Protocol, N.J.J. Jooste, briefly recorded a file note on his 
meeting that day with Hugh Gilchrist, Woolcott's superior in the Australian High Com-
mission. Jooste told Gilchrist about the State Attorney's opinion and his note had 
Gilchrist saying he would advise Woolcott to send Eybers 'a cheque before his 
departure. Mr. Gilchrist said that the amount of the cheque would naturally be decided 
upon by Mr. Woolcot [sic] but he hoped that he (Mr. Woolcot) would be able to settle 
the matter to Dr. Eybers' satisfaction'.75 
On the basis of what Gilchrist reported to him about this meeting, Woolcott 
accused the department of 'complete acceptance of Dr Eybers' position'.76 That may 
have been why, two years later, the State Attorney's Office to whom the Protocol Sec-
tion had sent the Aide Memoire, 77 seemed to hedge its bets. It said that there was in-
deed a binding contract, but that Woolcott would have been able to withdraw from it if 
the quality of the furniture and the modernity of the house were not as they had been 
represented. That a third person had inspected the house on Woolcott's behalf and had 
rejected it and the furniture supported Woolcott's objections on these points and cre-
ated the impression that his withdrawal was justified. 78 Eybers declined to accept 
this. 79 
In retrospect, since Woolcott could pinpoint the location of the house from a 
very sketchy description, he would have been aware of its external appearance even 
74 BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. III, Immediate Code telegram, Louw/Uys, repeated Pretoria, 28 November 
1956. 
75 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Handwritten note initialled NJJ, 31 December 1956. 
76 Ibid., Aide Memoire for the Chef de Protocol, 15 January 1957, p. 2, para. i). 
77 Ibid., Best/State Attorney, 28 January 1957. 
78 BTS, 90/6/25, Vol. I, State Attorney/Department of Foreign Affairs, 6 November 1958. 
79 Ibid., Eybers/Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 21April1959. 
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before he inspected it in person. A handwritten comment by Eybers, adjacent to Wool-
cott's amplified description, on a copy of the latter's 3 May 1956 letter put it suc-
cinctly: 'He knew to what extent the house was 'modem' - whatever he may mean by 
the term'. 80 (Underlining in original.) The house is still standing. While it would 
obviously have undergone renovations during the intervening thirty-nine years, its 
appearance is perfectly acceptable today (1995). It is located in a select suburb and is 
in no way out of keeping with neighbouring properties. Now in retirement in Canberra, 
neither Woolcott nor Gilchrist can recall the details of the case.81 
The Woolcott/Eybers affair points to the difficulty of hiring accommodation 
sight unseen as well as serving as a specific example of diplomatic immunity at work 
albeit distorted by political considerations on the part of the host government. It also 
illustrates the point made in the Introduction (p. 10) that foreign service is perhaps the 
only career where quite junior officers associate on a footing of equality with leading 
citizens of the countries where they are stationed. Here was a twenty-nine year old 
junior Australian Public Servant rejecting a house which was thereupon taken by the 
Chairman of the Public Service Commission. Woolcott's car, a 1955/56 model Jaguar 
2.4, 82 was itself suggestive of a much higher income level than that enjoyed by Public 
Servants of his age and rank back home in Australia or by his South African counter-
parts in Pretoria. 83 
Another point to emerge indirectly from the affair is that the easy flow of cor-
respondence between Pretoria and Cape Town by means of the public mails suggests 
delivery was more speedy in 1956 than it is today (1995). The same applies to overseas 
airmail. 'Canberra is one of the least accessible places where the Union enjoys diplo-
matic representation', wrote E.M. Rhoodie, the Information Attache in South Africa's 
Canberra High Commission, in January 1959. 'Airmail letters from South Africa take 
up to ten days'. 84 They take longer now. Thus history is not necessarily the story of 
either liberty or progress. 
80 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Woolcott/Eybers, 3 May 1956. 
81 H. Gilchrist, letters 14 November and 15 December 1994 and RA. Woolcott, letter, 17 January 
1995. 
82 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 2, Commissioner of Customs and Excise/SEA, 29 November 1956. 
83 By contrast J.P. Quinn, Australia's Acting High Commissioner in South Africa from April 1951 to 
May 1952, drove an Austin A40 which he brought to South Africa from London, his previous post. It 
accompanied him to Canberra, where it was later described as aging, at the end of his South African 
posting. R.N. Birch in John Paul Quinn, p. 15. 
84 South African Panorama, January 1959, p. 7. AA, Al838/T54, 1500/1/30/8, Memo. 19, Gil-
christ/DEA, 6 January 1959. 
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* * * 
The origins of the name Canberra are obscure. The author of a bicentennial 
project PhD thesis holds that it 'had been in general use by Europeans for nearly a hun-
dred years and may have been used by Aborigines for centuries before'. 85 However, an-
other researcher claims to have 'established beyond reasonable doubt' that it was 
'probably not of Aboriginal origin', but most likely 'a minor variation of an old English 
place name'. 86 An entirely artificial capital, a compromise between the rival claims of 
Sydney and Melbourne at the time of federation, Canberra counted less than 20 000 
inhabitants in 1949. 87 The compromise involved placing the 2400 sq km Australian 
Capital Territory enclave within New South Wales but at least 100 miles (161 km) 
from Sydney. Melbourne served as the federal capital until Canberra was inaugurated 
as the seat of government in 1927. Its general location was chosen in late 1908 and the 
particular site early in 1909. Construction formally commenced on 12 March 1913 
according to the plan of the American architect, Walter Burley Griffin, the winner of 
an open competition. 
At least until the late 1950s, however, Melbourne remained the de facto capital 
of Australia. The Depression, the Second World War and the reluctance of Public 
Service Departments to move to Canberra contributed to this. In the seven years 
between 1958 and 1965 the population more than doubled to 86 700 and the city 
changed in those years 'from a semi-rustic town to an integrated, if still small and 
incomplete, national capital'. 88 Small wonder that when he returned to Canberra in 
1969 for his second term, Uys could write: 'It is wonderful to be back in Australia. 
Canberra has become a city. Unbelievable what noticeable progress has occurred here 
since I left in 1957'. 89 About that time the English poet, John Betjeman, called it 'an 
enormous Garden City from England and America set down in what looks like Italian 
hill scenery around Urbino'.90 
85 J. Gibbney, Canberra 1913-1953 (Canberra, 1988), p. 9. A related PhD thesis is E. Sparke's, Can-
berra 1954-1980 (Canberra, 1988). These works were collectively initiated and funded by the federal 
Department of Territories and Local Government and supervised by the Australian National Univer-
sity in commemoration of the 200th anniversary of European settlement in Australia. 
86 G. Murphy, 'Canberra. What's in the name?', Canberra Historical Journal, New Series, No. 19, 
March 1987, p. 17. 
87 1911: 1700; 1921: 2500; 1930 8700; 1939 12 000; 1946: 15 000; 1950: 22 500; 1953: 29 500; 
1956: 33 000; 1957: 35 500; 1958: 39 500; 1959: 44 000; 1960: 51 3000; 1961: 56 530. The Can-
berra Times, 12 March 1962. 
88 Sparke, Canberra 1954-1980, pp. 103, 104. 
89 BTS, Uys, Vol. 6, Uys/Schimper, 7 May 1969. 
90 Foreword to Boyd's The Australian Ugliness, p. 7. 
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In 1954 the Chief Architect of the South African Department of Public Works 
gave as apt a description as one would have found at the time: 'The master plan is 
conceived in the form of a series of villages, some of which are developed and others 
quite undeveloped, so that in travelling from one village to another it is possible to 
pass through large areas of bushland. Eventually these areas will become built-up but 
the intervention of two World Wars has had a slowing down effect upon the city's 
development'. 91 
For years only one Minister - the Prime Minister - lived in Canberra, a quite 
modest house (compared to Libertas or Groote Schuur) called The Lodge being pro-
vided for the holder of the office from 1926. In the late 1930s, though, a larger house 
was built for the Treasurer,92 R.G. Casey, who occupied it for just over a year where-
upon it became the office of the new Canadian High Commission, serving as such until 
1973. 93 Known as Casey House, it is situated at the end of a short cul de sac just off 
State Circle, Rhodes Place, where the South African chancery is located. In 1979 the 
Australian Heritage Commission took it over as its headquarters. For the four years of 
his Prime Ministership (1945-1949) J.B. Chifley stayed at the Hotel Kurrajong, a 
government-owned establishment run by the Department of the Interior,94 returning 
home to Bathurst, NSW for the five month Parliamentary recesses. That was because 
his wife did not. accompany him to Canberra. 
Particularly as a result of Robert Menzies's policy, Canberra developed as a city 
during his second term as Prime Minister. While not a devotee of Canberra during his 
first term (1939-1941 ), Menzies became one during his second and he probably did 
more than anyone to turn the 'garden without a city' and the 'six suburbs' that had 'lost 
their way', as Canberra was called in 1954, into a true national capital.95 Canberra's 
isolation as well as its small size in the 1940s and 1950s had pluses and minuses for the 
handful of foreign diplomats stationed there. An advantage would have been that 
members of the elite, of which the diplomats were part, were thrown together to an 
extent unknown in larger capitals such as Pretoria and Cape Town. Always on the 
91 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, Macdonald/Director, 'Canberra, Australia: Residence of the High Commis-
sioner of the Union', 4 June 1954. 
92 Equivalent to Minister of Finance in South Africa. 
93 E. Thompson, Casey House, Rhodes Place, Yarralumla, A.C.T. (Australian Heritage Commission 
Background Notes, June 1984) and Gibbney, Canberra 1913-1953, p. 193. 
94 On the anniversary of his birth a waitress at the Kurrajong would put a bowl of pansies, his favour-
ite flower, on the table at which he sat in the dining room. The Canberra Times, 23 September 1954. 
95 Sparke, Canberra 1954-1980, p. 1. Menzies gave a brief account of his role in The Measure of the 
Years (Melbourne, 1970), pp. 142-48. 
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assumption that there was enough money for travel to relieve the boredom, Canberra's 
very intimacy favoured diplomatic life despite occasional complaints that the Prime 
Minister was the only cabinet member to live there. 
Sailing from Cape Town on 20 May 1949 on board the 'Dominion Monarch', a 
ship which came to symbolise the Australian/South African connection because until 
the late 1950s it carried most travellers between the two countries, Viljoen and his 
party arrived in Sydney on 7 June. Before their departure Stirling hosted a farewell 
lunch for the Viljoens at the Mount Nelson Hotel and also saw them off at the ship.96 
For the first week it was uncertain 'whether the office would be established in Canberra 
or Sydney'97 whereupon a decision was taken in favour of the former. Two weeks later 
Viljoen wrote that 'it would be wrong to have our headquarters anywhere else than in 
Canberra, as there is this advantage - of consulting other members of the Diplomatic 
Corps (the bulk is in Canberra) and all the Ministers who collect here for Parliamentary 
Sessions'. 98 
The question arose because, unlike the South Africans in respect of Pretoria, 
the Australian authorities did not object to missions establishing themselves in centres 
other than Canberra, only a few government departments having yet moved there from 
Melbourne.99 (The South Africans enforced their position by restricting diplomatic 
privileges to Embassy and Legation personnel resident in Pretoria. These were 
expected to move to Cape Town during the Parliamentary session.) Evatt himself had 
raised the possibility of the mission operating at least temporarily from Sydney, where 
he lived, because of the accommodation shortage in Canberra. Malan had no problem 
with that as a temporary measure. 100 Diplomatic missions located in Sydney at the time 
were those of Belgium, Finland, Israel, Italy, Norway and Sweden. There were then 
fourteen missions in Canberra. 101 As late as 1958 there were still eight missions in 
96 AA, A4231/2, Ministerial Despatch No. 6/49, 25 May 1949. 
97 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 7, Nel/SEA, 22 July 1949. 
98 BCB, Vol. 19, 31/6 (Secret), Viljoen/ForS)th, 5 July 1949. 
99 By 1957 only eleven of twenty-seven departments had their headquarters in Canberra. BTS, 
S4/7/2/l/5, 'Post Report - Canberra - 1957', Annexme 'C', p. 3. 
100 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 5, Forsyth/Under-Secretary, 10 February 1949. 
101 Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Denmark, France, India, Ireland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, United States and USSR Information supplied by the Library of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Canberra, Australia (1994); also BTS, S4/7/2/1/5, 
Viljoen/SEA, 30 June 1950, 'Post Report: Canberra', p. 11. 
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Sydney, 102 one (Malta) in Melbourne and twenty-three in Canberra. 103 The Pakistani 
High Commission, which maintained a branch office in Canberra, moved there only in 
1959, leaving the Belgian, Danish, Finnish, and Filipino missions to soldier on in 
Sydney. 104 They were joined by South Korea (1961) and Spain (1968). The last 
diplomatic mission to relocate from Sydney to Canberra was that of Lebanon on 31 
October 1971. 105 
Viljoen's circumstances subsequently caused him to change his mind about the 
advantages of Canberra over Sydney. He was ambivalent about the matter for the rest 
of his stay. He had also pointed out in his 5 July letter to Forsyth, quite correctly, that 
'The decentralisation of Government and Administrative functions makes it necessary, 
however, to travel extensively in this country and all High Commissioners here visit 
other parts of Australia regularly. I am afraid I shall have to do the same. '106 He was to 
be disappointed. The department kept him on a tight rein financially and, compared to 
his immediate successors, particularly Hamilton, he did relatively little travelling. As 
time passed he complained frequently to Forsyth about how little there was to do in 
Canberra for a man such as himself who liked to be busy. Thus: 'Canberra is a very 
isolated place with only a small population and, when Parliament is not sitting . . . I 
would normally be visiting other parts of Australia . . . but . . . you have practically 
stopped all travelling, with the result that during the Parliamentary recess, which lasts 
several months, I have very little to do . . . and this has given me this feeling of 
frustration'. And a month later: 'I hope you will try and let me do a little more travel-
ling as it is deadly (for me!) to sit in a small place like Canberra with little work to 
do•.101 
102 If one can include the Chilean and Danish Consulates, the diplomatic missions having closed in 
Canberra. Thus Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Israel, Notway, Pakistan and Philippines. lnfor· 
mation supplied by the DF AT Library ( 1994 ). 
103 Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, China, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaya, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, United 
Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. The Maltese mission became a High Commission in 1965, the 
year it relocated to Canberra. Information supplied by the DFAT Library (1994). 
104 Information supplied by the DFAT Library (1994); The Canberra Times, 4 October 1960; 
Commonwealth of Australia, DEA, Diplomatic List, October 1960, p. 32. 
105 Information supplied by the DFAT Library (1994). Denmark and Chile returned to Canberra in 
1966 and 1969 respectively; Philippines moved there in 1962, South Korea in 1966, Finland in 1967, 
Spain in 1968 and Norway in 1969. 
106 BCB, Vol. 19, 31/6 (Secret), Viljoen/Forsyth, 5July 1949. 
107 Ibid., 16 March 1951. 
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With seeming justification he complained about 'the curtailment of trips to 
Sydney and Melbourne' saying that he had recently 'to refuse some very important 
invitations, such as a dinner in honour of the Prime Minister at Melbourne, a reception 
in honour of the Minister of External Affairs at Sydney [and] the opening of the most 
important agricultural and industrial show in Australia which opens in Sydney 
today'. 108 He expanded on the rejected invitations in a letter to Forsyth on 18 May 
saying that they caused him embarrassment 'as the real reason for these refusals cannot 
be divulged'. On the other hand, at a time when airfares to Sydney and Melbourne 
were cheap - £2.10.0d to Sydney and £5 to Melbourne109 - and Viljoen himself told 
Forsyth at their final interview that his representation allowance was 'on the over-
generous side and could conveniently be reduced by £200 or £300 per annum', 110 he 
could easily have afforded to pay for short distance air travel out of his own pocket. 
Forsyth commented: 'I seem to remember that he said something very similar 
about the Canadian allowance when he left Canada. Perhaps it is permissible to 
comment that if he felt that the allowance was over-generous he might have said so 
while he was still enjoying it himself! - particularly after his Canadian experience!' 
Spies responded with a presumably heart-felt 'quite!'111 
Forsyth eventually gave way. He said that things 'should be a little easier' after 
the previous year's freeze on expenditure when even an officer 'found guilty of 
misconduct' could not be recalled to the Union 'because we had not the money to pay 
for his passage!'112 However, apart from a ten day visit to Tasmania in April 1951 
which was covered by a standing authorisation, Viljoen did not take him up on that for 
he decided to cut short his term113 and he returned to South Africa in October. He paid 
his first and only official visit to Western Australia when his ship called at Fremantle. 114 
108 BTS, Viljoen., Vol. 7, Viljoen/Forsyth, 8 February 1951. 
109 Gibbney, Canberra 1913-1953, p. 254. By late 1957 these had risen to £3.15.0d and £8.10.0d 
respectively. The visiting Scholtz considered them to be 'extraordinarily cheap'. BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, 
ScholtzJSecretary, December 1957, p. 8. 
110 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, ForS)th/Under-Secretary, 6 December 1951. 
111 Ibid. 
112 BTS, Viljoen., Vol. 7, ForS)th/Viljoen, 5 April 1951. The situation had presumably deteriorated 
after Forsyth issued his circular minute PM 28/9; PM 45/1 of 7 November 1949 stipulating that the 
department would 'during the next twelve months at least, unhappily be unable to consider any propo-
sals involving either the augmentation or the transfer of staff, save in the most exceptional and unav-
oidable circumstances'. BTS, 91/8/1, Vol. 3, Forsyth/All Heads of Mission. 
113 At his urging this had been extended by a year. 
114 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 7, ForS)th/Under-Secretary, 6 December 1951. 
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As Alan Watt's notes on their final lunch reveal, Viljoen also complained to the 
Australians about the life of diplomatic inaction in Canberra. He aired to Watt a head 
of mission's difficulties there as opposed to Sydney or Melbourne and he wondered 
what 'advice he should give to his Government as to where South Africa should plan 
her long-term representation in Australia'. Watt, then Secretary for External Affairs, 
thought that Viljoen was 'far from well and that his view may be coloured a little either 
by a feeling that he has not been able to do as much as he would have wished for his 
Government or by some suggestion from South Africa that he has not done as much as 
he should. Nevertheless, a very real problem is involved which I feel requires some 
consideration'. 115 It was Australian practice then as it is now for the records of such 
conversations to find their way to the Minister's desk. Then only some six months into 
a term which was to last a record nine years Casey was inclined to be sympathetic: 
I would believe that the lives of diplomatic representatives at Can-
berra must be very boring. I must say that if I was a Dominion 
High Commissioner, I would much sooner live in Sydney or Mel-
bourne - coming to Canberra when occasion demanded - even if 
this had to be weekly. However, this is not the sort of thing that we 
could advise them, for obvious reasons. 116 
Under a first point 'Location of Mission', taking up three-and-a-half out of eight 
pages, the possibility of relocating the office to Sydney was canvassed in a memo-
randum Nel prepared for Viljoen on topics for discussion with the department on his 
return to South Africa. 117 The wording suggested that Viljoen himself favoured a move 
to Sydney and that Nel opposed it. But a handwritten letter Nel addressed to Spies for-
warding a copy of the memorandum suggested the opposite - that Nel favoured the 
move while Viljoen opposed it! 11 8 Forsyth's notes on his final interview with Viljoen 
show that while the latter drew attention to the question 'he regretted his complete 
inability to make a recommendation as to whether the High Commissioner should live 
in Canberra or Sydney•.119 
115 AA, Al838!fl7, 1500/1/30/1, 'Record of Conversation with High Commissioner for South Af-
rica', 15 September 1951. 
116 Ibid., Casey/Watt, 26 September 1951. 
117 BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Nel/High Commissioner, 'Matters to be discussed with Officials of the Depart-
ment of External Affairs', 12 October 1951. 
11 8 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, Nel/Spies, 21November1951. The letter is an example of the obsequiousness 
referred to in Chapter Two above (p. 109). 
119 Ibid., ForS)th/Under-Secretary, 6 December 1951. 
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There the matter rested, never to be raised again. In the latter part of the 1950s 
a proposal to open an Information Office or Sub-Office in Sydney was successfully 
resisted but not one by the Department of Commerce and Industries in the early 1960s 
to relocate its representative from Canberra to Melbourne which was then Australia's 
commercial capital. 
On arrival Viljoen and his staff met with the reality that Canberra was to all 
intents and purposes a company town with one major employer, the federal 
government. 120 Just about all suitable accommodation, office and residential, lay within 
its gift, its agent being the Department of the Interior. Properties were not for sale, 
only for rent. Even today governments rent the land on which their diplomatic premises 
are built from the Australian government on ninety-nine year leases. The city had to be 
built from scratch and in such a way that Parliament, government departments and 
their staffs could commence operating at more or less the same time. In addition to 
erecting the obvious public buildings including office space to accommodate the influx 
of Public Servants from Melbourne, the federal government had to assume 
responsibility for constructing dwellings for the officials. These took two forms: 
houses for married couples and hotels, boarding houses and hostels for single people 
and since the houses were designed for Public Service occupation they were on a 
modest scale. 
The Federal Capital Commission (FCC) was created in 1924 to attend to such 
matters. Its predecessor, the Advisory Council, had already made a start with the con-
struction of the Hotel Canberra (now the Hyatt Hotel, Canberra's best) and the 
boarding houses which became famous under the names Brassey House, Beauchamp 
House and the Wellington Hotel. Work had also commenced on the Hotel Kurrajong 
and on the office building to be known as the East Block. Another office building, the 
West Block, was originally intended to house the National Library. In respect of 
domestic accommodation, the FCC at first sub-contracted this out to private builders, 
but later itself put up houses with its own workforce when the sub-contractors proved 
unreliable. In attempting to deal with the Great Depression the government followed a 
deflationary policy, drastically cutting expenditure, employment and services and most 
120 Viljoen observed in his first Post Report that 90 per cent of the population were Civil Servants. 
BTS, S4/7/2/l/5, Viljoen/SEA, 30 June 1950, 'Post Report: Canberra', p. 13. He meant the working 
population. Perhaps it wasn't as bad as that because in 1954 '8700 people, or 31 per cent of the popu-
lation' were said to be 'employed in one way or another by the Commonwealth'. Sparke, Canberra 
195./-1980, p. 25. 
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construction work ceased. The resulting housing backlog continued through the Sec-
ond World War and beyond. 
By the time of Viljoen's arrival in mid-1949 there was a 'waiting list for houses 
of over 2,300 applicants including many senior and executive public servants'121 a 
figure which had increased to 2980 by the end of 1950.122 In his memoirs Alan Watt 
refers to his own difficulties in obtaining a house that year on his appointment as 
Secretary for External Affairs. 123 There being no private construction of houses, the 
backlog was directly to affect the staff of the new diplomatic missions opened during 
and after the war. From heads of mission down, the staffs of these were completely 
dependent for their office and living quarters on the federal government. In 1954, for 
example, thirty-eight government houses were occupied by sixteen diplomatic 
missions. 124 
Negotiations for a suitable house for Viljoen commenced six months before his 
departure from South Africa on 22 May 1949. Their successful conclusion permitted 
him to depart at that juncture or at least to reside in Canberra. Therefore he could 
move almost immediately into a nine roomed house (five bedrooms) at 26 Balmain 
Crescent, Acton, on campus at the new Australian National University and later the 
university's property. The house is still standing and is used to accommodate two 
doctoral students besides housing an office for an association of post graduates. It is 
controlled by University House. Earlier it had been found unsuitable by the Belgian 
Minister who, then resident in Sydney, was contemplating a move to Canberra. 125 If 
the Belgian had taken it there would, according to the Australian authorities, have been 
no possibility of a suitable house for Viljoen for a 'considerable period' and he would 
have had 'to consider remaining in Sydney•.126 
The house was described as a 'relatively large Government house built in early 
days'. 127 Viljoen did not like it, cabling External Affairs on 14 June: 'Residence not 
very suitable, but at present, nothing better obtainable either here or Sydney'. 128 He 
121 AA, Al838!Tl7, 1500/1/30/1, Edwards/Viljoen, 30 June 1949. 
122 The Canberra Times, 27 December 1950. 
123 Watt, A ustra/ian Diplomat, pp. 198-200. 
124 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, Casey/Martensz, 28 January 1954; attached to Nel/SEA, 12 February 1954. 
125 AA, Al838!Tl 7, 1500/1/30/1, Verstraeten/Oldham, 17 March 1949. Viljoen claimed that it had 
also been rejected by two other heads of mission. BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Viljoen/SEA, 1July1949. 
126 AA, Al838!Tl 7, 1500/1/30/1, 0. 3055, 7 March 1949. 
127 Ibid. 
128 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. I, Code telegram No. I, Viljoen/SEA, 14 June 1949 .. 
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wanted to move to a larger residence but the Assistant Secretary in charge of Interior's 
Housing and Accommodation Branch told him that this was 'one of the largest owned 
by the Commonwealth'. Besides, there was a 'waiting list for houses of over 2,300 
applicants including many senior and executive public servants'. 129 
As far as Viljoen was concerned, the residence remained unsuitable. In August 
1951, a few months before his departure from Australia, he wrote that while it had 
been 'made quite habitable' it was not 'really up to the standard and fit for a residence 
of the High Commissioner'. For him part of the problem could have been that the 
house was 'situated in a part of the city not selected for residential purposes by the 
select people of the town' .13° From the government's point of view, though, one of its 
advantages would have been the low rent. Until September 1950 this was £A3.16.0d 
per week, rising that month by l/9d to £A3. l 7.9d because of the installation of a 
stainless steel sink in the kitchen. Another 9d per week was added in November 1950 
when Canberra's rates were increased. That brought the weekly rent to £A3.18.6d131 
which had risen to £A5.13.9d or £A295.15.0d per annum by 1955. 132 
The South Africans retained the house as their High Commissioner's residence 
until the completion in July 1957 of the double-storey Cape Dutch style house at 4 
Perth Avenue, Y arralumla, just off State Circle, known as 'South Africa House', which 
has housed the head of mission ever since. The eight year South African tenancy of 26 
Balmain Crescent produced a litany of complaints inter alia about the house's location 
as well as its layout and the size of its rooms. It was an ice-chest in winter and its 
dining room and lounge were too small. The former could seat only six for a formal 
dinner while, in the event of a cocktail party, all the furniture had to removed from the 
latter. 133 (That is still the case with the present, 'custom-built' official residence.) 
However, at least Viljoen was accommodated. His staff, Nel in particular who 
experienced five changes of residence during his first year in Australia, were less 
fortunate. Immediately on arrival in Sydney Nel took a two-bedroom flat for two 
weeks moving thereafter to an hotel in Canberra where he and his family resided for 
three months. 134 He was allocated a government house after a year. 135 Being single, 
129 AA, Al838ffl 7, 1500/1/30/1, EdwardsNiljoen, 30 June 1949. 
130 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Viljoen/SEA, 2 August 1951. 
131 Jbid., Nel/Secretary for External Affairs, 22 November 1950. 
132 Jbid., Vol. 3, Uys/SEA, 29 June 1955. 
133 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 3, Uys/SEA, 1 April 1955, pp. 3-4, para. 5. 
134 Nel, Vol. 3, Memorandum attached to Viljoen/SEA, 27 August 1950. 
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Killen and the typist, Miss J.M. Richards, were easier to house and could be 
accommodated in a hostel.136 
Today (1995) the South African diplomatic compound is, as it has been for 
more than a quarter of a century, one of Canberra's showpieces. Containing the 
chancery and the official residence and talcing up some five landscaped acres in the 
suburb of Y arralumla, it is bordered on three sides by Rhodes Place to the north, State 
Circle to the east and Perth Avenue to the south; and on the fourth, to the west, by an 
overgrown lot reserved since 1959 for Pakistan's chancery and official residence137 and 
further down by the grounds of the Commonwealth Club. 138 Pakistan's vacant lot 
separates the French and South African compounds and runs from Perth Avenue to the 
club's grounds. A high wire fence separates the South African and club properties. The 
side window of the head of mission's office on the first floor of the chancery overlooks 
the club's tennis court. Though a Golden Cypress (Cupressus Macrocarpa Brunniana) 
hedge next to the fence keeps the court from sight, the sound of racket on ball and the 
players' merry cries are distracting. In the 1970s, when there was a low fence with a 
gate, it was but a short walk from the chancery to the club. Now the club can be 
reached only by a circuitous route of about a kilometre. 
Designed in the Cape Dutch townhouse style with a nee-classical front portico, 
overlooking State Circle and overlooked by the new parliament building on Capital 
Hill, the chancery is one of the most prominently situated, handsome and admired in 
Canberra. Its very prominence - it is illuminated at night - would have been 
embarrassing to the Australian authorities during the years of the Australian-inspired 
political estrangement between the two countries. Not that the chancery and the 
residence which predates it by eleven years are universally admired. Thirty years ago a 
professional architect called the residence 'an inaccurately drawn cardboard backdrop 
for the finale of a musical comedy about Cecil Rhodes'. 139 That critic was not 
135 BTS, S4/7/2/l/5, Viljoen/SEA, 30 June 1950, 'Post Report: Canberra', p. 4. 
136 It is interesting that the 1950 Post Report does not identify these, referring only to Viljoen's and 
Nel's accommodation. BTS, S4/7/2/l/5, Viljoen/SEA, 30 June 1950, 'Post Report: Canberra', p. 4. But 
Australian sources reveal that Killen resided at Lawley House as perhaps also did Miss Richards. 
137 The then Pakistani Foreign Minister, Manzur Qadir, laid a foundation stone on 13 April 1959. 
The Canberra Times, 11 April 1959. 
138 The Commonwealth Club was founded in 1955 at the suggestion of the Indian High Commis-
sioner, General K.M. Cariappa, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army (The Canberra 
Times, 22 May 1953) who was its first Chairman. The name refers to the British not the Australian 
Commonwealth. Cariappa succeeded K.S. Duleepsinhji as Indian High Commissioner in Canberra. 
139 Boyd, The Australian Ugliness, p. 32. 
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especially complimentary about the rest of Embassy Row. He argued that countries 
'embarked on projects apparently calculated to make Canberra the architectural 
equivalent of a full-dress diplomatic levee. Unfortunately the falsity of the costumes 
becomes so apparent in the bright light that the effect is more like a fancy-dress 
party•.140 
One wonders what he would have made of the architectural discord the original 
plan for the ground now so harmoniously occupied by the South African chancery 
would have produced. It had been reserved for the Greek residence and chancery 
which would then have overlooked the back of the South African residence. The 
ground was, however, too small for the buildings the Greeks contemplated putting 
up. 141 An interesting feature of Canberra's Embassy Row architecture is that in some 
cases the chancery is dwarfed by the head of mission's residence. That is certainly true 
of the Greek, Belgian and French residences in relation to their chanceries which are 
on the same lots. This suggests that those countries have no real interests in Australia. 
In the case of South Africa, however, even then struggling for international 
recognition, the intention was to make the point that it was a country of standing with 
business to transact in Australia. 
In any event, the South African pioneers - Viljoen, Nel, Killen and Miss 
Richards - would have preferred the fancy-dress to the Cinderella-like working 
conditions they were required to endure. Such conditions persisted until February 1955 
when the chancery relocated to a set of offices designed to the mission's requirements 
in Industry House, Barton, a building erected by the Associated Chambers of 
Manufactures of Australia. The building was opened amid fanfare by the Governor-
General, Sir William Slim, on 25 November 1954. 142 Apart from the South African 
High Commission, other diplomatic offices it contained were the Chinese Embassy and 
the Burmese Legation which had also been accommodated at the Old Community 
Hospital. According to the 1955 Post report, this was 'the first time since the mission 
was opened that it ha[d] been properly housed'.143 
140 Ibid., p. 31. 
141 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
142 The Canberra Times, 25 November 1954. A sketch of the proposed building had appeared on the 
front page of The Canberra Times on 20 June 1952. 
143 BTS, S4/7/2/l/5, Uys/SEA, 28 February 1955, 'Post Report: Canberra - 1955', p. 13. 
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By then all four had left Australia: Viljoen and Miss Richards in 1951 and 
Killen and Nel in 1954. Nel, though, identified the Chambers of Manufactures as a 
potential supplier of office spacel44 and was intimately involved in the negotiations 
with them besides initiating the process leading to Treasury approval for the 
construction of the residence. Unlike the Australians who, once they had moved into 
their offices in Cape Town and Pretoria, retained those premises for years, the South 
Africans experienced six changes of offices before they moved for the seventh and. last 
time to the present chancery in 1968. 
As Knowles said, the Australian government assumed responsibility for 
providing diplomatic missions with accommodation. On arrival in Canberra the South 
African party occupied a set of four offices in East Block which Viljoen considered 
'very suitable for our purposes' and for which no rent was charged. 145 The following 
February, however, being required to give way to the Prime Minister's department, the 
South Africans were moved from East Block to five offices on the second floor of East 
Row, Sydney Building, Civic, a privately owned building leased to the Australian 
government and sub-let by it. The annual rental payable to the Australian government 
was £A210 including cleaning charges.146 Viljoen reported that these offices were 
'fairly suitable for our purposes' but Jacked heating. He hoped it would not be 
necessary to move again until the South African government built its own offices. 147 
Perhaps because it was dated three months later, at the beginning of the winter, 
the first Post report was less sanguine, calling the offices 'inadequate from every point 
of view'. The entrance, for example, was 'most unimposing, between a Greek green-
grocer-cafe and a butcher shop. The staircase is of cement, unattractive and steep'. 148 
Having to endure the 1950 winter in an unheated office was certainly a mark of the 
pioneer: 'due to intermittent power failures during the past winter months and the 
severe cold conditions prevailing, I found it impossible to occupy the office and to 
carry out my normal duties'.149 Presumably aware that there would be a comeback 
Viljoen thereupon and without authorisation bought a kerosene heater. 150 External 
Affairs queried this purchase in November. 
144 See BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Nel/SEA, 13 March 1953. 
145 Ibid., Viljoen/SEA, 3 March 1950. 
146 Ibid., Nel/SEA, 3 March 1950. 
147 Ibid., Viljoen/SEA, 3 March 1950. 
148 S4/7/2/l/5, Viljoen/SEA, 30 June 1950, 'Post Report: Canberra', p. 13. 
149 BTS, 416136, Vol. I, Viljoen/SEA, 5 December 1950. 
150 Ibid., 5 May 1950. 
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The ensuing four month correspondence until departmental resistance collapsed 
and ex post facto approval was given for the expenditure (£Al 1.9.3d), showed Viljoen 
to be a dab hand at picking his way through bureaucratic thickets. Not that Forsyth and 
Spies surrendered easily. He clinched the argument with this description: 
It was so cold that I had to sit in the room with a heavy overcoat 
and a hat on. Even then I caught repeated colds. and simply could 
not carry on. My room was also the reception room for visitors and 
a climax was reached when a visitor could not remove his coat, 
and in fact could only stay a few minutes, as the cold in the room 
was unbearable. 151 
Two of his staff 
also suffered severely, but occupying smaller rooms, they got some 
benefit from the electric heaters which came on only intermit-
tently. They were, at any rate, able to carry on without their health 
being affected and there was no essential need for them to enter-
tain visitors in their offices.152 
If not in respect of his staff, Viljoen had justice on his side because wintertime 
Canberra is much colder than Pretoria or Cape Town. As he pointed out in the Post 
report, the average temperature for June and July was 43. 7° and 42. 7° Fahrenheit 
respectively. 153 In addition to electric heaters and his own kerosene heater, his house 
was said to require forty-two tons of firewood to heat at a cost of £2.10.0d per ton, 
fires having to be kept going for 'seven months of the year' .154 
Any hope of semi-permanent occupation of the Sydney Building offices was 
dashed by a fire in the early hours of the morning of 28 December 1950 which com-
pletely gutted the South African premises and also the adjacent ones occupied by the 
Australian Superannuation Board. Viljoen called the fire as a calamity because it 'had 
destroyed practically all the legation records, and many private papers•1 55 including the 
passports of himself and his wife. This fact was discovered less than a month before 
their departure from Australia in October of the following year. 156 The fire was among 
151 Ibid., 8 February 1951, para. 3. 
152 Ibid., para. 5. 
153 BTS, S4/7/2/l/5, Viljoen/SEA, 30 June 1950, 'Post Report: Canberra', p. 7. 
154 Ibid., p. 6. 
155 The Canberra Times, 29 December 1950. For a survey of the damage caused by the fire see BTS, 
4/6/36, Vol. 1, Viljoen/SEA, 1 March 1951 and Spies/Secretary to the Treasury and Controller and 
Auditor-General, 28 March 195 l. 
156 BTS, Viljoen, Vol. 7, Nel/SEA, 21 September 1951. 
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the most dramatic of the experiences to befall the South African High Commission and 
Embassy in the four and-a-half decades of their existence to date. It even showed signs 
of assuming career-damaging proportions. 
Between them Ne! and Miss Richards had omitted to lock the safe at the close 
of business the previous day. While the safe's contents were undamaged, its handle had 
snapped off The department initially cast about for a scapegoat, giving thought to 
charging either or both with misconduct. In the end Forsyth accepted Viljoen's 
recommendation to let the matter rest. In keeping with the paternalistic and authoritar-
ian style of the times Viljoen had said that both officers 'fully appreciate the seriousness 
of the unfortunate occurrence and I can assure you they have already been severely 
punished. . .. They have learnt their lesson and for the rest of their lives you will find 
them most careful officers'.157 
Though Viljoen was assured that he and his staff would return to the Sydney 
Building once it had been rebuilt, it was thought this would take about nine months. 
Alternative accommodation was, therefore, necessary. The Department of the Interior 
accordingly found space at the Old Hospital Building, Acton, about 150 yards away 
from Viljoen's residence, then owned by the Australian National University and 
scheduled to be taken over by the university. Viljoen reported that 'The building in 
which the offices are situated is made of wood and was previously the residence of the 
Matron and Sisters of the Old Community Hospital of Canberra. Thereafter it was the 
offices of the Australian Department of Information and for a long time until we 
moved in has been used as a store for superfluous furniture'. 158 In the end the 
Australian authorities decided not to relocate the High Commission to the Sydney 
Building after its restoration and it operated rent free out of the Community Hospital 
Building for the next four years. 
The only charge to the South African government was £A50 per annum for 
electricity, cleaning and a towel service. The High Commission 'improved' the premises 
by installing Venetian blinds for £A65 and partitioning the Information Officer's office 
for £A83. 159 When it moved to Industry House the South African Treasury was 
157 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Viljoen/SEA, 6 April 1951 and Spies/High Commissioner, Canberra, 19 May 
1951. 
158 BTS 4/2/32/2 Vol. 1, Viljoen/SEA, 29 June 1951. (Translation.) 
159 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 3, Uys/SEA, 16 February 1955. 
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prevailed upon to authorise the donation of the blinds to the ANU as a gesture of good 
will. In any case, they could not be used at the new offices. 160 
The low cost of the Old Community Hospital was seen as its principal 
advantage. For the premises themselves 'while adequate in terms of space, [were] quite 
inadequate in terms of fire risk, security, situation and appearance'. 161 The location, far 
from banks, shops, government offices and the post office was a drawback. Even so 
the High Commission would probably have been prepared to stay there indefinitely but 
for the ANU's desire to assume control of its property in order to demolish the building 
and erect a new one suited to its own requirements. That prompted the move to 
Industry House. When that building was under construction, the Chief Architect of the 
South African Department of Public Works gave his imprimatur to the proposals for 
the High Commission's offices, calling them 'very good and worthy of our country'. 162 
The annual rental for eight offices for an initial three-year lease was £A1362.2.2d. 163 
When that lease expired in February 1958 the rent was increased to £A2250 per annum 
or £187.1 O.Od per month.164 
By the time the High Commission was given notice to quit its offices in 
Industry House (the Chambers of Manufactures needed the space for their own expan-
sion), 165 the number of offices rented had increased to fourteen and the rental to 
£A3402.0.0d. At that stage serious consideration was given to the construction of a 
chancery. One of Hamilton's last acts before his departure for Stockholm in March 
1961 was to send Pretoria tentative plans prepared at his request by Malcolm Moir, the 
architect of the residence, for a chancery in the Cape town-house style. Hamilton 
mentioned that he had been given confirmation of the informal option Uys had 
obtained in respect of the site adjoining the back fence of the official residence166 
(which the Greeks thought too small). 
Uys, then the Deputy-Secretary in Pretoria, put in a word for the retention of 
the option, saying that the residence 'was one of the ornaments of the Australian capital 
160 Ibid., Scholtz/Secretary to the Treasury, 5 April 1955. 
161 S4/7/2/l/5, Nel/SEA, 30 June 1952, 'Post Report: Canberra- 1952', p. 11. 
162 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, Macdonald/Director, 'Canberra, Australia: Residence of the High 
Commissioner of the Union', 4 June 1954, p. 9. 
163 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, ScholtzJSecretary to the Treasury, 23 July 1954. 
164 Ibid., Vol. 6, Hamilton/SEA, 2 January 1958. 
165 A subsidiary reason could have been the miscalculation on the part of the owners which led to the 
High Commission being undercharged in its rent for some years. 
166 BCB, Vol. 9, 15/34, Vol. 1, Hamilton/SEA, 20 February 1961. 
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and the Australians were just as proud of it as we were'. The golden opportunity to 
build a chancery beside it should not be let slip: 'If a nice chancery should be built 
South Africans who might visit the Australian capital in the distant future might also 
say it was indeed an intelligent and far-sighted policy to take the opportunity to acquire 
such a beautiful site'. 167 Some inflation of expectations had occurred since the PWD 
architect, Macdonald, had inspected the residence site in May 1954. It was his feeling 
then that the future chancery could be built facing Perth A venue in front of the house 
on the same site. 168 That had also been Uys's opinion.169 Seven years and two further 
moves170 lay ahead before the Canberra chancery achieved fruition but its course was 
set. 
Although most of the documentation relating to the construction of the 
chancery seems to have been destroyed, much of that concerning the residence is 
intact. It is possible, therefore, to chart the residence's course in detail from the time it 
was a twinkle in Viljoen's eye in March 1950 until its completion in July 1957. This is 
not the place to do so - South Africa House, Canberra, must therefore await its Anita 
Worrall and William Lorimer111 - but enough material is available to support an 
account of its construction and furnishing for publication, perhaps in the Canberra 
Historical Journal. Diplomatic housing has never loomed large in the consciousness of 
the citizens of Pretoria or Cape Town. So South Africans might be surprised to hear 
that the story of the housing of their head of mission in Australia's federal capital forms 
an integral part of that city's history. If only for that reason, the telling of it is more 
likely to be of interest to Australian than to South African readers. 
In April 1979 the then Ambassador to Australia, A.J. Oxley, referred to an 
aspect of the residence which has been apparent to its occupants ever since. 
Responding to a Head Office enquiry he said that 'from outside' it was 'regarded as one 
of the most beautiful homes in Canberra' and that, again 'from the outside', it looked 
'far bigger than it actually is'. But it was 'not well planned for entertaining purposes' 
167 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 7, Uys/Steenkamp, 28 March 1961. (Translation.) 
168 It 'is large enough to accommodate a Chancery Block on the Perth Avenue side when such a 
building is required'. BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, Macdonald/Director, 'Canberra, Australia: Residence of the 
High Commissioner of the Union', 4 June 1954, p. 5. 
169 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, Uys/SEA, 10 April 1954 and Uys/SEA, 9 July 1954, p. 2, para. 7. 
170 To Green Square, Jardine Street, Kingston from September 1961 to 1967, thence to 3 Zeehan 
Street, Red Hill for the balance of 1967 and 1968. 
171 Authors of Highveld - The Story of a House - The Residence of the South African Ambassador to 
the United Kingdom (Johannesburg, 1986). The wife of Dr Denis Worrall, Anita Worrall lived in 
South Africa House, Canberra, during her husband's term as Ambassador to Australia, 1983-84. 
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being able to accommodate only about a hundred guests for cocktail parties and 
fourteen for formal dinners. 172 Although he was unaware of it, these seeming 
deficiencies were deliberate and accorded with the standards considered appropriate in 
the early 1950s. 
The first of the residence's Chatelaines, Jill Hamilton, called it 'very suitable for 
entertaining'. 173 Being able to seat fourteen at dinner was the standard laid down for 
Australia's Secretary for External Affairs in respect of an official residence to be built 
for him in 1955. That house was expected to cost between £15 000 and £20 000. 174 
Built in 1926, the dining room at the Australian Prime Minister's house, The Lodge, 
could seat only ten. It was not that South Africa House was cheap to build. At a cost 
of £SA44 602 17.7d (£A55 753 4.6d) up to the end of February 1960175 it was not, 
but catering for the 'cast of thousands' held to require a backdrop by Oxley's time and 
thereafter, with their inflated standards, would have made it even more costly. 
In March 1950 Viljoen recommended the building of a two storey house in the 
old Cape Dutch style 'with at least four bedrooms with bath rooms, and servants 
quarters consisting of three bed rooms plus a sitting room'. There would also have to 
be provision for two garages. He had accordingly 'taken steps to select a suitable 
building site which will be kept for us until we hear from you whether the Union 
Government agrees in principle to our own buildings being put up, and whether they 
agree that both residence and office blocks should be erected on the same plot of 
ground'. 176 The site he identified was adjacent to the Prime Minister's residence. The 
Department of External Affairs rejected his proposals on grounds of economy. 177 
Some three years passed before Nel, who had acted as High Commissioner from 
October 1951 when Viljoen left Australia, informed the department that South Africa's 
mission was the only one of the eighteen in Canberra which had no permanent 
accommodation for its Head of Mission or office premises. 178 He could not hold out 
hope of 'obtaining suitable residential premises on a long term lease'. The best 
172 Oxley/SF A, 2 April 1979. Document in the writer's possession. 
173 The Advertiser (Adelaide), 25 November 1959. Her husband indicted in 1993 that they had no 
problem with the ground floor where the public rooms are situated. Letter, 2 October 1993. 
174 The Canberra Times, 15 March 1955. See Scholtz's comments on p. 4 above about a house of that 
cost in 1957. 
175 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, Acting Secretary for Public Works/SEA, 14 November 1959 and 
Snyman/SEA, 16 February 1960. 
176 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Viljoen/SEA, 3 March 1950. 
177 Ibid., Viljoen/SEA, 3 October 1950. 
l78 Ibid., Nel/SEA, 13 March 1953, p. 2. 
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alternative was to build, in which respect costs varied between £A400 and £A440 per 
hundred square feet. 
It is not clear why this should have aroused departmental interest but Spies 
wrote back asking for replies to specific questions. Though the department was in no 
position 'to hold out any hope' that it could buy or build, any proposals it might wish to 
make would have to reach the Treasury 'in a little more than a month'. 179 
So commenced the correspondence which culminated in the Treasury 
approving in early June 1953 the department's recommendation to apply the £36 000 
made available for office and residential accommodation in Buenos Aires, this being 
insufficient for the purpose, to the erection of a residence for the High Commissioner 
in Canberra. 180 Nel having proposed it, the amount actually authorised by Treasury 
was £A35 000 (£SA28 000) to cover 'the total cost of the building, fencing and initial 
outlay of the gardens'. 181 The number and size of'the reception rooms which would be 
required in terms oflocal custom' had earlier been fixed in terms ofNel's response to a 
departmental query to that effect. Spies had stated the assumption that 'four bedrooms 
and two bathrooms would be adequate'l 82 which Ne! confirmed provided the head of 
mission did not have a large family. 
In regard to the reception rooms, Ne! said that only the Americans, the Swedes 
and the British had as yet built their own premises. Other missions had bought houses 
and had extended their reception areas to suit their requirements. He made his 
proposals on the basis of discussions with such missions, with a leading local architect 
and with 'the officer of the British Ministry of Works in charge of building operations 
of the United Kingdom High Commissioner's offices and residence'. While these would 
not 'be adequate for a National Day reception attended by approximately four to five 
hundred quests' - only the American residence was sufficiently large to entertain on 
such a scale - he proposed 
(a) a dining room measuring 26' x 16' 
(b) a loWlge measuring 30' x 18' 
(c) a study measuring 16' x 12' 
(d) a hall measuring 18' x IO'. 
179 Ibid., Spies/Acting High Commissioner, Canberra, 31March1953. 
180 Ibid., Spies/Secretary for Finance, 4 June 1953 and Jooste/Acting Secretary for External Affairs, 8 
June 1953. 
181 Ibid., Jooste/Acting Secretary for External Affairs, 8 JWle 1953. 
182 Ibid., Spies/High Commissioner, Canberra, 7 May 1953. 
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When missions other than the Americans entertained more than two hundred 
persons, they did so 'at the largest hotel or restaurant'. 183 These dimensions were not 
dissimilar either to those of the completed residence: 
(a) dining room : 24' x 15' 
(b). lounge: 33' x 19' 
(c). study: 9'8" x 9'3" 
(d). entrance hall 16' x 12•.184 
or to those indicated for the architect's guidance in mid-1954: 
(a) dining room 18' x 24' 6" 
(b) lounge 20' x 34' 
(c) study 9' 6" x 9' 6" 
(d) hall 14' x 22'. 185 
If the dimensions did not experience an escalation, that was not the case with the cost 
which increased by sixty-three per cent between the time of Nel's first estimate in 
October 1953 and 16 February 1960 when the High Commission certified that the 
residence had been completed, 186 from £SA28 000 to £SA44 602 17. 7d. 
As for the cost of the land, Nel pointed out that there was no freehold in 
Canberra, only leasehold, properties being leased for ninety-nine years. Lessees paid 
rental at the rate of two per cent on the unimproved value of the land for the first 
twenty years. The assessment of value depended on the size of the site and the area in 
which it fell. The unimproved value of property in areas of interest to South Africa was 
around £Al500 per acre. Some two acres would be required for which the rental 
would be around £A60 annually. Rates of l/2d in the pound were payable - 8d for 
general rates including garbage services and 6d for water and sewerage. The value for 
rating was about two-thirds of the unimproved value, or £Al200, putting total annual 
rates at £A30. Rent and rates combined would therefore amount to £A90. 187 
183 Ibid., Nel/SEA, 22 May 1953, pp. 2, 3. 
184 I am indebted to Mr Martin Boswell, Administrative Officer at the South African High 
Commission, Canberra, for this information. 
185 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, 'Canberra: Residence for the High Commissioner for the Union of South 
Africa. Programme of work proposal to be executed. 
186 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, Snyman/SEA, 16 February 1960. 
187 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 1, Nel/SEA, 22 May 1953, pp. 2, 3. 
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Subject to final consultation with it, the department thereupon instructed Nel in 
early September to 'take the necessary steps to procure a suitable building site. 188 He 
reported a month later that after he, Killen and the Chief Government Surveyor in Can-
berra had inspected eight sites, their final choice had fallen on Block 2, Section 32, 
Y arralumla, a two and-a-half acre site fronting on Empire Circuit. Rental and rates 
would come to £Al 00 annually. While Viljoen's choice next to The Lodge was still 
available, its main disadvantage was that it had practically no view. The Australian 
authorities would therefore provisionally reserve Block 2 for the South African 
residence. The lease terms required a building conforming to local regulations to be 
erected within three years. A building of the size contemplated would probably take 
eighteen months. Nel said that the authorities were hopeful that the residence would be 
in the Cape Dutch style. 189 It was also the local view that the temporary presence of a 
South African architect would expedite such matters as the appointment of a suitable 
local architect. 190 
Between them Viljoen and Nel, who had no other connection with the 
residence, recommended its style and the approximate dimensions of its public rooms. 
Excluding the furnishings it is rather ironic, therefore, that the unique contribution of 
the man who had every connection with it - he was the head of mission when it was 
planned and built - was merely to choose its site and therefore, by extension, that of 
the later chancery. Diplomatic achievement being of an ephemeral nature, this could 
well be the most important and lasting contribution J.K. Uys made during either of his 
two terms as South African High Commissioner (1954-57) and Ambassador (1969-71) 
to Australia. A plaque at the bottom of the residence garden in front of the second 
willow tree from the comer closest to State Circle records that Robert Menzies planted 
the tree on 31 August 1959. It would not be inappropriate similarly to commemorate 
Uys's choice of the site on which the chancery and residence now stand. ('If you would 
see the man's monument, look around.')191 
Uys handed his letter of introduction to Menzies on 11 March 1954. A month 
later he was reporting on a new site for the residence, Block 6, Section 58, Acton, 
188 Ibid., ScholtzJActing High Commissioner, Canberra, 11 September 1953. 
189 Menzies himself was supposed to have said later that a residence in the Cape-Dutch style would be 
an asset to Canberra. BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 3, ScholtzJSecretacy for Finance, 25 August 1955. 
190 Ibid., Vol. 1, Nel/SEA, 12 October 1953. 
191 Inscription to Sir Christopher Wren in St Paul's Cathedral, London, written in Latin by his son. 
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which had become available in the meantime. 192 He was satisfied that 'no more suitable 
site' could be selected. He supplied a description: 'to the South West is the majestic 
building of the Embassy of the United States of America .... Bordering on the North 
Eastern corner, but on a lower elevation, the Greek Legation has obtained a site with 
an area of approximately 1112 acres. 193 On the Southern side ... runs Perth Avenue, so 
that in effect the whole area would be a corner property'. There was also talk 'in certain 
planning circles' that the new Federal Parliament would be erected on Capital Hill in 
which event the residence would have a 'ringside seat'. It did, forty years later. The site 
was big enough (2.9 acres) to permit future expansion of the residence, the building of 
office premises or a residence for another official or for domestic staff While there 
were a number of gum trees on the site, some could ·be retained to advantage when 
planning the garden. 194 None, however, survived.195 
Pursuant to Nel's earlier suggestion, the Chief Architect of the Department of 
Public Works, W.A. Macdonald, who was in Sydney for the Fourth Australian 
Architectural Convention, twice visited Canberra in May. Before he left South Africa it 
was agreed at an inter-departmental meeting that the residence would comprise 'a 
lounge, dining room, study, four bedrooms, two bathrooms, two garages and servant 
quarters'. 196 Macdonald concurred in Uys's choice of site but felt that the financial 
provision should be increased from the £SA28 000 recommended originally by Nel to 
£SA35 000 (£A43 750) inter alia because building costs would be £A550 per hundred 
square feet, not the £A400 to £A440 Nel had predicted. 197 
A week later the Minister of Finance approved F orsyth's verbal representations 
to that effect 'provided the total cost of the residence, servants quarters, garages, 
central heating, driveways, levelling of grounds, etc., is limited to the increased 
amount'. 198 Macdonald's visit led to the appointment of Malcolm J. Moir of the 
Canberra firm Moir and Sutherland as local architect with effect from 2 June 1954. 
192 The boundary between Acton and Yarralumla was readjusted in 1966. Block 6, Section 58, Acton 
became Block 6, Section 44, Yarralumla. I am indebted to Mr Martin Boswell of the South African 
High Commission, Canberra, for copies of the relevant correspondence. 
193 The first documentary reference found to the site of the present South African chancery. 
194 BTS, 416136, Vol. 2, Uys/SEA, 10 April 1954. 
195 I am indebted to Mr Billy Hopkins, Head Gardener at the South African High Commission, 
Canberra, for this information. 
196 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 2, Memorandum dated 26 April 1954 prepared by E.J.L. Scholtz. 
197 Ibid., Code telegram No. P.5, High Commissioner, Canberra/SEA, 7 May 1954 and 
Macdonald/Director, 'Canberra, Australia: Residence of the High Commissioner of the Union', 4 June 
1954, p. 3, sect. 2(e). 
198 Ibid., Telex message PR356, 10 May 1954 and Steyn/SEA, 14 May 1954. 
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Moir agreed that the building could be erected within a financial provision of £A3 8 
000. 199 Formal application was also made to the Australian Department of the Interior 
for Block 6. 
The next step was for the South African Department of Lands to approve the 
lease agreement. Uys signed this on 31 August 1954. It took effect on 7 September 
whereupon an annual rent of £A90 per annum for the first twenty years became 
payable to which was added another £A90 per annum for water and sewerage 
charges. 200 In 1974 the rent was increased to $A1600 and in 1994 to $A14 900. 
(Decimal coinage was introduced in 1966.) The unimproved value of the land is 
currently (1994-95) $A745 000 and the rates $A6018.4. The water and sewerage 
charges currently amount to $A130 (basic charge then 28 cents per kl up to 351 kl, 
thereafter 64 cents per kl) and $A460 per annum respectively. 201 
The selection of a builder proved complicated. Six concerns were invited to 
tender. Four did so including Simmie & Co. which had built the Australian War 
Memorial, the American Embassy, the Netherlands Chancery and the Institute of 
Anatomy, and D.C. Smith which had built the Library Annex and the Telephone 
Exchange. 202 Two tenders including Smith's, were invalid because of qualifying clauses 
inserted by the tenderer. All four grossly exceeded the set amount of £A38 000. The 
two valid tenders were for £A64 086 and £A64 339 and the invalid ones for £A57 339 
and £A63 386. The architect was unable to account for the 'great discrepancy between 
the tenders and the estimate made in May of last year'. 203 The Department of Public 
Works believed 'something unusual had occurred'. Its mind turned to the possibility of 
collusion between the tenderers. The prices quoted were 'highly excessive' and the 
architect had not furnished 'good reasons' for the large increase. But there was no 
evidence one way or the other. Clearly, though, it could not recommend that any of the 
tenders be accepted. 204 
199 Ibid., Macdonald/Director, 'Canberra, Australia: Residence of the High Commissioner of the 
Union', 4 June 1954, p. 8, sect. 9. 
200 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 14 August 1954; Secretary for Lands/SEA, 19 August 1954; and Uys/SEA, 31 
August 1954. 
201 I am indebted to Mr Martin Boswell of the South African High Commission, Canberra, for this 
information. 
202 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 3, Moir/Department of Public Works, 22 February 1955; Uys/SEA, 10 March 
1955. 
203 Ibid., Moir/Department of Public Works, 9 March 1955. 
204 Ibid., Department of Public Works/DEA, 25 March 1955. 
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Trying to salvage something from the apparent wreckage Uys and Moir, the 
architect, had a lengthy meeting on 31 March 1955 on the basis of Moir's proposals of 
two days previously to the PWD. In essence, these were: (a) abandon the project 
temporarily; (b) recast it; and ( c) treat with the tenderers, commencing with the lowest 
to eliminate excessively expensive items. Uys reported to Pretoria the next day 
associating himself with the third proposal but on the assumption that quality would 
not be sacrificed. 'The impression that the building must create is that everything was 
made to last for hundreds of years'. 205 Moir's subsequent negotiations with D.C. Smith, 
the lowest tenderer, produced a reduction of £A4279 in the latter's tender, from £A57 
339 to £A53 060 (£SA42 448). The PWD's Macdonald found it difficult to reconcile 
Moir's attitude with the instructions given him: 'the Architect was told to design to a 
figure of £A3 8 000 the balance being held for garden development and other 
contingencies which might arise. You will note that he appears pleased to get down to 
about £A50 000 which is considerably in excess of £A38 000 although he now refers 
to it as 'about 14% above the figure used in the estimate'. 
Even so, presumably feeling that by that time they had nowhere else to go, 
Macdonald and his department recommended that the approved amount of £SA3 5 000 
be increased to £SA40 000.206 That was lower than the amended tender. More 
realistically, with the consent of Eric Louw and the PWD, External Affairs requested 
Treasury to increase the amount by £SA10 000 to £SA45 000 (£A56 250) which it 
did. 207 The amended tender of £A53 060 (£SA42 448) was subsequently reduced to 
£A52 930 (£SA42 364) by the proposed use of red instead of green roof tiles and by 
eliminating the basement boiler room, store and cellar, providing instead for a boiler 
room in the garage block between the garage and the servants quarters. 208 The 
architect was not told of the £SA2600 reserve. 2o9 Uys's last communication for the 
year expressed the hope that his next one would report the conclusion of negotiations 
with D.C. Smith, and the commencement of work or that work would commence 
soon.210 
205 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 1 April 1955. (Translation.) 
206 Ibid., Macdonald/CCB, 23 June 1955, attached to Slater-Kinghorn/SEA, 15 July 1955. 
207 Ibid., ScholtzJDirector, PWD, 13 July 1955 and Scholtz/Secretary for Finance, 25 August 1955. 
208 Ibid., Moir/Uys, 18 October 1955 attached to Uys/SEA, 2 November 1955. 
2o9 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 2 November 1955. 
210 Ibid., 29 December 1955. 
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Dated 13 January 1956, his next report conveyed Smith's confirmation that he 
would build the residence for £A52 93Q.2II The exact date on which building oper-
ations commenced is not clear from the file but according to an undated submission 
from Spies to Eric Louw, it was 'early in February'. 212 That was almost eighteen 
months after the lease agreement on the site became operative. Uys was then more 
than halfway through his three year three month term. Forwarding the architect's first 
progress report under cover of his letter of 26 March 1956, he reported that. the 
builder had been handicapped from the start by exceptionally heavy rains.213 The 
significance of that was that unlike in Europe, in Canberra 'bricklayers, carpenters etc. 
just do not work in the open when it rains'. Indeed, they went on strike when 
employers threatened to compel them to do so.214 The second progress report, dated 
30 April, accompanied his letter of 1 May. It was probably typical of Uys that he 
should have stated in this letter that he was 'on the site every morning before office 
hours to see for myself how the job is done without in any way interfering with 
operations'. 
Copies of the first and second progress reports are not on the file. This contains 
the third to the thirteenth reports215 as well as the practical completion report dated 6 
November 1957 which indicated that the residence had been_ handed over to the Acting 
High Commissioner (D.P. Olivier) virtually complete on 15 July but for roller 
flyscreens, parchment light shades and external lanterns. With the exception of these 
items the residence was ready for occupation on the handing-over date.216 By the date 
of the practical completion report it already had its first occupants, AM. Hamilton and 
his wife and two daughters, who arrived in early September. The Hamiltons held their 
house-warming party on 20 November: 'One hundred and sixty guests were present, 
including the Prime Minister, most members of the Cabinet, a number of members of 
both Houses of Parliament, Australian Government officials and the Diplomatic 
2ll Jbid., Vol. 4, Uys/SEA, 13 January 1956. The building contract was signed in February. See BTS, 
4/6/36, Vol. 5, Uys/SEA, 14 May 1957, p. 4, para. 12. 
212 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, Acting Secretary/Minister, 'Resume of the Domestic Activities of the 
Department of External Affairs during the financial year 1955/56', n.d. 
213 Ibid., Uys/SEA, 26 March 1956. 
214 Jbid., 28 August 1956. 
215 Ibid. Moir/High Commissioner, 17 May (3rd), 12 June (4th), 2 July (5th), 24 July (6th), 22 August 
(7th), 26 September (8th), 15 October (9th), 16 November (10th), 21 December 1956 (11th), 1 
February (12th) and 2 April 1957 (13th). Uys's covering letters were dated 22 May, 13 June, 5 July, 
25 July, 28 August, 28 September, 18 October, 19 'November, 27 December 1956, 9 February and 4 
April 1957. 
216 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, Moir/High Commissioner, 6 November 1957. 
318 
Chapter Six: Backdrops 
Corps'. 217 Many were the 'commendations about the attractiveness of the house and the 
contribution it has made to the appearance of Canberra'. 
Uys had left Australia on 10 June 1957. Three days earlier, The Canberra 
Times published a photograph of him and his wife and daughters against the 
background of the almost completed house.2 18 At the commencement of his second 
term ( 1969-71 ), that newspaper published an illustrated article on the residence 
including a ground floor plan. The accompanying photographs showed the front facade 
and the dining room. 219 An illustrated article by Eschel Rhoodie in South African 
Panorama of January 1959220 had included photographs of the rear facade, Hamilton 
and family relaxing on the stoep, and an interior shot of Mr and Mrs Hamilton in 
conversation with Robert Menzies. 
There remained the garden. Turning the untamed lot into a settled garden was a 
priority and Hamilton achieved that within two years. His wife said: 'Our garden, a real 
wilderness when we arrived two years ago, has now become quite an attraction ... my 
husband had to work and plan for quite a while before the garden took its present 
shape. Now people are always popping in to see it'. 221 Hamilton had told Scholtz a few 
days earlier: 'South Africa House and the success we have made of our garden develop 
a lot of good will for South Africa and a friendly impression of our country'.222 At the 
end of August 1959 Menzies planted a willow tree in the comer of the garden closest 
to State Circle. It was altogether typical of the times that the occasion was a private 
one attended only by Menzies himself and Dame Pattie, the MacDermots (the 
Canadian High Commissioner, who recited a poem he had written in honour of the 
occasion), the Hamiltons and their son and elder daughter.223 Not even The Canberra 
21 7 BTS, 4/2/32/1, Vol. 1, Hamilton/SEA, 13 December 1957. See also The Canberra Times, 21 
November 1957. Tommy Boydell was among the guests. The Star, 9 December 1957; also AA, 
A1361/l, 4/15/37, 'The Hon. Thos. Boydell's tour in Australia - 1957. Second Tour'. 
218 The Canberra Times, 7 June 1957. 
219 Ibid., 17 June 1969. 
220 'Union's diplomats in Canberra', pp. 6-7. 
221 The News (Adelaide), 26 November 1959, interview with Mrs Hamilton. 
222 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
223 The MacDerrnots' absent son, Galt, a trained musician who was a student at the University of 
Cape Town during his parents' posting to South Africa, wrote the music for the world famous rock 
musical 'Hair'. He is said, ia., to have dra\\-n 'heavily on his knowledge of African rhythms to which 
he had been exposed as a child in South Africa to create the feeling of freedom for the show's lyrics'. 
He 'heard "the melodies of the Bantus" in his head, and the score was completed in two weeks'. B.L. 
Horn, The Age of Hair: Evolution and impact of Broadway's first rock musical (New York/Westport, 
Conn./London, 1991), pp. 27, 28. Years earlier the Australian foreign service officer Stewart 
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Times was present to record the ceremony for posterity.224 Hamilton sent Scholtz a 
snapshot taken by MacDermot which now reposes on his personal file. He had the 
bronze plaque which marks the tree cast in Sweden during his term there. 225 
Jamieson said of MacDermot himself that he was 'one of those lucky people who can be erudite and 
human at the same time'. AA, A9421, 9/2/3, Pt. 1, Jamieson/Quinn, 26 November 1951. 
224 Hasluck relates that Menzies was 'allergic to public relations gimmickry'. He did 'in a natural and 
unpremeditated way' the 'simple and homely things that most public relations men would have 
planned, contrived and organized' and 'there would not be a photographer in sight. He never had a 
public relations man on his staff and I have heard him speak with contempt of that particular craft in 
contemporary Australian politics'. P.M.C. Hasluck, Sir Robert Menzies (Melbourne, 1980), p. 28. 
225 A.M. Hamilton, letter, 28 October 1993. 
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THROUGH EACH OTHER'S EYES 
Still a core aspect of a foreign service officer's work abroad, political and eco-
nomic reporting provides a direct link between modem diplomacy and its immediate 
ancestor, the diplomacy of the fourteenth and fifteenth century Italian states. In those 
times the 'overriding importance attached to the quick receipt of news' was the main 
reason for the establishment of resident Embassies. One of 'the chief functions of the 
fourteenth century resident ambassador came to be to keep a continuous stream of 
foreign political news flowing to his home govemment'. 1 For the most part 'he had to 
rely on his own wits and industry' to collect it and 'his own judgment to evaluate it'.2 
The quality of his reporting determined the degree of influence he exercised over pol-
icy. 3 That has a modem ring to it as well as negative connotations. Sir Nevile Hen-
derson's 'tailored reporting' from Hitler's Germany, what his namesake Sir Nicholas 
Henderson called 'a study in scarlet for every postwar diplomat', lent encouragement to 
the policy of appeasement. 4 
Australian representatives were generally prolific and assiduous reporters from 
South Africa from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. But they may have been out-
performed by the Venetian Ambassador in Rome who wrote four-hundred and sev-
enty-two despatches in the twelve months between 1 May 1503 and 30 April 1504. 
And 
if some of these are hasty notes of only three or four lines, others 
are detailed (as nearly as possible verbatim) accounts of long con-
versations, or patient, laborious analyses of complicated political 
imbroglios, or bulging budgets of miscellaneous gossip; so that 
one wonders how he ever got time to do anything else than listen 
and write.5 
1 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 67. 
2 Ibid., p. 114. 
3 Ibid., p. 110. 
4 
'Sir Nicholas Henderson's valedictory despatch: Britain's decline; its causes and consequences', The 
Economist, 2 June 1979, p. 40. See also Rose, Vansittart, pp. 202-03, 206, 227, 233. A.W. Martin 
gives Robert Menzies's contemporary view of Henderson as 'an extremely clear-headed and sensible 
fellow with a frank and even breezy method of putting the British view to the Germans'. Robert 
Menzies, p. 234. Anthony Eden, who appointed Henderson, said later: 'It was an international 
misfortune that we should have been represented in Berlin at this time by a man who, so far from 
warning the Nazis, was constantly making excuses for them, often in their company'. The Eden 
Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London, 1962), p. 504. 
5 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 110. 
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Besides his regular despatches, a resident Ambassador in Renaissance Italy 
would from time to time prepare reports on the political situation at his post, 'filling in 
the background, with special attention to the character and motives of the important 
persons and factions, summarizing recent developments, indicating future expectations, 
and sometimes suggesting possible lines of action'.6 Modern Ambassadors do the same 
thereby heightening the sense of continuity between early modern and present day 
diplomacy. Their interest in minutiae encourages Mattingly in the belief .that 
Renaissance Italian politicians had 'not only an obsessive anxiety about the doings of 
their contemporaries, not only an almost pathological fear of being surprised, or 
anticipated or over-reached, but also an insatiable appetite for mere gossip'. 
They also had the 'political wisdom' to encourage 'a constant, even if 
indiscriminate, flow of news. By making the mesh fine, fewer items were likely to 
escape because the man on the spot missed a significance clear enough to a minister 
who had the run of dispatches from all over Italy'. 7 
The products of fifteen years of diplomatic reporting on the Australian side and 
twelve on the South African, some of them lengthy epistles, are too voluminous to be 
addressed in a single chapter. To do the subject justice would require a separate study. 
This chapter has the more limited aim of giving perspective to diplomatic reporting by 
examining the Australian and South African approach to it in the context of their bilat-
eral relations from the 1940s to the 1960s. Apart from that, aspects of it are revealing 
of the attitudes of the Australian and South African foreign services towards the 
development of junior personnel. That will be touched on as will the light the 
Australian reporting throws on aspects of the internal administration of the South 
African department and some of its personalities. It illuminates hitherto ill-lit corners. 
The best contemporary diplomatic reporting provides insights into a country's 
political history not available elsewhere. That is especially true if the writers' sources 
were close to the centre of power and willing to share their information. As Mattingly 
says, 'the art of diplomacy would become impossible if more people knew how to hold 
their tongues.'8 In the year he represented the United States in South Africa (1942-43), 
6 Ibid., p. 112. 
7 Ibid., p. 111. 
8 Jbid., pp. 114-15. 
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American Minister9 Lincoln MacVeagh's association with Louis Esselen enriched his 
reporting. Esselen was unquestionably Smuts's right hand man, more influential than 
any cabinet minister and (inside the country) with John Martin, the closest to what 
passed for a Smuts' confidant. 10 Without him, Mac Veagh's reports would have been 
less deserving of the State Department commendations they received. 
It has been said that of all American heads of mission in South Africa, 
MacVeagh stood out 'for combining perceptive observation and diligent scholarship 
with literary skill'. 11 He had a literary background and was a successful literary agent 
and publisher. He founded and was President of Dial Press from 1925 to 1931. He was 
respected in the State Department 'for both the quality and the wit of his reporting'12 
which was held to be 'profound and interesting'. 13 Franklin Delano Roosevelt had 
rewarded him with his first diplomatic post, Minister to Greece, after the 1932 
presidential campaign. He also assisted with the 1936 campaign. He left South Africa 
in late 1943 to take up appointments to the Greek and Yugoslav governments in exile. 
He was later Ambassador to Greece, 14 Portugal and Spain. He retired in 1953 and died 
in 1972. 
Enjoying access to the president, he regularly wrote Roosevelt long personal 
letters from his posts, about seventy in a11. 1s Five from South Africa were published in 
the year of his death in the Munger Africana Library Notes, No. 12, March 1972, 
taking up the whole issue. 16 The 1940s State Department described his fifth and final 
letter as 'a brilliant summary of South Africa and the South Africans' .17 In it he put 
Louis Esselen among 'the best of the real Boers, trained to the saddle, the gun and the 
9 It was only after the war that the United States and South African Legations were upgraded to 
Embassies. 
10 Smuts's English friend Margaret Gillett was probably closer to him than either of these. 
I I Munger Africana Library Notes, No. 12, March 1972, pp. 5-6. 
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
13 USNA, RG 59, DS 848A.00/647-l/2, Note, Freeman Matthews/Stettinius, 30 October 1943. See 
also J.O. Iatrides, ed., Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947 (Princeton, NJ., 1980), p. 
383 
14 References to his activities there in connection with the so..called 'Truman Doctrine' in the late 
1940s are contained in J.O. Iatrides, Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover, US/London, 
1981) and H. Jones, "A new kind of war": America's Global Strategy and The Truman Doctrine in 
Greece (New York/Oxford, 1989). See particularly latrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, p. ix. 
IS latrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, p. x. He also corresponded with Eleanor Roosevelt and 
her brother. 
16 Nine of his letters from Greece in the 1930s are reproduced in E.B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), Vol. II, pp. 6-7, 94-97, 172-75, 176-77, 
301-05 and Vol. III, pp. 26-28,223-27, 284-89, 319-23. 
17 USNA, RG 59, DS 848A.00/647-l/2, Note, Freeman Matthews/Stettinius, 30 October 1943. 
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frontier, with clear eyes still, and clear heads'. He also called Dr Malan 'the Satan of the 
Dutch Paradise Lost', a 'figure whose eventual comeback is so possible as to be 
dreaded still'. 18 Even so, because of his reliance on Esselen as a source, MacVeagh 
tended to underplay the significance of the Afrikaner opposition to the Smuts 
government. 19 Based on Esselen's comments, his descriptions of cabinet members were 
perceptive and amusing: 
The Government of South Africa is today, as Louis ESSELEN 
complained to me only yesterday, 'a one-man show'. The General's 
associates are all poor politicians with brains, like Hofmeyr, or 
good politicians without, like Steyn; or they are anachronisms, like 
ST ALLARD, dodos, like Collins, noisy blunderers, like 
CONROY, or infant prodigies 'with no language but .a cry,' like 
WATERSON or LA WREN CE. Not to be forgotten, too, is Major 
Piet VAN DER BYL, in connection with whom it is said that 
Smuts outdid the Roman Emperor, since the latter made his horse 
a Consul but Smuts made his clotheshorse a Minister. All these 
gentlemen, as Esselen has said to me, run to Smuts for their deci-
sions, but cooperate together not at all. 20 
Later Mac Veagh quoted the Indian High Commissioner, Sir Shafa'at Ahmed 
Khan, to the effect that while socially charming most of Smuts's Cabinet Ministers 
were 'nonentities'. 21 This rounded off a picture with which informed modern observers 
will not disagree. It is not farfetched to suggest that Mac Veagh's reporting contained 
hints of the electoral disaster which befell the Smuts government five years later. 
Writing of the depressing 'picture of his party's future' that Esselen had drawn in one of 
their last conversations, MacVeagh had him saying: 'we must do something - a lot of 
things - constructive in this country, and that soon, or people will turn against us'. 22 It 
was advice Smuts did not heed. 
Suggestive of Australian introspection, P.G. Edwards holds that bygone diplo-
matic reporting illuminates present-day concerns, the theme of his 1992 retrospective 
article23 on his 1979 book Australia through American eyes 1935-1945: Observations 
by American Diplomats. (St. Lucia, Qld., 1979.) He feels that much of the American 
18 Munger Africana Library Notes, No. 12, March 1972, pp. 41, 42-43. 
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
20 USNA, RG 59, DS 848A.00/654, MacVeagh/Secretary of State, No. 370, 9 November 1943, p. 2; 
Tothill, The 1943 General Election, p. 134. 
21 USNA, RG 59, DS 848A.00/654, DS 848A.00/600, MacVeagh/Secretary of State, No. 173, 22 
April 1943, enclosure, 15 February 1943). 
22 Ibid., DS 848A.00/654, MacVeagh/Secretary of State, No. 370, 9 November 1943, pp. 2, 3. 
23 P.G. Edwards, 'Australia Through the Eyes of American Diplomats in the 1930s and 1940s', 
Australian Studies Association, No. 18, October 1992, pp. 16-22. 
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reporting on the Australia of the 1930s and 1940s prefigured the 'navel-picking' 
domestic debates of recent years. It was 'sad', therefore, that the reports were 
'addressed to the White House and State Department in Washington, not to the Aus-
tralian people who needed to hear these injunctions'. We can only wonder, he 
concludes somewhat wistfully, 'what reports are being sent at this moment' by the 
'various embassies and high commissions in Canberra to their home capitals'.24 
South African journalist W.A. Bellwood25 wondered the same about diplomatic 
reporting from 1970s South Africa. He argued in a newspaper article that the press 
reported events and 'made criticisms openly'. What they said was 'available to anybody'. 
But that was not the case with reports 'which go out from diplomats'. If the Vorster 
government complained about the accuracy of press reporting, how much 'more 
uninformed and misleading' might some of the diplomatic reports be?26 What gave rise 
to that was one of Lord Harlech's pre-1943 general election despatches27 then newly 
released from the thirty-year rule. This contradicted Bellwood's memories of the period 
and of some of its personalities. 
A former Secretary of State for the Colonies (1936-38), Lord Harlech suc-
ceeded Sir William Clark as British High Commissioner in 1941. Bellwood challenged 
his views: 'What the British War Cabinet was told by Lord Harlech ... has largely an 
academic interest now. Yet the opinions expressed in his confidential report for 1943, 
just made public, are bound to cause many raised eyebrows; and perhaps some 
uneasiness about the contents of other secret reports from diplomats'.28 
What irritated Bellwood was Harlech's reference to the unpopularity of the 
Smuts government's war-time domestic measures, and especially, his description of 
J.H. Hofmeyr as 'a lonely and unsympathetic figure, contemptuous of the amenities of 
friendly intercourse and altogether lacking a personal following'. 29 Bellwood said that 
was 'contentious and superficial'. And if the government's policies were unpopular, 
24 Ibid., p. 22. 
25 Whom Louis Esselen offered the post of government Information Officer at the outbreak of war, not 
knowing that Smuts wanted A.N. Wilson, his friend John Martin's personal assistant, to have it. See 
Tothill, The 1943 General Election, p. 109. 
26 W.A. Bellwood, 'Diplomatic aim was not so clear', The Star (Johannesburg), 11 January 1972. 
27 PRO, DO 35/1119/G-581/18, Despatch from Lord Harlech, 4 June 1943. 
28 The Star (Johannesburg), 11 January 1972. 
29 PRO, DO 35/1119/G. 581/18, 4 June 1943, p. 3, para. 12. Alan Paton's biographer, P.F. Alexander, 
writes of Hofmeyr that he 'had virtually no understanding of or sympathy with other human beings'. 
Alan Paton: A biography (Cape Town & Oxford, 1995 (1994)), p. 185. 
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Smuts had won an overwhelming victory at the 1943 general election. So they could 
not have been as unpopular as all that. Events had, therefore, done 'nothing to show 
that Lord Harlech's observations were very perceptive'.30 
Bellwood even sprang to the defence of Piet van der Byl, Deneys Reitz's 
successor as Minister of Native Affairs. Harlech had said that his appointment 
'confirmed most people's worst fears' and that as Minister 'he had made a .bad 
beginning'. He was 'quite incapable of understanding the implications of policy' and had 
'More than once foolishly played up to the race prejudice of the Opposition'. He had 
also 'gratuitously confirmed the Government's adherence to the general policy of 
"segregation" which General Smuts himself only a year before had declared to be 
hopelessly out of date'. 31 For Bellwood, that was just not true. Van der Byl, 'probably 
the most under-estimated man in Smuts's Cabinet', was 'a shrewd and practical Minister 
whose admiration for and devotion to his Chief was such that he would not dream of 
flying in the face of policy laid down by Smuts'. 
If Bellwood thought Harlech's despatch was uninformed, he would presumably 
have been shocked by Esselen's views as MacVeagh reported them to Washington. 
It must be said that the Australian reporting did not in general testify to inside 
information, and was not of the same quality, literary or otherwise, as Lincoln 
MacVeagh's or Lord Harlech's. It was also less incisive than the despatches P.G. 
Edwards included in his Australia through American eyes. Edwards said of the 
Americans (p.19) that they 'cultivated good sources of information. Arthur Calwell32 
often leaked Cabinet secrets' to their legation. Towards the end of the period the 
British High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir John Maud, was an interpreter of 
events for his Australian colleague, 0 .L. Davis. Davis would interview him from time 
to time, reporting what he gleaned to Canberra. 
Though Maud enjoyed better access to South African politicians, it was an-
other matter how good an analyst he was. His strong political and humanistic convic-
tions distorted his perspectives. In his memoirs Maud himself quoted Paul Sauer to the 
effect that he was 'the m<?st intelligent man' the United Kingdom had ever sent to rep-
30 My MA demonstrated, I believe convincingly, that the 1943 victory was a contrived one which did 
not reflect the government's true standing in the country. The 1948 result reflected that better. 
31 DO 35/1119/G. 581/18, 4 June 1943, p. 4, para. 18. 
32 Minister for Information; from 13 July 1945 Minister for Immigration. 
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resent it in South Africa but no-one had done bilateral relations more harm. 33 Sole who 
was present on the occasion recorded the incident and its immediate aftermath in some 
detail in a letter to his parents. 34 
With the possible exception of Stirling and Dr Malan35 Australian representa-
tives may not, in fact, have established close relations with any of the South African 
Prime Ministers of the time or their ministerial colleagues. Most National Party Cabinet 
Ministers were probably unfamiliar with the role of diplomats and didn't like them 
anyway. At least Ministers and other prominent Afrikaners lacked Menzies's rapport 
with diplomats. Thus Davis recorded Mordekhai Nurock, the Israeli Charge d'Affaires, 
telling him that de Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu Affairs, and one of his officials had 
attacked him 'with all the fervour of pulpit orators' over the attitude of the South 
African Jewish community. They accused it of 'absorbing English ideas' instead of sup-
porting the National Party point of view. They seemed to assume, Nurock said, that he 
was 'anti-British and did not know that he had spent most of his life in the British 
Colonial Service'.36 
Reporting the view of his Commonwealth colleagues in 1960, Davis said 
'access to the Prime Minister was a rare privilege obtained only after much pressure'.37 
That may have been after Verwoerd gained experience. For, as Acting Australian High 
Commissioners, Hugh Gilchrist and Lionel Phillips seem to have obtained interviews 
with him without difficulty, the former within three weeks of his becoming Prime Min-
ister and the latter six months later. 38 In his time Malan had received Quinn and 
Kelly.39 As Minister of Native Affairs in 1951 Verwoerd had been accompanied on his 
first official visit to the Transkei and Ciskei by T.W.L. MacDermot and M.H. Marshall, 
33 J.P.R. Maud, Experiences of an Optimist (London, 1981), p. 94. 
34 Sole Reminiscences, pp. 257-58. Sole considers Maud to have been 'the outstanding intellect' 
among foreign Ambassadors in South Africa at the time. He says Maud was reported to have drafted 
Macmillan's 'winds of change' speech in Cape Town on 3 February 1960, an honour Maud does not 
claim for himself See Experiences, p. 87. 
35 Malan was on sufficiently good terms with Stirling to write him a four page letter in his own hand 
on the occasion of the latter's transfer to The Hague in 1950. Stirling, On the Fringe of Diplomacy pp. 
52-53. 
36 AA, Al838/l, 201/2/5, Pt. 7, Memo. 450, Davis/DEA, 24 September 1959, Record of conversation 
Davis/Nurock, 23 September 1959. 
37 AA, Al838/2, 201111/1, Pt. 3, Memo. 323, Davis/DEA, 6 July 1960. 
38 See AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3 Pt. 6, Annex to Memo. 578, Gilchrist/DEA, 29 September 1958 and 
A9421/l, 202/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 122, Phillips/DEA, 7 March 1959. 
39 AA, Al838/2, 916/1/2, I. 6880, 12 May 1952. See also handwritten notes by Forsyth and Taljaard 
on BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Quinn/SEA, Cape Town, 23 April 1952. It may have been Taljaard's idea 
that Malan receive them. 
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respectively Canadian High Commissioner and Acting Australian High Commissioner. 
(See pp. 165-66 above.) And Davis had a relaxed enough relationship with N. 
Diederichs, P.M.K. le Roux and B.J. Schoeman to have them attend a costume party 
he gave in March 196Q.40 
Also suggestive of some intimacy was Moodie's report on his first call on Prime 
Minister B.J. Vorster in 1972. Moodie said Vorster talked about previous Australian 
heads of mission 'displaying some familiarity in the process; including Colonel 
Hodgson whom he described as "quite a card".'41 Gilchrist, however, conceived an 
active dislike for Eric Louw which was reflected in his reporting. Louw was for him 'a 
sour, suspicious and pompous little man'.42 He said recently that Louw was the only 
South African politician for whom he felt 'any dislike'. He considered him 'mean and 
devious'. 43 
Munger mentions a complaint voiced by most diplomatic missions in the mid-
1960s that they could not 'get to know South African officials as individuals'. Though 
there were exceptions, the general rule was for them to keep their distance. Officials 
and prominent Nationalists accepted invitations, yet a formal Embassy dinner could 
pass 'with precious little real conversation'. Even Maud had 'commented on how little 
serious conversation he had with South African officials until the end of his tour'. 
Munger felt that the reserve was 'not so much cold rigidity on the part of Afrikaners as 
it is their concept of diplomacy'. Citing a Cape backbencher, he thought another reason 
was lack of fluency in English on the part of an individual or his wife. 44 That would not 
have applied to Cabinet Ministers. In fact, Stirling commented on the fluency in Eng-
lish of the 1948 Cabinet. 45 
Besides the limitations resulting from the above factors, the Australians were 
structured in their reporting, doing it within a tripartite framework: formal despatches 
from the head of mission to the Minister of External Affairs (ministerial despatches) or, 
between 1948 and 1951, to the Secretary of the Department (departmental des-
40 Al838/2, 774/1, Pt. 2, J.L. Chapman, 'Report on Visit to Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Port 
Elizabeth, March 1960', p. 1. 
41 M A9421/1, 201/1, Pt. 1, C.T. Moodie, Record of conversation Moodie/Vorster, 27 September, 
1972, p. 3, para. 10. Vorster had been only a backbencher during Hodgson's term. 
42 M A/1838/2, 201/10/1, Pt.2, Memorandum Gilchrist/Rowland, South Africa: Commonwealth 
Relations, 5 November 1959, para. 5. 
43 H. Gilchrist, letter, 15 December 1994, para. 12. 
44 Munger, South African Foreign Policy, pp. 69-71. 
45 A4231/2 Pretoria 1948, Ministerial Despatch No. 28/48, 14 September 1948, p. 5. 
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patches)46 which were gradually displaced by memoranda47 to the department. 
Whatever their file numbers the memoranda were also numbered consecutively, much 
as in the case of incoming and outgoing cables. 48 As the Australians gained experience 
of diplomacy, the requirement of regular formal despatches (which they would have 
taken over from the British) was relaxed. After Knowles and Stirling most reporting 
was done less formally by way of memoranda or cables including weekly or fortnightly 
summaries of events. 
The latter were despatched as 'Savingrams' meaning that they were encoded as 
if they were cables but despatched in the diplomatic bag or airmail. In the early years, 
the summaries reproduced the regular bulletins of the State Information Office. In the 
sense that they covered the main points, the summaries could be used today to con-
struct a political history of the country in the 1950s much as E.A. Walker based sec-
tions of his History of Southern Africa49 on The Round Table. Then there were cabled 
reports in respect of more urgent and sensitive matters and sometimes cabled and 
written reports on the same subject. The coverage of what Davis called 'African riots at 
Sharpeville and Langa' in March 1960 involved both. 
As reporters the Australians outdid the South Africans in volume and in 
variety. Theirs was an information-gathering exercise in accordance with diplomatic 
tradition. What lay behind it was the perceived need to formulate 'a coherent ... foreign 
policy based upon accurate and informed reports from overseas posts and skilled 
correlation in the Department in Canberra•.5o At any rate, that was the theory. They 
could not count automatically on receiving the British High Commission's reports 
because South Africa was still a member of the Commonwealth. They had therefore 
usually to rely on their own efforts. The occasions they were shown British reports 
were supposedly on an eyes only basis (which did not prevent them from making 
copies to send to Canberra). 
46 Apart from the file numbers they carried according to subject, the despatches were identified as 
such, eg., Despatch No. 6156, 7th April, 1956. A note appended to the list of contents in the 1951 
volume of despatches from South Africa reads: 'Prior to August, 1951, all despatches arriving in 
Ex1emal Affairs were divided into either Ministerial or Departmental. As from 1st August this 
distinction was abolished and a new series was commenced'. 
47 Minutes in South African terminology. 
48 See Chapter One, p. 59. 
49 See. eg., the Third Edition. London, 1957. (New impression with corrections 1962). 
50 
'The External Affairs Cadet Scheme', Current Notes, Vol. 20, No. 7, 1949, p. 808. 
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However British officials, especially Maud, had no objection to having their 
brains picked (indeed, it was mentioned in the Introduction that that formed part of 
Davis's instructions.) It was Gilchrist's practice to pass despatches from Australia's 
Asian missions and 'political intelligence bulletins on Asian developments' to the South 
African department's Political (East) Section.51 Canberra seems to have concurred with 
this example of practical Commonwealth co-operation. 
In retrospect, a useful aspect of Australian reporting was the practice, evident 
also in Canberra, of recording conversations with contacts and informants on a spec-
ially designed form. That way their interlocutors are easily identifiable as well as what 
was said. The South Africans sometimes did that too but in a less structured way. 
Some of the records are illustrative of why diplomats attend social functions. (Refer 
pp. 332-33 below to Uys's view). 52 Gilchrist's visit to Durban in July 1957 to attend the 
Governor-General's annual banquet for the diplomatic corps produced inter alia the 
record of a conversation with Walter Crouch, a young Sydney journalist who was sub-
editor on The Sunday Tribune.53 (See Chapter Four.) Crouch, 'a decent lad with a 
reasonable standard of professional ethics' and his wife 'said frankly that they detested 
South Africa and would be glad to be out of it soon'. 
According to Crouch (who at least seemed even-handed in his criticism), 
whites in the Union 'refused to look realities in the face', 'took refuge in slogans', were 
'soft and gutless' and 'so corrupted by the easy life provided by Native servants that 
they were unwilling to make any adaptations which might threaten this life of 
comparative ease'. Natal Indians were 'not particularly scrupulous as to how they made 
their money (e.g. by chiselling the poor-living native); few made any decent 
contribution to civic affairs; on the whole they were limp and unreliable people'. The 
'more-British-than-the-British' attitude of some Natalians 'also irritated him; some of 
them were not South African in their outlook at all, but English residents in the Union; 
they carped at the Government but contributed little towards a solution of the 
country's problems; and this played into the hands of the extreme Nationalists'. 
51 AA, Al050/2, 201/8, Memo. 401, Gilchrist/DEA, 9 August 1957. 
52 See, eg., the records of O.L. Davjs's and R.L.C. Cotton's conversations with A.M. Hamilton and 
N.P. van Heerden, respectively. AA, A9421, 221/1, Record of conversation Davis/Hamilton, 16 
November 1961 and A9421/l, 202/1, Pt. 1, Record of conversation Cotton/Van Heerden, 21 August 
1970. 
53 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6, Pt. 1, Record of conversation Gilchrist/Crouch, attached to Memo. 367, 
Gilchrist/DEA, 19 July 1957. 
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Piet Cillie, Editor of Die Burger, was later a favourite source as was Stanley 
Uys, Political Correspondent of the Sunday Times (Johannesburg). As late as 
September 1959 Uys was saying it was possible 'South Africa might never become a 
republic'. 54 He was also one of the sources for Davis's reporting on the disturbances of 
March 1960. Davis said that the information and views contained in his first cables on 
the subject 
were based substantially on press reports appearing in the English-
language press of Cape Town; on conversations with Mr. Stanley 
Uys, correspondent of the Johannesburg 'Sunday Times'; on 
lengthy discussion with both the United Kingdom Deputy High 
Commissioner and the United States Ambassador; and the 
statements by the Prime Minister in Parliament and the debates in 
the House. 55 
Cillie (an exception to Australian lack of access to purveyors of inside 
information) supplied such titbits as 'Smuts was a much stronger and more determined 
man than any of the present regime. He had not hesitated to shoot down even Whites 
where law and order was at stake'; Verwoerd was 'a brilliant mind but unfortunately ... 
relied solely on intellectual processes and never listened to his heart'; Malan 'was not a 
great brain but ... a great character'; Strijdom was 'not Prime Minister material';56 and 
Eric Louw 'preferred to be disliked rather than liked'. 57 The most frequently cited 
source in Davis's time, though, was Sir John Maud, the British High Commissioner and 
Ambassador ( 1959-63 ). 
Retired Chief Tax Commissioner L.S. Jackson who toured South Africa for 
three months in 1952-53 as a member of the Australian bowling team gave an 
interesting if unorthodox perspective to the value of Australian reporting from South 
Africa in the early 1950s. He denigrated the High Commission's capacity, expressing 
doubt that 'with its limited contacts and small staff it could supply 'the reliable picture 
of current S.A. affairs' that was available in South African newspapers, The Times 
(London) and The Round Table. In respect of the first-mentioned, Jackson thought an 
External Affairs officer 'could review and pot these weekly for you [the Department of 
54 AA, Al838/2, 201/l l/l, Pt. 3, Record of conversation Davis/Uys, attached to Memo. 449, 
Davis/DEA, 24 September 1959. 
55 AA, A9421/l, 202/7/l, Memo. 140, Davis/DEA, 25 March 1960. 
56 ibid., Record of conversation Davis/Cillie, 27 January 1960, attached to Memo. 71, Davis/DEA, 8 
February 1960. He did not say this of Strijdom in his 25 August 1958 leading article on the occasion 
of the latter's death. See P.J. Cillie, "n Held is ons ontval' (A hero is lost to us), Tydgenote 
(Contemporaries) (Cape Town, 1980), pp. 48-50. 
57 AA, Al838/l, 201/112, Pt. 3, Record of conversation Davis/Cillie, 17th May 1960. 
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External Affairs] if filed at the office of the South African High Commissioner'. 
Otherwise, the Australian High Commission could do that in South Africa. The Times 
contained 'much interesting comment on S.A. Affairs', while The Round Table usually 
put 'controversial matters in their proper perspective'. 58 
The file does not indicate what gave rise to this or how it was received. But 
Jackson's views link up with the comments of that better placed and more informed 
critic of Australian reporting in general, Walter Crocker. The cynical, cost-cutting 
Crocker who put an end to National Day receptions at his missions only to find the 
practice revived by his successors, 59 rightly says that much reporting is 'superficial and 
copied from the local newspapers or diplomatic gossip and has an insufficient basis of 
real knowledge or grasp. '60 Much Australian and South African reporting over the 
period falls into that category. There was a further dimension, especially to the 
Australian reporting: 
Ambassadors going newly to a post, especially if on their first 
appointment or two as head of Mission, report as though they had 
arrived there like Columbus in the New World, discovering the 
country concerned and that nothing had been known about it be-
fore. . .. The system of promotion encourages it as officers feel that 
their standing is related to the volume of paper bearing their 
name.61 
If not in the Crocker sense, some of Uys's reports from 1950s Canberra are 
certainly attention-getters today. 62 They tend to confirm that he was out of his depth in 
the diplomatic milieu. Consider his comments on the attitude of the Australian 
government towards the withdrawal of the South African delegation from the tenth 
session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1955: 
it will interest the department to know that the day after the 
reception of the report of the Union's decision, and on the same 
day that the State Information Office's telegram with the statement 
of the Honourable the Prime Minister was received here, to wit 11 
November (your telegram was not yet to hand) I attended a 
reception at the Swedish Legation in celebration of the King of 
Sweden's birthday and met the Right Honourable the Prime 
Minister, Mr Menzies, there .... 
58 AA, Al838!T204, 201/10/11/3, 'Extract from letter dated 24.6.53 from Mr L.S. Jatkson'. 
59 Crocker, Australian Ambassador, p. 46. 
60 Ibid., p. 59. 
61 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
62 Refer to RF. Botha's comment in Chapter Four on the pipe-spark-induced hole in one of Uys's 
despatches. 
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The Prime Minister, and I would say he is the highest authority in 
this country, completely unsolicited and unexpectedly referred to 
what had happened in New York. With striking emphasis he said 
that they (Australia) supported us and left it at that. I thanked him 
then and there just by saying 'Thank you, Sir.' The discussion then 
switched to the coming election here in Australia and comment 
that Mr Menzies made in that regard, especially about the Leader 
of the Opposition's election promises, appeared the next day in the 
press by way of a release. I mention this to show that even 
Ministers speak easily here and that I am therefore sorry that I did 
not make use of the occasion to ask the Prime Minister what he 
thought of the Union's action in New York. But as already men-
tioned, the Prime Minister disclosed unasked that he was 
completely satisfied with Australia's vote against the resolution in 
question. And, if I can help it, I do not speak of political and 
official matters when I meet members of the gov~rnrnent at 
functions. If they raise such questions first, that is naturally their 
affair.63 
That defeats the purpose of attending receptions. (See Sir Rodric Braithwaite's 
comment in the Introduction and the reference above to Cotton's conversation with 
Van Heer den.) The Belgian and Brazilian Ministers64 were less inhibited. Both raised 
the walkout with Uys at receptions, the former at the Swedish reception and the latter 
a few days later. Uys may have restricted his policy of self-denial to Cabinet Ministers. 
Even so, that was to pass up a golden opportunity to give and receive information. 
Hamilton was more sophisticated. His personal letters to Jooste - one to Louw 
- on his contacts with Robert Menzies were unquestionably attention-getters. 65 After 
all, how many heads of mission have the opportunity to commence a letter to their 
Foreign Minister: 'In the ten months that we have been here my wife and I have been 
fortunate in developing a friendly and informal relationship with the Australian Prime 
Minister and Dame Pattie Menzies. Lately we have been exchanging visits on Sunday 
evenings at our houses and last Sunday Mr Menzies and Dame Pattie had an informal 
supper with us'. 66 The letters to Jooste support the impression that the Hamiltons and 
the Menzies enjoyed a relationship of some intimacy. With exceptions, including the 
light they throw on the private Menzies, that is perhaps of more interest at this remove 
63 BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. II, Uys/SEA, 30 November 1955. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
64 ie. the diplomatic rank Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. Ministers head 
Legations, Ambassadors Embassies. 
65 The letters to Jooste that came to the writer's notice in the South African Archives were dated 10 
March 1959 (BCB, 41213211, Vol. l); 4 August 1959 (BCB, Vol. 12, 25/11); 22 April 1960 (BCB, 
Vol. 20, 32/13); 21 October 1960 (BCB, Vol. 5, 6/10 (S). There was one letter to Louw dated 31 July 
1958 (BTS, 4/2/32/l, Vol. l) which Louw had passed to the Prime Minister (Strijdom) and a minute 
Hamilton addressed to the department on 27 October 1960 (BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. III). 
66 BTS, 4/2/32/l, Vol. l, Hamilton/Louw, 31July1958. 
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than their content. An exception is the reference in the letter to Louw that when 
Menzies retired as Prime Minister he would be 'very tempted' to take the High 
Commissioner's post in South Africa. In the face of Hamilton's scepticism he said 'he 
was very interested in our affairs and . . . felt that in such a post he could be of service 
to both our countries'. He had mentioned that previously. 
Of course nothing came of it but what prevents us from dismissing the matter 
out of hand is Menzies's claim years earlier that the newly-established Australian 
legation in Washington was so important that he contemplated resigning as Prime Min-
ister in 1940 to head it.67 R.G. Casey was appointed instead. (Australian politics 
requires from those familiar with (white) South African politics a certain suspension of 
disbelief No doubt vice versa.)68 Another point of interest in the same letter is that 
Menzies believed 'a great mistake had been made in allowing India to maintain its 
Commonwealth association in 1949' (ie., when it became a republic). In retrospect, 
however, perhaps Hamilton's most interesting personal letter, dealing as it did with a 
variety of subjects including the choice of the site for the chancery, was addressed 
neither to Jooste nor Louw, but to E.J.L. Scholtz.69 
The way the originals of the formal Australian despatches are preserved - in 
bound volumes under the same general series number (A4231) - makes them readily 
accessible to modem researchers. (The rumour that the volumes in the series were 
discovered by chance in a locked room in the Department of Foreign Affairs turns out 
to be just that. )7° A list of formal Australian despatches from South Africa over the 
period 1946 to 1964 is given in Appendix V below. That they are kept together in the 
Australian Archives while the South African despatches, unindexed, are scattered over 
a multitude of files contributes to the impression of greater volume. This writer is in 
little doubt, however, that the Australian reports were indeed more numerous besides 
being more focused and better structured. If the South Africans were less focused and 
structured, that could have been because they tended to view their reporting not so 
much as information-gathering but as a ritual to which they were obliged to submit. 
67 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 121; N. Harper, A great and powerful friend: A study 
of Australian American relations between 1900 and 1975 (St. Luc.ia, Qld., 1987), p. 87; and AA, 
A3299/l, Folder 1, Notes on the news by Prof. Fred Alexander, 1.11. 72. 
68 See, eg., R. W. Parsons, 'South African Affairs: An Impression', The Australian Outlook, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, March 1952, p. 40. 
69 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
70 Ms Moira Smythe, letter, 23 May 1995. 
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Information-gathering was not mentioned in the reporting guidelines Forsyth 
issued in October 1949.71 What was required from missions was 'analysis and 
appreciation of events in the light of their international importance and relation to the 
Union's interests'. Commonwealth Relations Office telegrams and press reports 
satisfied the department's need for background information. The guidelines were not 
meant to 'discourage the submission to Head Office of useful information'. Their 
purpose was rather to bring about 'a better classification of reports and more precision 
and brevity in their preparation'. Reports should 'trace important worthwhile opinions 
or developments rather than actual events'. These should be analysed 'in the light of 
their international importance and relation to the Union's interests'. Reports should be 
'in summary form', 'as concise as possible' with individual subjects 'dealt with in 
separate Minutes'. 
In the result, South African researchers into aspects of Australian history will 
not learn much from their diplomats' contemporary reporting. South Africans who 
want to 'pin down' Australia will have to fall back on such works as D.H. Lawrence's 
Kangaroo (written during ten weeks in the country in 1922) and E.E. Kisch's 
Australian Landfall.72 One reader believed Kisch's book provided 'as much insight into 
[Australian] society' as the first-mentioned 'and more laughs'. 73 Nor should John 
Bryson's Evil Angels74 about the Chamberlain case be overlooked. One will therefore 
never know what the South Africans made of the Orr case, that most interesting and 
perhaps uniquely Australian phenomenon. (Not its basic ingredient - a professor 
accused by a female student and her father of initiating a sexual relationship with her -
but the way it developed.) It commenced in Tasmania in 1955, resonating later not 
only throughout Australian academia in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but among the 
public at large. It even achieved international dimensions - there was for some years an 
academic boycott of the Philosophy Department at the University of Tasmania where 
Orr had been professor. 75 
As with the Australians on South Africa, the South Africans were in the same 
position in respect of British reporting on Australia and they did not enjoy access to it. 
71 BTS, 91/8/1, Vol. 3, ForS)th/All Union Representatives Abroad, 31October1949. 
72 Trans. J. Fisher and I. and K. Fitzgerald. London, 1937. 
73 K.S. Inglis, 'Australia Day', Historical Studies, Vol. 13, No. 49, October 1967, p. 24. 
74 Ringwood, Vic., 1988 (l 985). 
75 For a brief reference to the Orr case see G. Bolton, The Oxford History of Australia, Vol. 5 
(Melbourne, 1990), p. 118. A recent work on the subject is C. Pybus, Gross Moral Turpitude: The Orr 
case reconsidered (Port Melbourne, 1993 ). The contemporary article material is considerable. 
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In any case, except where these suggested parallels with their own situation they were 
not especially interested in developments on the Australian domestic scene. Topics 
they covered included the government's attitude towards Communism and the 1950 
outlawing of the Communist Party which predated South Africa's own action in that 
regard, 76 the overturning of the legislation by the High Court, and the failure of the 
subsequent referendum to amend the Constitution by including in it a provision out-
lawing the Communist Party; aspects of the White Australia Policy including. the 
O'Keefe case of 1949 and the 1949 Immigration Act;77 the treatment of Aborigines; 
matters of parliamentary privilege (the Bankstown case);78 the Petrov case;79 the split 
in the Labor Party; and developments in respect of the Australia economy such as 
import control and, of course, various elections. 80 
In the matters it covered the South African reporting can be put into two cate-
gories: self-initiated and in response to specific requests from Head Office. An early 
example of the latter was Forsyth's instruction to Viljoen of 7 June 1949, the day the 
latter set foot in Australia, for an urgent report on the new uranium discoveries there. 
('It is ... of the utmost importance to us, having regard to the development work that is 
going on here, that we should have up-to-date information concerning discoveries of 
uranium in other countries, as the opening up of easily mined and cheap deposits is 
such countries may have an important bearing on the question of the exploitation of 
our own supplies'.)81 
Where South African heads of mission did tend to report in detail, particularly 
by way of the appendices which accompanied their reports, was on the speech-making 
tours they undertook periodically. The emphasis in such speeches was on points of 
similarity between the two countries82 and their historical connections including the 
76 Unlike the South African party, the Australian Communist Party was banned during the early 
stages of the Second World War, from June 1940 to December 1942. See Hasluck, The Government 
and the People, Vol. 1, Appendix 3, pp. 583-92. 
77 See, eg., BCB, Vol. 1, 6/2, Viljoen/SEA, 26 September 1949. 
78 See various items on BCB, Vol. 3, 615, Vol. III including Uys/SEA, 22 June 1955. 
79 Uys's one-and-a-half page report on Evatt's famous statement in the House of Representatives on 19 
October 1955 is completely superficial. See BCB, Vol. 3, 615, Vol. III, Uys/SEA, 29 October 1955. 
(Original in Afrikaans). Compare with Manne's treatment of the subject. R. Manne, The Petrov affair: 
Politics and e~pionage (Rushcutters Bay, NSW, 1987), pp. 258-63. 
80 In respect of elections, see Hamilton's series of three reports, of 23 October and 4 and 26 November 
1958, on the 1958 general election. BTS, 1/25/1, Vol. I. 
81 BCB, Vol. 19, 31/6 (Secret), Forsyth/Viljoen, 7 June 1949. 
82 That was also the line B.J. Schoeman followed in his radio talk on the occasion of his November 
1957 visit to Australia. See BCB, Vol. 13, 27/4 (Vol. II), 'Notes for broadcast speech by the Hon. Mr. 
BJ. Schoeman', attached to Meiring/Hamilton, 19 October 1957. 
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fact that the Australian wool industry was in a sense founded from the Cape. The white 
man's determination to maintain his position in South Africa featured prominently. As 
mentioned earlier (Chapter Four, p. 214), Hamilton saw speech-making outside 
Canberra as part of his 'chief task' - the 'political and public relations side'. ('I have 
reported regularly to the Department on my travels outside Canberra. . . . The South 
African flag has appeared in places where it had never been seen before!')83 
If the tours broke the monotony of the writers having to spend their time 
uninterruptedly in Canberra, the reports on them perhaps confirm Crocker's point that 
some reporting is intended to draw attention to the reporter. 84 However, they did not 
always land on the desks of the department's top echelon. One that went up to Jooste, 
though, was Uys's report of 7 August 1956 on his visit to Sydney inter alia to address 
the English Public Schools Association of New South Wales. Given his ethnic and 
cultural disposition, he may have felt in the presence of the enemy! 
At least for so long as the South African department could rely on receiving 
Commonwealth Relations Office material, the reporting of its diplomats was generally 
less of a priority than the need to promote the government's racial policies. That was 
part of the decades-long drive for recognition and acceptance. Suspended like a 
shadow over South African diplomacy even in the 1950s was the reality of the 
government's international situation. This had not achieved the dimensions of the 
1970s when South African missions were instructed to discontinue the practice of 
general political and economic reporting and to report exclusively on the way South 
African issues were 'playing' in individual countries. Nonetheless it was a major 
distraction. 
In Australia, apart from being there and administering themselves (see Chapter 
Six), the South Africans' principal task was to put the best possible gloss on develop-
ments in their country to the Australian 'establishment'. The idea (and propriety) of 
diplomats communicating with a mass audience through radio or television had not yet 
taken hold. (See Chapter Five.) Television in fact came to Australia only in 1956, 
shortly before the Melbourne Olympics. The audiences they reached were minute. 
Apart from Ministers and officials in Canberra, 85 they consisted inter alia of Rotary 
83 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 195:>. 
84 Many of these reports are on BTS, 4/2/32/1, Vol. 1. The twenty-four pages of notes appended to 
Uys's report on his visit to Queensland from l-9 September 1955 capture something of the flavour of 
these visits. Uys/SEA, 5 October 1955. 
85 Miss E.A. Warren of Australian External Affairs reported after a conversation with C.A. Smith, the 
South African Information Attache, her impression 'that much of his activity here will be to put the 
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Clubs in various parts of the country and the crowds at the agricultural and other 
shows they opened. Hamilton said recently that he 'became something of a specialist in 
opening the smaller agricultural shows in the outback and addressed innumerable 
Rotary Clubs and town meetings'. 86 If, therefore, the flag was seen where it had not 
been seen before, that was often in hamlets out in the Australian bush. 87 Not being a 
target of international criticism the Australians after Knowles and Stirling paid less 
attention to the public relations side of their work. In some cases they addressed only a 
few gatherings annually. Even so, they were also concerned about 'image'. 
Besides his criticism of the quality of Australian reporting, Walter Crocker 
correctly pointed out that 'the staff in Canberra [was] too Bmall for processing the 
volume of paper coming in. 88 It certainly was in respect of the material received from 
South Africa. That was not passed automatically to the top level of the department let 
alone to the political level of government. (Unlike the lengthy despatches on the local 
political scene the Canadian High Commissioner would send his head office from 
South Africa in the mid- l 940s. At least those reached the head of the department, 
Norman Robertson, who complained in 1944: 'I wish there were some means of 
curbing the prolixity of the S. Af Office. I find it very hard to read these 
despatches'. )89 Some irony therefore attaches to the fact that whatever Hamilton was 
saying to Menzies was actual and had impact, while the latter would not have been 
exposed to the detail of what his diplomats were reporting. (In short, why 
Ambassadors should ideally establish a close relationship with the head of the 
government to which they are accredited.) 
Officials in the Australian department who benefited most from their High 
Commission's reporting were those such as Killen's brother-in-law, Barrie Dexter, who 
worked on the Africa and Middle Eastern desk. It informed their submissions to senior 
staff. If there was a difference of perspective between the department and the High 
Commission or Embassy, there was also a dialogue which maintained the level of 
interest ofboth.90 
South African "Colour line" across'. AA, Al838, 201/1017, Pt. 1, Record of conversation Warren/ 
Smith, 9 July 1954. 
86 Antipodean Days, p. 2. 
87 The Australian equivalent of the South African platteland. 
88 Crocker, Australian Ambassador, pp. 58-59. 
89 Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa, pp. 102-03. 
90 See, eg., the departmental paper 'Prospects for South Africa' with the Embassy's paper of the same 
title. AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 213, Lee/Australian Embassy, Pretoria and Kevin/DEA, 
Memo. 450, 26 September 1963. 
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To counter Menzies's known liking for South Africa and South Africans, one 
External Affairs official observed to another in 1954 that it 'might be worthwhile' to 
pass him a particular Hodgson despatch because it 'might help show the South Africans 
to him in their true light!'91 The despatch concerned inter alia National Party policy 
towards the establishment of a republic. Menzies never saw the South Africans in 'their 
true light' in that sense. He had obviously also made up his mind about South Africa 
well before he met Hamilton92 and officially if not personally and privately he was as 
accessible to Viljoen, Nel and Uys as he was to Hamilton. Viljoen told Forsyth after a 
dinner at The Lodge in March 1950 that Menzies was 'one of the nicest men one can 
meet'. He had been on 'very friendly terms' with him from even before he became Prime 
Minister.93 Difficulties Viljoen had experienced in gaining access to Ministers, Evatt in 
particular, cleared up immediately on Menzies's assumption of office. Chifley, though, 
had been 'particularly accessible'.94 
Menzies's farewell letter to Viljoen suggests a relationship which transcended 
the purely formal: 'On behalf of Mrs. Menzies, my daughter and myself, I should like to 
say how warmly we have appreciated the very cordial personal relations which we 
have enjoyed with Mrs. Viljoen and yourself.' The previous year Jooste, then 
Ambassador to the United States, had, according to Viljoen, told him that 'Mr Menzies 
spoke in the most glowing terms of yourself and Mrs Viljoen and went out of his way 
to assure me how much he valued your friendship'.95 Casey's letter was couched in 
similar terms: 'If I may say so, I have received your letter with regret because it will 
mean the end of an association which has been most cordial and pleasant. Your 
position of dignity and respect in the Australian community has been most justifiably 
earned and both in the personal and official sense you will be missed at Canberra. '96 
Besides being indicative of intimacy, the content of these letters implies that heads of 
mission and ministers were thrown more into each other's company in 1950s Canberra 
than would have been the case in larger capitals. 
91 AA, Al838/2, 201/11/1, Pt.2, Handwritten note to Shaw, 10 November 1954. The despatch was 
A4231/2 Pretoria 1-16 1954, Ministerial Despatch No. 10/1954 (undated) dealing with the unveiling 
of the Kruger Statue on Church Square and Malan's retirement. 
92 His 1935 article as Commonwealth Attorney-General reveals understanding of the constitutional 
motivations of South Africa's Afrikaners vis-a-vis the British Commonwealth. See R.G. Menzies, 
'The Relations Between the British Dominions', The Australian Quarterly, No. 28, December 1935, 
pp. 5-9. 
93 BCB, Vol. 2, 615, Vol. I, Viljocn/Forsyth, 3 March 1950. 
94 Ibid., Viljoen/Fors)th, 30 September 1949; ForS)th/Viljoen, 14 October 1949; Viljoen/Forsyth, 15 
& 22 December 1949. 
95 BTS, Viljocn, Vol. 7, Viljoen/ForS)th, 29 August 1950. 
96 BTS, 4/2/32, Vol. 2, Menzics/Viljoen, 3 October 1951 and CaseyNiljoen, 21September1951. 
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Uys did not enjoy a personal relationship with Menzies but he experienced no 
difficulty in gaining access to him when Jooste instructed him to enlist the Prime 
Minister's assistance to have the Russian defector Vladimir Petrov or his wife testify at 
the Treason Trial. Menzies put him in touch with Col Charles Spry, head of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASI0).97 The Petrovs were thought to 
have first-hand knowledge of communist activity in South Africa. They declined to 
testify personally or by deposition ia. because they did not want further to provok~ the 
Soviet Union. 98 In any case, Petrov's only experience of South Africa was the few 
months he spent there in 1942 after his ship had been torpedoed and he was awaiting 
another ship to take him to London. The Australians had informed Uys of that in mid-
1955. 99 
Pursuant to instructions, Australians and South Africans prepared Post reports, 
updating them at regular intervals. The purpose of the reports was two-fold: to assist 
head office to determine the amount of the allowances payable at its missions and to 
give officers posted to a mission an idea of the conditions they could expect. The 
South African department told its missions in 194 7 that it wanted 'a complete overall 
picture of conditions at its various overseas offices'. They were required to report 
under the headings Living conditions, Social and General, covering such aspects as 
food, housing, heating, medical and dental, climate, clothing and schooling. 100 The 
Australians covered much the same ground in addition to which they were required to 
give a profile of the city where the mission was located. 101 
Whatever their value at the time, the reports are useful to researchers for the 
picture they present of the living conditions of the day, at least for diplomats resident 
in the capital cities. From them we learn, for example, the contemporary prices of a 
wide range of consumer goods. Also, for just about the entire period covered by this 
97 See various items on BCB, Vol. 12, 23/14 (S). The Petrov defection, a cause celebre in mid-1950s 
Australia, has echoed down the years. For details see Manne, The Petrov affair; also Manne, 'Is There 
an End to the Petrov Affair?', Quadrant, Vol. XXXV, No. 7-8, July-August 1991, pp. 15-21; A.W. 
Martin, 'New Light on the Petrov Affair: Evatt's Absence from the House', Quadrant, June 1995, pp. 
46-50; and J.R. Nethercote, 'New Light on the Petrov Affair: The Timing of the 1954 Election', 
· Quadrant, June 1995, pp. 50-52. 
98 BCB, Vol. 12, 23/14 (S), Note handed Uys by the head of ASIO's ACT office. 
99 AA, A9421/l, 202/3, Pt. 1, Wynes/High Commissioner, Cape Town, 1June1955. 
JOO BTS, 5417/2/1/5, Circular DA. 57-1, 4 July 1947. 
JOI AA, Al838/l, 1348/5, Circular dated 15 June 1948, signed by Burton, referring to an earlier one 
of 1945 and Administration Circular No. 99150, 9 January 1950. 
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thesis the Australian pound (£) was worth only eighty per cent of the South African 
pound. 102 Today the value of the South African rand verges on three to the Australian 
dollar. 
From 1956, apparently on its own initiative, 103 the Australian High Commission 
prepared two-part annual reports. Part A summarised developments in the mission and 
part B political developments in South Africa. Part A of the four annual reports to 
hand - 1956, 1957, 1958 and, to a lesser extent 1959 - provides a useful profile of the 
High Commission and its activities in those years. The annual South African post 
report touched on part of the ground covered by part A of the Australian reports. But 
it did not seem to have occurred to the High Commission/Embassy to send Pretoria an 
annual review. In 1962 it was instructed to do so in a twenty-six point 'shopping list' of 
the department's reporting requirements. 104 That was part of the latter's efforts to 
define its requirements in respect of each of its missions as a result of South Africa's 
departure from the Commonwealth. 105 
Canberra received an eight-page set of customised instructions signed by Uys 
which Sole probably drew up. It emphasised that the Embassy's despatches should give 
'the broad picture', eschewing details 'in favour of the trend which they collectively 
bring forth'. The 'primary object of furnishing political intelligence' was 'to enable the 
Department accurately to interpret world events with specific reference to South 
Africa's policy and interests'. Despatches that made this possible were the most helpful 
ones. 106 Notwithstanding such attempts to itemise its needs, the department was not 
particularly well-served with information from Canberra. 
More than indiscretion or altruism may lie behind the disclosure of information 
to diplomats. The sources may have in mind influencing the content of the reporting. 
Perhaps that was why Louis Esselen spoke freely to MacVeagh. During J.C.G. Kevin's 
term as Australian Ambassador South African officials such as Sole perceived him to 
report favourably 'on the development of our Bantustan policy1.1o7 They therefore did 
102 BTS, S4/7/21/5. Uys/SEA, 28 February 1995, 'Post Report: Canberra - 1955', p. 1. 
103 Gilchrist may have been behind this. In any case, he drafted the 1956, 1957 and 1958 reports. The 
last report seen by this researcher was that for 1959, prepared by Phillips, who lacked Gilchrist's flair. 
104 The first annual review was dated 11 January 1963. BCB, Vol. 2, S6/4, Woodward/Acting SEA. It 
was despatched in response to a 'reminder' dated 29 November 1962 signed by Sole. BCB, Vol. 2, 
S6/4. Vol. VII. 
105 BTS, 91/811, Vol. 13, Uys/All Heads of Mission, 24 February 1962. 
106 BCB, Vol. 2, S6/4. Vol. VII, Uys/Ambassador, Canberra, 11May1962. 
1o7 BTS, 1/25/3, Vol. I, Solc/Jooste, 2 September 1965. 
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what they could to give him access to the right sources including the Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development. In the result his reporting, though alive to its 
inadequacies, shortcomings and injustices, projected a more sympathetic and 
understanding view of apartheid, especially the 'Bantustans', than that held by some of 
his predecessors, especially Gilchrist. Kevin felt that the 'Bantustan experiment might 
succeed given time as well as greater effort'. 108 
The Africa and Middle East Branch in Canberra agreed with him. 'If the 
Government is prepared to spend more money and energy in the developing areas the 
chances of economic viability are quite good'. It was in fact conceivable that the 
Bantustans would 'eventually emerge as fully independent states'. 109 Thus Durban 
'could one day be the capital of an independent African nation in what is now the 
Republic of South Africa'110 Undoubtedly, 'given the likely continuation of white rule 
for some time - the main hope for African development lies in their acceptance (of the 
principle if not the speed and extent) of the Nationalist policy' .111 In short, both Kevin 
and the branch at that time took Verwoerdian separate development seriously. 
In effect Kevin's reporting tried to make up for what he called the South 
African's government's lack of a 'gift of communication' and its seeming incapability 'of 
putting its case to the world in its least unfavourable light'. The government could be 
expected 'because of neglect or pure maladroitness, to delineate still more precisely the 
already unhappy image it has created (and had created for it) abroad'. 112 He was 
worried about South Africa's image and devoted an early despatch to the subject. The 
image was not entirely of white South Africa's 'own making and some of the 
delineations' were inaccurate. There was 'no active race conflict, no advanced police 
state, no organised brutality and not the degree of exploitation seen in the image'. Few 
of the 'reformists outside the Republic' understood, or attempted to do so what 
apartheid was about. 'The main feature of the policy - separate development through 
the creation of Bantustans' was 'unobjectionable except on the ground of practica-
bility'. 113 
108 AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. 1, High Commission paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 6, para. 20. 
Attached to Memo. 450, Kevin/DEA, 26 September 1963. 
109 AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. I, Departmental general paper 'Prospects for South Africa', Summary. 
Attached to Memo. 213, Lee/Australian Embassy, Pretoria, 2 September 1963. 
110 Ibid., Departmental general paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 6. 
11 I Ibid., p. 7. 
112 AA, A9421/l, 201/I, Pt. 1, High Commission paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 13, para. 53. 
113 A4231/2, 1961/62, Kevin/Barwick, No. 10/62, 28 December 1962, 'The South African Image', p. 
1, paras. 1, 3. 
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He commented negatively on the Myrdal report, so named after Mrs Alva 
Myrdal who chaired the Group of Experts appointed in terms of the Security Council's 
resolution of 4 December 1963. 114 He said it contained 'many emotive passages and 
some which disguise the facts'. It was 'a threatening and, in a number of respects, a 
dishonest document' which seemed to be 'directed not towards soliciting South African 
co-operation but instead towards ensuring South African rejection and towards 
bringing further pressure on Britain and the United States, the Republic's main trading 
partners'. 115 Be that as it may, three decades later the principal features of the report 
were to achieve something of an echo in the South African political and constitutional 
settlement. 
Kevin's reporting reflected the conventional wisdom of the time. A 
contemporary myth about the South African past was that of the 'empty land' into 
which white and black moved practically simultaneously in the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What seemed to support it was that white and 
black as opposed to white and Khoikhoi or San first encountered each other in strength 
at the Fish River in the Eastern Cape in the course of the eighteenth century. An article 
of faith in National Party circles, the myth was often cited as moral justification for the 
white man's presence in Southern Africa. It is not clear whether National Party 
spokesmen invented it. If so, it was remarkably effective propaganda because it was 
widespread in the 1950s. 
Variations of the myth are to be found inter alia in such diverse documents as 
the report of the Santa Cruz Commission, 116 British diplomatic reporting117 and a New 
Zealand background paper prepared for the 1953 Prime Ministers' conference.ll 8 
Gilchrist held in 1957 that it was 'true that when the first White settlers arrived at the 
Cape in 1652 the Bantu were probably still up around Lake Nyasa and that sustained 
114 UN Doc. S/5471, 4 December 1963, in SCOR, 18th year, Sup. for October, November and 
December 1963, pp. 103-05 and UN Doc. S/5658, 20 April 1964, Annex, in SCOR, 19th year, Sup. 
for April, May and June 1964, pp. 22-43. 
llS A4231/2, Africa and Middle East, 1964, Kevin/Gorton, No. 7/64, 3 June 1964, 'The Myrdal 
Report', Summary and p. 3, para. 15. 
116 GAOR, Eighth Sess., Sup. No. 16 (A/2505 & A/2505/Add. 1), 'Report of the United Nations 
Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa', pp. 37-39. 
ll? Liesching/Home, No. 12, 12 June 1958, p. 1, paras. 2•3, attached to AA, A9421, 20217, Memo. 
393, Gilchrist/DEA, 20 June 1958. 
118 AA, Al838/2, 201/2/5/4, Pt. 1, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 5 May 1953, 'Prime 
Ministers' Conference, London, Apartheid Policies in South Africa: Background details'. 
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contact between the Europeans and Bantu did not occur until around 130 years later, 
in the eastern Cape'. 119 Sir Percivale Liesching, the British High Commissioner, stated 
categorically in a section of his 12 June 1958 report (prepared by Oliver Wright, a First 
Secretary on his stafl)120 he called 'The Native Problem', that the southern part of 
Africa was virtually empty when the white man arrived. Consequently 'he had as much 
right' to be there 'as the Bantu who were themselves immigrants from Central Africa'. 
The New Zealand document went further, holding that the Africans of the Union. had 
less 'claim to be native than most of the whites since they came there later'. 
Thus Kevin was in good company when he relied on a magazine article by 
Professor Repke of the Graduate School of International Studies, Geneva, in support 
of his argument that South Africa could not be treated in isolation simply as a moral 
issue. The whites had 'not merely a doubtful right to the land which they settled and 
brought to prosperity, but, rather, are justified in owning and controlling it. When the 
Europeans, setting out from the Cape, began to undertake their settlements in the 
middle of the 17th century, they came to a practically empty country at approximately 
the same time as the Bantu tribes from Central Africa arrived in South Africa from the 
opposite direction•.121 
Monica Wilson of the University of Cape Town was an early questioner of the 
myth. She demonstrated in 1959 that it rested on insubstantial foundations. 122 For 
Bantu settlement of, for example, the Transkei and Ciskei, predated white settlement at 
the Cape by centuries. Commenting on her work D.V. Cowen, Professor of 
Comparative Law at the same university, said later that the claim white and black had 
arrived in the country simultaneously was 'a piece of myth-making conjured up to 
support apartheid'. 123 He and Wilson were reacting to reports of Eric Louw's statement 
opening the Tenth Annual Congress of SABRA in 1959.124 They were not aware how 
widespread the myth really was. 
119 AA, Al832/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, Memo 269, Gilchrist/DEA, 28 April 1958, Annexure B, p. 3. 
120 Wright had a very successful career, at its conclusion spending six years (1982-88) as Ambassador 
to the United States in succession to Sir Nicholas Henderson. 
121 AA, A4231/2, Africa and Middle East, 1964, Kevin/Hasluck, No. 10/64, 20 August 1964, 'South 
Africa as a moral issue', p. 4, para. 16(a). 
122 
'The early history of the Transkei and Ciskei',African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1959, pp. 167-79. 
123 D.V. Cowen, The Foundations of Freedom with Special Reference to Southern Africa (Cape 
Town, 1961), p. 35. 
124 Die Burger, l April 1959. 
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There was less for Kevin's predecessors to be sympathetic about. Verwoerd 
had yet to embark upon his grand design and apartheid was as Malan described it in his 
'widely published'125 five page letter to the Reverend John Piersma of Oakdale 
Christian Reformed Church, Grand Rapids, Michigan, in 1954. South African 
diplomats touted this as 'the first official statement on the policy of apartheid'. 126 Malan 
had referred to the 'deep-rooted colour consciousness of the White South Africans' and 
the 'impenetrable armour' of 'racial purity and self-preservation' with which they. had 
surrounded themselves. If they 'had succumbed to the temptation of assimilation, they 
would have been submerged in the Black heathendom of Africa as effectively as if they 
had been completely annihilated'. That was the basis of Apartheid. He went on to 
expound 'another and more positive aspect [of] this creed\ All of this drew from 
K.C.O. Shann the comment 'Sometimes I think it's not so much what Malan is trying to 
do as the awful way he tries to justify it. •121 
Even so, some of Kevin's predecessors were sympathetic and they saw the two 
countries more or less as Paul Sauer had depicted them in 1952. ('I found in Australia 
... keen sympathy and understanding of the Australians towards South Africa's efforts 
at keeping the southern part of South Africa white, just as Australia on the southern 
fringe of Asia aims at keeping the continent European'. See Chapter Three above - p. 
161). J.P. Quinn said after his one year term as Acting High Commissioner: 
In many ways the problems of South Africa and Australia are 
similar. In Australia we face the need to preserve our civilisation 
and the homogeneity of our people in an area inhabited by 
populations of different race whose living standards are lower than 
ours. South Africa's problem is more direct insofar as the 
populations which threaten her cultural security are within her 
own borders and playing a vital part in the economy of the 
country. 128 
He also believed that 'experiments m the reserves aimed at increasing native 
responsibilities in the administration' were of interest to Australia in relation to its 
administration of New Guinea.129 
125 Munger, South African Foreign Policy, p. 88. 
126 AA, Al838/l, 201/2/5, Pt. 4, Handwritten note to Secretary, 1 April 1954. 
127 AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 3, Malan/Piersma, 12 February 1954; Shann/Hickey, handwritten 
note, 12 April 1954. 
128 AA, Al838ffl84, 20117/1, Pt. 1, Quinn/Mcintyre, Notes on South Africa, 22 August 1952. p. 4, 
para. 13. 
129 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, Quinn/Mcintyre, 22 August 1952. 
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Quinn's successor, Kelly, also came down firmly on the side of the white man 
as he was to do later in respect of the Portuguese in Timer. 130 He cautioned that a 
paper by Muriel Horrell of the South African Institute of Race Relations131 should 'be 
used with considerable discretion'. For it emanated 'from the chief centre in the Union 
opposed [to] the apartheid policy of the present Government'. Horrell 'made many 
comments in the course of her paper which an objective student would find difficult in 
supporting'. 132 Reporting the same day ( 19 August 1954) on 'Apartheid in legislation 
and practice', he claimed that almost all of the government's measures 'to implement 
the principle of apartheid [were] developments of legislation enacted by previous 
national and provincial governments in the Union'. Many of the apartheid laws dated 
back 'to the legislation of the old South African Colonies or Republics'. 
Opposition to apartheid came more from 'the large capitalist groups' who were 
'chiefly concerned with retaining a continuous supply of Native labour and only to a 
lesser degree from liberally-minded Europeans and radically-minded Africans, Indians 
and Coloureds'. There were grounds for believing that about 95 per cent of the 
European electorate in South Africa is firmly convinced that there should be two South 
Africas, a White South Africa and a Black South Africa'. 133 It was also Kelly who 
contradicted the assumption of the English-language press that foreign diplomats in 
South Africa were automatically reporting unfavourably about the government. 134 
The 'pre-Gilchrist' Australians were not alone in finding apartheid or aspects of 
it unexceptionable around that time. In 1956 H.S.H. Stanley of the British High 
Commission sent a colleague in the Commonwealth Relations Office a five-and-a-half 
page exposition of the Group Areas Act. He advised him to treat 'with reserve' 
statements 'about the hardship and dislocation' that the Act had 'inflicted on the 
different sections of the population' .135 
130 Juddery, At the Centre, p. 101. 
131 AA, Al838/l, 20112/5, Pt. 5, M. Horrell, 'Non-European policies in the Union, and the measure of 
their success', RR. 43/1954, March 1954. 
132 Ibid., Memo. 284, Kelly/DEA, 19 August 1954. 
133 Jbid., Memo. 283, Kelly/DEA, 19 August 1954. 
134 AA, Al838/2, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Kelly/Kevin, 23 May 1952. 
135 Stanley/Jasper, 18 October 1956, p. 5, para. 11. Copy on AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 5. At the 
UN, this acquired the status of a British delegation paper, being circulated without indication of its 
origins under the heading 'Unofficial C.R.O. note on Group Areas Act (Question of Indians in South 
Africa) From U.K. Delegation informally 7/1157, UNGA XI'. A copy is on Al838/l, 20112/5, Pt. 6. 
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Quinn warned against 'buying into the Indian business'136 but Marshall and 
Kelly did so to the extent that they accepted the South African government's view of 
India's foreign policy objectives. Marshall claimed that 'the lands adjacent to the 
western shores of the Indian Ocean [South Africa, the Rhodesias, East Africa and 
Mauritius] are now serving India as an outlet for a considerable portion of her surplus 
population [which] may lead in time to a demand by India for political control of large 
areas of Southern Africa'. 137 That was the conventional white South African wisdom of 
the day shared by government and parliamentary opposition alike. 138 And not only by 
them. None other than Mahatma Gandhi's son, Manilal, associated himself with it. 'To-
day India is more in need of South Africa than South Africa is of India. India has not 
been able to make South Africa feel the pinch of her needs not being supplied whereas 
South Africa is making India feel the pinch. India is badly in need of outlets for her 
surplus population which is a great need and that has been met in comparatively a large 
degree by South Africa. '139 
Malan said that more than once in the House of Assembly. He also claimed that 
Nehru wanted the whites out of Africa and he blamed him for the 1952 passive 
resistance campaign. 140 Strijdom told the House in 1955 that 'Nehru has two great 
objects. The one is ... to oust all the Whites from Asia; and in the second place to oust 
all the Whites from Africa . . . it is quite clear that he regards Africa as a dumping 
ground for the superfluous population of India. Hence the continuous infiltration of 
Indians in the various parts of Africa'. 141 That attracted a sceptical comment from the 
Australian High Commission in New Delhi: 'From here it is difficult to imagine anyone, 
let alone a man of intelligence enjoying access to adequate sources of information, 
believing that Mr. Nehru regards Africa as an area for the disposal of India's surplus 
population; but that is what Mr. Strijdom is reported to have told the South African 
Parliament. •142 
136 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Memo. 83, Marshall/DEA, 3 April 1950. 
137 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, 'For the Secretary and the Minister', M.H. Marshall, 30 January 
1952, para. 5. 
138 See HA Deb., Vol. 68, 12 May 1949, Col. 5666 for the opposition's view as expressed by 
Waterson. 
139 Indian Opinion, Vol. XL VII, No. 16, 22 April 1949. ('My visit to India'). Douglas Mitchell 
referred to this in the House of Assembly. HA Deb., Vol. 68, 11May1949, Col. 5580. 
140 HA Deb., Vol. 82, 11 August 1953, Col. 1327 and Vol. 85, 4 May 1954, Col. 4494-95. 
141 Ibid., Vol. 88, 18 April 1955, Col. 4024.; AA, Al838/2, 169/11/128, Pt. 1, Hodgson/Casey, 22 
April 1955. 
142 AA, Al838/2, 169/111128, Pt. 1, 28 April 1955, Memo. 541, Acting High Commissioner/DEA, 28 
April 1955. 
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Kelly said of local Indians: 'it is unquestionable that South African subjects of 
Indian origin are endeavouring to do their utmost to influence Bantu opinion against 
Europeans in the Union, and not only in the Union'. 143 It was, however, 'perhaps 
indicative of Hindu shrewdness that few, if any, of the wealthy Indians of Natal appear 
to have chosen to risk imprisonment by participating in the passive resistance 
movement'. 144 Not merely were 'the Indian residents of Eastern and Southern Africa ... 
concerned with a campaign for the acquisition of political rights within the existing 
political structures of this part of Africa', they were 'even more concerned with taking 
action to ensure that Eastern and Southern Africa will come, in the long run, under the 
hegemony of the Republic of India.' 145 Walter Crocker, then Australian High 
Commissioner in New Delhi, commented sarcastically: 'Mr. Kelly has the advantage 
over me of being in Africa and of being able to see at first hand what is going on. 
Presumably he has collected and analysed the relevant facts to justify so severe a 
conclusion.' He went on to demonstrate that Kelly had indeed failed to collect and 
analyse the facts, concluding: 
One of the most significant facts of the situation is that the recent 
policy in South Africa, having adopted a blanket attitude to 
peoples of non-European colour, has achieved the miracle of 
uniting African to African, of uniting Muslims and Hindus and 
outcastes to one another under the generic name of Indian, and of 
uniting these 'Indians' with Africans. It has also achieved the 
stroke of passionately interesting the Government of India and the 
Government of Pakistan in the fate of all these coloured peoples 
and of bringing them together on the question. The further 
miracle, of bringing Eastern and Southern Africa within the 
hegemony of India, however, does not seem to me to be within 
sight yet. 146 
It is difficult to fault his logic, though he was saying two years later: 
what Indians ... don't realize is the cumulative effect of Indian 
statements and attitudes on both the Europeans and the Africans 
in Africa .... Nehru and Company, do not want to drive the Euro-
peans out of Africa. But it is not altogether unnatural that many 
Europeans (who in Africa already live under the shadow of a great 
fear) should think that they do want to drive the Europeans out 
and even ... to take the place of the Europeans.1 47 
143 AA, Al838/2, 201121512, Pt. 2, Memo. 146, Kelly/DEA, 17 May 1952. 
144 Ibid., Memo. 276, 25 July 1952. 
145 Ibid., Memo. 233, Kelly/DEA, 2 July 1952. 
146 Ibid., Memo. 569, Stuart/DEA, 21 July 1952. 
147 Ibid., 169/11/128, Pt. 1, W.R. Crocker, Minute 'India and Africa', 21August1954. 
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So perhaps white South Africans were not entirely unjustified in their perceptions. 148 
(Such allegations of course also lent themselves to party political propaganda). 
Quite likely with an eye to the calibre of the political appointees United States 
administrations sent to represent them in Australia from the 1950s to the present day, 
Edwards calls the career diplomats who did so in the 1930s and 1940s 'highly trained 
observers'. 149 That may be another of the myths attaching to diplomacy. While the best 
diplomats are no doubt good observers, many are not noticeably so. White South 
African foreign service officers were never given any special training in that regard. 
Whatever his training Rudolf Asmis, German Consul-General in Sydney from 1932 to 
1939, was a keen observer of the Australian scene. In 1935 he reported on Aboriginal 
policy, drawing 'upon the data, observations and opinions which formed the core of 
public and academic debate at that time'. For his sources he maintained 'manifold 
contacts ... with anthropologists, missionaries, officials, merchants and cattle dealers' 
who made up 'the small group of people concerned with the research on, the 
conversion, social welfare and exploitation of the Aborigines'. 150 
Despite the nature of the government he represented and the immediate 
inspiration for his report - an instruction of 24 April 193 3 to German missions abroad 
for material on discrimination in countries which protested Germany's 'Jewish boycott' 
- Asmis produced a good report. In fact, if it were not for its associations, it could 
almost serve as a model of what old style foreign service reporting was about. For 
penetration and depth it was not equalled by Australian or South African reporting in 
the 1940s and 1950s. 
Diplomats with time on their hands sometimes compose pieces about the 
'national character' of their country of accreditation. Decades after the event these 
probably have more impact on the academics and journalists of the country concerned 
than they had on the original recipients. It says something about the nature of 
Australian society that the national character is a matter of ongoing concern and has 
formed the subject of at least one influential doctoral thesis, Russel Ward's The 
148 On his return from one of his trips as 'roving ambassador' Te Water told Stirling that 'India was 
suffering from lack of "Lebensraum" and her population, increasing by five million annually, was 
spilling westwards all over the Indian Ocean'. AA, Al838/2, 774, Pt. 1, I. 3822, 3818, 8 March 1949. 
149 P.G. Edwards, ed., Australia through American Eyes: Observations by American Diplomats (St. 
Lucia, Qld., 1979), p. 3. 
150 K. Kwiet & 0. Reinhardt, 'A "nazi" assessment of Australian racial policy from 1935', The 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1989, pp. 388-89. 
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Australian Legend. First published in 1958, this has so far gone through three editions 
and many re-printings.151 In June 1962, after two years in Australia, Frank Snowden 
Hopkins, United States Consul-General in Melbourne, sent the State Department a 
thirty-six page, single-spaced assessment of the 'Australian character, psychology and 
attitudes'. As mentioned in the Preface above he had once been associated with the 
State Department's Foreign Service Institute. 
Dr J.M. Siracusa, an American academic at the University of Queensland, 
discovered a copy of this despatch in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 
Boston, Massachusetts in the 1980s and published it as an article under the title 'In 
search of the Australian character'. 152 A related news item held that the State 
Department had classified the despatch 'believing parts of it would not help US-
Australian relations' and that Dr Siracusa obtained its release with 'some difficulty'.153 
If that was the case, it was probably due to the fact that the thirty-year rule still had 
eight years to run before the document would have been released in the normal course 
of events. 
Hopkins touched on such aspects as general characteristics; the 'mateship' con-
cept; 154 segregation of the sexes on social occasions; attitudes towards Europeans and 
Asians; the Common Market issue; and 'the Australian dream'. The latter, he thought, 
was 'a dream of demographic and economic development as a North Atlantic white 
man's civilization in the South Pacific'. Australians saw their country as 'an outpost of 
the Western world'. If it was to remain so 'they must populate it with immigrants of 
European stock'. Australians felt that they were 
flying the flag for the white race in dangerous proximity to the 
colored hordes of Asia. And they also feel that what they are doing 
is wholly in the interests of the other white nations, and deserves 
European and American support. They make an unconscious 
assumption that we of the North Atlantic countries are as color 
conscious and as race conscious as they are themselves. They are 
prejudiced in our favor because we are white, and they assume that 
151 R. Ward, The Australian Legend. Melbourne, 1989 (1958). 
152 J.M. Siracusa, 'In search of the Australian character', World Review (Australia), Vol. 23, No. 4, 
October 1984, pp. 4-30. I am grateful to Dr Siracusa for sending me a copy of the original despatch. 
Dated 13 June 1962, it was titled 'Australian Character, Psychology and Attitudes: A Personal 
Interpretation.' The quotations are to be found at pp. 24, 31 of the original and pp. 20, 26-27 of the 
article. 
153 The Age (Melbourne), 10 January 1985. ('News Diary: A delicate Melbourne essay.') 
154 Close, non-homosexual relationships between males, thought to have originated in the nineteenth 
century outback or rural areas. Ward supplies examples of the phenomenon in The Australian Legend. 
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we should be equally prejudiced in their favor because they are 
white . 
. . . this kind of thinking .... has its correspondences, no doubt, with 
the attitudes of European populations in Algeria, Rhodesia, and 
the Republic of South Africa. The obvious difference is that in 
Australia the besieged whites are in total and undisputed 
possession of a large territory, and intend to keep all non-whites at 
arm's length. 
The Australian attitude toward Asians was 'most ambivalent'. The 'typical Australian' 
definitely wanted to keep Australia 'a white man's country', and was not 'even too 
happy with the migrants from Southern Europe he has admitted in such large numbers 
since 1945'. 155 
One will search the Australian and South African Archives in vam for 
despatches of a similar kind by Australians on South Africans or vice versa. In fact, but 
for isolated references in individual documents, the South Africans do not appear to 
have addressed the character issue at all. One thinks in that regard of Hamilton's 
fleeting reference to the 'tall poppy' syndrome which Australians themselves see as a 
national characteristic. He called it 'the tendency, so marked in the Australian 
character, to drag everyone down to a uniform level in the public estimation'. 156 His 
observations about Australian reactions to the Sharpeville shootings may likewise be 
pertinent, striking as they do a chord with South African diplomats who served in 
Australia at a later date and in respect of other issues: 
These have been bad weeks for South Africa in this country. The 
torrents of abuse and self-righteous denunciation have been almost 
unbelievable: from the press, churches, universities and, 
inevitably, the trade union movement. The ABC news services 
have been so partial and hostile in their selection of news that at 
times one has found it hardly bearable to turn on the radio.1s7 
1 ss This last is part of the 'wogs begin at Calais' syndrome. The Australian-born have tended in the 
past to ref er to non-English or Irish immigrants as 'wogs'. In the late 1980s there was an incident in 
the Australian parliament involving the use of the word. An ALP Senator from Queensland allegedly 
called a Parliament House barmaid such when she corrected his pronunciation of 'Riesling', a wine 
dispensed by the glass in the non-Members bar. (He had asked for 'Riseling'.) The Opposition not 
unnaturally drew attention to the incident. The unfortunate Senator compounded his error in a 
statement of personal explanation. He denied calling the barmaid a 'wog' because she was obviously 
an Australian-born person. While the word was not part of his current vocabulary, he said he had 
previously applied it to immigrants! Historic Senate Hansard, 29 September 1988, pp. 1021, 1027. 
See also The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 September and 1 October and The Canberra Times; 30 
September 1988. I am indebted to Ms Lisa Gates and Ms Sylvia Mackay for this material. 
lS6 BTS, 4/2/32/1, Hamilton/Jooste, 4 August 1959. 
157 BCB, Vol. 20, 32/13, Hamilton/Jooste, 22 April 1960. 
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Perhaps it would have been better if South African diplomats had tried to analyse the 
Australian character. The course of bilateral relations in the 1970s and 1980s could 
then have come as less of a surprise to them and their department. 
Gilchrist seems to have been the only Australian who tackled the character 
issue. His views were not consolidated in one document but scattered over several 
including post reports, annual reports and material he prepared on his return to 
Canberra. His hand can be detected in the 1959 post report. This called Pretoria/Cape 
Town a pleasant post for an officer without dependents 'unless he is troubled by the 
possession of a liberal humanitarian conscience'.158 The report resorted to stereotypes: 
Compared with the 'average Australian', many White South Afri-
cans seem physically softer, emotionally more tense, quicker tem-
pered, rather less efficient and less capable of taking new initia-
tives, but more politically-minded, and more inclined to appeal to 
history and to hark back to what their forefathers did. By com-
parison, Australians tend to be relaxed in attitude, and more 
empirical, individualistic, egalitarian and libertarian in their phi-
losophy, and to show more optimism about their future.1 59 
Though South Africa was a powder-keg, Australian officers 'need have no qualms 
about bringing their families to live in Pretoria or Cape Town, within the next two or 
three years at least, and perhaps for a good deal longer'. 160 
Gilchrist's views contradicted the (English-speaking) white South African 
belief, which persists to this day, that Australians 'are just like us'. The post report held 
that 'Australia is regarded by White South Africans as a friendly and fortunate country, 
whose people are "just like South Africans", but whose life without servants, they 
think, must be very arduous'. 161 Gilchrist had said in briefing notes on B.J. Schoeman's 
visit in 1957: 
There is a widespread notion among White South Africans that 
'Australians think and feel just like South Africans'; differences in 
158 AA, Al838/l, 1348/5, Post Report: South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) February 1959, p. 1. 
He drew on the post report for his later paper 'Living in South Africa' dated 11 April 1960. A copy is 
on Al838/1, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1. 
159 Post Report: South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) February 1959, p. 2. See also the record of 
his conversation with Crouch, attached to AA, Al838/l, 201110/6, Pt. 1, Memo. 367, Gilchrist/DEA, 
19 July 1957. 
160 Post Report: South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town) February 1959, p. 7. 
161 Jbid., p 3. 
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outlook due to one country having a White proletariat and the 
other a Black proletariat are scarcely imagined; the irritation 
aroused in some Australian visitors to South Africa by the sloth, 
inefficiency, self-pity, 'softness', and lack of a sense of common 
fraternity in many White South Africans is not generally known in 
the Union. 162 
He referred on another occasion to 'the widespread South African failing of self-
deception and wishful thinking'.163 
Not all Australians would have agreed with him. T.C. Cowdrey, the leader of a 
large trade mission to South Africa in 1968 said on his return that South Africans were 
'so much like Australians it's hard to tell the difference'. 164 Gilchrist's colleague J.P. 
Quinn, observed after his year-long tour of duty in South Africa (1951-52) that 'there 
are many temperamental affinities between South Africans and Australians who usually 
"get on" well'. 165 In any case, the perception today of white South African immigrants 
to Australia is of people who work harder than native born Australians and who, of all 
immigrant communities, make perhaps the most significant contribution to Australian 
national life. It has been said of South Africans that they 'are the best educated and 
most highly skilled migrants Australia has seen'. 166 Be that as it may, if stereotypes like 
comparisons are odious, they can be amusing. Gilchrist's observation a few months 
after his return to Australia that South African whites needed not political advice but 
'psychiatric treatment' falls into that category.167 
If Australian official and public perceptions of South Africa tilted towards the 
negative as early as the 1940s and 1950s, 168 South African officials were caught in a 
time-warp about Australia. Apart from the restrictive guidelines, that may have related 
to the quality of the reporting the department received from its High Commission and 
Embassy. It is also possible that what reached it was not, after Hamilton, passed auto-
matically to senior officials. Reference was made in Chapter Four to Woodward's 
162 AA, Al838/l, 716/50/6/1, Pt.2, Annex to Memo. 541, 19 October 1957, p. 1. 
163 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 733, Gilchrist/DEA, 17 September 1958, p. 3, para. 10. 
164 Quoted by K. Good, 'The Intimacy of Australia and South Africa', The African Review, Vol. 2, No. 
3, 1972, p. 417. 
165 AA, Al838/Tl84, 20117/1, Pt. 1, 'For Mr. Mcintyre: Notes on South Africa', 22 August 1952. 
166 See The Australian, 22 June 1995 ('The new Voortrekkers'); The Bulletin (Australia), 7 April 
1992, pp. 24-26. 
167 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, 'South Africa: United Nations and Apartheid', 22 July 1959, para. 
2. Note from Gilchrist to Munro and Hill of the UN Branch. 
168 For instance, South Africa was described in The Canberra Times editorial of 15 November 1948 
as 'A danger to democracy'. 
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initiative in 1963 to secure acceptance of a Military Attache. Negotiations extended 
over several months. While they were in progress Kevin called on Sole for a tour 
d'horizon. In the course of it he asked 'whether he had heard much from Woodward, 
expecting that he might mention Woodward's discussion in Canberra about a South 
African Military Attache'. Sole replied that 'they had not had much from Woodward 
except a useful paper on Malaysia'. He did not mention the Military Attache. 169 
Sole's week-long visit to Australia in 1967 was also referred to in Chapter 
Four. He commented in his report: 'Even a fleeting visit to Australia brings home to 
any South African the extent of the similarities between Australia and the Republic, 
between our respective peoples and between the problems which both countries face in 
varying degree. Both countries are outposts of Western civilisation in Continents 
which have a very different orientation.'170 One detects in this a hint of Sir Ralph 
Cilento's views on the occasion of his May 1966 visit to South Africa: 
Australia's former indifference to South Africa, which was based 
on ignorance of the true situation here, is giving way to strong 
feelings of 'comradeship'. We have suddenly realised that there is 
great similarity between the problems facing both our countries. 
We are both European communities at the southern extremities of 
the world and both have to the north of us big non-White 
populations. I think the time has come for our two governments to 
get together for discussions in the economic, political and strategic 
fields. 171 
Visitors, especially sponsored ones, often felt the need to 'sing for their supper', into 
which category Cilento's reported remarks obviously fall: 
The fact that prominent Australians from time to time gave vent to such 
sentiments unreflective of the views of their government tended to confirm South 
African officials in their own attitudes. In any event, Sole's comments revealed that he 
had not moved beyond Hamilton's 1959 motivation of the Military Attache's post 
(which he would not have been aware of because he was Minister to Austria at the 
time). That is, the countries were white bastions which gave their 'strategic positions ... 
fundamental points of similarity': 'We are determined to maintain a white nation at the 
169 AA, A9421/l, 202/1, Pt. 1, p. 2, Record of conversation Kevin/Sole, 28 May 1963, para. 4. 
170 BTS, 1125/3, Vol. 2, 'Visit to Australia, May 4-11, 1967: Some Notes and Impressions', pp. 9-10. 
171 The Star (Johannesburg), 11 May 1966. Cilento was an expert of tropical medicine as well as a 
political commentator. He had been Director of the UN Department of Social Affairs. 
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foot of the African continent; the Australians must survive in an Asian environment'. 172 
In fact, neither Sole nor Hamilton had progressed beyond Sauer's view of fifteen years 
before. As Kevin said in 1963, 'The White South African tends to equate the Australian 
position at the bottom of Asia with his own in Africa'. 173 
In 1966, the year Harold Holt became Prime Minister, the Liberal/Country 
Party government liberalised the White Australia Policy as a first step towards 
abandoning it altogether. 174 Yet Sole could write almost halfway through the following 
year: 'Australia remains wedded to the "White Australia" policy, although this cannot 
be admitted publicly' .175 A background document prepared in the South African 
Department of External Affairs for official and semi-official participants in the 1967 
South African Airways' inaugural flight, whose number included Sole, contained the 
sentence: 'Australia and South Africa are thus clearly and consciously identified with 
the West in the conduct of their foreign relations and are concerned with the 
maintenance of Western civilization, standards and culture' .176 Sole personally 
contributed to the document the passage: 
While Australia is an anti-Communist bastion in Asia just as 
South Africa is an anti-Communist bastion in Africa, their 
common interest in the Indian Ocean provides a link and a basis 
for co-operation which will become of steadily increasing 
importance in the years ahead. Australians too are not unmindful 
of the strategic value of South Africa in the event of their current 
shipping and air links to Europe via the Middle East being 
endangered. 177 
Nothing in Sole's account displays perceptiveness about Australian foreign 
policy imperatives in the mid to late 1960s. It was seen in Chapter Three that by 1963 
the Australian armed services had begun to discount South Africa's strategic 
importance to Australia. And not only the services. The paper 'Prospects for South 
Africa', prepared by the Africa and Middle East Branch of the Department of External 
Affairs, stated categorically the same year that 'The airfields and facilities in the 
Republic of South Africa are of no direct strategic significance to Australia as there are 
172 BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1 (alternatively BTS, Vol. 229, 112515, Vol. I), Hamilton/SEA, 20 November 1959. 
173 AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. I, High Commission paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 10, para. 42. 
174 H.S. Albinski, Australian Policy under Labor: Content, Process and The National Debate (St 
Lucia, Qld., 1977), pp. 19-20. 
175 BTS, 1/25/3, Vol. 2, 'Visit to Australia, May 4-11, 1967: Some Notes and Impressions', p. 6 (g). 
176 Ibid., 'Supplement: Australia and South Africa', p. 3. 
177 Ibid., handwritten corrections by Sole on draft 'Australia and South Africa', p. 3. 
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adequate alternate routes to Europe'. 178 There is also nothing to suggest Sole recalled 
Woodward's warning in a personal letter two years earlier that Australians resented 
'any suggestion that the white Australia policy and apartheid [had] anything in 
common' .179 
In keeping with the traditional interest in diplomatic gossip, the Australians and 
the South Africans both displayed a somewhat morbid curiosity about the structure and 
personnel of the other's head office. In the 1950s that probably applied more to the 
former than to the latter. 180 As early as July 1947 Knowles was reporting on the 
movements of such relatively junior officials as B.G. Fourie, A.M. Hamilton, R. Jones, 
W.C. Naude and D.B. Sole. 181 On the South African side, extending even to the De-
cember 1943 examination paper for aspirant Cadets, 182 Sole and Jones had supplied 
Pretoria from war-time London with a reasonably detailed account of the Australian 
Diplomatic Cadet Scheme which Evatt and Hodgson had devised at the end of 1942. 
From time to time both missions sent their head offices on request or otherwise details 
of the other's scales of pay and allowances. 183 
In 1957 and 1960, 184 the Australians drew up and forwarded to Canberra 
organisational charts of the South African department (which the South Africans now 
call by the unlovely name 'organigrams'). Gilchrist supplemented his 1957 chart with 
brief descriptions of senior officials. In some cases, including his attempts at their 
Christian names or nicknames, his comments would raise a smile on the faces of those 
with first hand knowledge of the people;18s in others he had the facts wrong. Mostly he 
was on the mark. He said he had insufficient information about H.P. Martin, D.C.M. 
178 AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. 1, Departmental general paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 14. 
179 BTS, 4/2/32/2, Vol. 1, Woodward/Sole, 13 April 1965, p. 3. 
180See, however, BTS 1/25/8, Vol. 1, Nel/SEA, 2 March 1951. ('Re-organisation of the Australian 
Department of External Affairs'). A copy is on BCB, Vol. 4, 6/5/1 SR 
l81 AA, A4231/2, Pretoria 1-91 1947, No. 61/47, 22 July 1947. 
182 BTS 1/25/8, Vol. 1, Jones/SEA, Pretoria, 17 September 1943 and 11 August 1944. To the latter 
were attached a press notice inviting applications, a memorandum on the working of the scheme after 
it had been in operation for two years and a copy of the 18 December 1943 entrance examination. 
183 See, for example, BCB, Vol. 4, 6/5/1 SR, Viljoen/SEA, 16 November 1949. ('Salary and Allowan-
ces - Australian Foreign Service Personnel') and other correspondence on that file; AA, A1838/l, 
1348/5/1, 'Department of External Affairs, Pretoria. Cadetships in the Union's Diplomatic and Con-
sular Service', n.d.; 'Diplomatic and Consular Service', n.d.; 'Extra-territorial Allowances payable to 
members of the Union's Diplomatic Service when serving outside the borde:s of the Union', circa 
March 1953; 'The South African Foreign Service', 23 September 1953; and BTS 24/2, Kelly!Taljaard, 
10 February 1953 and related items on that file. 
184 Attached to AA, Al838/l, 1348/5/1, Memo. 585, Brook/SEA, 27 October 1960. 
185 W.C. Naude was not 'Christopher' but Christiaan and M.I. Botha was not 'Tees' but Thys, short for 
Matthys. 
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van der Merwe and J. Fourie to express an opinion and he did not refer to the depart-
ment's administrative staff with whom he presumably had no contact. 
Political (~ Section 
3July1957186 
UNION DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 
Minister of External Affairs 
(The Hon. Eric H. Louw) 
Secretary for External Affairs 
(G.P. Jooste) 
I. Political and Economic (General) Branch) 
Under-Secretary for External Affairs 
(Dr. W.C. Naude} 
Political and Economic Organisations 
Assistant Secretary 
(M.l. Botha, Counsellor) 
Political (West) Section 
G.G/ Lawrie, 1st Secretary) (AG. Dunn, 1st Secretary) 
International Organisations Section 
(H.P. Martin, 1st Secretary) 
Economic Relations. General. Consular and Treaties 
Assistant~ 
(AB.F. Burger, Counsellor) 
Economic Relations Section 
(K.E. Pakendorff, 1st Secretary) 
General, Consular and Treaties Section 
(D.C.M. van der Merwe, 1st Secretary) 
Protocol 
Chief gf Protocol 
(Col. N.J. Jooste, Counsellor) 
Assistant Chief gf Protocol 
(N .J. Best, 1st Secretary) 
II.~ 1kl!!!£h 
Senior Assistant~ 
(R. Jones; personal rank of Minister) 
Technical Co-operation 
(J. Fourie, 1st Secretary) 
Assistant~ 
(B.G. Fourie, Counsellor) 
Political 
(AJ.F. Viljoen, 
1st Secretary) 
III. Administration Branch 
Assistant~ 
(E.J. Scholtz) 
Special Problems 
(D.V. Fischer, 1st Secretary) 
(AJ. Oxley, acting) 
Principal Administrative Officer 
(S. Potgieter) 
Accountant 
(G.S.P. Oosthuizen) 
186 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt.I, Memo. 459, Gilchrist/DEA, 6 September 1957, Attachment. 
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He worked through the list starting with the head of the department: G.P. 
Jooste (Strongly Afrikaner Nationalist in outlook'); W.C. Naude ('A strong energetic 
character but according to some of his colleagues is inclined to "flap" in a crisis'); R. 
Jones ('There is some friction between him and Naude, resulting from Naude's higher 
status (the "personal rank of Minister" was apparently a sop to Jones' dignity'); M.I. 
Botha ('Old-world courtesy'); A.B.F. Burger ('Practical and energetic'); N.J.J. Jooste 
('A talkative and rather inefficient hand-shaker'); B.G. Fourie ('Pleasant and uncom-
municative personality, unceasing worker and generally regarded as the "man of all 
work" in the Department. ... Regarded as a possible head of department'); G.G. Lawrie 
('Recently divorced. Quiet and conservative'); A.G. Dunn ('Australian born. Hearty 
type'); 187 K.E. Pakendorff ('German wife. 188 Well-informed economist'); N.J. Best 
('Anglicized. Efficient'); A.J.F. Viljoen ('heavy footballer type, getting on in years. 
Pleasant but not impressive'); D.A.V. Fischer ('Although listed at a headquarters desk, 
has now been designated to assist Donald Sole in Vienna on Atomic Energy Agency 
matters in which he has had considerable experience. 189 Dynamic personality"); A.J. 
Oxley ('Acting head of "Africa (Special Problems)" desk, which includes Antarctica 
and special international problems which have an impact on Africa. Divorce pending'). 
Earlier Gilchrist had reported Spies's departure from the department at his own 
request on Jooste's appointment as Secretary. Spies was, he said, 'highly regarded' 
among members of the department 'as efficient and just'. 190 (Later he said of Spies's 
successor, Naude, that he had 'a more dynamic personality' than Jones and was 'likely 
to instil a more visible sense of urgency into the Department than ha[ d] hitherto been 
noticeable'.)191 Gilchrist did not confine himself to senior officials. In July 1957 he 
wrote of Patrick van Rensburg, a Cadet who had resigned: 
Van Rensburg, aged about 26, was a diplomatic cadet in Pretoria 
two years ago when he was posted to Leopoldville as Vice-Consul. 
187 A.G. Dunn was South African not Australian born. He spent part of his childhood in Australia. In 
1980 he was kidnapped in El Salvador by the Farabundo Marti revolutionary movement and appar-
ently murdered there. See his entry in the DSAB, Vol. V, pp. 213-14. Perhaps because of the 
circumstances of his death, he is the only professional South African foreign service officer to have 
been accorded an entry in the first series of the DSAB. 
188 Because of his marriage to a German, Pakendorff was transferred at the outbreak of war from the 
Department of External Affairs to the Department of Native Affairs where he spent the war years. 
189 Fischer joined the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later that year. 
AA, A9421/l, 221/l, Memo. 551, Gilchrist/DEA, 1November1957. He held senior positions in the 
agency until his retirement in the 1980s. Gilchrist reported G. G. Lawrie's resignation in the same 
memorandum. 
190 AA, Al050/2, 201/10, Memo. 370, Gilchrist/DEA, 5 October 1956. 
191 Ibid., 201/8, Memo. 401. Gilchrist/DEA, 9 August 1957. 
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(Mr. Woolcott of our Department knew him well). He comes from 
an English-speaking Catholic family, despite his Afrikaner name. 
In Leopoldville he had personal problems, and also clashed with 
the Consul-General (Van Lille), an ardent Afrikaner Nationalist. 
The combination of circumstances, including his own liberal 
views, ended in his resigning from the Department of External 
Affairs in June this year, just before the Parliamentary debate on 
the external affairs vote. (An Opposition speaker referred inciden-
tally to the resignation, in the context of Mr. Louw's Africa pol-
icy).192 
In respect of his political reporting Gilchrist's arguments and analyses some-
times put one in mind of the preoccupation attributed to medieval philosophers with 
the number of angels able to dance simultaneously on the point of a needle. 193 But he 
was quite acute in his comments about people. He excelled himself on the announce-
ment ofB.G. Fourie's appointment as Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
in 1958 which ended the two year period of token representation. (See Chapter Eight.) 
This was Fourie's first and only Ambassadorial post before his retirement twenty-four 
years later. 194 Gilchrist's remarks are worth quoting in extenso in illustration not only 
of his keen eye but for their illumination of a remarkable official. His portrait of F ourie 
was not equalled (or even attempted) from the South African side in respect of 
Australian officials. C.F.G. von Hirschberg, who knew Fourie well in the 1950s besides 
being one of his Deputy Directors-General between 1978 and 1982, said of it in 1994: 
'The 1958 Australian view of Brand Fourie is spot on. It is a remarkably exact analysis 
ofhim.'195 
Gilchrist set the scene with these earlier observations: 
192 AA, A9421/1, 221/1, Memo. 357, Gilchrist/DEA, 25 July 1957. The inspiration for his report was 
an article critical of South African foreign policy that Van Rensburg published in The Star 
(Johannesburg) on 11July1957. 
193 An example is his comments on the article 'Apartheid debate at Uno: New approach of moderation 
analysed' in the 27 December 1958 issue of the Digest of South African A.flairs (pp. 10-12). AA, 
A1838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, Gilchrist/Munro/Hill, 'South Africa: United Nations and Apartheid', 22 July 
1959. He was then serving in the Intelligence Co-ordination Branch of the Department of External 
Affairs in Canberra. An earlier example is his view about the possibility of B.J. Schoeman visiting 
Australia in 1957. AA, Al838/1, 716/50/6/1, Pt.2, Memo. 425, Gilchrist/DEA, 22 August 1957. 
194 He returned to South Africa at the beginning of 1963, was appointed Secretary for Information 
that year and in 1966, upon G.P. Joo!.te's retirement, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a post subse-
quently renamed Director-General for Foreign Affairs. On his retirement in 1982, he succeeded D.B. 
Sole as Ambassador to the United States, only his second time as Ambassador in a thirty-six year 
career in the department's diplomatic wing. He had been on the clerical staff for some twelve years 
before that. 
195 C.F.G. von Hirschberg, letter, 18 August 1994. 
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Fourie is an ambitious and inscrutable man of about 42, deferen-
tial and smiling to members of the diplomatic corps, but much dis-
liked by his departmental colleagues, some of whom consider him 
to be a ruthless little opportunist. He is of little value to us as a 
source of information on his department's thinking, since he 
evades virtually all types of question. Some of his colleagues have 
expressed the opinion that he is at least as close to Louw in the 
formulation of policy as Jooste is, if not closer. 196 (Italics ad-
ded.) 
He rounded off his portrait after the announcement of the appointment: 
By comparison with that of most of his colleagues in the Union 
Department of External Affairs, Fourie's rise has been rapid. 
Allowing for a natural element of jealousy on the part· of some of 
his colleagues, it cannot be said that Fourie is well liked by many 
of them. From hints dropped to us from time to time, it appears 
that his working methods aroused some hostility at the Counsellor 
and First Secretary level. It seems fair to say that Fourie is 
extremely ambitious and has pursued the ideal of departmental 
advancement with considerable determination. 
Early in 1957 a 'Special Problems' Section was created in the Af-
rica Branch. Fourie is said to have utilised this section as a means 
of attracting to himself, by familiar departmental devices, a good 
deal of control over other branches of the Department. 197 This cre-
ated so much trouble with other Assistant Secretaries that even-
tually the 'Special Problems' Section was abolished. 
Fourie is undoubtedly a hard worker, and is reputed to be someth-
ing of a perfectionist as regards drafts submitted to him. His mem-
ory of detail is ex1remely good. He is pleasant and extremely cour-
teous in manner, but o~en diffident in conversation with foreign 
representatives. Despite an ever-ready smile, his personality is ra-
ther negative and elusive. He speaks in a rather high-pitched voice 
with a noticeable Afrikaans accent. 198 As a rule, he is not a good 
conversationalist, and we have found it difficult to detect in him a 
continuing interest in any subjects except his work and his golf (at 
which game he is proficient) and the contemplation of flora and 
fauna, especially in remote bushland places. 
A notable characteristic of Fourie is the rather obvious manner in 
which he steers the conversation away from any matter which he 
does not wish to discuss. We, and others, have found him preter-
naturally cautious about expressing any views on official matters, 
even of a non-confidential nature. If he has any personal views on 
196 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Memo. 349, 30 May 1958, p. 2, para. 6. 
197 The extensive listing of the section's tasks on BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, ie., 'Political Section {Special 
Problems', nd.) suggests this allegation was not unfounded. 
198 There was, however, nothing \\-TOng with his English. For an example of his written English at an 
early stage in his diplomatic career, see his memorandum dated 1 April 1948 on the Atomic Energy 
Commission attached to BTS, 136/4/26, Vol. 2, Jacklin/SEA, 2 April 1948. 
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South African party politics, he keeps them closely to himself; 
possibly they are opportunistically formed. His own colleagues 
state that he does not discuss official matters with them except on 
a 'need-to-know' basis. Members of Commonwealth diplomatic 
missions in South Africa have felt that his evasiveness in conver-
sation on minor matters has sometimes been overdone to an irri-
tating degree. It is possible, of course, that it his new post he will 
blossom out and be more forthcoming. 
It has long been obvious that Fourie has the full confidence of his 
Minister, Eric Louw, and undoubtedly exercises much influence in 
the presentation of policy matters for Louw's consideration. He is 
generally regarded by the diplomatic corps here as a possible 
future Secretary for External Affairs. 
Fourie is married, but has no children. His wife, Bropwen, is an 
English girl whom he met during the War. She works profes-
sionally in Pretoria as a physiotherapist. It seems to us that her 
political views incline to those of the United Party rather than the 
National Party. While we cannot say that there is any estrange-
ment between herself and her husband, they appear to go their 
mm ways very independently.199 (Emphasis added.) 
The italicised passages point to some of Fourie's diplomatic strengths. (See the refer-
ence above to the art of diplomacy being impossible 'if more people knew how to hold 
their tongues'.) Gilchrist also accurately identified Fourie's dislike of competition and 
his desire to nobble it. 
The files contain many accolades to Fourie, one of the most competent and 
internationally respected South African foreign service officers of his generation. (He 
was born in 1916, the same year as Gilchrist himself) Knowles reported in 194 7 that 
he was 'stated to be a capable officer'.2°0 In 1948 Jacklin, Fourie's superior at the Per-
manent Mission in New York, told Andrews, the Minister in Paris, who had recom-
mended that 'young Brand Fourie be made available for the Paris Assembly',201 'I agree 
with you that Fourie would be very valuable in Paris, but I would not be doing my duty 
if I reported that the office could run without him or a competent replacement'. 202 
From Jooste in 1950: 
199 AA, Al838/2, 916/1/2, Memo. 519, Gilchrist/DEA, 29 August 1958. The first Mrs Fourie was 
killed in a car crash outside Cape Town in March 1960. Fourie subsequently remarried. He and his 
second wife, the former Daphne Doyle, have two children. 
2oo AA, A4231/2, Pretoria 1-91 1947, No. 61/47, 22 July 1947, p. 2, para. 5. 
2o1 The Third Session of the UN General Assembly. 
202 BTS, 136/2/3/2, Vol. I, Jacklin/Andrews, 9 August 1948 and Andrews/ForS)th, 10 August 1948. 
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I should make special mention of the manner in which [Fourie] 
represented the Union on the Fifth Committee and his willing 
cooperation and assistance in the other work of the Delegation, 
including the administrative work. Fourie is without a doubt one 
of our ablest foreign service officials. His charm in personal rela-
tions is quite exceptional. 203 
In 1952 from another South African source: 'Brand Fourie took charge of the 
4th Committee most efficiently and made a very good impression on his colleagues. '204 
K.C.O. (Mick) Shann reported from New York in 1959 that the South Africans 'had 
the advantage of a most capable and well-liked representative, Mr. Fourie, who had 
good relations with all of his Commonwealth colleagues'. 2os Brian Urquhart, a former 
UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs said of him in connection 
with the South West Africa/Namibia negotiations of the 1970s and 1980s: 'I had 
known Brand Fourie since 1945. He was a decent and honorable man, personally dedi-
cated to finding a proper solution for the Namibian problem, but constricted by the 
policy and politics of South Africa. •2°6 Even Eschel Rhoodie, an opponent, called him 
'one of the most intelligent and hard working Government officials in the entire ser-
vice'.207 
Staff attached for lengthy periods to sections or divisions of a foreign office 
constitute, as Steiner says, a 'reservoir of expertise' and a 'departmental memory bank'. 
They provide continuity.208 She writes of nineteenth century Foreign Office senior 
clerks that each was 'in charge of only one department and frequently stayed there for 
eight to twelve years. All the business of the department passed through their hands 
and they gradually built up funds of detailed knowledge about their areas. In the 
African, American and Asiatic Departments, they were the office experts. '209 Lack of 
continuity in personnel and approach was traditionally a weakness of the old South 
African department; also, it would seem, of the Australian department. If the South 
Africans were thereby put in the position of having continually to 'reinvent the wheel', 
the following passage from Millar suggests that the Australians were not far behind: 
203 BTS, 136/2/3/4, Jooste/Forsyth, 21March1950. 
204 BTS, 136/2/3/7, Roberts/ForS)th, 30 December 1952. 
205 AA, Al838/2, 20119/1 Pt. 2, Memo. 1221, Shann/DEA, 2 December 1959. According to Von Hir-
schberg: 'In New York, he had a different role to play and Mick Shann's description of him in that 
environment is also probably accurate'. Letter, 18 August 1994. 
206 Urquhart, A life in peace and war, p. 310. 
207 Rhoodie, The real information scandal, p. 600. 
208 Steiner, ed., The Times Sun1ey of Foreign Ministries of the World, p. 12. 
209 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. 13; also Steiner, 'The Last Years of the old 
Foreign Office, 1898-1905', The Historical Journal, Vol. VI, No. l, 1963, p. 71. 
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The Department of External Affairs has expanded so rapidly that 
it has had a continuing shortage of experienced people at most 
levels. The result is a game of musical chairs ... in which members 
of the department change their field of interest with great 
frequency. From being a First Secretary in Ghana, one may come 
back and deal with SEA TO and in a year or two be posted to 
Brazil. This gives a splendid range of experience, and would not 
matter so much if there were a proper research organisation to 
provide regular, up-to-the-minute as well as background analyses. 
But there is in effect no such division, and today's 'expert' on 
South America may have only had time to read the previous two or 
three days' telegrams when he took over.210 
Millar wrote that in the 1960s. Almost a quarter-of-a-century later he was saying: 
In the British FCO there is a Research Department, where either 
erstwhile academics or academically minded public servants can 
concentrate their efforts on an area or an issue, and write papers or 
be available for consultation. There is something similar in the US 
State Department. In the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
there is no such division, and the Department 'memory' consists of 
the latest part of the file. Sometimes this will have only a few 
weeks' or months' material on it. Officers are switched from 
subject to subject, region to region. This gives them a wider 
experience but it does not make for continuity or a deep 
understanding of the context of decisions. 211 
To this day that applies to the South African department. At least in the case of the 
Australian department the deficiency has been rectified, if only partially, by the setting 
up within W.J. Hudson's Historical Documents Branch of an Historical Records 
Information and Access Section with a staff of seven. 212 
It was mentioned in Chapter Two that set phrases such as 'the present staff is 
totally inadequate' tended to recur in departmental submissions to the South African 
Public Service Commission and the Treasury. The staff was rarely held to be adequate. 
Despite that structures were frequently created on paper, only to collapse inter alia 
because of insufficient staff to man them. Steps taken in respect of the reporting func-
tion in the 1950s illustrate these weaknesses. 
210 Millar, Australia's Foreign Policy, Sydney, 1968, pp. 16-17. 
211 Millar, 'Academics and Practitioners in Foreign Affairs', The Round Table, No. 319, July 1991, p. 
278. 
212 See the Introduction, p. 29 above. 
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In September 1956 Jones recorded a senes of decisions in respect of the 
department's political section which had been split in two in January 1955 to take 
account of the general increase both in 'the volume of work' and the 'intensity of the 
criticism of the Union's policies'. 213 The first of the new sections, 'Political: Special 
Problems' was, intentionally or otherwise, to provide B.G. Fourie with a 'vehicle' or 
springboard to higher rank in the department. That may conceivably have been the first 
but it was certainly not the last time vehicles were created within the structure of the 
South African department to accommodate the aspirations of favoured and upwardly 
mobile officials. When the incumbent moved on (and up) to other work, the justi-
fication for the vehicle disappeared whereupon it was eliminated from the structure; or 
if it remained it was but a pale shadow of its former self and in no way a fast-track to 
preferment for the new incumbent. 
The establishment of the second section, 'Political: General', hinted at the 
beginnings of a move away from reliance on British reporting because its principal duty 
was 'the study of international political events and trends and the collation and 
evaluation of information received'. At the time of Jones's note, the section discharged 
its functions by studying (a) reports received from South African missions abroad and 
from British and other sources; (b) national and international newspapers and other 
publications; whereupon it prepared ( c) special memoranda on matters of importance 
to the Union; and (d) a 'Weekly Review of International Events'. Copies of (c) and (d) 
were sent to Cabinet Ministers because Eric Louw was 'particularly anxious that they 
should be kept informed of international developments'. 214 At the time the staff 
consisted of a First Secretary (A.B.F. Burger), a Second Secretary (A.G. Dunn) and a 
Third Secretary (P.R. Killen). 
Jones said it was contemplated expanding the section by at least one 
experienced officer, an 'intelligent Second Secretary' who would study mission reports, 
comment 'intelligently' on them and make 'accurate and intelligent summaries'. 215 That 
was, however, subject to the 'availability of staff. Lack of staff, Jones argued, had until 
then prevented the department from performing 'certain important functions'. The 
perception of such an hiatus had inspired the creation of the Political (General) Section 
213 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19, 'Staff position of the Political (General) Section', 27 September 1956. 
214 Ibid., p. 6, para. 19. 
215 In other words, a precis writer, an important position in other services including the nineteenth 
century Foreign Office. Applicants to the Australian department in the 1940s were tested in precis 
writing. 
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in the first place. The matters concerned would be attended to in stages depending, 
inter alia, on 'availability of staff, ie., improving the standard of mission reporting by 
'commenting constructively' on reports received and supplying missions 'with 
information we have and may not be in their possession'; preparing an annual report; 
serving as a research section; and later as a planning section. 
In the event, an intelligent Second Secretary was not made available to 
strengthen the section and the matters adverted to remained unaddressed. Jones dated 
his note 27 September 1956. Some time during the next nine months, in fact by 3 July 
1957 the date of and as revealed by, Gilchrist's 'organigram', Political: General had split 
into Political (East) under G.G. Lawrie as First Secretary and Political (West) under 
A.G. Dunn, who had in the meantime been promoted to First Secretary. A.B.F. Burger 
had been promoted to Counsellor and was acting as Assistant Secretary in charge of 
the Economic Relations, General, Consular and Treaties Division. And Killen was 
assisting Dunn in Political (West). Jones himself had been promoted to Senior 
Assistant Secretary in charge of the Africa Branch with the personal rank of Minister 
while Special Problems had followed Fourie to the Africa Branch. There, as Assistant 
Secretary under Jones, he also supervised the Technical Co-operation (J. Fourie, First 
Secretary) and Political (A.J.F. Viljoen, First Secretary) Sections. 
Nominally under D.A. V. Fischer, but with A.J. Oxley as its effective head, the 
Special Problems Section was soon disbanded. It had served its purpose. By 1958 
Oxley was Deputy Chief of ProtocoJ.216 In the course of these personnel shifts the 
perceived importance of reporting subsided, to be revived when circumstances were 
more propitious only to be dropped again (and again).217 The South Africans would 
have done better to follow the 1930s Australian example of publishing their own 
Current Notes on International Affairs. The discipline imposed by the production of a 
regular publication could have enforced a degree of continuity at least among the 
departmental staff involved with it. 
The ambivalence with which young South African diplomats were beheld by 
their seniors from the 1930s to the 1950s was mentioned in Chapter Two. If the South 
216 See the 1957 statement of departmental diplomatic personnel on BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 19. 
217 
'They never go far. They never do what they set out to do. Always pecking at new things are the 
Bandar-log'. Chi! the Kite in 'Kaa's Hunting'. R. Kipling, The Jungle Books (London, 1989 (1987)), 
p. 62. This Penguin edition joins the First and Second Jungle Books in one volume. Chil and the 
Bandar-log are not the only Kipling creations whose words or deeds can be applied to a Department 
of Foreign Affairs. There is also Chuchundra the musk-rat in 'Rikki-tikki-tavi'. 
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African Department of External Affairs did not follow the post-1906 British practice of 
having clerks sit in judgement on despatches,218 it was also inattentive to the Foreign 
Office reforms which relieved junior diplomatic personnel of the routine work which 
'stultified their education, dulled their wits and deprived them of every kind of 
initiative'.219 Arthur Ponsonby, then a Member of Parliament, gave the 1914 Royal 
Commission this example: 
I had been nearly nine years in the Service, and my work was still 
to copy out dispatches, to put numbers on papers, to sort confiden-
tial prints, and, more especially, to do up, dispatch bags with 
sealing-wax and red tape. That occupied my whole time day by 
day, and the resentment caused by that inspired me to draw up this 
memorandum, which I presented to Sir Thomas Sanderson ... 220 
Gie complained from Washington in 1944: 'The present position is that all the 
diplomatic members of my staff have their hands so full with administrative duties that 
I am afraid that much really important diplomatic work has per force to be 
neglected'.221 A decade later E.F. Hom, the Minister in Stockholm, expressed anxiety 
'about the mounting burden of routine administrative work which now makes so great 
a demand on the time of the diplomatic personnel'. 222 After four years in the 
department including three in Australia, P.R. Killen described his duties in 1952 as: 
'Immigration and consular work, accounts, cyphers, general correspondence and 
general office administration, locally recruited staff, assisting with the drafting and 
writing of political and economic reports, social'. 223 
Shortly after his own arrival in Canberra in 1954, pressing for a replacement for 
Killen who was about to return to South Africa, Uys wrote: 'In the month that I have 
worked here with Mr Killen, he was occupied day after day only with accounts, 
passport, visa and purely administrative tasks. So it was before my arrival and so it will 
218 See Chapter One, p. 50. 
219 J.D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy; Rambles and Reflections, 1902-1928, London, 1928, p. 
18. 
22° Cd. 7749, Royal Commission on the Civil Service: Appendix to Fifth Report of the Commis-
sioners: Minutes of Evidence, 29th April 1914-16th July 1914, Q.36,551-Q.43,890, with Appendices. 
London, 1914, Q.39,397, pp. 119-20. Ponsonby's famous memorandum of 17 October 1900, with 
comments, is reproduced in Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, Appendix 4, pp. 222-30. 
See also Steiner, 'The Last Years of the old Foreign Office, 1898-1905', The Historical Journal, Vol. 
VI, No. 1, 1963, p. 72 and Jones, The British Diplomatic Service, pp. 164-65. 
221 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 7, Gie/Forsyth, 19 October 1944. 
222 BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Horn/SEA, 1July1954. 
223 BTS, Killen, Vol. IA, Staff report, 6 June 1952. 
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be with his successor'. 224 He explained in the same minute why Killen's post should be 
filled by a home-based officer and not by a locally-recruited unit. The department 
concurred. 225 
So it was indeed. When E.J.L. Scholtz, who by then had risen to Assistant 
Secretary (Administrative), inspected the Canberra High Commission in November 
1957226 he reported that the time of the Third Secretary, C.R. Roberts (Killen's 
successor) was 'fully occupied with administrative duties'. He also worked overtime.227 
That was the only inspection of the Canberra office during the period covered by this 
study. 228 (Only the missions in Buenos Aires, Canberra, Luanda and Rio de Janeiro 
were not visited by the 1956 Van Veen/Parminter inspection mission.)229 Some months 
after Roberts's resignation in June 1959 Hamilton told Scholtz it was essential 'to have 
a junior officer sent here to look after our administration and consular work'. 230 
Hamilton had also been under pressure the previous year during Roberts's 
convalescence after a serious motor accident especially since that coincided with 
Olivier's pending transfer to Pretoria. Advising the department that Roberts's return to 
duty could not be counted on for some time, Hamilton claimed that in the absence of a 
replacement for Olivier, 'it might not be possible to carry on the work' of the High 
Commission 'even on an emergency basis'.231 
224 BCB, Vol. 1, 2/1, Uys/SEA, 21 April 1954, p. 3, para. 12. (Original in Afrikaans.) Uys qualified 
the reference to the successor, saying that would be the case unless he were assisted by a fulltime 
locally-recruited unit. 
225 Ibid., Spies/High Commissioner, Canberra, 12 May 1954. 
226 With B.J. Schoeman and Thomas Boydell, Scholtz was a passenger on the South African Airways 
'Goodwill Flight' which inaugurated the airline's fortnightly service to Australia. 
227 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 6, Scholtz/Secretary, n.d. p. 3. See also Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 
20 November 1959 pleading for a replacement for Roberts who had resigned the previous June and 
remained in Australia. 
228 The Australians seem to have been inspected twice during the period: once by W.J. Thorley of the 
Public Service Board in 1956 and once by a Mr Nienaber of ASIO in 1959. The latter recommended 
measures to strengthen security at the Cape Town and Pretoria offices. Thorley inspected only the 
Cape Town office, between 15 and 26 May 1956 - the Pretoria office was closed for the Parliamentary 
session. See AA, Al838/l, 201110/6/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 18, Hodgson/Department offa.1ernal Affairs, 23 
January 1957, Annex, p. 2 (Annual Report for 1956) and Al838/Tl84, 1348/8, Memo. 163, Phil· 
lips/Department of External Affairs, 13 April 1960, Annex, p. 2. (Annual Report for 1959). A Public 
Service Board Inspector also visited the post in May 1963. A9421/2, 2/1/3, Pt. l, Memo. 320, 
Kevin/Department of External Affairs, 19 July 1963. 
229 BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2, 'Grading of Diplomatic Posts in the Department of External Affairs', 30 Oc-
tober 1956. See Chapter One, p. 55. 
230 BTS, Hamilton, Vol. III, Hamilton/Scholtz, 20 November 1959. 
231 BTS, Olivier, Vol. 2, Hamilton/SEA, 7 August 1958 and Vol. 1, Hamilton/SEA, 15 August 1958. 
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At that time, while South African Cadets and Third Secretaries in missions ab-
road were fully occupied with administrative duties, their colleagues at home ·found 
themselves prohibited from signing even what were known as 'reminders' to other 
government departments. 232 But neither of their ranks included an Arthur Ponsonby 
unless the future Foreign Minister, R.F. Botha, could be considered to fall into that 
category. Almost the antithesis of the normal entrant into the Department of External 
Affairs in the 1950s, Botha certainly caused trouble and made waves. That would have 
contributed to his rise. His account of his relationship with the administrative section 
during his Cadet years (1953-56) before his first posting to Stockholm in 1956 
suggests those traditional Public Servants would have been glad to see the back of 
him.233 
Not only the most junior diplomatic officer was involved with administration. 
In 1950s Canberra the Official Secretary, ie. the second-in-command, was 'responsible 
to the High Commissioner for all administrative matters' including the 'most effective 
execution of the duties of members of the stafP.234 The High Commissioner himself, 
apart from being ultimately responsible, also did much hands-on administering, 
especially during J.K. Uys's first term (1954-57) when the official residence was 
built. 235 Obviously in his element, Uys reported in 1956: 
Correspondence and related duties in connection with the building 
and furnishing of the new residence are attended to by me 
personally as these duties can, in the nature of things, not be 
delegated to the junior staff of the Mission. This work takes up 
quite a bit of my time but it is interesting to follow operations step 
by step. In the Jong run it will save time, and maybe money. 236 
Australian heads of mission were ostensibly less occupied with administra-
tion. 237 O.L. Davis listed as his duties in June 1959: 
1. Overall responsibility for conduct of Mission; 2. Liaison with 
Union Government at Cabinet and Head of Department Level and 
232 These were usually worded along the lines of 'It would be appreciated if you would indicate when 
a reply to my minute so-and-so dated such-and-such could be expected'. 
233 R.F. Botha, telephonic communication, 1 July 1994. 
234 Olivier, Vol. 1, 'Duties of Second Secretary. Office of the High Commissioner of the Union of 
South Africa, Canberra. Post occupied since 12/1/1955 by Mr D.P. Olivier - 3rd Secretary'. (Original 
in Afrikaans.) 
235 Throughout his career Uys was known for his administrative talents rather than his political 
insight. 
236 BTS, 4/6/36, Vol. 4, Uys/Acting SEA, 1May1956. 
237 See, however, Crocker, Australian Diplomat, p. 61. 
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with Heads of Diplomatic Missions; Representation of Australia at 
official diplomatic and social functions and entertainment of 
guests at Head of Mission level; 4. Correspondence with Union 
Government and other Missions on policy questions; 5. Political 
Intelligence and political reporting; 6. Representation when in, 
and political intelligence reporting on, other territories in Africa 
south of the Sahara, including official tours of those territories, 
especially the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the 
Protectorates. 238 
Even so, the High Commissioner's staff could not avoid administrative 
entanglements. Hodgson complained in 1953: 'It is not too much to say that the staff of 
this office finds its energies consumed in administrative work for our own and other 
Departments and that the lack of a trained clerical officer is, preventing this Mission 
from discharging its primary political functions•.239 Gilchrist took up the refrain in 
1957: 'the amount of administrative, accounting, consular, information and post-office 
work' precluded 'political officers from giving due thought to reporting, let alone to 
evolution of policy'. 240 
Putting aside the opinion Uys formed after only a month's acquaintance with 
Killen (see above), it may seem from the latter's job description ('assisting with the 
drafting and writing of political and economic reports')241 that, if not in Colin Roberts's 
case, then his work had a dimension beyond the administrative. That is hard to 
substantiate because the South Africans did not follow Lincoln Mac Veagh's custom of 
having the initials of those who drafted a document which he subsequently edited and 
signed appear on the final version. 242 For the last three years of Hodgson's term 
practice at the Australian High Commission was to have the initials of the person who 
drafted it appear on the final page of the original of a despatch to the Minister or the 
Secretary. (See Appendix V). 
238 AA, 1838/1, 1348/2, Pt. 2, 'Mission: Australian High Commission, Cape Town - Permanent staff 
as at 30th June, 1959, Form "A".' Dating back to Dunk's term as Secretary, Australian missions were 
required to submit half yearly returns of home based and locally engaged staff. Part A of the pre-
scribed form related to the former and part B to the latter. The purpose, Dunk said, was to 'maintain 
central control of overseas staff'. Stating the position as at 30 June and 31 December, the returns listed 
the duties performed by the occupants of each post. In Hodgson's time the Head of Mission's duties 
were not given. Those quoted above appeared in the first return after Davis's assumption of duty. 
239 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Memo. 73, Hodgson/DEA, 4 March 1953. 
240 AA. Al838/1, 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, Memo. 605, Gilchrist/DEA, 27 November 1957. 
241 BTS, Killen, Vol. 1 A, Staff report, 6 June 1952. 
242 Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh Reports, p. vii. Such reports were additional to 'several hundred 
long despatches' MacVeagh himself wrote 'covering every conceivable topic of possible interest to his 
superiors' during his first term in Greece up to 1940. 
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That first occurred in November 1954 when Woolcott's initials appeared on 
Hodgson's eleventh despatch of the year.243 Woolcott prepared Hodgson's comments 
on the announcement that Jooste would succeed Forsyth as Secretary for External 
Affairs.244 If junior officers did not sign despatches, the presence of their initials at 
least made it clear who had drafted them. The practice is not evident after Hodgson. 
Aware of the facts, the department sometimes congratulated Hodgson on 
despatches his subordinates had prepared.245 Perhaps Hodgson could afford to be 
relaxed about having the identities of those who drafted his despatches disclosed. After 
all, he was on the eve of retirement after what casual observers would have regarded 
as a successful two-decade career with the Department of External Affairs. In the early 
1960s the Australian mission's smaller size - it was then basically a two man post -
suggests that those who drafted the despatches also signed them. South African heads 
of mission were traditionally unenthusiastic about letting it be known who had written 
their despatches and did not follow this practice. 
Woolcott gave his duties in 1954 as: 
1. Liaison with Union Government Departments and foreign mis-
sions and correspondence in which matters of policy are involved. 
2. Security; coding and cyphering. 3. General interviewing of 
public. 4. Consular matters referred to High Commission. 5. 
Political research. 6. Compiling economic reports for the Depart-
ment of External Affairs. 7. Representation. 8. Publicity. 9. Pay-
master. 10. General work on behalf of other Departments. 11. 
Clerical duties, including registration of all inwards correspond-
ence. 246 
Within that framework, besides his economic reports, which were ten to twelve 
pages long and despatched quarterly, 241 he reported on 'non-European political activi-
ties'. The department liked these reports, which were usually prepared for Hodgson's 
signature, and from time to time sent Hodgson congratulatory messages. Woolcott's 
successor, Nicholson, inherited those aspects of his work. Woolcott's immediate prede-
cessor, Miss E.A. Warren, had researched and written a lengthy 'Report on the basic 
industries in the Union of South Africa'. Copies were sent to the Departments of 
243 Dated 19 November 1954 entitled 'Speculation on Dr Malan's Successor'. 
244 AA, A1838!Tl84, 201/711, Pt. l, Memo. 496, 14 December 1955. 
245 See, eg., AA, Al838/I, 201110/6, Pt. I, Kevin/Hodgson, 30 July 1956. 
246 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. I, 'Australian High Commission, Pretoria. Permanent Staff as at 1st 
July, 1954', Form A. See also permanent staff as at I July 1955 and I January 1957 on the same file. 
247 Examples are on AA, AI838/274, 774/2, Pt. 4. 
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National Development, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, and Trade and Customs. 
Hodgson's memorandum forwarding to Canberra the introductory and mining chapters 
credited Miss Warren with primary responsibility for the survey. 248 
When Woolcott was invited for a visit by a friend in the Indian Commission in 
Nairobi whom he had met in Moscow during his first posting, Hodgson recommended 
that his travel costs and expenses be paid. The department concurred. 249 Accompanied 
by his wife who had given birth to her second child two months before, Woolcott 
visited British East Africa for the first eighteen days of October 1956. His twenty page 
report on his visit was dated 19 January 1957,250 the day before he sailed for Australia 
on board the 'Dominion Monarch'. 
The department was less generous to Gilchrist who had sought earlier in 1956 
to take up an invitation from the South African Consul in Elizabethville, A.J. Oxley,251 
to visit him. That provided an opportunity 'to investigate the Belgian Congo' and 
Hodgson recommended that Gilchrist also visit Bukavu and Leopoldville. The total 
cost of the tour would amount to some £A300 but at least the journey to Elizabethville 
would cost nothing because Oxley, who was returning there after a visit to the Union, 
would provide transportation. The department replied that no money was available. 252 
Notwithstanding the rebuff Gilchrist accepted Oxley's offer, hitch-hiking back to Pre-
toria on the return journey.253 (As he put it in his report, 'I sought and obtained a suc-
cession of lifts along the road'254 - unorthodox and challengeable activity for a foreign 
service officer which perhaps influenced the department in its decision a month later to 
pay for Woolcott's visit.) 
248 AA, A1831/1, 201/4/8, Memo. 39, Hodgson/DEA, 15 February 1954. Somewhat 'Freudianly', 
'Miss Warren' became 'Mr Warren' in the copy of Hodgson's covering letter on the Treasury file 
A571/69, 56/640, Pt. 1. That file contains a more comprehensive copy of the survey than is apparently 
available on the External Affairs file. 
249 AA, Al838/1, 1348/2, Pt. l, Memo. 336, Hodgson/DEA, 7 September 1956. 
250 A copy is on AA, Al838/2, 169/11/128, Pt. 1. 
251 He and Gilchrist had first met in Athens in the early 1950s when the latter was a member of the 
UN Special Commission on the Balkans. Oxley was Ambassador to Australia from 1977 to 1983, his 
last post before retirement. 
252 AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6, Pt. 1, I. 9316 and Memo. 259, Hodgson/DEA, both of 12 July 1956. 
253 H. Gilchrist, letter, 15 December 1994. 
254 AA, A1838/l, 201/10/6/l, Pt. 1, Memo. 312, Gilchrist/DEA, 16 August 1956, p. 2, para. 8. He 
told the writer recently: 'Hitch-hiking back provided some good stories and cost me only about a fiver'. 
Letter, 20 January 1995. 
371 
Chapter Seven: Through each other's eyes 
Gilchrist accompanied H.D. Mitchell, a First Secretary in the British High 
Commission, by road to the Bechuanaland Protectorate in November of that year. Per-
haps as a precaution he advised the department of the visit only after the event. 
Somewhat pointedly he annexed to the report on his itinerary a statement itemising his 
out-of-pocket expenses which came to £4.6.9 including £2.15.9 for a 'single second-
class ticket on "mixed goods" train Francistown to Mafeking' and £1.2.0 for six gallons 
of petrol for Mitchell's car on the return journey from Mafeking to Pretoria.255. No 
doubt the department considered this good value when it received the product of the 
visit, a twenty-one page, single-spaced report on the Bechuanaland Protectorate to 
which was annexed a five-page 'Historical Summary of the Dispute Regarding the 
Chieftainship of the Bamangwato Tribe (Seretse Khama's Case)',256 this being a leading 
political issue of the day. 
The case of E.H. Hanfield detracts from the perception that the Australians did 
more than the South Africans to bring their junior staff along. It arose during 
Hodgson's term and also involved KT. Kelly. Hanfield, who was not a foreign service 
officer, went to South Africa in 1953 as a consular clerk. Before his posting he had 
been the departmental Travel Officer in Canberra, there turning out work of 'a very 
high standard'.257 He had spirit and caused a stir shortly after assuming duty in South 
Africa. Having clashed with Kelly, the Official Secretary, about what he should do and 
where, he wrote AS. Watt, the Secretary for External Affairs, under whom he had 
served in Moscow in the 1940s, a three page letter of complaint. 258 It would, he said, 
'be a waste of Commonwealth funds' to keep him in South Africa 'under the arrange-
ments the Official Secretary' proposed for him, an office dogsbody and substitute 
chauffeur ('to save taxi fares') in Pretoria, not Cape Town where the department 
wanted to place him. 
Some of the work Kelly had in mind for him, such as packing trunks for 
despatch to Pretoria after a parliamentary session, had previously been undertaken by a 
temporarily engaged African. It was also apparent that Hodgson, the High Commis-
sioner, 'couldn't care less' what he did. J.K. Waller, then Assistant Secretary for 
Personnel Affairs in Canberra, minuted Watt that he considered it 'most improper that 
255 1348/2, Pt. 1, Memo. 406, Gilchrist/DEA, 28 November 1956. 
256 AA, Al838/2, 15517114, Pt. 1, Memo 405 (previously 438), Gilchrist/DEA, 21 December 1956. 
The Annex was dated 28 December. 
257 AA, Al838/l, 1348/2, Pt. 1, Hartley/Assistant Secretary, 1257/24, 11February1953. 
258 Jbid., 1348/1, Pt. 1, Hanfield/Watt, 24 September 1953. 
372 
Chapter Seven: Through each other's eyes 
a consular clerk should write to you in this way' and suggested he ignore the letter. 
'However, I think there is little doubt that Hanfield's charges are correct and that Kelly 
is not making proper use of his services'. 259 
Hodgson's best efforts to prise Hanfield loose from Cape Town and attach him 
to the High Commission in Pretoria, including correspondence with Tange, Watt's suc-
cessor as Secretary, proved unavailing. Hanfield stayed where he was. Not that he .was 
content with his lot. A year later he wrote in terms reminiscent of Ponsonby's tum of 
the century complaint. This writer has not come across similar correspondence from 
junior South African officials. 
The greater part of my time is taken up with typing and allied 
duties, and I very much doubt whether the wastages inherent in 
the running of an office by a single person were clearly seen when 
the arrangement was originally made. I would emphasize that I 
am entirely alone in the office, and every single operation is car-
ried out by me personally. So far as correspondence is concerned, 
this is everything from opening envelopes, indexing inward mail, 
typing replies and envelopes, stamping envelopes, postage book 
entry, sealing envelopes and filing, to, finally, closing the office to 
take the mail to the post office. During last month I typed 194 
outward, and received 178 inward, communications ... These fig-
ures do not include daily newspaper cuttings for the Trade Com-
missioner, mail re-addressed to the High Commission and the 
Trade Commissioner, consular and administrative cireulars from 
Canberra, and sundry typing for office records in migration cases. 
During the same month I had an average of 25 visitors per week to 
the office. 260 
Hanfield's 'chutzpah' should have brought him more than the consular posts he 
occupied for much of his career, including Deputy Consul-General in New York and 
Consul-General in Bombay not to mention the Administratorship of the Cocos 
(Keeling) Islands, his last post before retirement in 1983.261 Perhaps it would if he had 
turned to politics, as Arthur Ponsonby did fifty years earlier in the United Kingdom. 
There again, his progress was not bad for someone who had started out in the Public 
259 AA, Al838/I, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Waller/Watt, 18 November 1953. 
260 Ibid., Pt. 1, Hanfield/DEA, 11September1954. 
261 DFAT, Dept of Foreign Affairs, Appointments and Biographies, Six1h ed., 1984, p. 475. I am 
indebted to Ms Moira Smythe for a copy of his entry. 
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Service as a male typist262 and he quite likely had a more fulfilling career than many 
'low flying' foreign service officers with university degrees including Kelly. 263 
262 AA, Al838/l, 1348/1, Pt. 1, Tange/Hodgson, I April 1954. 
263 As mentioned in Chapter Four (p.197, footnote 88) Kelly occupied only two minor Ambassadorial 
posts in the course of his career: Buenos Aires (1964-66) and Lisbon (1970-74) for a total ofless than 
seven years. 
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THE UNITED NATIONS DIMENSION 
Australia's feeling that members of the British Commonwealth should be 'fully 
informed' of 'each other's attitudes, policies and problems' in 'the work of the United 
Nations and its various constituent bodies' was among the reasons behind its proposal 
to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa. 1 However, if anything was to strain 
the relationship it was precisely the United Nations connection and particularly after 
1960. Even before that the perceived importance to Australia of the relationship 
declined as the 1950s advanced, notwithstanding Robert Menzies's ideal of a Common-
wealth united under the crown with South Africa a key member. (Indeed, it was Smuts 
himself who had suggested the name British Commonwealth in 1917). 2 Two factors 
were at play: the relationship's basic lack of substance which Evatt and Burton should 
have anticipated but did not (Curtin suspected it)3 and the fact that South Africa was 
becoming increasingly controversial internationally. 
Evatt said in 1948 that Australia 'regarded the maintenance of ... :friendly rela-
tions with South Africa ... as a matter of the greatest importance. The presence of an 
Australian High Commissioner in the Union ... had been of considerable value'. 4 He 
also expressed to Malan his 'firm belief that our two Governments [would] co-operate 
to the maximum'. 5 In 1951, the Liberal Party government considered that since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations 'the :friendly relationship and mutual 
understanding between our two countries have grown tremendously ... We have also 
long recognised the importance of South Africa to Australia as constituting the main 
link in one of our life-lines to the United Kingdom'.6 
1 AA, Al066/l, M45/21/6, Agendum No. 979, 29 October 1945, 'Australian Representation in South 
Africa'. See Chapter Three, p. 126. 
2 Hall calls him 'the political architect of the name'. H. Duncan Hall, Commonwealth: A History of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations (London, 1971), p. 192. 
3 Mulrooney, Australia's relations with South Africa, p. 26. See Chapter One, pp. 40-41 above. 
4 AA, 1838/l. 201/10/6/1, Pt. 1, 'For the Press' (Draft), n.d. 
5 BTS, 130/10, Vol. 1, Evatt/Malan, No. 13, 6 June 1948. The next sentence set the parameters: 'Few 
things are more important in the interests, not only of our two countries but of the Commonwealth of 
Nations, than of international peace and justice, and I look forward to co-operation with these ends in 
view'. 
6 AA, Al838, 201/10/7, Pt. 1. Undated notes, presumably for a speech on the occasion of Viljoen's 
departure. 
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Such views of the relationship gave way to a more pragmatic attitude as its lack 
of substance became apparent. For several periods during the 1950s the post was left 
vacant as perceptions of its value diminished. Even so, periodic departmental assess-
ments concluded that the post had value inter a/ia because it was 'our only African 
post'. 7 That surrendered in tum to the more negative stance represented by the view 
articulated in the late 1950s that South Africa's 'policies and attitudes are a source of 
embarrassment to the West, and particularly to the United Kingdom, the United States 
and ourselves in our policies with respect to South and South East Asia and Africa'. 8 
By 1960 the Australian High Commissioner in South Africa was seen as 
'hampered by the physical and political isolation of the Government to which he [was] 
accredited'.9 And by 1963 Australian officials contemplated having to choose between 
South Africa and black Africa, to the forrner's disadvantage: 'In view of the voting 
power of the African states in New York and because of Australia's sensitivity on such 
matters as New Guinea and aborigines, any such choice could hardly favour the 
Republic'. 1° For that reason Australia had already changed its votes at the UN General 
Assembly on the Apartheid and South West Africa items. 11 
However, at the time Australian officials were beginning to see South Africa as 
a burden the latter's government, initially an unenthusiastic if not actually reluctant 
partner to the diplomatic connection, came more and more to appreciate its value. The 
highly regarded J.P. Quinn, who had on-the-spot experience, told his superiors in 1952 
that 'Australia has adopted a more consistently sympathetic approach than any other 
Commonwealth country and South African Ministers, particularly Dr. Malan and Dr, 
Donges, have expressed warm appreciation of our support' .12 By 1954 Jooste, Ambas-
sador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, was 
calling Australia 'our best friend'.13 
7 AA, 1838/1, 201/10/6/l, Pt. 1, Desmond/Lee, 'The political importance of our South African post', 
30/1/1952. 
8 AA, Al838/2, 201/11/1 Pt. 2, Memo. 668, Nicholson/DEA, 14 November 1958. 
9 That was in the context of a lobbying effort in Africa to win support for Australian policies 'on 
Trusteeship and related matters'. AA, Al838/l, 201/10/6/1, Pt.I, 0. 8367, 22 May 1960, para. 4. 
IO AA, A9421/l, 201/1, Pt. 1, Departmental general paper 'Prospects for South Africa', p. 12. 
Attached to Memo. 213, Lee/Australian Embassy, Pretoria, 2 Septembe1 1963. 
11 AA, Al838/T54, 201/2/6/1, Pt. 5, 'South West Africa', n.d., p. 3, para. IO and A5819/2, Vol. 22, 
ag. 883, Attachment, 'History of United Nations consideration of apartheid and the Australian 
attitude', para. 2. 
12 Al838/Tl84, 20117/1, Pt. 1, J.P. Quinn, 'For Mr Mcintyre: Notes on South Africa', p. 2, para. 7. 
13 BTS, 412132, Vol. 2, Uys/Secretary for External Affairs, 7 July 1954. (Translation). 
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In 1956 BJ. Schoeman, the Minister of Transport, told Hodgson in connection 
with the air link that because of the friendship he would do nothing to harm Australia's 
commercial interests. 14 A year later, referring specifically to the United Nations, he 
informed a visiting Qantas delegation that it was 'important for the Union to have 
closer relations with Australia, as a friendly country'. 15 Gilchrist reported in 1958 that 
Louw, when proposing the toast of Australia at Australia Day 
reception this year, made the main theme of his remarks Austra-
lia's support of South Africa's resistance to interference by the 
United Nations in her domestic affairs. Both Louw and Schoeman 
... have gratuitously expressed appreciation of this support to me 
on several occasions.16 
Louw conveyed his thanks in writing to his Australian counterpart, R.G. Casey, almost 
annually from the time he became Minister of External Affairs. And as mentioned in 
Chapter Six, in 1956 and for some years Louw and his officials behaved dismissively 
towards a Pretoria landlord who seemed to have a case for breach of contract against 
Woolcott of the Australian High Commission. In a way, the landlord was a victim of 
South African perceptions of the friendship. 
Events at the United Nations were central to both governments' attitudes. 
Those were influenced in turn (in no particular order) by the organisation's compo-
sition; by the nature of its constitution or Charter; and by such intangibles as the anti-
colonialism and the new international morality engendered by the Second World War. 
Sara Pienaar wrote in 1987 that the 'tale of South Africa's relationship with the United 
Nations hardly bears repetition but for its contrast with the much less familiar story ... 
of South Africa's earlier experiences in the League of Nations'. 17 In fact, the tale of 
South Africa's relationship with the United Nations has not been told yet, at least not 
by historians and not on the basis of archival documents. It is not proposed to tell it 
here but to focus on such of its aspects as will lend perspective to the Australian/South 
African connection. 
In the context of references such as Jooste's above to Australia as our 'best 
friend' - Louw was also fond of such terminology - it is useful to remind oneself of 
14 AA, Al838/l, 716/50/6/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 83, Hodgson/DEA, 1March1956. 
15 Ibid., Record of conversation, 16 August 1957 - attached to Memo. 425, Gilchrist/DEA, 22 August 
1957. 
16 AA, Al838/2, 916/l/2, Memo. 118, Gilchrist/DEA, 19 February 1958, p. 4, para. 10. 
17 S. Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations between the Two World Wars: The League of 
Nations Dimension (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 183. 
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Lord Palmerston's dictum that the nature of a state's relationship with others is 
impermanent, only its 'interests are eternal and perpetual'. 18 As for its interests, there is 
Hedley Bull's view that these 'are simply what they are perceived to be by the ruling 
groups at any one time.'19 Likewise, though common practice, it is misleading to apply 
concepts descriptive of human relationships - friendship, enmity etc. - to those between 
states. 
There is a further caveat. In April 1994 national elections ushered in a five-year 
South African government of national unity which effectively replaced the former 
white oligarchy by a non-racial disposition. The once banned African National Con-
gress (ANC) became the dominant partner in government. The story of South Africa's 
march to majority rule is complex and it is too soon for historians to treat definitively 
of the process. While even at the present juncture it is clear that the United Nations 
made a contribution, its role was most likely peripheral, one of sound and fury rather 
than of substance. Its most visible aspect was serving as a forum for white South Af-
rica's opponents to ventilate the issues. 
That, of course, was not unimportant. Hugh Gilchrist observed at a relatively 
early stage ( 1958): 'Rightly or wrongly the United Nations debates have given far more 
publicity throughout the world to South African racial questions than would ever have 
been given if the General Assembly had not occupied itself with these matters. '20 And 
let it be said that ifthat did not unleash decisive action by the UN, the ventilation of the 
issues at least had the effect of preventing a deal between South Africa and its western 
interlocutors. Less visible but quite likely more significant was the coordinating role 
played by the organisation's secretariat from around 1962 onwards. (See the 
Conclusion below.) 
The United Nations developed along lines quite unforeseen when the represen-
tatives of fifty states met in San Francisco between 25 April and 26 June 1945 to draft 
the Charter. Idealism abounded. Interestingly, this was epitomised for at least one par-
ticipant, Australia's Paul Hasluck, by the person of South Africa's elderly Prime Min-
ister: 
18 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. XCVII, House of Commons, 1 March 1848, 
Col. 122. 
19 H. Bull, 'International Relations as an Academic Pursuit', Australian Outlook, Vol. 26, No. 3, 
December 1972, p. 260. See the Introduction, p. 16 above. 
20 AA, AI838/2, 201/9/l, Memo. 118, Gilchrist/DEA, 19 February 1958, p. 3, para. 7(c). 
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The Americans made much play of the hopes of mankind and did 
it sincerely but the one delegate who made a clearer and stronger 
impression as a visionary was Smuts of South Africa. He appeared 
usually in military uniform and his keen bony face, like an eagle 
on a peak of rock, and the knowledge that he had fought the 
British in the Boer War as well as fighting the common enemy in 
two Great Wars made him a romantic figure. He had an air of 
apostleship about him and a loftiness and, whatever the truth may 
be, he looked and sounded more like a prophet and less like a poli-
tician than the Vandenbergs, Stassens and Connallys of the con-
ference. 21 
That was an irony of the San Francisco Conference. 22 One may compare this 
view of Smuts with his complaint to J.H. Hofmeyr from the conference about 'a strong 
humanitarian tendency, finding expression in provisions for equal rights all round and 
other somewhat embarrassing proposals so far as we are concerned'. 'The conference', 
he said, 'has to be carefully and even anxiously watched'. 23 The situation seems to have 
deteriorated and he was gloomily telling Hofmeyr a month later: 'Owing to the vague 
humanitarianism running very strong in the Conference and in Congress and public 
opinion generally, we have had much trouble over the subject of trusteeships which 
involves the colonies and mandates'. 24 
In view of the support Australia was perceived to give South Africa at the 
United Nations in the 1940s and 1950s, another irony was that it should have been 
Evatt's work to enlarge the scope and powers of the General Assembly which set the 
scene for the South African government's embattled position in the organisation for 
most of its existence. If the final version of the Charter had reflected the original for-
mulation of the General Assembly chapter in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on which 
the Charter was based, 25 one wonders whether India would have been able to bring the 
matter of the treatment of South African Indians to the General Assembly in the last 
quarter of 1946. For the Assembly was not initially empowered make recommenda-
21 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 200. 
22 Known officially as the United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO). 
23 Van der Poel, ed., Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol. VI, Smuts/Hofmeyr, 6 May 1945, p. 534. 
24 BTS, 136/1, Vol. 3, Cypher telegram, Smuts/Hofmeyr, 2 June 1945. 
25 Cmd. 6560, Dumbarton Oaks Conversations on World Organisation, 21st August - 7th October, 
1944, Statement of Tentative Proposals, Chapter V, B, I. The proposals were named after the estate 
outside Washington, DC, where they were drafted by officials from the United States, United 
Kingdom and the Soviet Union between 21 August and 28 September 1944. The subsequent meetings 
between United States, United Kingdom and Chinese officials from 29 September to 7 October also 
formed part of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See also Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 
1939-1945, Washington, 1949, (Department of State Publication 3580), Appendix 43, 7 October 
1944, pp. 611-19. 
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tions about specific cases. If only for that reason and even if Australia does not feature 
in it as such, Evatt is a key figure in any study of South Africa's early post-war foreign 
relations. 
The treatment of Indians question was a Trojan horse for a full-scale and de-
cades-long examination of the South African government's racial policies at consecu-
tive sessions of the General Assembly up to the 1990s. It and the annual item on South 
West Africa which South Africa itself had initially placed on the agenda fed off each 
other and together both compounded the government's difficulties. Relevant aspects of 
the San Francisco Conference will therefore be canvassed in the course of the chapter. 
In that connection it is important to bear in mind that the Charter has so far been 
amended substantively only twice - to increase the sizes of the Security Council (in 
1965) and of the Economic and Social Council (in 1965 and 1971). Otherwise it is the 
document drafted at San Francisco though the interpretations placed on some of its 
provisions are quite different to what was intended at the outset. 
Established as a 'centre for harmonizing the actions of nations' in the attainment 
of certain common ends (Charter Article 1(4)), particularly the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, its principal raison d'etre, the United Nations turned out in 
practice to be a vehicle for discord and disharmony. Eric Louw supplied a reason in a 
1959 radio broadcast: 
The real trouble is that the founders of these organisations, ani-
mated by great hopes and high ideals, do not take sufficient 
account of human nature. Nations are composed of groups of 
human beings. Most human beings in the final resort, look to their 
own interests, and to the interests of their families. Nations, 
through their representatives, act and react in the same way.26 
(He seemed by then to have overcome the element of surprise present in his complaint 
a few years earlier that, driven by self-interest, UN members engaged in 'horse-trading'! 
He confessed to having done that once himself1)27 
The United Nations differed from its predecessor in politics if not law, the Lea-
gue of Nations, in several respects. In taking its decisions, the League had required 
unanimity between those of its members present and voting. The only unanimity the 
26 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/l, Pt. 2, Memo. 7, Phillips/DEA, 11 January 1960, transcript of Louw's 
broadcast on 'Top Level', 20 December 1959. 
27 HA Deb., Vol. 95, 10 June 1957, Col. 7606. 
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Charter presupposed was that of the great powers. Without it, the UN had 'no foupda-
tion upon which to rest'. 28 Allowance was made for the great powers to disagree, but 
the serious political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States which 
soon manifested themselves, paralysed the new organisation in the area of its primary 
responsibility. That was not anticipated. 
Also not anticipated was the wave of anti-colonialism set off by developments 
during the war. The direct result was that for most of its existence the United Nations 
'has been a "decolonisation machine" grindingly absorbed in the dismantlement of 
western empires'. 29 The early Japanese victories over the Americans, the British and 
the French in the Far East, commencing with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 
December 1941, had shown the colonial powers to be vulnerable. The dawning of 
Asian self-confidence had already been marked by the Japanese victory over the 
Russians in 1905, or so India's Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, said in 1960.30 
The wartime severance of the connections between the metropolitan powers and their 
colonial possessions compounded the formers' postwar problems. 
Absence did not make the heart grow fonder and by the war's end 'nascent re-
volutionary movements were struggling to prevent the reimposition of the prewar 
colonial order' in most territories that had been under Japanese occupation.31 The 
Atlantic Charter of 11 August 1941, four months before the United States entered the 
war was a stimulus for the anti-colonialist cause. 32 Even black nationalists in faraway 
28 H.J. Morgenthau, 'Political Limitations of the United Nations', G.A. Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics 
in the World Community (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953), p. 148. 
29 The Economist, Vol. 334, No. 7904, p. 103. Review of Sir Anthony Parsons's From the Cold War 
to Hot Peace (London, 1995). The Australian diplomat, W.D. Forsyth, used similar words in 1963. 
Hudson, 'Australia's Trusteeship Policy', Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1967, p. 12 and fn. 
16. 
30 GAOR, Fifteenth Sess., 944th plenary meeting, 13 December 1960, p. 1240, para. 96. The 'whole of 
Asia', Menon said, 'saw this as the defeat of a European empire by a small, short-statured Asiatic 
people'. D. Warner confirms Menon's view. He puts it more strongly than I have above: 'Nationalists 
in the Philippines, Indochina, the Dutch East Indies and even in Turkey and Egypt were strongly 
influenced by the war and the Japanese victory. Nehru and Sukarno were just two of the future leaders 
swept up in the movement.' 'Dress Rehearsal for Pearl Harbor', International Herald Tribune, 19 
April 1995. 
31 D.A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967 (New York and London, 1970), p. 
147. 
32 Churchill denied that this document, essentially a press releast drafted by Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
PUS at the Foreign Office, was intended to refer to British or other colonial possessions. But its 
wording was sufficient guarantee that the world's anti-colonialists, foremost among whom were the 
Americans, would sit up and take notice. Whatever Churchill had in mind, presumably to prepare the 
way for the United States' entry into the war, the document had universal application. For particulars 
of the Atlantic Charter see Churchill's account in The Second World War, Vol. III, The Grand 
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South Africa regarded it as 'a symbol of the freedom for which they had been striving 
since before Union'.33 
As evident from Smuts's cable to Hofmeyr, anti-colonialism featured strongly in 
San Francisco. A member of the delegation, HT. Andrews, observed later that the 
'wave against "Imperial-colonialism" was intense'.34 Two-thirds of the participating 
states were hostile to the colonial system, the Latin Americans alone making up forty 
per cent35 Though impressed by latter's solidarity in San Francisco, Smuts's son and 
biographer, Jannie, felt that 'their voting power was out of all proportion to their 
intrinsic worth'.36 South African delegations to the General Assembly up to 1960, the 
victims of overwhelming majorities of which the Latin Americans constituted a promi-
nent component, would not have disagreed with him. Anti-colonialism was part of 
what Geldenhuys calls 'the new international morality'. 37 The easy racism with which 
the white world contemplated people of other cultures and colours gave way to a guilt-
ridden anti-racism which, as Hudson says, became 'almost universal orthodoxy' in the 
western world.38 The composition of the United Nations where other cultures and 
colours were in the majority facilitated the process. 
Fixed in its own morality which saw nothing strange about the social and 
political inferiority of the country's non-white majority, white South Africa was the 
principal target and victim of the new morality from the time of the General Assembly's 
first session. It was left behind as the rest of the world changed. In Pienaar's words, 
Alliance (London, 1950), Chapter XXIV, pp. 385-400; D. Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945 (New York, 1972), pp. 399-402 - Diary entry for 12 August 1941; and 
W.R. Louis. Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the decolonization of the British Empire 
(Oxford, 1977), pp. 121-28. Huntington Gilchrist, a former League of Nations official, called the 
Atlantic Charter a self-denying ordinance. 'Colonial questions at the San Francisco Conference', The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 5, October 1945, p. 982. 
33 Reader's Digest Illustrated History of South Africa - The Real Story, New York, 1988, p.361. 
South Africa subscribed to the Atlantic Charter as a signatory to the Declaration by United Nations of 
1 January 1942. See also USNA, 843A.00/588, MacVeagh/Secretary of State, No. 116, 23 February 
1943, Enclosure, Report by the OSS representative, Goodhue Livingston, 'Unrest among natives in the 
Union', p. 4 
34 BTS, 136/2/1, Vol. 1, Andrews/SEA, 21March1946, p. 2. 
35 Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, p. 147. See Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 186 on 
the Latin Americans. 
36 J.C. Smuts; Jan Christian Smuts (London, 1952), p. 483. 
37 D.J. Geldenhuys, The Effects of South Africa's Racial Policy on Anglo-South African Relations 
(Unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1977), p. 36 et seq. See also G. Mills & S. 
Baynham. 'South African Foreign Policy, 1945-1960', G. Mills, ed., From Pariah to Participant: 
South Africa's evolving foreign relations, 1990-1994 (Johannesburg, 1994), p. 12 
38 W.J. Hudson. Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne, 1978), p. 54. 
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'South Africa's domestic dilemmas landed it in a kind of time-warp which made it 
increasingly out of step, and sympathy, with the rest of the world'.39 Henry Cabot 
Lodge, the United States Permanent Representative, put it succinctly in 1959: the 
'majority of mankind was not white and [the] majority of [the] General Assembly was 
not white and had no sympathy for South African racialist policy'.40 Smuts said in 
Pretoria in December 1946: 
According to our time-scale, equality is a new word. There is no 
equality in this country - or on this earth. In fact, here in South 
Africa the coloured man does not look on the native as his equal. 
The Indian does not look on the native as his equal. 
It is the traditional attitude of man, and you will not change it. ... 
People at Lake Success41 were drunk with slogans - equality, non-
discrimination. If there were no leaders in the world, where would 
we be? One man is better tha[n] another - that is the lesson of his-
tory, the lesson we have learned in South Africa. There must be 
discrimination. 
I think we are on safe ground in essentials. We want to keep the 
peace in South Africa. We can only keep it among our heter-
ogenous elements by sorting them out fairly and decently, and so 
keep the show going and the army marching - the one a general, 
the other a corporal , another a private, and another a camp-fol-
lower. But we all take part in the march. That is South Africa and 
that is the history of the world. 42 
Perhaps so, but a view out of tune with the times. The Indian delegation was to quote 
it against him at the General Assembly's second session.43 
The United Nations was from the beginning a political organisation and its 
General Assembly a pseudo-parliament where the mustering of majorities determined 
which causes succeeded and which did not. In the General Assembly each member has 
39 Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations, p. 182. 
40 Quoted by J. Plimsoll, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, I. 14535/6, 19 August 1959. 
41 In the Borough of Queens, City of New York, where the second part of the UN General Assembly's 
first session was held. 
42 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 21 December 1946. One is reminded of the third stanza of Cecil 
Francis Alexander's early Victorian children's hymn All Things Bright and Beautiful (1848). This 
particular stanza gave rise to some controversy in the last quarter of 1995. See The Pretoria News, 6 
September 1995. ('Bishop brands hymn as wicked'.) See also AA, A423 l/2, Pretoria 1-91 1947, 
Knowles/Minister of State for External Affairs, Despatch 3/47, 14 January 1947. For such reasons H. 
Seedat calls Smuts 'a tragic figure'. The Star (Johannesburg), 26 May 1995. ('History will show Jan 
Smuts as a tragic, not heroic, figure'). 
43 See UN doc. A/373, 2 September 1947, para. 4, in GAOR, Second Sess., First Com., Summary 
Records 16 September - 19 November 1947, p. 533. 
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one vote and what Inis Claude calls 'majoritarianism'44 prevails, ie. decisions are carried 
either by simple majorities or a two-thirds majority in respect of 'important questions'. 
Kay rightly says that success or failure in United Nations diplomacy is judged by the 
criteria of parliamentary diplomacy - votes won or lost, amendments adopted or 
defeated, and successful or unsuccessful parliamentary stratagems - rather than by any 
contribution made to the control or resolution of the problems at hand'. 45 In addition to 
its formal rules there are, as Peterson says, 'a whole series of informal practices. that 
help the formal rules operate more smoothly and permit adjustments to the needs of a 
particular issue or moment'. 46 As in a national parliament, intimate knowledge of both 
the formal rules and the informal practices is of cardinal importance. 
Though not mentioned in the Charter, 47 the geographic and political groupings 
have occupied a central position for most of the organisation's existence. Bailey likens 
them to an 'embryonic party system', seeing in it a reason why the Assembly 'bears 
some resemblances to a parliamentary body'.48 Especially in the pre-African period, 
there was also a Commonwealth Group which met regularly in New York during Gen-
eral Assembly sessions besides coming together periodically in London. South Africa's 
candidature in the late 1950s for the so-called Commonwealth seat in the Security 
Council was rejected by the other members of the group. In 1957 Eric Louw, who 
would by then have been aware of United Nations realities, commented on the absence 
of a Western group as such, saying that where the others stood together and voted 
together 'it happens again and again that the western nations are split, because there is 
not a Western group'. He likened the group caucus to a parliamentary caucus: 
The group caucus meets, and decides how it will vote on a certain 
issue. Whatever the individual nation's view may be on the par-
ticular issue the member states of the group caucus vote as a 
group. The groups stand together, act together, and vote as a 
group.49 
44 See l.L; Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organi-
zation (New York, 1959 (1956)), pp. 128-40. 
45 D.A. Kay, 'The Impact of African States on the United Nations', International Organization, Vol. 
XXIII. No.l, Winter 1969, p. 46. 
46 M.J. Peterson, The General Assembly in World Politics (Boston, 1986), p. 10. 
47 Neither are Permanent Missions at UN headquarters in New York and at other centres where the 
UN maintains offices, eg. Geneva and Vienna. Permanent Missions are as much part of the UN as the 
group system. 
48 S.D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice 
(London. 1960). p. 26. 
49 HA Deb., Vol. 95, IO June 1957, Col. 7607. 
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He also implied that if delegations acted contrary to the wishes of their groups, 
they could be expelled. In his radio broadcast two years later he said that in 'the voting 
on the three perennial South African items on the agenda, the Afro-Asian and 
Communist states, and certain states with large mixed populations, always constitute a 
solid bloc, which commands a clear majority in the Assembly'. 50 
At least in respect of the South African items - Treatment of Indians, South 
West Africa and, from 1952, Apartheid - voting patterns show that this is misleading. 
During the period covered here, there was only one truly monolithic group, the Soviet 
Union and its satellites whose votes were indistinguishable one from the other. Of the 
other groups the Arabs and Asians displayed a high degree of cohesion; the Latin 
Americans, numerically the largest group for much of the 1950s, less so. Indeed, from 
South Africa's point of view, the votes of a country like Argentina were consistently 
more favourable than those of the United States or Israel.51 The same went for Turkey 
whatever that country's group affiliations - Asian or European - at the time. 
The numerical strength of the groups in relation to each other changed with 
time. Of the fifty-one founder members, there were twenty Latin American States 
(39.22%), by far the largest grouping;52 ten Asian and Middle Eastern States 
(19.61%);53 three African States (5.88%);54 thirteen Western European and other 
States (including Australia, Canada and New Zealand) (25.49%);55 and five consisted 
of the Soviet Union and its Satellites (9.8%).56 Between 1946 and 1948: the ranks of 
the Asians increased by five57 and the Western Europeans by two.58 The great com-
50 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 7, Phillips/DEA, 11 January 1960, transcript of Louw's 
broadcast on 'Top Level', 20 December 1959. 
51 In 1954 Jooste explained Israel's position as follows: 'Their attitude, we now know, is dictated by 
fear of opposing India, whose friendship, I believe, is of importance to them in their difficulties with 
the Arabs.' BTS, 136/2/21, Vol. 3, Jooste/SEA. 14 January 1954, p. 4. 
52 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ven-
ezuela. 
53 China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yugoslavia. India was 
not yet formally independent. Yugoslavia's position was anomalous. Although part of Eastern Europe, 
its votes on various UN issues including the South African items were to put it among the Asians. 54 Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa. Ethiopia and Liberia fell within the African-Arab-Asian grouping, 
while South Africa was grouped with the Commonwealth. 
55 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. As with Yugoslavia, Turkey's position was also 
anomalous. Although falling geographically mainly in Asia, its delegations voted like Western Euro-
peans. 
56 Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. 
57 Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan, Thailand and Yemen. 
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promise of 1955 brought about the admission of sixteen States: six Asian and Middle 
Eastern States;59 six Western Europeans;60 and four Communist States.61 They were 
followed by Japan, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia in 1956; Ghana and Malaya in 1957 
and Guinea in 1958. Israel had joined in 1949 and Indonesia in 1950. 
Sole, then South Africa's Permanent Representative in New York, reported on 
the implications of the 1955 compromise. He said it marked the abandonment in favour 
of one of universality, of the original concept of the UN as an organisation of like-
minded states joined together for the maintenance of peace and security. He forecast 
the decline of western influence and a more than proportionate increase in the strength 
of the 'Bandoeng group'62 and the Soviet bloc. The 'anti-colonial line-up would be 
considerably strengthened and would occupy almost a commanding position'. The 
'recognition of Communist China in 1957 ... was more probable'63 and the 'Latin 
American voting machine would play a crucial role if it could be aligned firmly on the 
side of the west'. 64 
By the end of 1958 the percentage of Latin Americans had declined to 24.1, 
while that of the Asians had increased to 31.32. The percentage of the Western Euro-
peans had risen slightly to 24.1, that of the Africans (excluding South Africa) to 6.02, 
that of the Communists to 12.05 while two States, Israel and South Africa, belonging 
to no group comprised 2.41 per cent.65 European and non-European States66 had been 
more evenly balanced in the League of Nations.67 In any case its reliance on the una-
58 Iceland and Sweden. 
59 Cambodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Laos, Libya and Nepal. 
60 Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
61 Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania. 
62 So named after the 18-24 April 1955 Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, which saw the creation of 
the Non-aligned Movement. Under the title 'Asian-African Conference', Current Notes, Vol. 26, No. 
5, May 1955, pp. 310-16, gives an account of the conference. The conference pressed for the applica-
tion of the principle of universality to UN membership (p. 314). The previous month's edition of 
Current Notes (No. 4, April 1955, pp. 293-97) contained the text of the conference's communique. 
63 The People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China in the Chinese seat only in 1971. 
64 BTS, 136/2/24, Vol. 1, Sole/SEA, 23 October 1956. 
65 Except in South Africa's case, the Commonwealth which, even in its original form of the white 
Commonwealth, was scarcely monolithic. 
66 In the sense of geographic location. 
67 The League's original forty-two members were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Ca-
nada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, 
Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Salvador, Siam, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. F.P. Walters, A History of the Lea-
gue of Nations, London, 1965 (1952), pp. 64-65. 
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nimity rule, the prevailing international morality, and the climate of its times made the 
League very different proposition. Eric Louw thought so. (See the transcript of the 
above mentioned radio broadcast.) 
The UN's original composition favoured the United States in its battle for sup-
remacy with the Soviet Union and for much of the 1950s the organisation was an 
instrument of American foreign policy.68 But, as The New York Times commented in 
1958, American influence declined with the expanding the membership: 
our grip on the General Assembly is slipping. It has progressively 
slipped with the admission of four new members in 1946, two new 
members in 194 7, one new member in each of the years 1948, 
1949 and 1950, sixteen new members in 1955, four new members 
in 1956 and two new members in 1957.69 
If by the end of the 1950s the organisation's changing composition was giving 
rise to Western misgivings, 70 the mass admission of African States in the 1960s not 
only put an end to United States domination but changed the nature of the organisa-
tion's political process. 71 Thirty-seven (sub-Saharan) African states became members 
between 1957 and 1968, sixteen in 1960 alone, the year of African independence, 
when the percentage of African members grew from 5.88 in 1945 (Ethiopia, Liberia 
and South Africa) to 21.21 in 1960. These states made their presence felt immediately. 
A measure of their impact is that they were responsible for the amendments to the 
Charter enlarging the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. That in 
the face of opposition by all five permanent members of the Security Council. This 
demonstrated their 'political savvy, strength and will' and not unnaturally 'resulted in a 
tremendous surge of self-confidence and a heightened feeling of group solidarity'. 72 
By the time (the late 1970s) a former United States Permanent Representative 
was calling a book about his experiences at the United Nations A Dangerous Place73 
and heading one of its chapters 'Theatre of the Absurd', meaning the General 
68 The General Assembly's adoption in February 1957 of resolutions 1017 A and B (XI) concerning 
Soviet opposition in the Security Council to UN membership for South Korea and South Vietnam, by 
votes of 40-8-16 and 40-8-18, shows the ex1ent of US influence at the time. 
69 The New York Times, 12 October 1958. (Editorial, 'The U.N. and the U.S.'). 
7° Claude, Swords into Plowshares, pp. 458-59. 
71 Kay, 'The Impact of African States on the United Nations', International Organization, Vol. XXIII, 
No. 1, Winter 1969, p. 21. 
72 Ibid., p. 29. 
73 D.P. Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (London, 1979). His attitude towards the UN would not have 
harmed his campaign for the US Senate. First elected in 1976, he is still New York's senior senator. 
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Assembly, the latter was 'controlled by Third World countries who ... want action they 
cannot perform themselves and see the General Assembly as an instrument'. 74 In South 
Africa's case, the new African members transformed a situation of annual discomfort 
for the government in respect of at most three interrelated agenda items into a virtual 
United Nations campaign in which South Africa and its principal international 
interlocutors were the focus of relentless attack. 75 That merely put the seal on a 
situation which had been unfavourable to South Africa from the beginning. 
Barratt claims that until the African entry 'South African representatives were 
still playing a relatively normal role in the UN ... participating fully in the meetings of 
the General Assembly and its committees'. 76 'Relatively' is the key word for South Af-
rica was even then too controversial to consider putting up candidates for most of the 
elective positions on the main committees during sessions of the General Assembly77 
let alone for the presidency of that body. By 1958 South Africa was, with the excep-
tion of the United Kingdom which was barred by the convention that the great powers 
did not nominate candidates, the only member of the old (white) Commonwealth not 
to have held that office. An Australian (H.V. Evatt) was elected to it at the third ses-
sion in 1948; a Canadian (L.B. Pearson) at the seventh session in 1952; and a New 
Zealander (L.K. Munro) at the twelfth session in 1957.78 
By 1960 South Africa was also the only member of the Commonwealth not to 
have been a member of the Security Counci179 or of the Economic and Social Council. 
It had, however, been elected to the Social Commission in 1946 as was the Chairman 
of the South African delegation (Heaton Nicholls for the first part of the first session; 
74 M. Keens-Soper, 'The General Assembly Reconsidered: the Attack on Secret Diplomacy', G.R. 
Berridge & A. Jennings, eds., Diplomacy at the UN, London & Basingstoke, 1985, p. 83. 
75 The notion of a United Nations 'campaign' is misleading for, as Morgenthau says, there is 'no such 
thing as the policy of an organization, international or domestic, apart from the policy of its most 
influential member or members', in this case the Africans. H. Morgenthau, 'Political Limitations of 
the United Nations', G.A. Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics in the World Community (Berkeley & Los 
Angeles), 1953, p. 150. 
76 CJ.A. Barratt, 'South African Diplomacy at the UN', G.R. Berridge and A. Jennings, eds., Di-
plomacy at the UN (London & Basingstoke, 1985), p. 194. 
77 Chairman. Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur. M.I. Botha served as Vice-Chairman of the Fifth 
(Administrative and Budgetary) Committee at the ninth session in 1954. B.G. Fourie had been Rap-
porteur of the same committee at the fifth session in 1950. 
78 Of other members of the Commonwealth, Mrs V.L. Pandit (India) presided over the eighth 
Assembly in 1953, Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) over the seventeenth in 1962, and Alex 
Quaison-Sackey (Ghana) over the nineteenth in 1964. 
79 Australia (1946-47: 1956-57) and Canada (1948-49; 1958-59) had been members twice and New 
Zealand (1954-55); India (1950-51); and Pakistan (1952-53) once. Ceylon and Ghana served two-year 
terms in 1960-61and1962-63, respectively. 
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Smuts for the second part) to be a Vice-President of the General Assembly. Also in 
1946 Seymour Jacklin, formerly Chairman of the South African Public Service Com-
mission and Treasurer of the League ofNations,80 was elected to a three-year term on 
the Committee on Contributions.81 He was then sixty-four years of age and South Af-
rica's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 
Barratt's other example of normality, South Africa's election to a vice-presi-
dency as the agreed Commonwealth candidate at the fourteenth session in 1959, is not 
a good one. (Sole misses the point too. Reminiscences, p. 176.) The vice-presidency 
was a quid pro quo, a 'consolation prize', 82 for South Africa not pressing its candidacy 
at that session for the so-called Commonwealth seat on the Security Council. 83 Louw 
had sold the idea of returning to the United Nations after the two-year period of 'token 
representation' ( 1956-58) to the cabinet inter alia on the basis of membership of the 
Security Council. 84 
It had not been an easy decision. Davis, the Australian Hi~h Commissioner in 
Pretoria, cabled Canberra later that he and his British and Canadian colleagues agreed 
that the evidence showed it 'had been reached after much difficulty'. It was therefore 
'important that the supporters in Cabinet of a more moderate approach should, if pos-
sible, not be let down'. 85 Louw announced South Africa's candidature in the House of 
Assembly on 18 August 1958. 86 By November the Commonwealth Relations Office 
80 AA, A4231/2, Pretoria 1-91 1947, No. 61/47, 22 July 1947. 
81 Not, as Sole says (Reminiscences, p. 101), to 'the standing subcommittee which serves as the U.N.'s 
financial "watchdog".' That is the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 
82 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, I. 7211, 24 April 1959 para 2. 
83 Judging by the amount of telegraphic 'to-ing' and 'fro-ing' on this issue, it was a quite a major one. 
By then South Africa was odd man out even in the context of the old Commonwealth. The Australian 
Archives has much material on the issue. See, eg., Al838/2, items (ie. file nos.) 201/9/1; 201/9/1, Pt. 
2; 201/10/l Pt. 2; 201/11/l, Pts. 2 and 3; 201/1/51, Pt. l; 916/1/2; A1838/T55, 201/11/37, Pt. 1. See 
also BTS, 136/3/10, Vol. 2, 'Die Unie se kandidatuur vir die Veiligheidsraad 1959 en 1961' (The 
Union's candidature for the Security Council 1959 and 1961). Note apparently prepared by J.S.F. 
Botha. 
84 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/l, Pt. 2, Memo. 1219, Rowland/DEA, 18 November 1958, para. 2; 201/11/l, 
Pt. 2, I. 20176, 18 November 1958, para. 3. The work of the Good Offices Committee on South West 
Africa (see UN doc. A/3900, 27 August 1958 and AA. Al838/2, 916/1/2, Woodberry/Secretary, n.d.) 
and the allegedly more favourable attitude at the General Assembly towards the other South African 
items were additional factors. 
8
.5 AA, Al838/2, 201/9/1, Pt. 2, I. 10257, 11June1959. 
86 Ibid., 916/1/2, I. 14225, 18 August 1958. 
389 
Chapter Eight: The United Nations dimension 
was talking of a vice-presidency as an alternative. 87 South Africa ostensibly deferred its 
bid for the Security Council until 1961 but it never formally materialised. 
The vice-presidency was also not a sure thing. The Latin Americans were 
divided on the issue and Argentina's Permanent Representative, Mario Amadeo, told 
Australia's Plimsoll that South Africa would not receive a majority of the votes. In 
selecting a nominee, he said, the Commonwealth should consider the views of other 
countries. The Latin Americans, for example, would never think of nominating the 
Dominican Republic for any office at that time. 88 Even if Argentina did not vote for 
another candidate, 'they might very well put in a blank paper for this post'. Plimsoll 
countered that if South Africa were defeated 'it would increase pressures inside that 
country to leave the United Nations'. Amadeo accepted that, but expressed the hope 
that 
Commonwealth countries might make representations to South 
Africa to present their case in such a way as to make it easier for 
other countries to go as far as possible towards seeing their 
position. Argentina was a white country and did not want to see 
European civilisation go under, but often South Africa did not 
state its position in a way that helped the Argentine Government 
domestically in supporting it. 89 
As it happened, South Africa drew the fewest number of votes, sixty out of a 
possible eighty-two, of any candidate nominated by the five groups (A to E).90 
Indicative of its controversial status was that only sixty-one votes were cast in favour 
of the Republic of China in group E.91 What probably tipped the balance in South 
Africa's favour was that India lent its support to and lobbied for the former's 
candidature. 92 While adamantly opposed to South African membership of the Security 
Council, India was apparently 'willing to see South Africa working in more junior 
Committees to rehabilitate herselfin the United Nations'.93 
87 Ibid., 201/11/1, Pt. 2, Memo. 1266/58, Davis/DEA, 28 November 1958, para. 7. See also 201/1/51, 
Pt. 1, I. 1734, 21January1959. 
88 Ibid., 201/9/1, Pt. 2, I. 14529/30, 19 August 1959. 
89 AA, A9421, 223/1/l, Serial No. UN 595, 19 August 1959. 
90 A= Africans-Arabs-Asians; B =Communists; C =Latin Americans; D =Western Europeans and 
Others; E = Permanent members of the Security Council. 
91 GAOR, Fourteenth Sess., 796th plenary meeting, 15 September 1959, pp. 5-6, para. 6. The question 
of the Chinese seat still had twelve years to run. 
92 AA, A9421, 223/1/1, Australian High Commission, Pretoria, Savingram, 13 August 1959, para. 
(d); and High Commission, London, Cablegram 3371, 4 September 1959. 93 AA, Al838/2, 201/1111, Pt. 2, I. 4479, 12 March 1959. See also 20119/l, Pt. 2, Memo. 124, 
Phillips/Department of External Affairs, 12 March 1959, para. 4. 
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If things at the United Nations were bad from the South African government's 
point of view before 1960, they became immeasurably worse thereafter. But that falls 
outside the scope of this study. Ironically, especially during Eric Louw's tenure at the 
foreign ministry, and before the African admission to membership, the government was 
at its most active in combating perceived UN intervention in the country's domestic 
affairs. After vainly seeking to prevent the inscription of the apartheid and Treatment 
of Indians items, it put its case against General Assembly consideration of them at 
length in plenary and in the committees at session after session. From time to time it 
withdrew its delegation from the Assembly to reinforce its attitude. The longest of 
these withdrawals was for two years between 1956 and 1958. The delegation had been 
withdrawn from the sixth Assembly in 1951 because of the decision to grant Michael 
Scott a hearing on South West Africa and from the tenth Assembly in 1955 after 29 
November. 
South Africa's standing in the pre-1960 UN can be measured statistically. The 
1955 compromise produced a twenty-seven per cent increase in the membership. 94 Be-
fore then, between the first and the ninth sessions of the General Assembly (1945-54), 
when the organisation's composition was not far from its most favourable to South 
Africa, roll-call votes were held in plenary on the twenty-one resolutions adopted in 
respect of the Treatment of Indians (6),95 South West Africa (11)96 and Apartheid 
(4).97 1243 individual votes were cast covering the categories 'Yes' (796), 'No' (103), 
and 'Abstention' (293) in addition to which there were fifty-one individual absences,98 
not a large number, showing that delegations' discipline was good. (A collective 
approach is permissible because, as Sole pointed out in 1955, their attitude to apar-
94 See The Economist, 1December1956, pp. 759-60 ('What the Assembly Is') for a useful analysis of 
the significance of the enlarged membership. 
95 44 (I), 8 December 1946; 265 (III), 14 May 1949; 395 (V), 2 December 1950; 511 (VI), 12 January 
1952; 615 (VII), 5 December 1952; 719 (VIII), 11November1953. 
96 65 (I), 14 December 1946; 141 (II), 1 November 1947; 337 (IV), 6 December 6 December 1949; 
449A (V), 13 December 1950; 449B (V), 13 December 1950; 570A (VI), 19 January 1952; 570B (VI), 
19 January 1952; 749A (VIII), 28 November 1953; 749B (VIII), 28 November 1953; 844 (IX), 11 Oc-
tober 1954; 904 (IX), 23 November 1954. 
97 616A (VII), 5 December 1952; 616B (VII), 5 December 1952; 721 (VIII), 8 December 1953; 820 
(IX), 14 December 1954. 
98 Revealed by checking the other categories against the list of UN members. Delegations absent 
themselves from votes for various reasons, including the desire not to be seen taking a position, a 
phenomenon known in UN parlance as voting with one's feet. Laziness or incompetence on the part of 
individual representatives is uncommon. 
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theid conditioned delegations' approach to the other South African items. 99 Even so, 
the voting patterns reveal minor differences in attitude towards the three.) 
Table 1 summarises the outcome: 
Table 1 IOO 
Group attitudes re,·ealed by roll-call votes on South African items 1946-1954 
Sixty countries; twenty-one resolutions: 
%Y %N %A %Abs 
AFRICANS 2 80.95 2.38 9.52 7.14 
ARABS 6 90.32 0 5.65 4.03 
ASIANS 10 89.39 0.51 9.6 0.51 
COMMUNISTS 5 61.9 14.29 23.81 0 
LATINS 20 70.24 3.57 19.52 6.67 
WEO 17 32.26 19.93 43.88 3.92 
TOTAL 60 64.04 8.29 23.57 4.1 
The immediate conclusion is that, taken together, the twenty-one resolutions 
were adopted convincingly, indeed by well over two-thirds of the delegations present 
and voting, if not of the total membership. Conversely, the South African position on 
the three items was rejected equally convincingly. IOI The six Arab states voted affirma-
tively 90.32 per cent of the time, the two Africans (Ethiopia and Liberia) 80.95 per 
cent of the time, the third highest percentage after the Arabs and the Asians. The 
Western Europeans and OthersI02 trailed with only 32.26 per cent affirmative votes. 
The WEOs abstained 43~88 per cent of the time, also casting the highest percentage of 
negative votes. That was where South Africa's support lay. This was, however, mainly 
of a token nature for there was no way South Africa and its 'friends' could have 
secured the deletion of any of the three items from the General Assembly's agenda. 
99 BCB Vol. 7, 8/4, Du Plessis/SEA, 18 January 1955, Attachment, p. 3. Only the roll-call votes on 
the resolutions themselves are taken into account. There were also roll-call votes on the inscription of 
the items on the agenda and in the committees including on individual paragraphs of resolutions. 
I 00 The percentages in this and subsequent tables were obtained by feeding the relevant voting 
statistics into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The calculation and sorting facilities of the Word for 
Windows 2 program with which this thesis was written were also helpful. 
IOI The best results South Africa achieved were in connection with the Treatment of Indians item at 
the first session when, in committee nineteen states and in plenary twenty-one, supported its position. 
102 The 'Others' were Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United States. For the sake of convenience 
I also include Israel, Turkey and South Africa. 
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This confirms Sole's impression that 'after the advent of the Nationalist Gov-
ernment in 1948 the anti-South African momentum in the U.N. became virtually 
unstoppable'. 103 In fact, given the nature of the country at the time and the refusal of its 
rulers to contemplate a serious amelioration of the situation of its non-whites, the 
momentum was unstoppable from the beginning. After all, the Asiatic Land Tenure and 
Indian Representation Act, No. 28 of 1946, which opened the door to international 
examination of South Africa's discriminatory domestic legislation was the product of 
Smuts's, not Malan's, South Africa. (As was Alan Paton's Cry, The Beloved Country 
which dramatically revealed to a world audience the predicament of South Africa's 
black people.) 
And it was Smuts who complained of the 'solid wall of prejudice against the 
colour policies in South Africa which not even the most efficient publicity could have 
broken down in the time at our disposal'. 104 Events were to show that the wall would 
grow higher and ever more solid until the installation of a non-racial disposition in the 
country five decades later. Sole is hard on Smuts for not being alert to the procedural 
pitfalls into which he fell in respect of the Treatment of Indians item. 105 But even 
assuming he had won the day then, the respite would have been only temporary. The 
Pakistani view relayed to Canberra in 1952 does not negate that conclusion. 
Pakistan ... appreciated South Africa's difficulties and realised ... it 
would be difficult for South Africa to make substantial or rapid 
concessions. So long as South Africa adopted a reasonable 
approach, as it showed signs of doing in 194 7 when General 
Smuts succeeded in having the original resolution upset and the 
item deleted from the Agenda, 106 Pakistan was prepared to be 
conciliatory and reasonable in its approach. Even during the last 
Session, Pakistan had refused India's request to co-sponsor the 
Indian Resolution. The present South African Government, how-
ever. had shown itself so scornful of the United Nations, so 
insulting to Asiatic peoples and so completely intolerant that Paki-
stan had no alternative but to support the Indian Resolution. Paki-
stan felt that there had been no improvement in the policy of Dr. 
Malan's Government since then. It was considered that South Af-
rica had added to the certainty of a two-third majority vote being 
registered against it at the last General Assembly by Dr. Malan's 
103 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 103. 
104 Rand Daily Mail, 19December1946. 
105 Reminiscences, p. 102. See below. 
106 The resolution failed to achieve a two-thirds majority. The item was back on the agenda at the 
General Assembly's next session. 
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comment that the Latin American countries were opposed to South 
Africa because they were countries of half-caste populations. 107 
In addition to the roll-call votes, five resolutions in respect of two of the three 
South African items, were adopted between 1946 and 1954 by show-of-hands votes, 
four on South West Africa and one on the Treatment of Indians. 108 Show-of-hands 
votes are held when a record of who voted how is not considered important. They lack 
the drama of roll-call votes. Where roll-call votes permit an analysis of voting patterns; 
show-of-hands votes do not. Collectively the five resolutions were adopted by 76.12 
per cent in favour, 7.84 per cent against, with 16.04 per cent abstentions, again a con-
vincing collective repudiation of South Africa's position. Table 2 illustrates the non-
monolithic nature of the various groups, suggesting that an analogy between them and 
the parliamentary caucuses of political parties should not be taken too far. The Latin 
Americans were, in fact, less of a 'voting machine' than Sole believed. 109 As mentioned, 
the only truly monolithic group was the USSR and its satellites. Pakistan and South 
Africa were at the two extremes of the spectrum: every vote the former cast was 
affirmative, while the latter, except on one occasion when it abstained, 110 invariably 
voted negatively or absented itself. The other fifty-eight members fell between the two. 
Table 2 
Affirmative votes in descending order 
Twenty-one resolutions 
100% (1) 
1 Asian [Pakistan] 
90-99% (12) 
5 Arabs [Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria] 
4 Asians [Afghanistan, India, Iran, Philippines] 
3 Latins [Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico] 
80-89% (11) 
1 African [Liberia] · 
107 AA, Al832/2, 201/2/5/2, Pt. 2, Ministerial Despatch 16/52, Beavis/Casey, 25 July 1952, p. 2, 
para. 5, reporting on a conversation with Messrs Akhtar Husain and Itaat Husain, respectively Joint 
Secretaries in charge of the UK & Commonwealth Division and of United Nations Affairs in 
Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations. 
108 Indians: 816 (IX), 14 November 1954; SWA: 338 (IV), 6 December 1949; 651 (VII), 20 
December 1952; 851 (IX), 23 November 1954; 852 (IX), 23 November 1954. The number of show-of-
hands votes especially in respect of South West Africa mushroomed over the next few years. There 
were a total of forty-eight between 1955 and 1961: Indians 4; SWA 42; and Apartheid 2. 
109 As The Round Table (No. 146, March 1947, p. 136) pointed out in respect of the General 
Assembly's first resolution on the Treatment of Indians, 44 (1), the votes of the Latin Americans were 
split between affirmative, negative and abstention. 
110 On the General Assembly's first resolution on South West Africa, 65 (I). 
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4 Asians [Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Yugoslavia] 
6 Latins [Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Uruguay] 
70-79% (8) 
1 African [Ethiopia] 
1 Arab [Yemen] 
1 Asian [China] 
3 Latins [Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador] 
2 WEOs [Israel, United States] 
60-69% (7) 
5 Communists [Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian 
SSR, USSR] 
1 Latin [Panama] 
I WEO [Iceland] 
50-59% (5) 
3 Latins [Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela] 
2 WEOs [Denmark, Norway] 
40-49% (4) 
3 Latins [Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru] 
1 WEO [Sweden] 
30-39% (2) 
1 Latin [Argentina] 
1 WEO [Canada] 
20-30% (3) 
3 WEOs [France, Greece, Netherlands] 
10-19% (2) 
2 WEOs [Luxembourg,, Turkey] 
1-9% (4) 
4 WEOs [Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, United Kingdom] 
0% (1) 
South Africa 
As a corollary to the few occasions they voted affirmatively, those responsible 
for the highest percentage of negative votes were (in descending order) South Africa 
(80.95), Belgium (33.33), United Kingdom (28.57), Luxembourg (23.81), Australia 
(23.81), New Zealand (14.29) and Turkey (4.76). It fell to New Zealand (76.19), Aus-
tralia (71.43), United Kingdom (66.67), Turkey (61.9), Belgium and France (57.14), 
Greece, Argentina and Denmark (47.62), Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Do-
minican Republic and Venezuela (42.86), Canada and Peru (38.1), and Colombia 
(33.33) to record the highest percentage of abstentions. The performance of the Old 
(white) Commonwealth and, for comparative purposes, select countries such as 
Argentina, Belgium, Israel, Turkey, the United States and the Soviet Union, is 
reflected in Table 3. 
395 
Chapter Eight: The United Nations dimension 
Table 3 
The old Commonwealth and select other countries 
Twenty-one resolutions 
%Y %N %A %Abs. 
Argentina 38.1 14.29 47.62 0 
Australia 4.76 23.81 71.43 0 
Belgium 9.52 33.33 57.14 0 
Canada 38.l 23.81 38.l 0 
Israel 72.22 5.56 22.22 0 
New Zealand 9.52 14.29 76.19 0 
South Africa 0 80.95 4.762 14.29 
Turkey 14.29 4.76 61.9 19.05 
United Kingdom 4. 76 28.57 66.67 0 
United States 71.43 9.52 19.05 0 
USSR 61.9 14.29 23.81 0 
From the South African government's point of view, therefore, the voting 
records of Argentina and Turkey were hardly worse than Canada's, a fellow (white) 
member of the Commonwealth. And Canada was out of step with Australia, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Israel cast more affirmative votes than the United States 
and the Soviet Union while, curiously, the Soviet Union's record was better than that 
of the United States in each of the categories of affirmative, negative and abstention. 
No wonder Eric Louw decided there was nothing to be lost by embarking 'on a policy 
of confrontation with the United Nations'. 
Sole gives that as a reason why his own eighteen month term as Permanent 
Representative in New York (1955-57) was the least enjoyable of his entire career. 111 
Louw's reason was probably to strengthen his position in domestic politics. At any 
rate, developments at the United Nations up to the time he became Minister of 
External Affairs in January 1955, and confirmed by the analysis of voting patterns 
above, showed clearly that South Africa stood no chance at all of achieving favourable 
settlements in respect of the three South African items (meaning in effect their deletion 
from the General Assembly's agenda). 
Hudson poses the question about Evatt in San Francisco whether 'behaviour 
which jangled on the sensitivities of officials and diplomats carried a price'. He con-
cluded in effect that it did not. Evatt had a reputation for 'unpolished assertiveness ... 
and in some quarters he was personally disliked'. But it was to be doubted 'whether this 
111 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 17 l. 
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had much effect on British and American attitudes towards Australia or policies with 
respect to Australia'. 112 The same can be said of Louw at the United Nations. In the 
long run Louw's abrasiveness was probably not a factor Even if his manner had been as 
suave as that of his successor, Hilgard Muller, as in the latter's case, suavity 
unaccompanied by material concessions in respect of its domestic policies would not 
have saved South Africa at the United Nations during Louw's time as foreign minister. 
Cadogan, the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State considered Evatt to 
be 'the most frightful man in the world'. 113 If for different reasons, Louw could well 
have been viewed in similar terms. But that has never been a disadvantage at the 
United Nations. The situation at the General Assembly was, in fact, tailor-made for 
people like Evatt, Louw and Andrei Vyshinsky of the Soviet Union, not to mention 
India's V.K. Krishna Menon. It suited their personalities. 
Between 1946 and 1974 when South Africa was denied the right of participa-
tion in the General Assembly, all South African delegations based their case in respect 
of the Treatment oflndians and Apartheid items (merged in 1962) on the provisions of 
the Charter's domestic jurisdiction clause, Article 2 (7). This reads: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VIL 
Central to the South African thesis, which was first put by Smuts at the second 
part of the first session of the General Assembly when India secured the inscription on 
the agenda of 'the question of treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa', 114 
was that the party invoking the protection of Article 2 (7) itself had the right to decide 
which matters lay 'essentially' within its domestic jurisdiction. Smuts had in fact told his 
parliamentary critics in February 1946 that Article 2 (7) secured the position. m That 
was how it may have seemed to participants in the San Francisco Conference. As Sole 
112 W.J. Hudson, Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945 (Canberra, 
1993), p. 158. 
113 Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M 1938-1945, p. 745 - Diary entry for 23 
May 1945. 
114 GAOR, First Sess., Second Part, Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committee, Summary 
Records 21-30 November 1946, Annex 1, p. 52. 
115 HA Deb .. Vol. 55, 7 February 1946, Col. 1274. 
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says, '2 (7) was always viewed as the safeguard offered to the smaller powers in 
exchange for their acquiescence in the right of veto accorded to the five Great 
Powers'. ll 6 
Kelsen holds that such an interpretation is 'compatible with the wording of the 
Charter'. 117 Naturally, anyone advancing it would have little difficulty in demonstrating 
at least to his own satisfaction that on such issues as the treatment oflndians and apar-
theid, the General Assembly engaged in the annual commission of gross violations of 
the Charter. ll 8 But the matter was never as simple as that. The zeal and conviction 
which South African delegations brought to bear on the issue drew from one observer 
the not imperceptive comment: 'I've often wondered if the Dutch Roman Law [sic] 
tradition affected South African behaviour. Australia often used legalistic tactics, but 
transparently as tactics. One always suspected the South Africans really believed what 
they said - very unusual in national and international politics - and virtually unknown in 
diplomacy'. 119 
That was where Charles Fincham, the junior South African Foreign Service 
Officer, contradicted the official line, 120 He argued in 1948: 
it appears that there is no warrant for the view that a member State 
can make a decision legally binding on other members or on the 
Organization as a whole, to the effect that a particular matter is 
one which is essentially within domestic jurisdiction. Such a deci-
sion must be taken by the Organ to which the dispute has been 
submitted, on the general principle that it is the sole judge of its 
ovm competence under the relevant provisions of the Charter. 121 
That has in fact been United Nations practice over the years. Fincham also 
argued that from the way in which it was applied in 1946 and 1947, 'Article 2, 
Il6Letter, 7June1993. 
117 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 
(London, 1951), p. 783. 
118 In the early 1980s with departmental financial support, a one-time law adviser in the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs devoted an LLD thesis to this proposition. The thesis was 
published (J.C. Heunis, United Nations versus South Africa: A Legal Assessment of United Nations 
and United Nations related Activities in respect of South Africa (Johannesburg/Cape Town, 1986) 
and State President P. W. Botha, in whose office the author was then chief law adviser, was 
instrumental in having it distributed to those governments with which his own maintained diplomatic 
relations. 
119 Communicated to the writer on an unattributable basis. 
120 See the Introduction, pp. 26-27 and Chapter Two, pp. 118-19. 
l2I Fincham, Domestic Jurisdiction, p. 95. 
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paragraph 7 is either a dead letter, or else has a meaning which is very different from 
that which emerges from a casual perusal of the text'. 122 The key to the situation is 
that, as Rajan says, the 'Charter is essentially a political document in legal garb and the 
Organization which is established was meant primarily to achieve certain broad 
political ends - not embody certain legal rights and obligations of the signatories'. 123 
Fincham, who was one of Rajan's principal sources, held that 'the purpose of an 
instrument like the Charter is in the first place political•.124 Writing as 'Pollux' in_ The 
British Yearbook of International Law, Fincham's friend, Edvard Hambro, the first 
Registrar of the International Court of Justice, called the Charter 'a highly political 
treaty'. 125 Morgenthau identifies a tendency to consider the Charter's 'legal provisions' 
and the 'institutions derived from them' as if 
they were self-sufficient entities which receive their political 
meaning and their ability to perform political functions from their 
own literal content without reference to the political environment 
within and with regard to which they are supposed to operate. 126 
If during the 1940s and 1950s the argument about domestic jurisdiction proved 
unconvincing, the South African approach made even less of an impression on the new 
African members. Nigerian Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku said in 1960: 
There is no use in telling Nigeria that this is an internal affair. We 
will never accept that as an internal affair of the Union of South 
Africa. As long as we live on a continent where there is racial dis-
crimination against people of African descent - or as long as there 
is discrimination against people of African descent anywhere in 
the world - it can never be considered by Nigeria as an internal 
affair of any country. The sooner it is understood the better.127 
Hudson would have had that sort of criticism in mind when he referred to South 
African attempts to 'fight emotion with peculiarly formal logic', as 'bone-headedness'. 
On the other hand, he conceded that South Africa was in 'an almost impossible posi-
122 Ibid., p. 143. 
123 M.S. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, 2nd ed. (London, 1961 (1958)), p. 382. 
Emphasis in original. 
124 Fincham., Domestic Jurisdiction, p. 174. 
125 
'The interpretation of the Charter', The British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 1946, p. 
55 and fn. 3. Rajan identifies Hambro as 'Pollux'. Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, p. 
404, fn. 2. 
126 Morgenthau, 'Political Limitations of the United Nations', G.A. Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics in 
the Jt'or/d Community (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953), p. 143. 
127 GAOR, Fifteenth Sess., 944th plenary meeting, 13 December 1960, p. 1240, para. 62. 
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tion' and if South African whites are racists ('and racists they are'), 'history has not left 
them much option•.128 
In view of South African reliance on Article 2 (7), it might be thought that in 
anticipation of future difficulties the South African delegation would have played a 
leading role at San Francisco to bar United Nations intervention in a country's domes-
tic affairs. A National Party government would have done so. Fifteen years earlier 
Hertzog resisted pressure to sign the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes on grounds that South Africa might then be obliged to defend aspects 
of its 'Asiatic policy before an international tribunal•.129 (In the event of the League 
Council being unable to reach unanimity over a dispute, the Act provided for compul-
sory arbitration). Bodenstein explained to the Secretary of the Cape League of Nations 
Union in 1931 that the Act contained 'provisions which are dangerous to the Union, 
because of its peculiar geographical position and of the precarious foothold of the 
white man in Southern Africa'. 130 
That was an approach to which Smuts appeared oblivious. During the 1946 
parliamentary debate on the ratification of the UN Charter, his parliamentary 
opponents as well as some of his allies, particularly Col Stallard, drew the obvious 
conclusion from the wording of Charter articles that the colour question and the treat-
ment of Indians were going to give South Africa trouble. 131 But Smuts waved them 
aside. 132 
The record shows that at San Francisco it was the Americans and the Austral-
ians, not the South Africans who took active steps to minimise the possibility of United 
Nations interference in their domestic affairs. The Australians had the White Australia 
Policy in mind. In the case of the Americans, that had been very much the position at 
Versailles in 1919 concerning the equivalent provision in the League of Nations Cov-
enant, artide 15(8). 133 For the same reason the then Australian Prime Minister, W.M. 
128 W.J. Hudson, 'Australia and United Nations Sanctions', World Review (Australia), Vol. 8, No. 2, 
July 1969, p. 23. 
129 Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations, p. 99. 
130 S. l-'32, The Parliament of the Union of South Africa, The Senate (Fourth Session - Sixth Parlia-
ment), Correspondence between the Department of External Affairs and the Cape League of Nations 
Union regarding the question of the accession of the Union of South Africa to the General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, p. 4. 
131 HA Deb., Vol. 55, 6 February 1946, Cols. 1188-89, 1205-06. 
132 Ibid., 7 February 1946, Col. 1274. 
133 See Fincham, Domestic jurisdiction, p. 15. 
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Hughes, circumvented a Japanese move at Versailles to have a racial equality clause 
included in the Covenant. 134 Ironically, an added factor for the Americans at San 
Francisco was Evatt's demand for the Charter to contain a full employment clause: 
Mr Pasvolsky explained that it was Dr. Evatt's intention to inject 
the World Organization into the internal affairs of the member 
states. This, he declared, was not conjecture, but had been told to 
him face to face by representatives of Australia and New Zealand 
on several occasions. The full employment argument, he said, was 
based on the theory that if a nation did not maintain full employ-
ment it would upset world peace. Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that he 
thought this was the most dangerous theory with which the United 
States had ever been diplomatically confronted.135 
Citing an anonymous member of the South African delegation, Duncan Hall 
claimed in 1971 that Smuts 'took a strong stand' at San Francisco 'against any weak-
ening of the barrier erected by the [League of Nations] Covenant' against intervention 
in matters of domestic jurisdiction. He gave, Hall said, 'a stern warning against any 
tampering with this provision'. Otherwise, 'South Africa would not join the United Na-
tions, nor probably would other countries'. The occasion was a meeting of British 
Commonwealth delegations and Smuts was supposedly reacting to a suggestion by 
Evatt that the United Nations be given a basis for intervening in Indonesia and Indo-
China.136 B.G. Fourie may have been Hall's informant. He was a last-minute addition to 
the South African staff in San Francisco as Smuts's assistant private secretary. He was 
at that time a clerical assistant at the High Commission in London. In words suggestive 
of Hall he claimed in his recent memoirs that Smuts worked hard for the inclusion in 
the Charter of Article 2 (7). 137 He had said in a draft of the book that he doubted 
whether South Africa would have signed the Charter if it had not contained the 
article. 138 
134 See Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris, pp. 54-59; L.F. Fitzhardinge, 'Australia, Japan and Great 
Britain, 1914-18: A Study in Triangular Diplomacy', Historical Studies, Vol. 14, No. 54, April 1970, 
pp. 250-59; L.F. Fitzhardinge, 'W.M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles', Journal of Commonwealth 
Political Studies, Vol. V, No. 2, July 1967, pp. 138-41; and Harper, A great and powerful friend, pp. 
33-35. The Japanese argument was subsequently said to have 'combined disconcertingly ... the 
qualities of being unanswerable and unacceptable'. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, p. 64. 
135 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1945, Vol. I, General: The United 
Nations (Washington, 1967), p. 924. 
136 Hall, Commonwealth, pp. 774 and 956, fn. 8. Eric Louw also cited Smuts to that effect at the Gen-
eral Assembly's 577th plenary meeting on 15 November 1956 (p. 33, para. 111 of the plenary records 
of the eleventh session). 
137 B.G. Fourie, Brandpunte: Agter die skerms met Suid-Afrika se bekendste diplomaat (Cape Town, 
199)1, p. 35. 
138 B.G. Fourie, Buite/andse woe/inge om Suid-Afrika 1939-1985 (1991), p. 34. 
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One is obliged to give these claims due weight. However, neither the records of 
the San Francisco Conference nor the reports of the South African delegation are sup-
portive of them. The South African delegation submitted but three amendments to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and strengthening the domestic jurisdiction clause was not 
among them. Two related to the preamble and one to the inclusion of a paragraph for 
the apportionment of costs in respect of the enforcement of Security Council deci-
sions. 139 H. T. Andrews's report on the work of Committee I/I concerning the preamble 
and the purposes and principles of the Charter supports the impression that the South 
African delegation played a passive role in respect of Article 2 (7). 140 It may be signifi-
cant in this connection that in the early years of the controversy, when setting out their 
interpretation of Article 2 (7) at length, South African spokesmen, would refer to the 
article's drafting history, citing inter alia Evatt and John Foster Dulles of the United 
States delegation, but never their own representatives. 141 As for Smuts not signing if 
the Charter had omitted Article 2 (7), he would not have signed if the major powers 
had withheld their own signatures. But if they were satisfied, then so was he. (See 
below.) 
The domestic jurisdiction principle was accorded a relatively unimportant place 
in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. But at San Francisco, as Article 2 (7), it became 
one of the basic principles of the United Nations. 142 The effect was supposedly 'to 
make it a limitation upon all the activities of the Organization rather than merely a 
limitation upon the action of the Organization under Chapter VI' concerning the pacific 
settlement of disputes. 143 With an eye to how the Charter would play in the Senate, 
recalling that the latter had rejected the Covenant and therefore kept the United States 
out of the League of Nations, the United States delegation was largely responsible for 
that. 144 Evatt came late to the issue at San Francisco and was obliged to put up 'a 
139 United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization San Francisco, 1945, Volume III, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Comments 
and Proposed Amendments, English Text (London/New York, 1945), pp. 4 7 4-79. 
140 See first attachment to BTS 136/1, Vol. 4, Andrews/SEA, 20 July 1945, pp. 5-6, paras. 16-18. 
141 See, eg., G.P. Jooste's statement on the occasion of the inscription of the apartheid item on the 
General Assembly's agenda for the first time. GAOR, 38lst plenary meeting on 17 October 1952, pp. 
53-59. 
142 N. Harper, N. & D. Sissons, Australia and the United Nations (New York, 1959), pp. 144-45. 
143 L.M. Goodrich & E. Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 
(Boston, 1946), p. 72. 
144 See L.M. Goodrich, The United Nations (New York, 1959), pp. 74-79; RB. Russell, A History of 
The United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-45 (Washington, D.C., 1958), pp. 
900-910; Rajan, United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, pp. 32-47; and The New York Times, 16 
June 1945 ('Dulles Wins Plea to Bar League [sic] From Meddling in Domestic Issues'). 
402 
Chapter Eight: The United Nations dimension 
scrambling fight' to retrieve the situation which his work to enlarge the powers of the 
General Assembly and extend the organisation's authority in the economic and social 
field had served to undermine. 145 In fact, it was only when members of his staff pointed 
to the direct threat to White Australia that he sprang into action. His contribution was 
to close the door on the possibility of a Security Council recommendation for the set-
tlement of a dispute providing an opportunity for an aggressor state to gain leverage 
over the victim of its aggression. 
Evatt's role was, in the words of the Australian delegation's report on the San 
Francisco Conference, to have it recognised that 
the decision of any nation as to such internal matters as migration 
cannot become the subject of any action by the United Nations. 
The only possible ground for intervention by the Security Council 
will be to prevent a breach of the peace or to suppress aggres-
sion.146 
Watt explained what he had in mind: 
suppose Japan or China demanded that Australia should accept 
one million migrants within a year, and threaten Australia if she 
refused. On appeal to the Security Council, the Council might 
agree to deal with the threat, provided Australia accepted 500,000, 
or 200,000 or less. The Australian amendment was designed to 
limit the powers of the Security Council, in such a case, to pre-
venting aggression or defending the victim of aggression. 147 
Perhaps because he was primarily interested in safeguarding Australia's domes-
tic jurisdiction not that of other countries, Evatt himself subsequently tended to elas-
ticity in his interpretation of Article 2 (7). Hudson calls his interpretation 'typically 
political'. When it suited him not to take 'a permissive view, he did not take it, as in the 
case of South Africa'. 148 Otherwise he did. It was only after the Liberal-Country Party 
Coalition took office in December 1949 that the Australian interpretation generally 
became as inflexible as the South African one.149 'Australian delegations' then, says 
145 Hasluck, 'Australia and the formation of the United Nations', Royal Australian Historical Society, 
Journal and Proceedings, Vol. XL, 1954, Part III, p. 178. 
146 Report by the Australian Delegates, No. 24 [Group E.]-F.4311, para. 153, pp. 29-30. 
147 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 65. 
148 W.J. Hudson, 'Australian diplomacy and South Africa', Racism: The Australian Experience: A 
study of race prejudice in Australia, Vol. 3 (Sydney, 1977), p. 170. 149 See BTS, 136/l/l/2C (4/3/53-31/3/61), Sole/SEA, 27 January 1956. 
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Hudson, 'in a sense swung closer to South Afiica in that they sought to prevent even 
discussion of items which they believed were beyond United Nations competence'. 150 
Australian support for the South African position got off to a rocky start. At 
the Second Part of the First Session in 1946 Australia switched votes on the Indian 
item, from negative in the Joint Committee of the First (political) and Sixth (legal) 
Committees151 to abstention in plenary. 152 Sole writes of the 'audible gasp' with which 
this was received. It may have had the unintended effect of inspiring other countries to 
change their votes, contributing to the result that a relatively narrow majority in the 
joint committee became a two-thirds majority in plenary. Sole implies that Smuts's 
occupancy of the South Afiican seat at the final meeting of the joint committee cost his 
delegation the day. The matter had to do with the order in which the joint committee 
voted on the proposals before it. 
The delegation's position, its 'second line of defence' after Article 2 (7), was 
reflected in a United States/United Kingdom/Swedish amendment referring the 
question to the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion. 153 The 
Ukrainian chairman (D.Z. Manuilsky) rejected a Belgian proposal that this should be 
put to the vote first. Instead, he ruled that the Franco-Mexican amendment154 (to the 
Indian draft resolution) which favoured India's position, should receive priority. Smuts 
ignored Sole's attempts through Heaton Nicholls to have him request votes on the 
Belgian proposal and on Manuilsky's ruling. 
According to Sole: 'A golden opportunity was thus lost, due to an inexcusable 
error of judgement on Smuts' part in insisting on occupying the South Afiican seat 
where it should have been occupied by a member of the delegation familiar with rules 
of procedure and thus competent to counter the manipulation of the rules of procedure 
by a hostile and unscrupulous Chairman'. 155 His point is valid but probably only he 
himself could have given effect to it. (As a member of the relevant committee of the 
Preparatory Commission he had been involved in the drafting of the rules. )156 How-
l50 Hudson, 'Australian diplomacy and South Africa', pp. 168-69. 
151 GAOR, First Sess., Second Part, Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committees, Summary 
Records 21-30 November 1946, 6th meeting, 20 November 1946, p. 51. 
152 Ibid., 52nd plenary meeting, 8 December 1946, p. 1061. 
153 Ibid, Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committees, 5th meeting, 28 November 1946, p. 43. 
154 Ibid., Annex lf, p. 133. 
155 Reminiscences, p. 102. 
156 Ibid., p. 114. 
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ever, where other representatives on the joint committee consisted of people of the 
seniority of Hartley Shawcross (United Kingdom) and Andrei Gromyko (USSR), he 
would probably have been thought too junior to occupy the South African seat. 
(Hasluck, who was older and whose relationship with authority was different, was the 
Australian representative.) 
It is not clear whether Smuts's lapse affected the final outcome. For Sole omits 
to mention that South Africa was afforded a 'second bite at the cherry' in plenary. It is 
also a moot point whether, as he implies, a vote in the joint committee on the question 
of referral to the court would have produced the desired result. In plenary, under the 
benign presidency of Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgium's Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade, Smuts's proposal at the first of the three lengthy meetings held on the 
item on Saturday 7 and Sunday 8 December 1946157 to have the matter referred to the 
International Court, was put to the vote first. It was rejected in a roll-call vote by 
thirty-one to twenty-one, with two abstentions. Only then was the joint committee's 
draft resolution (ie. the Franco-Mexican draft) put to the vote and adopted by roll-call 
by thirty-two to fifteen, with seven abstentions. 
Conditions were just about as favourable for the South Africans as they could 
have hoped. If Manuilsky had been a hostile chairman of the joint committee, Spaak 
was helpfulness itself in plenary. It was he who had earlier raised the question of the 
draft resolution requiring a two-thirds majority. After relatively protracted debate it 
was decided in a roll-call vote by twenty-nine to twenty-four with one abstention that 
the joint committee's draft resolution indeed required a two-thirds majority. At that 
stage it might have seemed that the draft would be defeated. The debate was 
protracted because delegations' positions on the procedural question tended to reflect 
their positions on the substance of the item. Forty of the fifty-four member states at the 
time voted the same way in the committee and plenary - twenty-four affirmatively;158 
thirteen negatively; 159 with three abstaining.160 
157 GAOR, First Sess., Second Part, 50th plenary meeting, 7 December 1946, pp. 1009-10. 
158 Byelorussian SSR, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Gua-
temala, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, 
Uruguay, USSR, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 
159 Belgium, Canada. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Para-
guay, Peru, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. 
160 Denmark, Ecuador, Turkey. 
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With two exceptions161 there was among these states a correlation between 
their votes on the Franco-Mexican draft resolution in the joint committee and in 
plenary and those in plenary on the important question issue and the South African 
proposal to refer the matter to the court. That is, those who supported the Franco-
Mexican draft voted against the important question issue and the South African 
proposal; those who supported the important question issue and the South African 
proposal voted against the Franco-Mexican draft. The delegations arguing agains~ the 
important question issue obviously believed that the resolution would fail to achieve a 
two-thirds majority. 
The transformation of the simple majority of twenty-four to nineteen with six 
abstentions in the joint committee into a two-thirds majority of thirty-two to fifteen 
with seven abstentions in plenary hinged on the votes of fourteen delegations: Afghani-
stan, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Iceland, 
Lebanon, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama and Sweden. Afghanistan, Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Lebanon and Liberia had been absent when the vote was taken in the joint 
committee. In plenary Afghanistan, Lebanon and Liberia supported the Franco-
Mexican resolution, Argentina voted against it, and Bolivia abstained. Of the remaining 
nine delegations, Dominican Republic, Iceland and Norway switched from negative 
votes in the joint committee to affirmative votes in plenary; Australia, Brazil and 
Sweden from negative to abstention; Honduras and Panama from abstention to 
affirmative; and New Zealand from abstention to negative. 
Sole attributes the Australian abstention to Evatt personally: 'it was Evatt who 
inflicted on Smuts his biggest defeat on the Indian question at the 1946 General 
Assembly'. 162 For it appeared that the delegation had switched its vote on Evatt's 
instructions. 163 There again, the briefing paper Sole prepared for Viljoen in 1949 held 
that the abstention was given 'without consultation with Dr. Evatt'. 164 However, while 
the matter was referred to Canberra for a decision, the course adopted appears to have 
been recommended by the delegation on the basis of a 'strong request from India'. 165 
Sole, who was there, believes that the Australian switch was decisive. The Indians 
161 France and Uruguay, the former abstaining and the latter voting affirmatively on the important 
question issue. 
162 Letter, 30 June 1994. 
163 Reminiscences, p. 103. 
164 BTS, Vol. 229, 1125/5, Vol. II, 'Australia's attitude towards the Indian question'. 
165 AA, A1067/l, M46/21/7, Pt. 2, 0. 23411, 13 December 1946, para. 2. 
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thought so too but the Australians denied it.166 Heaton Nicholls claimed that 
Australia's action had influenced the voting of the South Americans. 167 
At this remove, however, it is impossible to say exactly who was influenced by 
it. New Zealand, the country closest to Australia politically, did not follow suit. On the 
contrary, it went the other way. If others were influenced, that would perhaps have 
come from Australia's third position in the voting order after Afghanistan . and 
Argentina, both of whom had been absent from the vote in the joint committee. What 
is certain is that Australia's abstention was not well-received in South Africa. Knowles 
cabled Canberra on 11 December 1946: 
considerable resentment is felt in local official circles on Austra-
lia's abstention from voting on the critical division on the South 
Africa - India question, the question thus obtaining two thirds 
majority.168 
The reply was on the shrill side. Australia had gone 'to the limit in support of 
South Africa both within and without the conference'. Having supported South Africa 
up to the plenary, the delegation had then abstained because its vote would otherwise 
'have been construed as a definite censure of India'. (Italics added.) In any case, Aus-
tralia had not complained about the 
continuous lack of support at international conferences from South 
Africa. They have always been opposed to every progressive move 
and at San Francisco they were the one nation which prevented the 
unanimous vote on the Australian proposal for full employment. 
At Paris, where we were fighting hard for democratic principles, 
we received no South African support.169 
The reply was leaked in Canberra, perhaps by Evatt himself, and part of it 
appeared verbatim in the Sunday Times (Johannesburg) on 26 January 1947. New at 
the diplomatic game, Knowles cabled Evatt that he was 'greatly disturbed at this 
serious leakage', following up with a detailed despatch.17o 
166 AA, Al068/l, M47/21/4/l, Box 1, Secretary/Official Secretary, New Delhi, 23 January 1947. 
167 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 26 January 1947. 
168 AA, Al067/l, M46/21/7, Pt. 2, I. 29165, 11December1946. 
169 Ibid., 0. 23410, 13 December 1946. That is one way of looking at Evatt's performance at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Others, not only the Russians, saw it as an extreme manifestation of Evatt pro-
moting himself. 
170 AA, A4231/2, Pretoria 1-91 1947, No. 14/47, 5 February 1947. There is little doubt that the reply 
was leaked in Canberra because the word 'censure' in Canberra's cable, which also appeared in the 
Sunday Times article, was wrongly deciphered by the High Commission as 'defiance'. 
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The alleged lack of South African support for Australian concerns rankled. 
When reprimanding the Australian delegation for responding to press enquiries that 
'any official explanation or comment' on the switch to abstention 'would have to come 
from Canberra', thereby 'unnecessarily' embarrassing the department and the govern-
ment, Dunk claimed that South Africa had not 
given us good support at international conferences and particularly 
at Paris they stood out as one of the most reactionary countries. 
They should not therefore complain is another delegation finds it 
unable to always support their own case. 
Even so, while not believing 'that the treatment of Ind~ans by South Africa was 
satisfactory, we stayed with them to the limit. We, in fact, voted for their 
amendment'. 171 In any case, the 'impression that the Delegation was carrying out 
instructions not in accord with its own attitude' was incorrect. 172 Smuts referred 
obliquely to the matter in a February 194 7 letter thanking his old associate from the 
1919 Paris Peace Conference, J. G. Latham, then Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia, for sending him a supportive press article: 'I had better not say anything 
about Australia's attitude at the U.N.O. meeting.'173 By contrast with the language of 
later resolutions on the South African items, the language of this one (44(1)) was 
relatively innocuous. 
At the 194 7 session, however, Evatt delivered a lengthy and highly positive 
intervention in plenary over the South West Africa issue - what Hudson calls Evatt's 
'fierce defence of South Africa'174 - in which he praised Smuts extravagantly, saying 
that he was 'renowned throughout the world as a great leader of liberal thought'. 175 
Jordaan, a member of the South African delegation, wrote: 
If India again was the principal prosecutor of the Union on the 
South West Africa issue, it should also be stated that no individual 
in that debate did the Union a greater service than Dr. Evatt who 
forcibly drew attention to the Union's past record and the integrity 
of the Union's leaders like General Botha and Field Marshal 
Smuts. 176 
171 AA, A1068/1, M47/21/4/l, Box 1, 0. 23411, 13 December 1946, para. 3. 
172 Ibid., para. 4. 
173 Van der Poel, ed., Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol. VII, Smuts/Latham, 12 February 1947, 
p.124. 
174 Hudson, 'Australia's Trusteeship Policy', Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1967, p. 16. 
175 GAOR, Second Sess., 104th plenary meeting, 1November1947, p. 585. 
176 BTS, 136/2/8, Vol. 1, Jordaan/Secretary, 20 December 1947, p. 5. 
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Perhaps because of the nature of his primary source (his letters home), Sole is 
not influenced by hindsight. Unlike Robert McNamara's, 177 his memoirs are refresh-
ingly free both of mea culpas and of reinterpretations to take account of current 
political trends. Information he had prepared178 additional to that contained in the 1946 
report on South West Africa, which was considered by the Trusteeship Council instead 
of merely being on record at the United Nations as the South African government had 
intended, led the Council to draft what he calls 'a highly critical report' on South Af-
rica's administration of the Territory. He says it was so hostile that even the Australian 
representative 'on the Trusteeship Council (no friend of South Africa's) regarded it as 
provocative'. 179 
Sole does not name the representative but he would have been W.D. (Bill) 
Forsyth who was something of an expert on trusteeship.1 80 The perception of others is 
that Forsyth was not ill-disposed towards South Africa. Thus Hudson writes of the 
same session of the Council that Forsyth 'sought constantly to shield South Africa' and 
he provides examples of this. 181 Re-reading the material today and in the fullness of 
knowledge of the evolution and outcome of the South West Africa question at the 
United Nations, one is left with the impression that if the report was 'highly critical', 
this was not unjustified. On the basis of the information it was considering, what the 
Council in effect did was to point to the fact that the Territory was being administered 
for the benefit of its white rather than its non-white inhabitants. 182 That was hardly 
surprising inasmuch as the former's self-governing status exerted a strong influence 
over the South African authorities. The non-whites did not enjoy similar leverage. 
More of this below. 
In the 1950s the South African view of the United Nations was shared by the 
United Kingdom. Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the United States, reported 
in 1953: 
177 R.S. McNamara (with B. VanDeMark), Jn Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New 
York, 1995). The book was timed to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of the fall of Saigon on 
30 April 1975 and therefore of the effective end of the Vietnam War. 
178 See UN doc. T/175 in TCOR, Third Session, Supplement (doc. T/337, 28 December 1948), pp. 51-
152. The replies were in response to a list of fifty questions annexed to Trusteeship Council resolution 
28 (III), dated 12 December 1947. 
179Reminiscences, p. 121. 
ISO See the Introduction, p. 20 above. 
181 W.J. Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations (Sydney, 1970), p. 91. 
182 See UN doc. T/209, para. 5 in TCOR, Third Session, Supplement (doc. T/337, 28 December 
1948), p. 231. 
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To the United States the United Nations is a conscious, necessary 
and major instrument of foreign policy, whereas to Her Majesty's 
Government it is perhaps at best an instrument through which 
policies already formed can occasionally be furthered, and at 
worst, a dangerous hazard in our course. l 83 
The same year Gladwyn Jebb, the British Permanent Representative in New 
York, complained that the UN had become part of the problem instead of representing 
the solution to such 'international, or allegedly international' disputes as apartheid.· The 
very 'ventilation of such questions at the United Nations [was] an abuse of its machin-
ery'.184 Jebb's successor, Sir Pierson Dixon, observed in 1954 that 'the United Nations 
is not at all the institution which was planned in 1942 and launched in 1945'. 185 He 
warned that, as it was, the UN had 'great disadvantages both for Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment, the United States Government and the free world generally'. Among those he 
included its creation of 'problems which would not exist if it did not'. Particularly from 
the United Kingdom's point of view there was 'the continuing annoyance of having to 
defend our admirable colonial record against biased attack'.1 86 
Sole reported from New York in 1956 that his British counterpart had said that 
'his Government was inclined to look more and more upon the U.N. with the doubts 
which South Africa has always expressed'.187 At the time South Africa's reliance on 
Article 2 (7) was both supported and encouraged by its Western associates, 
particularly the United Kingdom and Australia. Not only South Africa invoked Article 
2 (7). The USSR did so in respect of its invasion of Hungary in 1956 and earlier in 
respect of items relating to human rights under the peace treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania. 188 France did so in respect of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
and the United Kingdom in respect of Cyprus, 189 though more flexibly than South Af-
rica. France also staged walk-outs from the General Assembly. 190 
183 Makins/Eden, 11 February 1953, para. 2. Copy on BTS, 136/2, Vol. 3. 
184 Jebb/Eden, 12 January 1953, p. 2, para. 7. Copy on BTS, 136/2, Vol. 3. 
185 Dixon/Eden, No. 14, 20 August 1954, p. 5, para. 15. Copy on BTS, 136/1, Vol. 6. 
186 Ibid., p. 2, para. 5. 
187 BTS, 136/2/24, Vol. 1, Sole/SEA, 23 October 1956, p. 3. 
188 AA, A1838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 6, Tange/Minister (Menzies), 31March1960. 
189 This may have detracted from South Africa's case. On the other hand, the South African argument 
had already been rejected at the General Assembly's first session. 
19° For example, France withdrew from part of the tenth session in 1955 when the General 
Committee's recommendation against inscription of the item on Algeria was overturned in plenary. 
BTS, 136/2/23, Vol. 3, 'Withdrawal of the French delegation from the Tenth session of the General 
Assembly', n.d. 
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In 1952 the British presented an aide memoire to the South African 
government indicating that they 'were firmly convinced that the United Nations are 
debarred by Article 2 (7) of the Charter from considering questions such as Tunisia, 
Morocco and South African Racial Relations'. 191 Anthony Eden said the next year that 
the United Kingdom should continue its battle in favour of its interpretation of Article 
2 (7).192 
Thirty-four resolutions were adopted by roll-call votes on the three South 
African items between 1946 and 1961. Australia voted affirmatively four times, nega-
tively seven times, abstained twenty-two times and was absent once. 193 Its support of 
South Africa was, therefore, mainly verbal and principally on the Article 2 (7) issue. 
When at India's instance in 1952 the General Assembly inscribed the apartheid item on 
its agenda for the first time, Jooste moved a motion to the effect that the Assembly 
would decide it was not competent to consider it. He gave a detailed exposition of 
South Africa's case on Article 2 (7).194 R.G. Casey, the Australian Minister of External 
Affairs, aligned himself with Jooste and hoped 'very much for the future of the United 
Nations that his motion [would] prevaiJ'.195 On the Treatment of Indians item, Casey 
told the Ad hoc Political Committee at the same session that the General Assembly 
'should have declared itself incompetent' to deal with it under Article 2 (7). The 
article's meaning 'was very clear and could be interpreted in only one way'. 196 
Two years before, Casey's predecessor as External Affairs Minister, P.C. 
Spender, 197 had supported Jooste's arguments in the General Committee against 
191 BTS, 136/1/1/2C, Aide Memoire, Domestic Jurisdiction, 22 October 1952. Also in 1952 a South 
Africa delegate, A.A. Roberts, commented that the 'rationalization that has been going on in an 
attempt to explain why native races are a domestic matter with France, but not with the Union, would 
be amusing if it were not so distressing in its implications. Certainly some of our big "friends" are 
extremely uncomfortable about it'. BTS, 136/2/3/7, Roberts/Forsyth, 30 December 1952. 
192 Eden/Jebb, 23 March 1953, p.2, para. 6. Copy on BTS, 136/2, Vol. 3. 
193 Indians (9): Yes: 265{1II), No: 395{V), Abstention: 44(1); 5ll(VI); 615(Vll); 719(VIII); 
ll79(XII); 1302(XIII); 1460(XIV); South West Africa (16): Yes: ll43(Xll), No: 14l(II); 449B(V), 
Abstention: 65(1); 337(1V); 449A(V); 570A(VI); 570B(VI); 749A(VllI); 749B(VllI); 844(1X); 
904(X); 1565(XV); 1568(XV); 1593(XV); 1596(XV); Apartheid (9): Yes: 1598(XV); 1663(XVI), 
No: 72l(VllI); 820(1X); ll 78(Xll); 1248(XllI), Abstention: 616A(Vll); 616B(VII), Absent: 
1375(XIV). 
194 GAOR, 38lst plenary meeting, 17 October 1952, pp. 53-59, paras. 8-67. 
195 Ibid., p. 65, para. 117. 
196 Jbid., AHPC, 10th meeting, 5 November 1952, p. 46, para. 15. 
197 After holding the office for eighteen months, he resigned in 1951 to become Australian Ambas-
sador to Washington. In 1957 he was elected a Judge on the International Court of Justice. In 1966 it 
was his casting vote as President which in a sense settled the South West Africa Case in South 
Africa's favour. 
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inscription of the Treatment of Indians item. He 'deplored the tendency of United Na-
tions organs to impinge upon the internal affairs of Member States'. 198 Bill Forsyth told 
the Ad Hoc Political Committee in 1954 that the 'apartheid item was a clear case of 
intervention in the domestic affairs of a Member State'. United Nations 'intervention 
had succeeded in poisoning relations with South Africa, which was hardly consistent 
with the Charter objectives of tolerance and good neighbourliness'. 199 Appendix V 
below lists other South African and Australian statements on Article 2 (7). The list is 
not exhaustive. 
Australia's reluctance in the 1950s to become involved in South Africa's 
domestic affairs extended also to replies to letters directed to the Prime Minister or the 
Minister of External Affairs by outraged clerics, students and others. 200 Louw 
announced the beginning of token representation in the General Assembly at the end of 
1956.201 Casey was alone in taking to the rostrum to express his understanding and 
regret: 
We in Australia would hope that all Members would give heed 
and reflection to the warning light that the Union of South Africa 
has shown. For myself, I can only hope that the action that South 
Africa has taken will tum out to be no more than a temporary one 
and that the circumstances that brought about its partial with-
drawal will; be modified, as delegations reflect of the situation that 
brought it about. 202 
Louw thereupon cabled Uys in Canberra to convey the Union government's sincere 
appreciation to the Australian government: 'Casey's statement is greatly valued as tes-
timony to the warmth, friendship and depth of understanding between our two count-
ries. '203 Uys followed this wording which quite likely heightened the feeling of uneasi-
ness among already edgy Australian officials. 
198 GAOR, Fifth Sess., General Com., 69th meeting, 21 September 1950, p. 3, para. 25. See the 
summary record of the First Committee's 545th meeting on 11 December 1952 (Seventh Sess.), pp. 
257-59, paras. 28-35 for Spender's exposition on the applicability of Article 2(7) to the Tunisian 
question. 
199 GAOR, Ninth Sess., AHPC, 44th meeting, 6 December 1954, pp. 211-12, para. 4. 
2oo See, eg., correspondence on AA, A1838/l, 201/2/5, Pt. 6 and A1838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 2, and 
852/10/2/3, Pt. 3, replies to R~. J. Garrett (5 March 1954); S. Abraham and J.P. Kennedy (28 June 
1957); C.L. Pannam (17 October 1957) and P.J. Clarey, MP (24 December 1959). 
201 GAOR, Eleventh Sess., 597th plenary meeting, 27 November 1956, pp 357-58, paras. 152-56. 
202 Ibid., 598th plenary meeting, 27 November 1956, p. 361, paras. 35-37. 
203 BTS, 136/2/24, Vol. 2, Immediate Code Telegram, Minister/Uys, 28 November 1956 and BCB, 
Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. III, Uys/McBride, 29 November 1956. 
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Whether there were doubts in cabinet circles about the efficacy of token repre-
sentation, or for whatever reason, Louw cast about the next year for a face-saving 
device to enable South Africa to return to the General Assembly. Gilchrist reported 
that while he was 'under strong pressure ... to pull right out of the United Nations' he 
wanted, 'at some risk to his political position', South Africa to return to 'full participa-
tion' if that could be achieved 'without loss of face'. 204 Louw turned to Casey, writing 
him what might be termed an importunate letter urging him to vote against instead of 
abstaining on the inscription of the Indian and apartheid items, to lobby other western 
delegations to do likewise and to speak up against inscription. He suggested points 
Casey should make. 205 He also wrote to the New Zealand Foreign Minister who cabled 
his ministry that with regard to 'public attitude in New Zealand ' it would be 'best to 
adhere to present brief. 206 
Casey replied a month later assuring Louw that while Australia would vote 
against inscription of the apartheid item (perhaps because he was impressed by Louw's 
argument that South Africa's absence brought about voting parity between the Western 
and anti-Western factions in the Assembly at forty each), it could not do more than 
abstain on the other items. His delegation had been 'active in the lobbies . . . in an 
attempt to swing some votes in your favour'. He himself had spoken to several heads 
of delegation and would speak against inscription 'along the lines suggested in the 
second last paragraph in page 2 of your letter•.207 
In Casey's absence in New York, Australian officials had informed the Acting 
Minister of External Affairs (F.H. Osborne, otherwise Minister for Air) that the 'South 
Africans are asking us to go a good deal further than at previous sessions'. In fact, the 
request regarding the Treatment of Indians item 'would require a reversal of policy'. 
Since 1951 Australia had abstained on the item to 'avoid being isolated with South Af-
rica'. The South African aim, the submission held, was 'to get an excuse to return to 
full participation in the United Nations'. In that regard, their representative at the UN, 
J.S.F. Botha, had let it be known that '20-30 votes against inscription of the items' 
would be regarded 'as a reasonable excuse'. 20s The objective was to get most of those 
2o4 AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 5, I. 12579, 5 September 1957. 
205 BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. III, Louw/Casey, 19 August 1957. A copy is on AA, Al838/2, ~16/1/2. 
206 Inward telegram, No. 246, Macdonald/Acting Minister, 13 September 1957. Copy on AA, 
Al838/2, 916/1/2. 
2o7 AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 5, I. 13497, 20 September 1957. 
208 AA, Nl838/2, 916/1/2, UN Branch/Acting Secretary, 13 September 1957 and Plimsoll's hand-
written comment. 
413 
Chapter Eight: The United Nations dimension 
who had abstained on inscription previously, to vote against on this occasion. 209 The 
trouble was that 'South Africa [was] unlikely to get its 20-30 votes even if it [could] 
persuade more countries than Australia'.210 The United Nations Branch, supported by 
Plimsoll, believed that Australia should 'decline to change [its] attitude'. Menzies 
disagreed. 
Osborne cabled Casey saying that to accept Louw's proposition would prob-
ably entail a 'deterioration of [Australia's] position vis-a-vis the Afro-Asian group and 
particularly India'; that it could make the position more difficult in respect of the item 
on Dutch New Guinea; and especially increase the difficulty of making 'headway with 
the Latin Americans'. Australia could 'hardly accept the position that other countries 
should make the running on behalf of South Africa'. Though Australia gave 'a lot of 
support to South Africa' it 'would not want to be regarded as a spokesman for South 
Africa'. The same cable also expressed doubt whether 'legally the issues involved in the 
Indian question are essentially within South Africa's domestic jurisdiction'. Of course, 
'we have never said in United Nations that we see any doubts about legal position 
because any such statement would be unhelpful to South Africans'. 211 It all depended 
on what other countries were prepared to support South Africa. 
In the event, Casey maintained Australia's abstention on the inscription of the 
Treatment item.212 Even so, India's Krishna Menon called his accompanying remarks 'a 
provocation' and used them, or so he said, as the excuse for a lengthy speech.213 How-
ever, as he promised, Casey complied with Louw's request on the apartheid item. 214 In 
making Louw's points, he largely followed Louw's wording: 
It should be remembered ... that South Africa, since the establish-
ment of the United Nations, has played its part as a Member of the 
Organization and has fulfilled its obligations under the Charter. 
We should not forget ... that South Africa was one of sixteen 
countries that constituted the United Nations forces in Korea.215 
Louw's letter of thanks conveyed his 'sincere appreciation of the Australian 
voting on the inscription of the two South African items. I need hardly tell you that I 
209 Ibid., 852/10/2/3, Pt. 5, I. 13097/13117, 13 September 1957. 
210 AA, A/1838/2, 91G/l/2, Plimsoll/Acting Minister, 10 September 1957. 
2 11 Ibid., 852/10/2/3, Pt. 5, 0. 11455, 12 September 1957. 
2l2 GAOR, Twelfth Sess., 682nd plenary meeting, 20 September 1957, pp. 52, 55, paras. 85, 120. 
213 Ibid., pp. 51, 55, paras. 80, 118. 
214 Ibid., p. 51, paras. 75-80. 
215 Ibid., para. 76. 
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am equally appreciative of the assistance in the lobbies by yourself and your Delega-
tion, and above all, of your strong open intervention from the rostrum'.216 Casey was 
alone in publicly welcoming Louw's announcement the following July that South 
Africa would return to the General Assembly at that year's session, the thirteenth. He 
or Tange, the Secretary, watered down a departmental draft inter alia by eliminating a 
sentence expressing the hope that the United Nations would 'refrain from intervention 
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of its members, even in cases such as th(lt of 
South Africa, when the majority of members is opposed in one degree or another to 
certain of the domestic policies of individual members•.217 (Emphasis added.) Hamilton 
reported later from Canberra: 
There is no doubt that the Union's decision has caused a good deal 
of satisfaction here, both in the Government itself and in the 
Department of External Affairs; and I am sure that it will fortify 
the Australian Government's desire to be of as much assistance as 
possible to us at the United Nations.218 
His remarks may seem to fall within the ambit of E.M. Rhoodie's claim on the 
basis of what he said Hamilton told him in Australia, that South African heads of mis-
sion reported only what they knew 'the government would like to hear'. 219 Yet the 
attitude of Australia's Permanent Representative in New York, E.R. Walker, suggests 
that Hamilton was not far off the mark: 'it is surely to our own and South Africa's 
advantage to draw them back into full participation in United Nations Affairs'. He 
assumed that 'keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth would be a further import-
ant consideration'. 220 
Presumably the Americans agreed. Two years before they had interpreted 
Louw's remarks on the inscription of the Treatment of Indians item on the agenda of 
the eleventh session as indicating that South Africa intended withdrawing from the 
United Nations altogether. Their view was not unjustified because Louw had said 
'today a South African delegation is for the last time protesting against inscription of 
216 AA, Al838/2, 916/1/2, Louw/Casey, 26 September 1957, attached to Memo. 987/57, Hill/DEA, 
11 October 1957. 
217 Compare draft attached to Woodberry/Secretary n.d. with Press Release 75, 17 July 1958, both on 
file AA, Al838/2, 916/1/2. 
218 BTS, 136/2/26, Vol. 2, Hamilton/SEA, 24 July 1958. A copy is on BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. III. See 
also AA, Al838/2, 916/1/2, 0. 8980, 17 July 1958. 
219 
'In Australia, our High Commissioner, Anthony Hamilton, used to chuckle when he told me this.' 
The real information scandal, p. 43. In any case, Jooste personally submitted Hamilton's report to 
Louw on 5 August 1958. 
220 AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 5, I. 13097/13117, 13 September 1957, p. 2, para. 8. 
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this item'. 221 Alarmed, the State Department requested Australia and others to make 
representations in Pretoria to urge South Africa not to withdraw because this 'would 
weaken the United Nations at a time when it was of crucial importance to world peace' 
besides adding 'to the problems of the Free World'. 222 Louw's claim that South Africa's 
vote in the General Assembly was important to the West did not therefore lack sub-
stance. 223 
No politician wants to stand perpetually in isolation, in a negative sense the 
cynosure of all eyes. It is the same with the representatives of states at the United Na-
tions. What Hudson calls Australia's 'almost exclusively legal approach', for which he 
criticises the Menzies government of the 1950s,224 started slipping in 1959 when India 
angled for and obtained an Australian abstention instead of its customary negative vote 
on the substance of the apartheid item. The matter commenced when Australia's UN 
mission cabled Canberra in late October that India was 'particularly anxious to secure 
an Australian abstention in the voting on its draft resolution on Apartheid and is pre-
pared to water down the present draft still further if it would make it easier for us to 
abstain'. 225 
There was at first resistance at desk level. B. G. Dexter of the Africa and Mid-
dle East Branch (P.R. Killen's brother-in-law), told his superior B.C. Hill that he was 
not 'at all happy about the proposal'. Australia should avoid doing 'anything that might 
help provoke South Africa into leaving the Commonwealth'. In any case, 'South Af-
rica's apartheid policy is no more the business of the UN than is our treatment of the 
Aborigines, Indian treatment of the Nagas, or Soviet treatment of its Jews'. Hill agreed, 
minuting J.K. Allen of the UN branch who had requested his comments on a draft 
telegram: 
If we are to change our position, I am against doing it during the 
Ass. We should explain ourselves full out to the S Africans & the 
UK between sessions - that's the time to review UN policies on big 
issues, not opportunistically on the basis of particular resolu-
tions. 226 
221 GAOR, Eleventh Sess., 577th plenary meeting, 15 November 1956, p. 30, para. 80. Louw 
announced token representation at the 597th plenary meeting on 27 November. (p. 357, para. 152). 
222 AA, Al838/2, 916/112, Record of Conversation Renouf/Hoey, First Secretary, American Embassy, 
23 November 1956. 
223 HA Deb., Vol. 95, 10 June 1957, Cols. 7600-01. 
224 Hudson, 'Australian diplomacy and South Africa', Racism: The Australian Experience, p. 169. 
225 AA, Al838/2, 852110/2/3, Pt. 6, Allen & Munro/Secretary, 26 October 1959. 
226 Jbid., Dexter/Hill, 22 October 1959. 
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Nonetheless the decision to switch was taken after consultation with Menzies. 
Casey confirmed it in New York. Shann, the External Affairs Officer in London, cabled 
on 6 November: that it was a decision which 'disturbed' the Commonwealth Relations 
Office which intended taking it up with Casey. 'Apart from further isolation of their 
own position and Article 2 (7), they feel it is unfortunate that we have chosen this year, 
when South Africa has been more reasonable in the United Nations and appear to have 
made some adjustments in the substance of their apartheid policy'. Shann said he re-
plied that 'we could not afford going on forever damaging our relations with a lot of 
other people who tended, because of our negative view, to identify us with policies of 
racial discrimination'. 221 
In effect, it took the Australians seven years to give effect to this point of view. 
Before the Sauer visit of 1952, anticipating that he would raise the matter, a 
departmental note prepared for Casey on the South African items at the UN held: 
we - virtually alone - have helped South Africa a lot in the past. I 
believe you agree that we should be cautious before undertaking to 
do more .... We have become conspicuous by being the only 
country other than South Africa to vote against the resolutions, 
and our arguments on domestic jurisdiction are listened to with 
irritation. The position cannot fail to have adverse effects on our 
efforts to get a better understanding with Asian countries in 
particular and attract the hostility of some members towards our 
own native policies in our Trust Territory ... South Africa's own 
tactics (e.g. walking out) are often embarrassing to us. They could 
help themselves by showing greater willingness to meet India and 
Pakistan outside the U.N.228 
N. Pritchard, Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner pending the arrival 
of Lord Carrington's successor, General Sir William Oliver, used arguments similar to 
those made to Shann when he called on Tange in Canberra the same day. An 
Australian abstention would leave only Britain itself, France and Portugal in 
,opposition. The UK was 'particularly anxious' to sustain the point that the resolution 
infringed Article 2 (7) because it had heard that 'United Kingdom policy in Nyasaland 
might be brought to the United Nations'. And, in a seemingly approving reference to 
'grand apartheid', he said there were 'some signs of South African efforts to create 
some autonomy in the Bantu community and it would be unwise to respond to this 
gesture by turning away from South Africa'! 
227 Ibid., I. 20372, 6 November 1959. 
228 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1, Pt. 1, For the Minister. Visit of Hon. Paul Sauer - South African items in 
the U.N., 10 September 1952, unsigned. 
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Tange dismissed his arguments: 
Australia had to have regard to the disadvantages to us of mis-
understanding of our motives (support for South Africa) in Asia 
and elsewhere. I thought that if the United Kingdom voted against 
such a resolution they would automatically be given credit for 
voting out of consideration for another member of the Common-
wealth rather than out of sympathy for the policies of racial dis-
crimination. Australia would not receive this tolerance. 229 
Casey subsequently fended off representations in New York by W.D. Ormsby 
Gore, the Minster of State for Foreign Affairs and Sir Pierson Dixon, the United 
Kingdom's Permanent Representative, who argued that if the, 'position was abandoned 
on domestic jurisdiction it could open way to discussion by General Assembly on in-
ternal affairs of places like Central African Federation and Kenya. South Africa might 
also be pushed further in direction of leaving the United Nations'. Casey replied that 
Australia's negative votes of previous years 'had been widely interpreted throughout 
Asia as representing a vote on substance of South Africa policy and not on juridical 
basis of United Nations action'. Australia might have been prepared to continue on that 
basis if it's vote would make any difference. But that was not the case. 230 
Jooste, Tange's South African counterpart, was disturbed by the news, perhaps 
especially because the delegation in New York, which was aware of it, had not 
reported it to Pretoria. When, on instructions,231 O.L. Davis, the Australian High 
Commissioner, called on him on 9 November, the day before the vote was taken in the 
Special Political Committee, he said he 'received the information with the greatest 
regret and could not but regard it very seriously'. No country in the world 'was held in 
such high regard in South Africa as Australia'. He blamed Krishna Menon for the turn 
of events. Menon had 'for some years been working hard to get an apparently mild re-
solution in order to isolate South Africa' and 'appeared to be having some success'. 232 
He had reproached Davis a few days earlier for Australia's abstention in the Fourth 
Committee on the South West Africa question. 233 
229 Ibid., Record of conversation with Tange/Pritchard, 6 November 1959. Pritchard had served as 
Assistant Political Secretary in South Africa for part of the war. 
230 Ibid., I. 20461, 8 November 1959. 
231 Ibid., 0. 14792, 7 November 1959. 
232 AA, Al838/2, 852/10/2/3, Pt. 6, Memo. 538, Davis/DEA, 11 November 1959, Attachment, p. 2, 
paras. 6, 11; and I. 29494, 9 November 1959. 
233 Ibid., 2011911, Pt. 2, I. 20225, 5 November 1959. 
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Curiously, while Australia abstained on the resolution (1375 (XIV)) at the 
committee stage, it did not take part in the vote in plenary a week later. 234 This was the 
only occasion during the period covered by this study when Australia missed a vote on 
one of the South African items. It was one of the few Western countries to do so. 235 
Millar says the reasons for the absence 'were stated to be "unavoidable".' Canberra may 
not initially have been aware of the position because a draft of Casey's letter to the 
ALP's Clarey (see footnote 200 above) at the end of December incorporated the words 
'when the resolution was presented during the recent session of the United Nations 
General Assembly criticising South Africa's apartheid policy, we voted neither for it 
nor against it, but abstained'. That did not appear in the letter sent to Clarey.236 
The Sharpeville shootings in March 1960 unleashed a firestorm of criticism, not 
least in Australia, marking a watershed in the South African government's relations 
with the international community. South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth a 
year later removed even the minor measure of protection membership had afforded it 
until then. Reassessing its position, Australia adjusted smoothly to United Nations .re-
alities. Hudson comments approvingly: in 'a changing situation, Australia changed her 
policies and, just as important, the terms in which she expressed them so that there 
tended to be a change of emphasis: legalism gave way to politics'.237 The switch to 
abstention on the apartheid item in the Special Political Committee in 1959 had paved 
the way. 
In the early 1950s the British felt it would be a pity if the apartheid item were 
discussed 'since it could do a great deal of damage. Even discussion was tantamount to 
intervention in South Africa's domestic affairs'. 238 A decade later they pragmatically 
changed their stance to bend with the wind. Their attitude towards apartheid in the UN 
context changed. From being a purely internal South African matter, it became a 
234 GAOR, Fourteenth Sess., SPC, 148th meeting, 10 November 1959, p. 102, para. 10; 838th plenary 
meeting, 17 November 1959, pp. 559-60, para. 24. 
235 T.B. Millar, 'Australian voting at the United Nations on issues concerning South Africa', 
Australia's Neighbours, 4th Series, Nos. 13-14, March-April 1964, p. 3. Between 1946 and 1961 
South Africa absented itself fifteen times from plenary votes on these items, Spain four times, Iceland 
and Luxembourg three times, and Australia and Norway once. 
236 The undated draft and the version as despatched dated 24 December 1959 are on AA, Al838/2, 
201/10/1, Pt. 2. 
237 Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question, p.156. See also Albinski, Australian Policy under 
Labor, pp. 21-22. 
238 BTS, 136/2/19, Vol. 1, Jordaan/SEA, 30 September 1952, p. 3. 
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question that was sui generis, 239 a rationalisation that ostensibly had as its raison d'etre 
events such as Sharpeville which followed close on the heels of Macmillan's 'Winds of 
Change' visit to South Africa in January 1960, not to mention South Africa's recently 
announced withdrawal from the Commonwealth. 
Along with the United Kingdom, Australia supported both the 1960 and 1961 
resolutions on apartheid (1598 (XV) and 1663 (XVI)). Four years earlier Casey had 
told the Assembly that South Africa had 'fulfilled its obligations under the Charter'. 
Now Plimsoll told the Special Political Committee that South Africa should 'comply 
with its obligations under the Charter'. 240 Millar suggests that the Australians were 
influenced by the British change of position two meetings before. Plimsoll's statement 
was not, however, as Millar says, 'an unusual second intervention in such a debate'. 241 
It was an explanation of vote. What made it noteworthy was that it was delivered by 
' 
the head of the delegation instead of by the representative in the committee, JD. 
Hood, himself a senior official. 
South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth ungagged the hitherto sup-
portive or at least restrained British and Australians. Their delegates at the UN now 
gave vent to imaginative expressions of abhorrence. There was, for example, the 
British Conservative MP, Patrick Wall's famous (1962) description of apartheid as 
'morally abominable, intellectually grotesque and spiritually indefensible',242 sentiments 
which did not, however, prevent him in later years from accepting invitations to visit 
South Africa as a guest of the government. (He may not have been responsible for the 
wording.)243 Hood told the Special Political Committee in November 1961 that his 
government 
239 An expression used by the British representative in the Special Political Committee, P. Smithers, 
who said that 'While the importance attached by the United Kingdom to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the 
Charter remained undiminished, it regarded apartheid as being now so exceptional as to be sui 
generis'. GAOR, Fifteenth Sess., SPC, 242nd meeting, 5 April 1961, p. 77, para. 12. The statement 
followed the announcement of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. 
240 GAOR, Fifteenth Sess., SPC, 244th meeting, 7 April 1961, p. 85, para. 5. He also said that 
Australia 'was strongly opposed to any sanctions against the Union; nor did it think that the situation 
in that country endangered international peace and security'. 
241 Millar, 'Australian voting at the United Nations on issues concerning South Africa', Australia's 
Neighbours, 4th Series, Nos. 13-14, March-April 1964, p. 3. Hood had spoken at the 24lst meeting 
on 4 April. See p. 72, paras. 23-26 of the summary record. 
242 GAOR, Seventeenth Sess., FoUJih,Com., 1380th meeting, 12 November 1962. p. 332, para. 17. He 
was taking part in the committee's general debate on South West Africa. 
243 Sir Brian Barder writes in that connection: 'The wording looks strongly London-drafted to me, 
and probably the outcome of a prolonged debate in which our UN Mission, Patrick Wall, various bits 
of the FCO almost certainly including ministers, and, certainly, the Embassy in Pretoria/Cape Town 
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shared the virtually universal repugnance to the policy of 
'apartheid' ... and that despite its adherence to the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of States, it considered that the 
special nature of the question of 'apartheid' justified its examin-
ation by the United Nations. 244 
And in respect of South West Africa the Australian representative in the Fourth 
Committee, L.R. Mcintyre, blandly repudiated a position held for sixteen years: 
The Government and people of Australia ... considered that South 
Africa should have followed the example of other Mandatory Pow-
ers and have placed South West Africa under the Trusteeship 
System.245 
As recently as 1960 Australia's position on the item had been that it would 
'continue to recognise the legal right of South Africa, expressly affirmed by the 
International Court, not to place South West Africa under the International 
Trusteeship System'. 246 (Emphasis in original.) It might be thought that the British and 
the Australians were influenced in their change of attitude by the human rights aspects 
of the apartheid issue. More likely, the organisation's changing membership profile 
coupled with South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth were the decisive 
factors. 
The South African Indian elite247 enlisted the aid of the British government of 
India to inscribe the matter of their treatment on the agenda of the second, substantive 
part of the General Assembly's first session in 1946. Two prominent South African 
Indians, Sorabjee Rustomjee and H.A. Naidoo,248 and Hyman Basner, a natives' repre-
would have been involved. My guess is that what was wanted was a short, striking, key text - what 
we'd now call a sound-bite ... which could be quoted for years as defining our position on apartheid.' 
e-mail message 14 August 1995. 
244 GAOR, Sixteenth Sess., SPC, 28lst meeting, 7 November 1961, p. 108, para. 28. 
245 Ibid., Seventeenth Sess., Fourth Com., 1387th meeting, 16 November 1962, p. 388, para. 8. 
246 0. 9497, 7 June 1960, p. 9. (Savingram to all posts setting out official thinking on the items of the 
agenda of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly.) Copy on BCB, Vol. 6, 8/0, Vol. III. 
247 The legislation, Uma Shashikant Mesthrie points out, 'had serious implications for the Indian 
commercial and propertied class whose economic e>.."]lansion would be seriously curtailed'. From Sastri 
to Deshmukh: A Study of the Role of the Government of India's Representatives in South Africa, 1927 
to 1946 (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1987), p. 290 
248 Respectively presidents of the South African and Transvaal Indian Congresses. In New York, 
operating out of Room 969 of the Hotel Commodore, they referred to themselves as 'Delegates of the 
South African Passive Resistance Council'. They put out a pamphlet under the title 5 months of 
Struggle: A Brief Account of the Passive Resistance Struggle From 13th of June - 13th of November, 
1946. A copy is on AA, Al067/l, M46/21/7. 
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sentative in the Senate,249 went to New York to assist the Indian delegation with the 
preparation of the case. It was, however, South Africa itself which requested the ins-
cription of the South West Africa item on the agenda of the same session. 250 If only for 
that reason, the South African government never considered the item to fall within the 
scope of Article 2 (7).251 
It is important to know why Smuts took the South West Africa question to the 
United Nations. His political opponents criticised him for doing so, claiming that 
recognised the organisation's authority over the territory. 252 Sole and Friedmann, the 
South African Press Association correspondent in London during the war, contend that 
after the 1943 general election Churchill strongly advised Smuts to annex South West 
Africa.253 Hancock claimed later that 'Not a dog would have barked' if he had done so. 
After all, the 'Russians went unchallenged when they followed a d1ff erent fashion in 
dealing with the Baltic States'. But he did not do so because of his 'old-fashioned 
respect for the legal fabric of the society of nations'. 254 
The Round Table called Smuts a 'constitutionalist'.255 Following Hancock, 
W.R. Louis argues that 'If South Africa had simply annexed South-West Africa during 
the war (in the manner that the Soviet Union appropriated the Baltic states) perhaps 
the vexed question of South-West Africa might not have arisen before the United Na-
tions and the International Court of Justice'. 256 Millar argued in similar terms in the 
1960s. 257 The British judge on the International Court, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, put it 
more strongly in 1971: 'Had this been done, there would have been no way in which it 
could have been prevented, or subsequently undone, short of war'. 258 
249 M. Basner, The Political Memoirs of H.M Basner (Johannesburg, 1993), pp. 183-93. 
250 BTS, 136/2/2, Vol. 1, SENSA Legation, Washington, No. 247, repeated London No. 1226, 9 
August 1946. 
251 An official report on the General Assembly's Fourteenth Session in Current Notes (Vol. 31, No. 1, 
January 1960, p. 32) states wrongly that 'Australia's attitude on the question of South West Africa 
has always been that this was a domestic matter and, therefore, by the tenns of Article 2(7) of the 
Charter, not within the competence of the United Nations'. 
252 See, eg., HA Deb., Vol. 82, 11 August 1953, Col. 1322. 
253 D. Friedmann, letter, 18 October 1988 and Sole, Reminiscences, pp. 84-85. Friedmann died in 
March 1995 at the age of eighty-seven. The Citizen (Johannesburg), 7 March 1995. 
254 Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, p. 467 and footnote. 
255 
'South Africa and the United Nations', The Round Table, No. 146, March 1947, p.133. 
256 Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 563. 
257 T.B. Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations (Sydney, 1967), p. 172, fn. 76. 
258 International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Legal 
Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), 'Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice', p. 298 (286), para. 125. (Each page carries two numbers.) 
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Needless to say, this writer does not agree with such views. The Soviet and 
South African situations were not analogous. The Soviet Union was a great power and 
the Baltic States lay outside the League of Nations mandates system. Assuming that 
Friedmann and Sole are correct, Churchill's advice could in some way have been con-
nected with the British view, which the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, expounded 
to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May 1944 and later that year in the United 
States, 259 that the mandates system had served its purpose. 
Smuts himself said as much in the South African Parliament the same year. 260 
Australia's Curtin seemed to agree but not Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister 
whom, Louis says, evolved into the 'arch priest' of international supervision when he 
chaired Committee 11/4 on trusteeship at the San Francisco Conference.261 To the dis-
agreement of Curtin and Stanley, Fraser told the Prime Ministers it was 'essential to 
make provision for reports on colonial administration to be submitted to and discussed 
by some central international body'.262 Though Evatt's contribution to the trusteeship 
chapters of the United Nations Charter has received more attention, Fraser by no 
means just tagged along in his wake. As chairman of Committee 11/4 at San Francisco, 
a post he occupied because the British did not want Evatt to have it, 263 he prevented 
the South African reservation on South West Africa from being reflected accurately in 
the summary records of the conference. 264 
259 See PMM (44), 10th meeting, 9 May 1944, pp. 1-2; Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 441-42; and 
Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, pp. 488-89 .. 
260 S. Slonim, South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute, 
(Baltimore & London, 1973), p. 75. In tying Smuts's remark exclusively to his concern about the 
future of South West Africa, Slonim is obviously unaware of the wider dimension. 
261 See also PMM (44), 10th meeting, 9 May 1944, pp. 1-3, 5; and Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 343. 
262 PMM (44), 10th meeting, 9 May 1944, p. 5; Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, 
pp. 489-90. 
263 Hudson, Australia and the New World Order, p. 63. 
264 A statement by D.L. Smit is summarised in UNCIO Docs., Vol. X, p. 434. (Doc. 260 (ENGLISH), 
11/4/8, 12 May 1945, p. 2). This bears no relation to the statement Smit claimed to have delivered. See 
International Court of Justice, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, South West Africa Cases 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Vol. II, 1966, pp. 33-34, para. 31. Adding to the 
confusion is that Smuts stated that he personally had reserved 'the question of the incorporation of 
South West Africa for the later Peace Conference'. BTS, 136/1, Vol. 3, Cypher telegram No. 35, 2 
June 1945. Also HA Deb., Vol. 55, 6 February 1946, Cols. 1169-70. At the Third Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1948, Eric Louw attributed the reservation to Smuts personally. GAOR, Third Sess., 
Part I, 164th plenary meeting, 26 November 1948, p. 164. Finally, Sole (Reminiscences, p. 113), also 
attributing it to Smit, asserts that the statement was not delivered at all but merely handed in as a 
document! 
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Smuts took the South West Africa question to the United Nations not because 
of his respect 'for the legal fabric of the society of nations' nor, as Barber and Barratt 
suggest, because he 'was confident of success', 265 but because politically be thought he 
had no choice. In 1971 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice revealed understanding of that motiva-
tion, saying that it would not be the 'first historical example of seeking a political 
recognition of incorporation of territory without there being any obligation to do so'. 266 
Having tested the atmosphere at the first part of the General Assembly's first se~sion 
(held in London from 10 January to 15 February 1946) at which the New Zealander 
Fraser was South Africa's most vehement critic, Heaton Nicholls, who led the 
delegation, reported that 
if the arrangements finally decided upon by the Union Govern-
ment go beyond the terms of the present mandate, it will be neces-
sary for these arrangements to be submitted for information and 
ratification by the General Assembly. 
Even if it should prove 
possible to obtain the tacit endorsement of the General Assembly 
for the Union's action [which, misguidedly, he thought might well 
be the case] without submission of a formal resolution for approval 
... it would not be safe to proceed on the assumption that it will be 
possible to take action outside the terms of the mandate, without 
the General Assembly taking cognisance of such action. 267 
That was why Smuts went to the General Assembly. He had believed initially that the 
disposition of territories would be a matter for the peace conference. That had been the 
case at Versailles in 1919; but it was not in 1945 and he had no option but to follow 
Heaton Nicholls's advice. 
From South Africa's point of view, the first part of the first session was diffi-
cult. One does not know whether Fraser's criticism was directly responsible for this268 
265 J. Barber & J. Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The search for status and security 1945-
1988 (Johannesburg, 1990), p. 22. 
266 International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Legal 
Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), 'Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice', p. 257 (245), para. 56, fn. 34. Emphasis in original. (Each page carries two numbers). 
267 BTS, 136/2, Vol. 1, Annexures, 'Report of the First Meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly held in London, January 1946', p. 12, para. 23. Sole presumably drafted this section of the 
report. 
268 See, eg., GAOR, First Sess., First Part, Fourth Com., 2nd meeting, 21 January 1946, pp. 6-7 and 
BTS, 136/2, Vol. 1, Annexures, Heaton Nicholls/SEA, 7 March 1946, p. 8, para. 4. 
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but the summary record of the Fourth Committee's third meeting on 22 January 1946 
has Heaton Nicholls assuring the committee that the outcome of the announced pro-
cess of consultation of the territory's 'European and native populations' would 'be 
submitted to the General Assembly for judgment'. Fraser pounced on that, calling it 'a 
considerable step forward'. Heaton Nicholls at least 'recognised the moral responsibility 
of informing the world through the General Assembly ... The Union of South Africa 
had now said that she would recognise the authority of the General Assembly'. 269 . 
The summary record does not reflect the air of gloom projected by the delega-
tion's report nor its forecast that 'trusteeship in all its aspects [would] continue to pro-
vide major debating points in the next two or three sessions of the General Assembly'. 
There is a tendency to short-sightedness not to mention optimism in such forecasts. In 
respect of South West Africa, H.T. Andrews said of the same session that 'clearly a 
long road is ahead before the United Nations is likely to concur in our intended pol-
icy'. 270 A few years later he was saying: 'if we exercise a little patience over the next 
year or two, the dispute as between ourselves and the United Nations must eventually 
peter out'! 271 Nor does the summary record convey the prevailing atmosphere of 
'suspicion, prejudice and antipathy towards the mandatory and colonial powers' which 
saw 'South Africa in particular' bear 'the major brunt' of the criticism. Fraser's 
'forthright attack on a fellow member of the Commonwealth induced other states of 
little political consequence ... to make entirely unwarranted charges against the good 
faith of the Union Government'. 
South Africa was regarded 'even by our friends as endeavouring to evade, if not 
the letter, at least the spirit of our obligations under the Charter'. Pursuant thereto 
'several delegations including notably New Zealand and India' contended that the 
Union was 'legally or morally obliged to place South West Africa under trusteeship'. 
What complicated matters was that Pretoria was unable to authorise the delegation 'to 
give an undertaking in regard to any form of consultation with the General Assembly'. 
The suspicion was therefore profound that South Africa 'meditated some form of uni-
lateral action which was held to be contrary to the spirit both of the Charter and of the 
mandate'. 272 
269 GAOR, First Sess., First Part, Fourth Com., 3rd meeting, 22 January 1946, pp. 10-11. 
270 BTS, 136/2/1, Vol. 1, Andrews/SEA, 21 March 1946, p. 2. 
271 BTS, 136/2/11, Vol. 3, Andrews/SEA, 4 January 1949, p. 4. 
272 BTS, 136/2, Vol. l, Annexures, Heaton Nicholls/SEA, 7 March 1946, p. 8, paras. 4-6. 
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If the countries Fraser and Evatt represented had once been ardent annexation-
ists in respect of the territories they held under mandate - Western Samoa and New 
Guinea - at least in the persons of these two men they were strongly anti-annexationist 
in the 1940s as well as being enthusiastic about the idea of international supervision of 
mandated territories; indeed, to British horror, of all colonial territories.273 Fraser did 
not attend the May 1946 meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the first after the 
Attlee Labour government gained office in the United Kingdom. New Zealand .was 
represented by the Deputy Prime Minister, Walter Nash. Smuts brought up the 
question of South West Africa, saying that he was going to raise the matter at the 
General Assembly in September. The non-European section of the population had been 
consulted and desired incorporation. 
Evatt immediately advised him to 'tread very warily'. He 'felt certain that [the] 
proposal would meet with objection ... At San Francisco there had been very strong 
feeling against the annexation of Mandated Territories. He thought that that feeling 
would be found also in the Assembly'. He advocated presenting the Assembly with 'full 
factual information regarding the territory'. He suggested Smuts consider the idea of a 
trusteeship agreement with a clause that incorporation would take place if the terri-
tory's people made it clear in a vote or plebiscite that they wanted that. Hall, the new 
Colonial Secretary, foresaw 'many difficulties' in the event of 'a straight application for 
immediate incorporation'. Would it not be best to place South West Africa under 
trusteeship, including in the agreement 'a provision that after a period of, say, five 
years, the territory should be incorporated in the Union'.274 The sense of the meeting 
would not at all have been to Smuts's liking. He was obliged to go through the motions 
in New York but after the London meeting he would have been under no illusions 
about the possibility of success. He was not, as Millar says, gambling for United 
Nations approval. 275 He would not have expected to receive it. 
Slonim raises the question whether the South African government canvassed 
the views of other UN members before submitting the matter to the General 
Assembly.276 Under normal circumstances that would have been the commonsense 
approach. If, however, the government did not do so apart from airing the matter at 
273 Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 18. See also F. Eggleston, 'The United Nations Charter Critically 
Considered: The Trusteeship Provisions', The Australian Outlook, Vol. I, No. 1, March 1947, p. 44. 
274 PMM ( 46 ), 17th meeting, 22 May 1946, pp. 3-6. The record of the meeting lists Sole as having 
been present. 
275 Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations, p. 172. 
276 Slonim, South West Africa and the United Nations, p.81, fn. 2. 
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the Commonwealth meeting, it meant that it knew the answer. Later at the United Na-
tions, even before the Fourth Committee considered the issue, Forsyth reported: 
It is still too early to forecast developments, but it seems likely 
that, apart from British support, we shall stand virtually alone. 
The United States is not sympathetic and, according to press 
reports, the South American phalanx has decided to oppose us on 
the ground that we are seeking annexation in order to provide a 
native labour supply for the projected gold field development in 
the Free State. 277 
It may have seemed unfortunate from Smuts's point of view that the application 
for incorporation coincided with the Indian complaint abou~ the treatment of South 
African Indians. But that was unlikely to have tilted the balance against him. Sentiment 
in the Assembly was in any case decidedly anti-colonial and in favour of all mandated 
territories being placed under trusteeship. India's complaint merely added a further 
dimension. Thus the British report on the proceedings of the second part of the first 
session held that the 'South African case suffered from the feeling aroused by the 
Indian complaint ... as well as the "anti-imperialist" sentiment of the Assembly, which 
was undoubtedly in favour of mandated territories being placed under trusteeship'. 278 
As The Round Table observed at the time, 'General Smuts's request [for incorporation] 
was rejected so decisively ... that rejection must have been inevitable'. 279 
Sole places much of the blame on Smuts personally, writing that his approach 
to the issue was 'doomed from the start'. That inter alia because he did not take the 
advice of 'so outstanding a statesman as Churchill', because 'he was so completely out 
of tune with the temper of the times', because 'he had little conception of the strength 
of anti-colonialist feeling', and because 'he persisted in thinking that the methods and 
procedures of the postwar settlement would be broadly similar to what he had per-
sonally experienced at the end of World War r.280 
Not all of this is true. Churchill may have been an outstanding statesman but 
not in the colonial field where he had the reputation of being a reactionary. Louis 
writes that his ideas 'often reflected the experience not only of the earlier period of the 
277 BTS, 136/2/2, Vol. 1, Cypher OTP telegram, from Forsyth, 4 November 1946, p. 2, para. 5. 
278 United Nations. Proceedings of the General Assembly. Second Part of the First Sess. (with 
annexes), New York, 23rd October-16th December, 1946, London: HMSO 1947, p. 12, Annex G, 
para. 3. 
279 The Round Table, No. 146, March 1947, p. 133. 
280 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 119. 
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First World War but also of the Victorian age, when he had spent his formative years 
in India, in the campaign in Africa against the Mahdi, and in the Boer War'. 281 There 
was also his famous remark that he had not 'become the King's First Minister in order 
to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire'. 282 Like Smuts, therefore, Chur-
chill was a child of his times. He may have counselled annexation, but it is another 
matter how reflective such advice was of opinion in his own government let alone in 
the Dominions at large. 
Smuts was not alone in thinking that the 'methods and procedures of the 
postwar settlement' would or could be similar to those at the end of the First World 
War. The Australians thought so too. Evatt's observations at the 1946 Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' meeting on the disposal of the Italian colonies, in which Chifley con-
curred, contradict the common perception that they viewed all colonial matters 
through a UN prism. He said that if 
the Council of Foreign Ministers283 did not reach a decision on 
the subject, the proper authority for doing so would not be the 
United Nations Organisation. It was unthinkable that a decision 
should be left to over 50 nations, the majority of whom had not 
been active belligerents. The twenty-one former belligerents who 
would be represented at the forthcoming Peace Conference should 
decide this matter. 284 
It was at the seventeenth meeting that Smuts raised the question of South West 
Africa. Where he differed from the Australians and the New Zealanders was that he 
saw all territorial problems falling within the purview of the Peace Conference, 
whereas for them mandates were a United Nations affair. In any event, so far as this 
writer is concerned, South Africa would have gained little more than a temporary 
respite if Smuts had annexed the territory during the war. The mass admission of 
African States to the United Nations in the 1960s would have seen to that. Even so, 
Fraser, Evatt and the Indians would probably have ensured that South Africa did not 
get away with it in the short term either. 
281 Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 5. 
282 Speech at the Lord Mayor's Day Luncheon, London, 10 November 1942. The Times (London), 11 
November 1942. 
283 Comprising the UK, US, USSR, French and Chinese foreign ministers. 
284 PMM (46), 6th meeting, 28 April 1946, p. 4. In any event, the question of the disposal of the 
Italian colonies found itself on the General Assembly's agenda. 
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Why did Smuts not simply fall in with prevailing international opinion and con-
clude a trusteeship agreement? Much (South African) ink has been expended since 
1945 on showing that the government was neither legally nor morally obliged to do so. 
Even in the 1990s Sole proceeds from the assumption that incorporation was the only 
acceptable solution. It is true that the trusteeship system was 'voluntary'. All that had 
happened was that machinery had been established at San Francisco which 'might be 
used'. 285 But the United Nations is a political organisation and in the context of trus-
teeship, the dictionary meaning of 'voluntary' was a dead letter practically from the 
start. In any case, .Butterfield's view is not inapplicable: 'it is possible for us to have the 
law on our side while the ethics of the case are against us'.286 
A South African domestic parallel is the supposedly voluntary nature of enlist-
ment in the armed forces during the Second World War. The Smuts government did 
everything possible short of conscription to compel young white men to join the ser-
vices, freezing recruitment for the Public Service and attempting to force all but select 
'key men' already in employment to join up'. Reflecting the government line, the Eng-
lish-language churches applied great moral pressure to the young men of their congre-
gations to do so. 287 
Was a trusteeship agreement ever a viable option? The key to the situation was 
the existence of a sizeable, vocal, not to mention self-governing white population in the 
Territory which markedly narrowed the South African government's options. Most 
commentators overlook the significance of this. Dale makes the point that South West 
Africa was the only (B or C) mandate which could be termed a 'white man's country' 
(in the sense that it was suitable for white settlement).288 Not only were many Germans 
allowed to remain after the war289 but settlement from South Africa was encouraged, 
probably in part to neutralise the German influence. At least during the first decade of 
285 Gilchrist, 'Colonial questions at the San Francisco Conference', The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 5, October 1945, p. 988. Gilchrist had been Assistant Director of the 
Mandates Section in the League of Nations Secretariat. At the San Francisco Conference he was 
Executive Officer of Commission II. 
286 H. Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century: A Christian View (London, 1960), 
p. 31. 
287 See Tothill, The 1943 General Election, pp. 294-95. 
288 R Dale, The evolution of the South West African dispute before the United Nations, 1945-1950, 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1962), p. 48. See fn. 3 for pre-war white population 
figures. 
289 7855 remained while 6374 or just under half were repatriated. G.-M. Cockram, South West 
African Mandate (Cape Town, 1976), p. 167. 
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the mandate financial inducements were provided for the purpose. 290 In 1924 most of 
the Germans in the territory were naturalised pursuant to the South West Africa 
Naturalisation of Aliens Act, No. 30of1924.291 In 1928 over three-quarters of the so-
called Angola Boers, some three hundred-and-fifty families or 1900 individuals were 
settled in the territory.292 
By contrast, thereby fortuitously retaining its freedom of action when political 
circumstances and attitudes changed, Australia expropriated German properties in 
New Guinea in 1920, turning them over to Australian ex-servicemen (who mostly 
proved incapable of running them) and deported German nationals the following 
year.293 
White settlement in South West Africa was permissible because Article 22(6) 
of the League of Nations Covenant as well as Article 2 of the mandate instrument 
authorised the administration of the territory as an integral portion of the territory of 
the mandatory state. Not only was it permissible but South Africa argued at the United 
Nations in 1946 and at the International Court of Justice in the 1960s, that it was 
necessary in order to develop the territory. 294 That was also its response to charges 
that it administered the territory for the benefit of the whites. 295 In 1921 the whites 
numbered 19 432, increasing to 30 677 in 1936. In 1940 the white population was 
estimated at 32 700. The non-white population was 208 307 in 1921 and estimated at 
287 745 in 1936.296 Pursuant to the South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 42 of 
1925, 297 the white population was granted limited self-government similar to that 
enjoyed by a South African province. 
290 International Court of Justice, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, South West Africa Cases 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Vol. II, 1966, pp 419-20, paras. 3-4. See also 
Cockram, South West African Mandate, pp. 92-94. 
291 Ibid., p. 171. 
292 Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, 
No. 21-1940, p. 1094. Originally from the Tran5vaal, these farmers settled in Angola at various inter-
vals commencing in 197 4. 
293 Cockram, South West African Mandate, p. 166; H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and 
Trusteeship (Washington, 1948), p. 145. 
294 UN doc. Nl23, 1946, para. 57 (GAOR, Fourth Committee, Trusteeship, Part I, Summary Record 
of Meetings 1 November - 12 December 1946, Annex 13, pp. 199-235); South West Africa Cases, 
Vol. II, 1966, pp 419-20, paras. 3-4; Slonim, South West Africa and the United Nations, p. 232. 
295 Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations, p. 125. 
296 Official Year Book, No. 21-1940, Tables (a) and (b), p. 1089. 
297 Statutes of the Union of South Africa 1925, pp. 734-800. See also Official Year Book, No. 21-
1940, pp. 1083-88. 
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German voters at first outnumbered the others and German candidates were 
returned in seven of the twelve seats at the first elections to the Assembly in May 
1926.298 Their advantage was only temporary and at the outbreak of the Second World 
War the Union element outnumbered the Germans by two to one. 299 Within the Union 
element, Afrikaners outnumbered English-speakers by five to one. 300 As a counter to 
pro-Nazi activity on the part of the Germans who were agitating for the territory's 
return to Germany, non-Germans in the white population pressed for incorporation at 
an early stage. The South West Africa Commission of 1935 (the Van Zyl Commission) 
concurred.301 In May 1943 and May 1946 the Legislative Assembly passed resolutions 
requesting incorporation. 302 
In this way the hands of successive South African governments were tied. Even 
though the government could, as Australia did, dictate the terms,303 a trusteeship 
agreement was not considered a practical proposition. Carrying with it implications of 
a sell-out, an agreement would have meant domestic political disaster. Dale puts it 
mildly when he says 'South African policy towards South West Africa, if it were not to 
be repudiated by the white electorate, had to take into account the necessity for the 
maintenance of white supremacy in all areas under the jurisdiction of the South African 
Government'. 304 Louis misses the point altogether: 'At any cost, Smuts wanted to 
avoid international measures that might interfere with the race laws of South Africa'.305 
The point was that a perception whites in South West Africa, most of them Afrikaners, 
were to be handed over to the tender mercies of the United Nations would at that time 
have had most adverse consequences for the perpetrator in the context of South Af-
rica's domestic politics. 
By way of a contingency plan D.D. Forsyth circulated a draft trusteeship 
agreement prepared in his department to other departments and the South West Africa 
Administration early in 1946.3°6 Smuts could not afford to follow through on it. He 
298 Cockram, South West African Mandate, p. 171. 
299 Ibid., p. 191. 
300 Dale, The evolution of the South West African dispute, p. 173. 
301 Ibid., p. 182. 
302 Ibid., p. 221. See also 'The South-West Africa Commission', The Round Table, No. 104, Sep-
tember 1936, pp. 772-83. 
303 Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question, pp. 83-85 and 'Australia's Trusteeship Policy', 
Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1967, p. 14 .. 
304 Dale, The evolution of the South West African dispute, pp. vi, vii. 
30S Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 518. 
306 BTS, 91/8/1, Vol. 2, ForS)1h/ All Heads of Departments of State, 28 January 1946. 
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was not expected to lose the 1948 general election, but negotiations with the UN over 
a trusteeship agreement would practically have guaranteed that. To that extent he can 
be awarded points for political nous. And even if an agreement had been negotiated it 
would not have been assured of an easy passage. That was Australia's experience. 307 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals which in effect constituted a draft United Na-
tions Charter were silent on two issues: voting in the Security Council (ie. the great 
power veto insisted upon by the Russians) and trusteeship. The question of Security 
Council voting was settled at the Yalta Conference later in 1944 on the basis of an 
American proposal while the trusteeship question was sorted out in San Francisco inter 
alia also on the basis of American proposals. The American contribution to the Dum-
barton Oaks proposals and therefore to the charter was more comprehensive than that 
of the other participants because the Americans had researched the question of 
postwar organisation more thoroughly than the others. The proposals also lacked a 
preamble but that was of lesser significance. 
As mentioned, Evatt can be held indirectly and unwittingly responsible for 
South Africa's difficulties at the United Nations because of his work at San Francisco 
to enlarge the scope and powers of the General Assembly. He described the effect of 
his intervention in San Francisco: 
The original Dumbarton Oaks draft . . . limited discussion by the 
Assembly to matters relating to the maintenance of peace and 
security. Largely as the result of Australian initiative at San Fran-
cisco, that draft was amended so that the powers of the Assembly 
now extend to all matters comprehended by the Charter itself, cov-
ering all its principles, all its initiatives, and all its organi-
zations. 308 
Hudson believes that Evatt's achievement was twofold. In the first place he for-
ced the great powers who had envisaged a General Assembly with 'carefully limited 
powers' to accept one with 'almost unlimited scope'. Then, on this issue, he 'emerged as 
the key player outside the great powers and finally as a winner against the great pow-
307 See Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question, pp. 83-86; T.A Pyman, 'The Australian Role in 
the United Nations as a Trustee State for Papua New Guinea', Australian Outlook, Vol. 34, No. 3, De-
cember 1980. pp. 254-56. 
308 CPD, 26 February 1947. p. 160. See also the delegation's report on the San Francisco Conference, 
ie., The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, United Nations Conference on International 
Organization, Report by the Australian Delegates, No. 24 [Group E.]-F. 4311, pp. 19-21, paras. 80-
90. 
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ers'. 309 This was no doubt one of the reasons why, at the end of the San Francisco 
Conference, the small powers expressed their gratitude to Evatt by a vote of thanks 
which the steering committee carried by acclamation. 310 Another reason was his 
(fruitless) efforts to water down the great power veto in the Security Council, which 
extended the conference's life by several weeks. 
Smuts was dismissive of the small powers, telling the Senate before he left for 
London and San Francisco that the 'small countries may be troublesome. Small dogs 
often bark the loudest, but they cannot do much harm'.311 He was wrong there because 
it was precisely the small powers en masse who turned out to be the South African 
government's most determined and successful opponents at the United Nations.312 
Where Evatt worked actively to expand the General Assembly's powers, the South 
Africans were more interested in the powers of the Security Council. It followed, Sole 
reported on the 1945 Commonwealth meeting, that 'we should not spend too much 
time endeavouring to define closely the powers and functions of the various other con-
stituent bodies of the organisation'.313 
Nonetheless, the South African delegation supported the move to give 'the 
Assembly an extended and more worth while role. in certain important respects than 
was envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals'. Leif Egeland reported after the 
conference: 
The attitude of the Union Delegation throughout was to support 
extensions of the powers and scope of the Assembly as the 'Town 
Meeting' or forum of the world, the acceptance of which did not 
run counter to any provision of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, 
which one or more of the sponsoring Great Powers might regard 
as fundamental. 314 
309 Hudson, Australia and the New World Order, pp. 107-08. Chapter eight of the book (pp. 92-11) is 
devoted to this issue. 
310 Report by the Australian Delegates, No. 24 [Group E.]·F.4311, para. 53, p. 15. 
311 Sen Deb., 23 March 1945, Col. 554. 
312 Watt holds that Evatt was guilty of a similar lack of foresight: 'in pressing for an increase in the 
powers of the General Assembly beyond those contained in the Dumbarton Oaks draft, his imagina-
tion did not lead him to foresee that the votes of Small Power bloc~ in the General Assembly might in 
due course be directed, not merely against Great Power policies, but also against the policies of 
smaller Powers like Australia - for instance, in regard to trust and non-self-governing territories.' The 
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, p.105. 
313 BTS. 136/1, Vol. 3, Heaton Nicholls/Acting Prime Minister, 17 April 1945, Attachment, p. 3. 
31 4 BTS, 136/1, Vol. 14, Egeland/SEA, 24 September 1945. 
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The way Australia and South Africa viewed the San Francisco Conference was 
conditioned by the personalities and experience of the leaders of their delegations. 
Natal Senator G.R. Richards argued in February 1946 that Smuts had been 
'accompanied only by two civil servants of no responsibility and without any previous 
experience'.315 Albeit exaggerated, his complaint was not unfounded. The three dele-
gates consisted of Smuts himself; D.D. Forsyth, the politically inexperienced Secretary 
for External Affairs; and Leif Egeland, Minister in Stockholm, who replaced Dr S.F.N. 
Gie, Minister in Washington on the latter's untimely death days before the conference 
opened. Of the three, only Smuts signed the Charter. 316 Egeland wrote thirty years 
later: 
In a way we were essentially a delegation of one, Forsyth having 
had difficulty in persuading Smuts to have any advisers or assist-
ants at all. For Smuts was concerned less with the details of the 
proposed Charter and more with the overriding need to keep the 
Big Three sufficiently in agreement to ensure that some sort of 
charter could operate during the transitional and critical years 
ahead.317 
Then there were D.L. Smit, Member of the Native Affairs Commission and 
former Secretary for Native Affairs; L.E. Orkin, Industrial Registrar, Department of 
Labour; H.T. Andrews, Head of the South African Supply Mission, Washington, DC., 
J.R. Jordaan, Legation Secretary, South African Legation, Washington, DC., and R. 
Jones, Acting Accredited Representative, Ottawa. Somewhat Freudianly, Smuts 
referred to the 'staff, ie. those other than himself and Gie, as 'not very large but fairly 
efficient'.318 Egeland in effect substituted for Sole because Heaton Nicholls, on whose 
staff Sole was in London, insisted that he could not do without his services.319 The 
numbers if not the names had been the product of discussions in mid-March 1945 
between the High Commissioner's office and Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office.320 
Apart from Smuts himself and perhaps Andrews, the South African delegation 
was hardly of the calibre of the Evatt side of the Australian delegation. (See below). In 
part that had to do with Smuts's conception of its role. Viewing the Dumbarton Oaks 
315 Sen Deb., 20 March 1946, Col. 441. 
316 UNCIO Docs., Vol. 15, p. 507. 
317 Egeland, Bridges of Understanding, pp. 168-69. 
31 8 Sen Deb., 23 March 1945, Col. 556. 
319 Sole, Reminiscences, p. 87. 
320 BTS, 136/l/3, Vol. I, High Commissioner, London/SEA, No. 339, 13 March 1945. Handwritten 
comments by Forsyth and Smuts on the file copy of this cable refer to the positions of Sole and Fourie. 
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proposals as it were through British eyes, he saw his own role and that of his delega-
tion basically as extensions of the British delegation. As far as he was concerned, the 
proposals were 'a careful draft prepared by experienced officials', the 'work of a com-
mission of skilled experts who had sat for a long time and had conducted searching 
discussions' and amendments should be confined 'to essentials or the process of dis-
cussion would be endless'.321 If Evatt had believed that, the course of United Nations 
history would have been different. 
It is not unreasonable to ask why Smuts went to San Francisco. His govern-
ment was a 'one man show', the cabinet weak and running to him 'for their deci-
sions'.322 He could hardly absent himself at all, let alone for an extended period, 
without an adverse effect on the formulation and implementation of policy. He told his 
friend Margaret Gillett that 'only a sense of duty' took him away from South Africa at a 
time when he was 'badly wanted' . 'But I feel I should be there [in San Francisco], in 
case I could be needed as one of those who remember 1919. Issues may be raised 
where I could speak with some effect because of my past experience'. 323 That was his 
rationalisation. But he contributed nothing to the furtherance of purely South African 
interests or, in fact, to the work of the conference as such. Besides, he was not needed. 
Against the background of the perceived failure of the League of Nations ('the League 
reeked with the odour of failure'), 324 the presence of someone so closely associated 
with its birth was hardly a guarantee that his advice would be welcome. At least not to 
the Americans who were the prime movers behind both the Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
and the San Francisco Conference. 
The situation was such that even a Smuts at the height of his powers would not 
have shown up to best advantage. Most of the preparatory work had already been 
done by others over a period of years. The British and American delegations teemed 
with experts in various aspects of international organisation and trusteeship.325 And the 
321 BCM (45 ), 5th meeting, 6 April 1945, p. 11. Ms Moira Smythe of the Australian Archives kindly 
supplied me with a photocopy ofEvatt's copy of the 1945 minutes. 
322 Louis Esselen's complaint to the American Minister, Lincoln MacVeagh. USNA, RG 59, DS 
848A.00/594, MacVeagh/Secretary of State, No. 137, 17 March 1943, p. 2 and No. 370, 9 November 
1943, p. 2. 
323 Van der Poel, ed., Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol. VI, Smuts/M.C. Gillett, 4 March 1945, 
pp. 526-27 .. 
324 H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, Fifth Ed. (Oxford, 1975), p. 2. 
325 Not only that but it was disclosed recently that by intercepting diplomatic cable traffic, the 
Americans 'knew in advance the negotiating positions' of almost all the participants in the San 
Francisco Conference. That 'played a major role in enabling America to fashion the United Nations 
into the organization it wished'. S. Schlesinger, 'Cryptanalysis for Peacetime: Codebreaking and the 
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honour bestowed on him of the Chairmanship of Commission II on the General 
Assembly was hollow because it was largely a ceremonial job. The action lay elsewhere 
in the committees and sub-committees. 326 
The Australian delegation was an odd one. There were in effect two delega-
tions, each occupying a different floor of the Sir Francis Drake hotel, what Hasluck 
called 'a calf with two heads'.327 The calfs other head, in fact nominally the brain of the 
whole animal, having been designated so by Prime Minister John Curtin, was F.M. 
Forde, the Deputy Prime Minister who, for eight days after Curtin's death in early July 
1945, was de Jure Prime Minister of Australia. 328 He later spent six years as Australia's 
High Commissioner to Canada, overlapping, as mentioned in Chapter Four, with the 
first South African High Commissioner there, Dr P.R. Viljoen, who became the first 
South African High Commissioner to Australia. 
The nucleus of the Evatt team consisted of brilliant young officials who later 
made names for themselves in politics, diplomacy and academia. Paul Hasluck, entered 
federal politics in 1949, serving before the end of his public career twenty-five years 
later as Minister for Territories, Minister of Defence, Minister for External Affairs and 
Governor-General of Australia. J.W. Burton, Alan Watt and Keith Waller became 
permanent heads of the Department of External Affairs, Burton in 194 7 at the age of 
thirty-two. Burton later sought to enter electoral politics before commencing in the 
1960s a distinguished academic career in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
In retirement Watt wrote a pioneering study of Australia's foreign relations.329 Kenneth 
Bailey, a Professor of Law at Melbourne University, succeeded Sir George Knowles as 
Solicitor-General and Head of the Attorney-General's Department. Keith Waller was 
Secretary to the Delegation (in this case the whole delegation) in San Francisco. In the 
1960s he served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to the United States and from 
1970 to 1974 as head of the department. 
Birth and Structure of the United Nations', Cryptologia, Vol. XIX. No. 3, July 1995, pp. 217, 219. See 
also W.H. Honan, 'War Decoding Helped U.S. To Shape U.N., 'The New York Times, 23 April 1995. 
326 See C. Eagleton, 'The Charter adopted at San Francisco', The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. XXXIX, 1945, p. 936. 
327 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, title of chapter 19, pp. 188-206. Forde and Evatt, in that order, 
eventually signed both the Charter and the report on the San Francisco Conference, the latter as 
'delegates'. UNCJO Docs., Vol. 15, p. 490 and Report by the Australian Delegates, No. 24 [Group E.]-
F.4311. 
328 Hughes, Australian Prime Ministers, pp. 133-35. 
329 The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965. Cambridge, 1968. See the Introduction 
above. 
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The Australians were well-prepared, amvmg m San Francisco with many 
amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which they and their New Zealand 
colleagues had previously thought out. 33o Evatt proceeded to put his stamp on the 
conference immediately by successfully lobbying for Australia to be a member of the 
Executive Committee. According to Hasluck, 'this single act gave to us many oppor-
tunities, both at the conference and after to become one of the dozen or so nations that 
had a significant part in forming and shaping the United Nations'. 331 Even then 
somewhat unstable, a relative newcomer on the national political stage, in effect only 
the co-leader of the Australian delegation, the brilliant and thrusting Evatt viewed the 
proceedings from a perspective quite different to Smuts's, that of a politician on the 
make. As it happened, that was better suited to the occasion and to later events. 
The contrast between the Australian and South African performances provides 
another example of the impact of personalities on international relations. Hasluck 
called Evatt a political opportunist who turned to foreign affairs to advance his 
career332. He was, Hasluck said, 'first and last a successful politician'. 333 If as a 
politician Evatt beheld a picture bigger than his own country's immediate interests, at 
San Francisco he was guided less by that than by what he thought it would take to 
make Australia and himself come out on top. In that way his driving ambition brought 
about an expansion of Australia's interests. Despite his decade on the High Court 
bench, he was a man for the times, adept at the political in-fighting and horse trading 
which has always characterised the United Nations as a political institution. Australia's 
election to the Executive Committees of the San Francisco Conference and the later 
Preparatory Commission, to the Security Council for 1946-4 7, not to mention his own 
election as President of the General Assembly for 1948, owed much to his 'pushiness'. 
He may, as claimed recently, have been a 'miserably failed Labor leader'334 but 
that was as Leader of the Labor Party and of the Opposition in succession to Curtin 
and Chifley. As Minister of External Affairs he was what the situation called for in 
330 For the New Zealand amendments see Department of External Affairs, Publication No. 10. New 
Zealand and the San Francisco Conference: Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the 
establishment of a General International Organisation advanced by the Prime Minster of New 
Zealand. Wellington, 1945. 
331 P.M.C. Hasluck, 'Australia and the formation of the United Nations', Royal Australian Historical 
Society, Journal and Proceedings, Vol. XL, 1954, Part III, p. 167. 
332 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 27. 
333 See P.M.C. Hasluck, 'Australia and the formation of the United Nations', Royal Australian His-
torical Society, Journal and Proceedings, Vol. XL, 1954, Part III, p. 176. 
334 Peter Ryan in The Weekend Australian, August 28-29 1993. 
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1945. He 'achieved', as Alexander says, 'results which were at times spectacular'.335 
Watt is not alone in his assessment that Evatt 'reached the peak of his international 
influence during the San Francisco Conference'.336 Like Hughes at Versailles twenty-
five years previously, Evatt took active steps to ensure (or so he thought) that the 
world outside would not encroach on vital Australian interests and, again like Hughes, 
could not care whom he offended in the process. Accustomed to basking in the 
approbation of the British establishment, Smuts would not have dreamed of behaving 
like Evatt or Hughes. 
Apart from the difference in personalities, it was perhaps a generational thing. 
Born in 1870, Smuts was ill-equipped him to deal with the world after 1945. In any 
case, most men of seventy-five are already ten to fifteen years into retirement.337 Born 
in 1894, Evatt was in 1945 only slightly older than Smuts had been at the time of the 
1919 Paris Peace Conference. By 1945 Smuts was an anachronism whereas Evatt was 
well suited to the new UN environment. 
A comparison of Evatt and Smuts as foreign ministers points to a further irony. 
Evatt, the High Court judge with limited political experience (after a decade on the 
bench he returned to politics only in 1940) turned out to be a master politician in San 
Francisco and later in New York. Smuts, with four decades experience of domestic 
and, intermittently, international politics behind him, behaved like a High Court judge. 
Even so Hasluck, that acute observer, probably would have been kinder to Smuts than 
he was to Evatt. He saw, as did Smuts, that 'the Dumbarton Oaks draft recognized the 
existence of power', basing 'its proposals for security on the unanimity of the posses-
sors of power'.338 But the San Francisco Conference whittled away at that foundation, 
Australia being one of the principal whittlers. Evatt wanted a success for himself and 
Australia; Smuts wanted the United Nations to succeed. 
335 F. Alexander, Australia since Federation: A Narrative and Critical Analysis (Melbourne, 1967), 
p. 280. 
336 Watt, Australian Diplomat, p. 64. 
337 E.G. Malherbe's words of consolation to Smuts after his 1948 electoral defeat at Standerton are 
apposite. Smuts bemoaned what he thought was the fact that his old comrades from the Boer War who 
were living in the area had turned against him. Malherbe replied that they could not have done so 
because, being much older than Smuts, most of them were already dead! Never a Dull Moment, pp. 
281-82. 
338 Hasluck, 'Australia and the formation of the United Nations', Royal Australian Historical Society, 
Journal and Proceedings, Vol. XL, 1954, Part III, p.178. 
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' 
Along with Cadogan, Smuts quite likely thought Evatt 'a frightful man', but his 
South Africa could have benefited more, at least in the short term, if he himself had 
been as successful as Evatt at the game of international politics UN-style. If South 
Africa had not been a target at the 1946 and 194 7 UN General Assemblies, perhaps the 
United Party could even have won the 1948 general election with all that such a 
victory would have implied domestically and internationally. 339 
Not surprisingly in view of its scratch nature and its leader's conception of its 
role, the South African delegation maintained a relatively low profile in San Francisco. 
That is apparent from its proposed modus operandi cabled to Cape Town and Wash-
ington during the preliminary British Commonwealth meetings: 
In our participation in the actual work of the Conference, in view 
of the limited number of our delegates and advisers, we must con-
centrate on those matters - (a) in which the Prime Minister is per-
sonally interested, (b) which intimately affect the policies of the 
Union.340 
In her 1954 memoirs Virginia Gildersleeve, the Dean of Barnard College, New 
York, and one of eight US delegates to the San Francisco Conference, recalled her 
South African colleague on Committee 1113 (L.E. Orkin or D.L. Smit) dealing with 
international economic and social co-operation, saying that 'his instructions were never 
to speak and always to vote with the great powers'.341 Sm.it's reservation in Committee 
1114 on 11 May 1945 in respect of South West Africa342 may, therefore, have been one 
of the few occasions when South African silence was broken except in a few commit-
tees, apart from Smuts's chairmanship of Commission II. Andrews also seems to have 
been active in Committee Ill, if mainly in respect of Smuts's preamble. 
339 Under the headline 'South Africa's Colour Problem Is Acute', a 'Special Correspondent' in The 
Sydney Morning Herald on 4 December 1946, obviously not a practical politician, completely misread 
the situation by predicting that the setback in New York would neither weaken Smuts's 'position as 
the leader of the United Party or that of the party itself in the eyes of the nation'. On the contrary, if 
they campaigned on a new deal for non-whites and told the people they were 'going to remove from 
them the stigma' of"'the most backward white nation in the world",' the mass of the population would 
support them! In any case, the support of world opinion would be a 'powerful and persuasive cry'. 
340 BTS 136/l, Vol. 3, Addressed Washington No. 37, repeated Cape Town No. 486, 9 April 1945. 
See also Heaton Nicholls/Acting Prime Minister, 17 April 1945, Attachment, pp. 2-3. 
341 V.C. Gildersleeve, Many a good crusade (New York, 1954), p. 340. 
342 See UNCIO Docs, Vol. X, p. 434. (Doc. 260 (ENGLISH), Il/4/8, 12 May 1945, p. 2) and 
.International Court of Justice, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, South West Africa Cases 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Vol. II, 1966, para. 31, pp. 33-35. 
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Dumbarton Oaks and the Yalta voting formula represented for Smuts the 
maximum that could be achieved and he would defend the settlement they represented 
against all comers including his parliamentary opposition. That meant, however, that 
there was little of substance he could tum his hand to in San Francisco. He knew that 
before he left Cape Town and he accordingly cast about for an issue that would keep 
his name to the fore. He found it in the preamble which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
had lacked. It is not clear how long this had been engaging his attention. Egeland. says 
he went to London with a draft preamble. 343 In the debate on his vote at the 1945 
parliamentary session he had referred to the need for the Charter to reflect the question 
of 'fundamental human rights'. 344 Appendix III hereunder contains an account of the 
preamble's drafting history, the texts of the various drafts and, for comparative pur-
poses, the preambles to the League of Nations Covenant and the United States Consti-
tution which inspired aspects of the UN preamble. 
Coming from the leader of the South African delegation, the idea of a declara-
tion on human rights was a trifle far-fetched. The Chicago Tribune thought so, calling 
Smuts 'a curious figure'. Yet it agreed with him. The Charter should incorporate a dec-
laration of human rights, 'even if to do so embarrasses the Russian dictatorship, not to 
mention the South Africans whose laws directed against the Negro offend every prin-
ciple of right and morality'.345 Gladwyn Jebb, then a member of the British delegation 
in San Francisco, was amused that Smuts should be 'particularly concerned' with the 
preambular 'passage about promoting social progress and better standards of life "in 
larger freedom"', 346 wording which appears only in the preamble as adopted and for 
which he was not directly responsible. Even more telling, though, is the wording for 
which he was responsible. He wanted the UN to declare its 'faith in basic human rights, 
in the sacredness, essential worth and integrity of the human personality', and express 
belief 'in the equal rights of individuals' and in the 'enlargement of freedom and the 
promotion of social progress and in raising the standards of life'. 
343 Egeland, Bridges of Understanding, p. 167. 
344 HA Deb., Vol. 52. 22 March 1945, Cols. 3983-84. 
345 The Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1945. Half a generation previously the American press had idolised 
Smuts. See Spooner, United States policy toward South Africa, pp. 98-99. On the occasion of his 1929 
visit to the US one commentator wrote that from the 'remote and uncertain base of influence' 
represented by his membership of a nation numbering 'fewer white citizens than one-seventh of New 
York State', Smuts had 'stepped onto the stage of world events at their climax and influenced 
profoundly the destinies of mankind'. P.W. Wilson, 'Smuts, Son of Veldt, visits US', The New York 
Times, 29 December 1929, Section 9, p. 1. 
346 The Memoirs of Lord G/adwyn (London, 1972), p. 163. Also, BCM (45 ), 5th meeting, 6 April 
1945, pp. 11-12. 
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Strange sentiments for a white South African segregationist347 whose entire 
career suggested a sublime disbelief in the proposition that all men were created equal. 
(See page 383 above.) As he revealed in New York in 1946, the rights Smuts contem-
plated were rudimentary - 'the right to exist, the right to freedom of conscience, and 
freedom of speech, and the right of free access to the courts'. 348 Such as they were, 
they were overshadowed within two years by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 'the most widely recognized statement of the rights to which every person on 
our planet is entitled'.349 In retrospect one suspects that his motives had less to do with 
human rights than a desire to bask in the limelight. Observers saw him as 'a glamorous 
figure', an image he cultivated. (Why else did he wear uniform?) Virginia Gildersleeve 
remembered him 'still slender and straight in spite of his age, in his marshal's [sic] 
uniform with his decorations', urging the adoption of his preamble. With typical 
hyperbole he apparently described the occasion as 'the fulfilment of his dream and 
crowning achievement of his life'.35o 
347 See, for example, HA Deb .• Vol. 52, 22 March 1945, Col. 3985. 
348 GAOR, First Sess., Second Part, Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committee, 1st meeting, 
21 November 1946, pp. 3-4. 
349 R.N. Gardner, 'Eleanor Roosevelt's Legacy: Human Rights', The New York Times, 10 December 
1988, the fortieth anniversary of the declaration's adoption. Gardner was Professor of International 
Law at Columbia University, New York. 
35o Gildersleeve, Many a good crusade, p. 344. 
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Here ends this examination of Australian South African and Australian diplo-
matic relations between the mid- l 940s and the early 1960s. In initiating the relation-
ship the Australian government saw South Africa under Smuts as a normal Common-
wealth country with which the establishment of diplomatic relations was natural and 
desirable at a time when Australia was rapidly expanding the number of its over.seas 
missions. The tendency then and for some years was to regard South Africa as a vital 
link in Australia's communications with the United Kingdom. The Australians were 
accordingly also responsible for the airlink which first connected the two countries in 
1952. Then flown by propeller-driven aircraft, the air route led to the expansion of 
Australian territory· when the United Kingdom transferred to Australia sovereignty 
over the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean, eight hours flying time from 
Perth and an essential refuelling stop en route to Southern Africa. 
The wider context of the Australian initiative was the sense of isolation which 
has always characterised that country's perception of its place in the world. As Miller 
puts it, 'distance has played a large part in determining Australia's attitudes to external 
relations'. 1 Andrew Fisher's view in 1910 that, thanks to its geographic position, South 
Africa held for Australians the keys of East and West, remained valid until the 1960s. 
South Africa lies beside the Cape Route, one of Australia's two sea routes to the 
United Kingdom. (The Suez Canal is the other). Brief stopovers at Durban or Cape 
Town brought many influential Australians on their way to and from the· United 
Kingdom into contact with South Africa. 
More than sixteen thousand Australians joined the British Forces in South Af-
rica at the turn of the century, many settling there after the Anglo-Boer War. Blainey 
gives as 'a forgotten reason' for their enlistment the 'large colony of Australians' then 
living in the Transvaal who were 'deprived of the franchise and civic rights'. 2 By 1904 
more than five thousand Australians were living on the Witwatersrand, 3 several occu-
pying leadership positions in the trade unions, later in the newly-established South 
1 J.D.B. Miller, 'Australia in the Commonwealth: a troubled adjustment to a changing Common-
wealth', The Round Table, No. 240, November 1970, p.579. 
2 G. Blainey, 'The men before Anzac', The Herald (Melbourne), 25 April 1986. 
3 B. Kennedy. A Tale of Two Mining Cities: Johannesburg and Broken Hill 1885-1925 (Melbourne, 
1984), p. 2. 
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African Labour Party.4 Even before the war, by May 1896, around five thousand 
Australians were thought to be living on the Rand, attracted on the one hand by the 
lure of gold which had been discovered by the Australian George Harrison ten years 
before5 and propelled on the other by the prevailing recession in Australia. There were 
so many Australians on the Rand that 'all Australia was thrown into a state of anxiety' 
for their safety as a result of the 'appalling dynamite disaster in Johannesburg' on 19 
February of that year.6 
By contrast, Australia was not on the road to anywhere for South Africans and 
few ever visited it except for a specific purpose. There were but a handful of South 
African ministerial visits from the time of Union up to the 1960s, indeed up to the early 
1990s. F.H.P. Creswell stood in for Hertzog at Canberra's inauguration as Australian 
federal capital on 9 May 192 7 and at the opening of the Parliament Building. Creswell 
had Australian connections: his elder brother William was the founder of the Australian 
Navy. 7 HG. Lawrence attended the Commonwealth Conference on the Japanese 
Peace Settlement in Canberra in August 1947.8 S.P. le Roux represented the govern-
ment at the Jubilee Celebrations in Canberra in 1951 later touring part of Australia by 
car. And P. Sauer and B.J. Schoeman went to Australia on inaugural flights in 1952 
and 195 7 respectively. 
The Australian feeling of isolation quite likely also contributes to the greater in-
terest in foreign policy questions evident among Australian scholars than among their 
South African counterparts. Likewise, if Australia is largely a closed book to South 
Africans, some Australians have written significant works on South African themes. 
Probably the best-known example is W.K. Hancock's two-volume biography of Smuts 
and the four volumes of Smuts's papers he edited with Dr Jean van der Poel besides the 
article and lecture spin-offs from his research. In 1965 Geoffrey Blainey published (or 
4 See Kennedy, op. cit., p. 22 and D. Ticktin, The Origins of the South African Labour Party 1888-
1910 (Unpublished PhD. Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1973), pp. 15-21, 73-76 for information 
about Australians, or men with Australian backgrounds, active in South African labour politics. 
5 E.L. & J. Gray, A History of the Discovery of the Witwatersrand Gold.fields (Johannesburg, 1940). 
Preface. 
6 The Star (Johannesburg), 6 May 1896, Australian Notes. The fact that The Star ran a regular series 
of Australian Notes, covering all the states and New Zealand, is suggestive of numbers. See The Star 
of 13 January, 4 February and 4 April 1896. 
7 See their respective entries in ADB, Vol. 8, pp. 145-4 7 and DSAB, Vol. I pp. 187-89. 
8 An account of the conference including the opening and closing addresses is given in Current Notes, 
Vol. 18, No. 7, August 1947, pp. 433-52. 
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as Denoon puts it, 'intervened dramatically in South African historiography')9 the 
seminal article 'Lost Causes of the Jameson Raid' which argued that the Raid was 
mounted for economic and financial rather than political reasons. 10 
Ignorance of Australia among South African academics is surpassed only by 
public ignorance. A newspaper columnist wrote of a visit by an Australian trade dele-
gation at the end of 1993: 'They went home at the tour's end amazed by our hostility 
and lack of knowledge about Australia. South Africans, they said, gave the impression 
that they blamed Australia single-handedly for sanctions. Nor could they believe how 
little South Africans knew about Australia. '11 
Perceptions of Australia's communications needs as well as sentiment therefore 
superseded John Curtin's commonsense view in 1941 that 'the expense involved' in 
establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa on a residential basis 'would not be 
justified by the work involved'. If that test were applied to diplomatic relations in gen-
eral, there would be fewer world-wide and those that remained would be more cost 
effective. For nothing has happened to contradict Smuts's 1930 view of South African 
diplomatic representation that it was 'going to be a very expensive thing'. It was then 
and is now. 
It is sobering to contemplate the small sizes of the British Foreign Office and 
Diplomatic Service on the eve of the First World War, a time when the United 
Kingdom was a Great Power. The diplomatic services maintained by the other Great 
Powers of the day were similarly sized. Steiner's view that changing international cir-
cumstances were responsible for the relatively gargantuan diplomatic establishments 
maintained today even by powers far from Great, is superficial and requires elabora-
tion. 
At least in developed countries the matter of their diplomatic representation is 
often drawn into the domestic political debate as are the standards diplomats are 
required to maintain while performing their duties abroad. These tend to be tied up 
with perceptions of the national prestige. Even so, while governments do not generally 
allow money to stand in the way of that, few can afford (or desire) to maintain their 
9 Denoon, 'The isolation of Australian history', Historical Studies, Vol. 22, No. 87, October 1986, p. 
266. 
IO Economic History Review, second series, Vol. XVIII, 1965, pp. 350-66. 
11 Chris Gibbons in The Star (Johannesburg), 5 February 1994. 
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diplomats in the baronial splendour of the past. Developing countries are especially less 
fortunately situated. 
Those representing the newer and poorer ones may find themselves in the posi-
tion of the Eritrean Charge d'Affaires at the United Nations whose government contri-
butes $US 800 monthly towards his subsistence and who is 'diplomat, administrator, 
and secretary' to himself A typical day sees him boarding 'the G [subway] train to his 
modest midtown [Manhattan] office, where his duties are multiple: debating disarma-
ment or human rights as one of his country's representatives at the United Nations; or 
typing, filing and answering the phone'. 12 Some governments cannot afford even that. 
Inheritors of the British civil service tradition, the Australian and South African 
Departments of External Affairs kept their diplomats on a relatively tight rein finan-
cially during the period under consideration. Viljoen probably suffered the most in that 
regard and Hamilton the least. The Australians would have been surprised to learn that 
meeting the 1956 South African rugby team on arrival in Sydney was not considered a 
worthy objective of official expenditure. Perhaps that was because the South African 
department was less conscious than the Australian one of the value of sport as an arm 
of diplomacy. 
The composition of a country's foreign service is also affected by domestic 
political considerations. That applies as much to the ostensible democratisation of the 
British foreign service in the course of the present century as it does to the various 
mergers and fusions which produced the South African and Australian foreign services 
as they are today. The following recent broadside suggests that the British service may 
not have been sufficiently democratised: 
An elite corps should not have been left to perpetuate itself, 
untouched and unchallenged by the anti-establishment social revo-
lution of the Thatcher years. Above all, the Foreign Office's privi-
leged position matters because it fosters illusion. Grand people 
who live in grand places at the grand expense of others will inevi-
tably spend time thinking grand thoughts. Any coincidence 
between these and Britain's real interests will be largely acci-
dental.13 
12 J. Sexton, 'For Many Who Serve, No Room for Pomp', The New York Times, 22 October 1995, p. 1. 
13 
'Punched out', The Economist, Vol. 334, No. 7907, 25 March 1995, p. 48. (Bagehot). Refer also to 
Bruce Lockhart's view of the Foreign Office. Chapter One above, p. 51. 
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Down the years the Australian and South African services, particularly the for-
mer, have been at pains to deny charges of elitism. They were more susceptible to 
charges of anti-feminism and, of course, racism, particularly in the case of South Africa 
from whose service non-whites were excluded altogether. Before, during and after the 
period 1945-61, the South African Public Service Commission and Department of 
External Affairs prohibited the appointment of female foreign service officers. Though 
their gender did not automatically disqualify Australian women from serving as diplo-
mats, they were in practice recruited only during the term of the Labor government 
(1941-49). The Liberal Party-Country Party coalition discontinued the practice during 
its lengthy period of office ( 1949-72). 
The current reconstruction of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs 
is designed to have it better reflect the composition of the country's population. 
Reconstructions or rationalisations of that nature are driven by the exigencies of 
domestic politics rather than by the needs of efficiency or of the international situation. 
That was the case with the department's absorption of the Department of Information 
in the late 1970s. In that sense the South African foreign service mirrors the country's 
domestic politics not to mention its social mores. The concern of the 1950s with 
'mixed' dancing at diplomatic receptions and the suspicion with which the ideals of the 
Moral Re-Armament Movement were beheld have given way to other preoccupations. 
. Similar changes of attitude no doubt occur in all foreign services which also reflect 
their societies at large. 
Diplomats are required to deal with the political, economic and social elites in 
the countries where they are stationed and have to be acceptable to them. A candid-
ate's acceptability has always featured prominently among the selection criteria applied 
by the Australian and South African departments. In nineteenth century European dip-
lomatic services it was a sine qua non that a country's representatives should be drawn 
from the same social strata as the power-wielders with whom they were dealing. The 
German Kaiser would drop in on the British Ambassador in the course of his morning 
rides; Robert Menzies would call unannounced on Anthony Hamilton. To this writer's 
knowledge, no other South African representative has ever found himself in so felici-
tous a position professionally. If not responsible for it, the Hamilton/Menzies friend-
ship quite likely confirmed Menzies in his liking for white South Africans. 
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Unlike his predecessors, Hamilton enjoyed the advantage of living in a resi-
dence situated between the Prime Minister's Lodge and the Parliament building, within 
walking distance of both and probably not more than five minutes from the first-men-
tioned. The absence of a defined Embassy Row in South Africa as well as the larger 
size of Pretoria and Cape Town, made such 'cosiness' unknown to diplomats in South 
Africa. If not working against them, the nature of Pretoria and Cape Town was not 
especially advantageous to foreign diplomats. 
Menzies unquestionably facilitated the work of South African High Commis-
sioners in Canberra, an advantage not necessarily understood by the South African 
authorities. While the last word has yet to be pronounced on this - one awaits Volume 
Two of the Menzies biography - from the early days of his second Prime Ministership 
his actions showed Menzies to be sympathetic towards white South Africa. The par-
ticular context was keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth. His hand is evident in 
the arrangements for Boydell's controversial talks to Australian schools in 1959. Even 
during the furore generated in Australia by the Sharpeville shootings, Menzies held that 
the matter was a domestic one for South Africa. He was assailed for that domestically 
and internationally. Some of his Cabinet colleagues and especially some of his diplo-
mats, were harder headed and more realistic. Menzies conceivably held the Australian 
government back from adopting a less pro-South African posture after South Africa 
left the Commonwealth than was actually the case. 
That was to occur when the Whitlam Labor government (1972-75) took office. 
From that day until recently Australian/South African bilateral relations were in a state 
of decline. On the other hand, even the frosty political relationship from the mid- l 970s 
to the mid- l 990s which was conducted at the highest diplomatic level, that of Ambas-
sador, was preferable from the South African government's point of view to no rela-
tionship at all. 
Researchers into diplomatic activity in early postwar Canberra are helped by 
the'one-horse', 'company town' nature of the city in those days. With truth did the first 
home-based woman clerk attached to the South African High Commission, Miss J.M. 
Richards, observe of 1951 Canberra: 
[It] is ... very little more than a village, and if one has to stay here 
without a break for any length of time life becomes tedious. If one 
can afford to spend an occasional weekend in Sydney or Mel-
bourne one's attitude towards life in Canberra is certainly a hap-
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pier one. The shops here are quite inadequate, and for this reason 
as well it is necessary to visit the cities once or twice a year. 14 
Canberra's sole newspaper, The Canberra Times, then owned and edited by the 
Shakespeare family, 15 took an interest in diplomats and its 'Canberra Diary' column is 
an excellent guide to what they were doing. From it we learn, for example, that Gert 
Nel made his residence available to the Australian Institute of International Affairs for 
a reception it gave Julian Huxley in 1953.16 The following year the diary reported that 
Heather Menzies, the Prime Minister's daughter, gave a farewell party at The Lodge 
for Rae Killen and his wife and one or two others on the occasion of their departure 
from Canberra. 11 
The newspaper's sports columns tell us that Killen turned out regularly for the 
University 'B' Hockey team; that Nel and Killen were members of the Wanderers 
Cricket team, which was composed of diplomats; that Nel improved his standing as a 
golfer at the Royal Canberra Golf Club from B grade to A grade; and that Colin 
Roberts was a high-scoring shot at the Canberra Rifle Club besides being on its com-
mittee and chairing its social club. 18 Olivier was once accorded the headline 'Olivier To 
Lead A.C. T. In Country Week'19 and in April 1958 Rhoodie was a 'danger man' to the 
cadets of the Royal Military College: 'Last week he cut the Forestry School defence to 
pieces and made repeated openings for the rest of the backs'.20 
Pretoria and Cape Town were not 'one horse towns' with a single newspaper 
dependent on the activities of diplomats to fill its social columns. It is therefore impos-
sible to build a profile of Australian diplomats in South Africa equivalent to that of the 
South Africans in Canberra. Indicating the nature of the city, most Canberra housing 
including diplomatic housing was in the gift of the federal government. Even heads of 
missions were housed by the Department of the Interior unless and until their own 
governments built them residences. That was not the case in Cape Town or Pretoria 
and diplomats were not thrown into each other's company there to the same degree as 
in Canberra. By 1960, however, Canberra's sense of diplomatic intimacy was receding. 
14 BTS, S4/5/45, Vol. 2, Miss Richards/Viljoen, 15 May 1951. 
15 The Canberra Times, 12 March 1963. ('City Foundation Was The Times' Genesis'). 
16 Ibid., 18 November 1953. , 
11 Ibid., 24 February 1954. 
18 He seems to have given his dislike of the social side of the job as a reason for his decision to resign 
from the South African Department of External Affairs. 
19 15 April 1957. 
2o 24 April 1958. 
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In October of that year The Canberra Times estimated that the city had 'a diplomatic 
population of between 800 and 1,000, representing 27 countries'. 21 
The period covered by this thesis was in some ways rather more innocent and 
unsophisticated than the present one. Even at the height of the furore in Australia over 
the Sharpeville shootings, individual diplomats were not the targets they became later. 
Their names, addresses and telephone numbers appeared in the diplomatic list. (That 
was not South African practice.) Not only that, but when Colin Roberts arrived in 
1954 The Canberra Times reported his future home address - 21 Favenc Circle, Grif-
fith. 22 It had been Killen's before him as well as Nel's until he moved into the official 
residence. 
P.R. Viljoen, Eschel Rhoodie and Anthony Hamilton were alone among South 
Africans in Canberra to make their mark outside the narrow confines of the South 
African Department of External Affairs. 23 However, the ranks of the Australian 
diplomats in South Africa during the period contained names who were, or were to 
become, famous in Australian administrative, diplomatic and even political history. The 
first High Commissioner, Sir George Knowles, was a longtime Solicitor-General and 
head of the Attorney-General's department. The second, Alfred Stirling, was at the 
time of his appointment one of the most senior External Affairs officials. And the third, 
Lt Col W.R. Hodgson, officially headed the Australian department for ten years, 
effectively serving in that capacity for nine. 
Apart from them, J.P. Quinn was at the time considered a most promising 
young officer. K. T. Kelly had interesting extra-departmental connections and departed 
this life accompanied as it were by a blaze of glory. J.C.G. Kevin was the first 
Australian diplomatic officer to head the department's administrative branch. Had it not 
been for his death at the early age of fifty-eight in 1968 he could conceivably have 
progressed higher in the department. One Australia's few women diplomats of the day, 
Elizabeth Ann Warren, commenced her brief overseas career in South Africa, being 
21 4October1960. 
22 The Canberra Times, 28 July 1954. Commonwealth of Australia. Department of Ext~rnal Affairs. 
Diplomatic Representatives in Australia, June 1951, p. 15; September 1953, p. 22; and January, 1955, 
p. 21. The Russian defector Petrov lived at 7 Lockyer Street, Griffith. Ibid., September, 1953, p. 23. 
23 Although he rose to head it, Rae Killen was hardly known outside it. On one occasion during his 
term even a government-supporting newspaper misspelled both his Christian name and surname, 
calling him Ray Kilian! 
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replaced by R.A. Woolcott. He in turn ended a distinguished foreign seivice career in 
1992 with three-and-a-half years as permanent head of the department. 
The Australian government initially overestimated the importance of its rela-
tions with South Africa. From their side the South Africans were insufficiently inter-
ested to engage immediately in an exchange of High Commissioners, to Australia's 
embarrassment. By the time the South African government came to appreciat~ the 
connection's value, South Africa had become controversial internationally and an 
embarrassment to its Western interlocutors. At the United Nations the latter found 
themselves having to balance the voting support they rendered South Africa and the 
criticism this drew from Afro-Asian countries with the need for South Africa's vote in 
Cold War confrontations. 
That was a time when the United States and its Western and Latin American 
supporters enjoyed a numerical majority over the Communist bloc and its Afro-Asian 
supporters. The UN was then an instrument of United States foreign policy. It had 
ceased to be so by the early 1960s with the large influx of African members. The 
writing was, however, on the wall after the so-called 1955 compromise which changed 
the organisation's character from one of like-minded states to one exemplifying the 
principle of universality. The 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-aligned States had 
pressed for United Nations universality and may therefore have played a part in 
bringing about the change of attitude. 
The South African government's basic problem at the United Nations was that 
it was out of step from the beginning, with the numbers against it in an organisation 
whose proceedings are characterised by their pseudo-parliamentary nature. (In the 
General Assembly majority votes determine which issues succeed and which do not.) 
The British and the Australians were the most supportive of the South African position 
among the old (white) Commonwealth. However, after a decade and a half they con-
cluded that they should save their own positions whereupon they distanced themselves 
from South Africa. What led to their change of policy was the UN's changing compo-
sition and their own potential marginalisation rather than the human rights aspects 
highlighted by Sharpt;ville. 
Whether or not the South African delegation played a role in securing the 
inclusion in the UN Charter of Article 2(7) which ostensibly prohibited the organisa-
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tion from intervening matters within a member state's domestic jurisdiction - and it was 
argued that its role was minimal - South Africa claimed the protection of the article 
more than any other country in United Nations history. The Australian delegation's 
contribution to the wording of the article was made necessary by its work to broaden 
the scope and powers of the General Assembly. The South African case on the domes-
tic jurisdiction principle, which was initially supported and encouraged by its Western 
interlocutors, was that the state invoking it had the exclusive right to decide what 
matters fell within its domestic jurisdiction. UN practice contradicted that assumption 
from the beginning. For most of the 1950s the Australian position on Article 2(7) 
coincided with the South African one. 
Their contemporary reporting from the United Nations shows that while the 
Australians considered themselves obliged to surrender to the pressure of numbers, 
they remained sceptical about the pretensions of South Africa's opponents. Plimsoll's 
report on the debate in the General Assembly leading to the adoption of resolution 
1514(XV) on the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples' is an example. He dismissed Ghanaian assertions of having brought 'the 
ancient wisdom of Africa' to UN counsels: 'the truth is of course that the ancient 
wisdom of Africa consists of cannibalism and witchcraft'. However, it was not 
politic for representatives of the colonial powers to prick these 
balloons ... and the myths are being allowed to develop. Indeed the 
flattery being accorded to African delegations on all sides may be 
giving them a wrong impression of their importance and an 
unjustified complacency about their own standards. 24 
At the commencement of the diplomatic relationship and for some years, Aus-
tralian representatives in South Africa conceived of it as their job to develop favour-
able white South African perceptions of Australia. In 1952 J.P Quinn commented with 
satisfaction that South African Cabinet interest in Australia had been 'quickened' as a 
result of S.P. le Roux's attendance of the Jubilee celebrations the previous year.25 Paul 
Sauer's visit as Qantas's guest in September 1952, especially his perception that here 
was another bastion of white civilisation, would have quickened it further. There fol-
lowed Menzies's six day visit to South Africa in July 1953. Apart from only two 
24 AA, A4231/2, UN, New York, 1961, Despatch 1/61, Plimsoll/Menzies, 24 February 1961, paras. 2-
3. 
25 /.A, Al838/2, 716/50/1/7, Pt. 2, No. 5152, Quinn/Casey, 25 April 1952. The original is on 
A423 l/2, South Africa 1952. 
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'discordant notes'26 Hodgson called the visit 'an outstanding success' in 'every possible 
way'. It was 'a very good thing for the morale and spirit of South Africa that Mr. 
Menzies was able to make even such a flying trip'. Menzies's speeches were much 
admired, attracting the 'most glowing testimonials from all shades of political 
opinion'. 27 
The objective of stimulating South African government interest in Australia 
diminished in importance as South Africa became more controversial internationally. 
Four years after Menzies's visit the prospect of B.J. Schoeman visiting Australia on the 
occasion of an inaugural flight was a matter of concern to Gilchrist, the Acting High 
Commissioner. He was also disturbed by Hodgson's proposal, at the time of his retire-
ment that Prime Minister Strijdom should visit Australia. For Gilchrist both proposals 
were unacceptable in the context of the coming 1958 South African general election 
because he thought they could influence voter opinion in favour of the government. 
Apart from his own inclinations, he was not unlikely reinforced in his attitudes by the 
views of his contacts in opposition circles. 
A later parallel was the instruction the British High Commissioner, Sir John 
Maud, issued to his officials early in his term. He told them to desist from letting it be 
known that whether or not South Africa became a republic was a matter of purely 
South African concern. That horrified the opposition and was seen as sabotage of their 
efforts to keep South Africa a monarchy. 
One of the objects of this study was to give South Africans an historian's per-
spective on what real foreign service officers or diplomats did in a given historical 
context and thereby, by analogy, what diplomats do in general. The object was to 
dispel the impression fostered by political scientists, perhaps because of the nature of 
their discipline and of their sources, of the diplomat as a cog in a well-oiled machine 
turning out considered and well-rounded policies in pursuit of a defined national in-
terest. The study may have succeeded in that. Where it may not have succeeded, 
though, is in dispelling notions of diplomacy as a glamorous profession whose mem-
bers engage in 'social pursuits of doubtful value'. Even so, the aforementioned Eritrean 
26 Malan's reference to India and Havenga's reference to the United States and the gold price when he 
proposed a toast at a dinner Hodgson hosted for Menzies. Hodgson seemed to regard the second inci-
dent as more important than the first. 
27 AA, Al838/2, 201/10/1111, Hodgson/Minister for External Affairs, 4 August 1953, paras. 6, 8. 
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in New York with his multiple duties and low income may be more representative of 
the average modern diplomat than is generally thought. 
If for Western diplomats the rationale of the diplomatic cocktail party or 
reception is to serve as a clearing house for information, many of the invited (and 
uninvited) guests are probably unaware of that. They would see their presence, and 
probably rightly, as testimony to their standing in the community. For diplomatic par-
ties are not confined to diplomats. Outside of parties given by delegations at the United 
Nations, most of the guests will probably be non-diplomats, particularly nationals of 
the host country. What should not be discounted is the 'expectation factor' - diplomats 
entertain because it is expected of them. Walter Crocker abolished National Day 
receptions. His successors restored them quite likely because they lacked the strength 
of will to resist local expectations. On the other hand, at least some developing country 
diplomats lead lives of 'unpretentious ordinariness', not giving parties at all. 28 
The cocktail party or reception provides Western critics of the diplomatic life-
style with a symbol too convenient to discard. The debate in the United Kingdom in 
1995 about containing Foreign and Commonwealth Office expenditure attracted head-
lines such as 'Diplomats on last round of cocktails?',29 'Embassies to lose luxurious life-
style'30 and 'Pass along the lemonade, Jeeves'. 31 Even The Pretoria News gleefully 
announced the speedy end of the 'caviar-and-champagne lifestyle of British diplomats 
abroad', what it also called 'high living at the taxpayers' expense'.32 South African di-
plomacy has drawn such recent headlines as 'SA party animals flourish in Paris 
embassy'33 and 'Let's have no more lizards lounging on cocktail circuit'.34 Similar head-
lines are likely to catch the eye in developed countries for as long as diplomacy lasts. 
Richard Casey tried unsuccessfully to dispose of the cocktail party forty years ago; Ri-
chard Woolcott attempted the same in 1988 at his first press conference as Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs and Trade,35 to similar lack of effect. 
28 Sexton, 'For Many Who Serve, No Room for Pomp', The New York Times, 22 October 1995, p. 12. 
29 The Herald (Glasgow), 3 July 1995. 
30 The Sunday Times (London), 26 March 1995. 
3! The Star (Johannesburg), 27 March 1995. 
32 The Pretoria News, 27 March 1995. 
33 Business Day (Johannesburg), 14 March 1995. 
34 
'Business Report', The Star/Pretoria News, 23 May 1995. 
35 RA. Woolcott, 'Press Conference by the New Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Mr Richard Woolcott, Canberra, 6 September 1988', World Review (Australia), Vol. 27, No. 
4, December 1988, p. 37. 
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Political developments open up career opportunities for officials. The impact 
on the careers of individual Information Officers of the merger between the Depart-
ments of Information and Foreign Affairs in the late 1970s was touched on in Chapter 
Five. United Nations consideration of the South African issue provided upwardly 
mobile South African officials such as G.P. Jooste, D.B. Sole B.G. Fourie, J.S.F. 
Botha and R.F. Botha with excellent career opportunities. All five made their names at 
General Assembly sessions or, if not there, in Pretoria as in R.F. Botha's case; or poth 
in New York and Pretoria in connection with UN work. The South West Africa ques-
tion was central to the rise of Jooste, Sole, Fourie and RF. Botha. J.S.F. Botha took 
charge of the Permanent Mission during the two year period of token representation 
between 1956 and 1958. The careers of these officials also testify to the relevance to 
diplomacy of A.J.P. Taylor's 'dictum' about patrons, not so much in the sense that 
'when you lose your patron you are done for', 36 but that patrons are indispensable for 
advancement in the first place. 
On the Australian side, J. Plimsoll would have consolidated the reputation he 
had already made for himself in Canberra, during his term as Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations. Menzies commended his handling of the 1961 proposal to strike 
Eric Louw's general debate statement from the record followed by the motion of cen-
sure: 'Mr Plimsoll, greatly to his credit, went to the rostrum and spoke against this 
proposal. ... I was proud of him. I thought it was an admirable attitude and an admir-
able speech on his part, particularly as he had had no opportunity to consult with us at 
all. . . . I want to say deliberately that in both of those matters Mr Plimsoll represented 
this country with great dignity and immense common sense'.37 Four years later Plimsoll 
was Secretary for External Affairs, a post he held for five years before resuming his 
Ambassadorial career abroad. He became Governor of Tasmania after his retirement as 
an official. 
The South African issue also boosted careers in the UN Secretariat. One who 
benefited was an Indian national, Enuga Sreenivasulu Reddy. A graduate in math-
ematics from the University of Madras in 1943, Reddy joined the Secretariat in May 
1949 after graduating from New York University the previous year with an MA in 
international relations. Twenty-two of ~s thirty-six years as a Secretariat official were 
spent servicing the South African liberation struggle. 38 In 1963 he entered on the 
36 See Chapter One above, p. 78. 
37 BTS, 136/2/29, Vol. 3, Woodward/Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 19 October 1961. 
38 Reddy CV. 
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ground floor of what came to be known to the target government's officials as the anti-
apartheid industry when the General Assembly set up a 'Special committee on the 
policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa'.39 
Reddy hints of the extent of his role in his Introduction to Anti-Apartheid 
Movement and the United Nations. 40 If it is accepted that the United Nations as an 
organisation made a contribution to the demise of apartheid, then Reddy was quite 
likely the Secretariat official whose personal contribution was of more than passing 
significance. Future historians would do well to examine it. He once told this writer 
that he had a hand in drafting most resolutions adopted at international gatherings on 
the subject of apartheid. Not only meetings of United Nations bodies but also of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).41 
This scrutiny of a handful of South African and Australian diplomats within a 
given historical context has not contradicted the writer's impression that a top British 
Ambassador at the height of his powers outclasses most others. 42 Certainly he has seen 
nothing among the archival records of the Australian and South African Departments 
of External Affairs to rival the quality of Sir Nicholas Henderson's 'valedictory des-
patch' from Paris on the occasion of his retirement from the British foreign service in 
March 1979. 43 This addressed the theme of Britain's decline in the world. Among its 
virtues is that it is relatively easily accessible. Sent to the then Secretary of State, the 
Labour Party's David Owen, it was published a month later by The Economist44 where, 
it has been said, Mrs Thatcher read it. 
39 Resolution 1761 (XVII), 6 November 1962, operative paragraph 5. Resolution 3324 D (XXIX) , 16 
December 1974, operative paragraph 11, renamed it the Special Committee against Apartheid. 
40 E.S. Reddy, ed., Anti-Apartheid Movement and the United Nations: Statements, papers and letters 
of Abdul S. Minty, honorary secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and director of the 
World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, New Delhi, 1994, 
pp. vii-xviii. In 1995 Minty was appointed Deputy Director-General (Multilateral) in the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs. 
41 In May 1995 the University of Durban-Westville awarded Reddy an honorary doctorate. See the 
Sunday Tribune (Durban), 28 May 1995. (E. Naidu, 'Still fighting on'.) 
42 Perhaps by virtue of the calibre of the people selected. 
43 I am indebted to Sir Brian Barder, formerly United Kingdom High Commissioner to Australia, for 
drawing my attention to this despatch and for sending me a copy. According to Sir Brian (e-mail mes-
sage, 22 September 1995) valedictory despatches are usually 'a retrospective look at the country which 
the author is just about to leave, and its relations with Britain, how British interests have fared under 
his or her stewardship, and so on. It's comparatively rare to write in the sort of terms that Nicko Hen-
derson did about "Britain's place in the sun".' 
44
'Sir Nicholas Henderson's valedictory despatch', The Economist, 2 June 1979, pp. 29-30, 33-34, 38-
40. 
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She is said to have been impressed and, on the strength of it, recalled Hen-
derson from retirement after her victory in the 1979 British general election, appointing 
him Ambassador to the United States. Whether or not this is a true account of the cir-
cumstances of his appointment, there is no denying that from the United Kingdom's 
point of view Henderson was the right man in the right place when Argentina invaded 
the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) less than two years later. His recently published dia-
ries45 should be recommended reading for all new Ambassadors irrespective of coun-
try. No matter if he was atypical of British diplomats as a whole. The standards he set 
are worthy of emulation by all. Of particular relevance in the present context was his 
use of the media as an arm of his diplomacy. 
The present comparison between the Australian and South African Depart-
ments of External Affairs within the same time-frame has given perspective to both. 
There were similarities as well as differences, not least in respect of the two countries' 
approach to diplomatic service. These reflected attitudes in their wider societies. The 
South African department was established in 1927; the Australian department to all 
intents and purposes in 1935. Australia opened its first overseas missions in 1940, 
eleven years after the first South African missions. Paradoxically, however, the devel-
opment of the South African department lagged behind that of the Australian depart-
ment. 
The Prime Minister's dual position between June 1927 and January 1955 as 
Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs was responsible for that. The Aus-
tralian department operated independently of the Prime Minister under its own minister 
from 1935. To all intents and purposes the early postwar period marked the real 
beginnings of Australian diplomacy as well as a bend in the road for South African di-
plomacy as South African diplomats found themselves in the unexpected position of 
encountering the wind from the front. While Australian diplomacy went from strength 
to strength, South African diplomacy declined. 
Smuts, the international visionary, had a braking effect both on the develop-
ment of the South African department and on the conduct of the Union's foreign rela-
tions in the critical early post-war period which saw th~ creation of the United Nations. 
The department came more into its own under Malan before achieving a measure of 
fulfilment under Eric Louw (in the sense of living a less hand-to-mouth existence). The 
45 N. Henderson, Mandarin: The Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969-1982. London, 1994. 
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Smuts government's relations with the United Nations set the pattern for those of its 
successor: by the time the National Party took office in 1948 relations were set in 
concrete and nothing short of a radical reversal of domestic policy would have enabled 
South Africa to harmonise its relations with the organisation. 
However irascible and abrasive in his dealings with foreigners, Louw was a 
good departmental minister, a fighter for his department in cabinet and loyal to its per-
sonnel. 46 Having been the country's first head of mission abroad in the 1920s, he was a 
founder of the South African foreign service and he always took an interest in its 
development. As shown by his instructions to the 1956 inspection mission, 47 he was 
knowledgeable in administrative matters. For the Australian department, however, 
Evatt, who was Minister of External Affairs from 1941 to 1949, was not an unmixed 
blessing. For one thing he was also Attorney-General (Minister of Justice), a portfolio 
to which some people felt he accorded priority even while he was serving as President 
of the United Nations General Assembly.48 Then, his personality, working methods and 
style caused unhappiness to most External Affairs officers who came into contact with 
him. 
The modus operandi of the Australian department as well as the practical 
effects of its personnel policy were to some extent superior to those of the South 
African department. Even if it were not a conscious policy at the time, the number and 
variety of postings most of its officials enjoyed pointed to a measure of career plan-
ning. The South Africans operated on a more ad hoc basis. South African officials of 
the day could well have been glad to have the opportunities open to, say, O.L. Davis 
and R.A. Woolcott who served in many more posts (of shorter duration) than they did. 
By the time Nel left Australia he had been in Canberra longer than any other diplomat 
except the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps49 (a position which almost automatically 
accrues to the longest serving head of mission). Perhaps because of the Labor tradi-
tion, the Australians took a greater interest in their junior personnel. In any case, they 
46 The Sunday Times (Johannesburg) headline (3 June 1973) 'Louw did not flinch, even from Ver-
woerd', was well-chosen. 
47 BTS, S4/5/2, Vol. 18, 'Proposed inspection of the Union's foreign missions by the Chief Public 
Service Inspector, Mr J.P.B. van Veen and Mr W.G.W. Parminter, formerly Minister for the Union in 
Paris'. 
48 See, for example, Edwards, Australia through American eyes, p. 95. 
49 The Canberra Times, 15 December 1954. ('Canberra Diary'). 
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displayed some humanity in dealing with them. The practice of notifying the next of kin 
of officials and wives of their safe arrival at a post was a nice touch. 50 
In at least two respects the new South African department could usefully emu-
late the Australian one. Firstly, it could establish its own regular publication or journal 
akin to Current Notes on International Affairs or the Australian Foreign Affairs 
Record in which authoritative articles by members of the department and outside 
experts could be published as well as the texts of ministerial statements, reports on 
conferences etc. Down the years the above journals, especially the first-mentioned, 
which was of high quality, have enhanced the Australian department's status in the eyes 
of its interlocutors including Members of the Commonwealth Parliament for whom it 
was originally intended to provide a service.5 1 In its early years Current Notes provided 
the department with a sense of coherence and helped it prove its worth. In fact, it 
proved of inestimable value to the department in its formative years. It has been 
claimed that Current Notes 'did much to establish an informed public opinion'52 in 
respect of Australia's foreign relations. The new South African department needs a 
vehicle similarly to imprint itself positively upon the consciousness of a critical media, 
parliament and public. 
Secondly, the department could create an historical documents unit. This could 
also consist of two wings: a Documents Section and an Information Section. The first 
would prepare selections of documents relating to South Africa's foreign relations for 
publication. The second section could play the role of Millar's 'proper research organi-
sation to provide regular, up-to-the-minute as well as background analyses',53 thereby 
addressing the traditional problem of a lack of continuity. The recent establishment of 
such an organisation within the Australian Historical Documents Branch presumably 
satisfies the need Millar identified in respect of the Australian department as far back as 
1968. 
Some may argue that the new South Africa has no need of information about 
the foreign relations of the old. After all, that was 'bad' history. The writer believes, 
however, that there is no such thing as 'good' history or 'bad' history; only history that 
50 See the examples relating to Nicholson and Wallis on AA, A1838ffl 71, 1252/4/53 and 
1252/16/11. 
51 Heydon, Quiet Decision, p. 126. 
52 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 105. 
53 Millar, Australia's Foreign Policy, pp. 16-17. 
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is well-written or badly-written. There are lessons to be learned from the ancien 
regime's foreign relations if only in the sense, in some respects, of how not to go about 
things. The new department should help lift the veil on the country's foreign relations 
from their beginnings. That would be in keeping with the government's announced 
policy of openness and transparency. In any case, as Pienaar observed of the research 
for her study of South Africa and the League of Nations,54 and whether a matter of 
rejoicing or regret, the records are unlikely to contain any 'smoking guns'. The present 
writer found none during the course of his archival work on both sides of the Indian 
Ocean. 
54 Pienaar, South Africa and International Relations, Preface. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE STAFF OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONS 
AUSTRALIANS (1946-1962) 
Heads of Mission 
Sir George Shaw Knowles 2/9/19461- 23/1111947 (Deceased) High Commissioner 
A. T. Stirling 7 /8/1948 - 15/5/1950 High Commissioner 
Lt Col W.R. Hodgson 23/7/1952 - 3/7/1957 High Commissioner 
O.L. Davis 30/4/1959 - 15/611962 High Commissioner/Ambassador 
J.C.G. Kevin 2119/1962 - 13/2/1968 Ambassador (Deceased) 
Acting Heads of Mission 
M.H. Marshall 23/1111947 - 7/8/1948; 17/5/1950 - 23/4/1951 Acting High Commis-
sioner 
J.P. Quinn 23/4/1951 - 13/5/1952 Acting High Commissioner 
K.T. Kelly 2/4/1952 - 5/8/1952 Acting High Commissioner 
H. Gilchrist 4/7 /195 7 - 12/111959 Acting High Commissioner 
L.E. Phillips 211111959-29/4/1959 Acting High Commissioner 
N. St. C. Deschamps 1/11/1960 - 22/12/1960 Acting High Commissioner2 
J.H. Brook 16/6/1962 - 201911962 Charge d'Affaires 
No. 2s, 
O.C.W. Fuhrman 15/8/1946 - 111111946 Official Secretary 
M.H. Marshall 111111946 - 23/4/1951 Official Secretary 
K. T. Kelly 2/4/1952 - 261511955 First Secretary 
H. Gilchrist 22/511955 - 3/7/1957 First Secretary 
L.E. Phillips First Secretary 12/1/1959 - 9/9/1960 
J.H. Brook 9/9/1960 - 14/2/1964 Third Secretary/Second Secretary/ Acting First 
Secretary 
Third Secretaries/Second Secretaries 
M.J.S. Knowles 15/8/1946 - 1112/1948 Third Secretary 
1 The date of his meeting with the Acting Prime Minister, J.H. Hofmeyr. He had an audience with the 
Governor-General, G. Brand van Zyl, the next day to whom he expected to hand over his 'credentials'. 
AA, A4231/2, South Africa 1946, Despatch No. 1, 13 September 1946. Knowles and his party first 
touched South African soil when their ship, the s.s. Nestor arrived at Durban on 15 August. 
2 This was during Davis's leave and consultation visit to Australia. Deschamps was then Charge 
d'Affaires in Dublin. The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who 1994195, p. 167. 
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K. Desmond 10/9/1948 - 19/10/1951 Third Secretary/Second Secretary 
Miss E.A. Warren 23/11/1951 - 11/6/1954 Third Secretary 
R.A. Woolcott 3/6/1954 - 20/1/1957 Third Secretary/Second Secretary 
I.E. Nicholson 15/1/1957 - 23/9/1959 Third Secretary 
J.H. Brook 11/711960 - 9/9/1960 Third Secretary 
Trade3 
G.R.B. Patterson 28/5/1947 - 25/411953 
A.B. Millard 28/5/1947 - * 
A.G. Hard */1949 - 10 May 1950 (Deceased) 
E.E. Jarvis */1951 - * 
A.J. S. Day 6/111954 - */1956 
G.P.H. Knight* - */1955 
S.D. Shubart */1956 - */1960 
D.R. Cristofani */1955 - */12/1959 
J.L. Chapman */1960 - */1966 
Attaches 
Cape Town 
E.H. Hanfield 26/8/1953-15/3/1957 
S.A. Wallis 4/3/1957 - */1959 
N.M. Hocking 29/7/1959 - 22/10/1962 [The Cape Town Office was named a Consu-
late and Hocking designated Vice-Consul when South Africa became a Republic in 
1961] 
Pretoria 
W.J. Symington */1961 * 
Secretary-Typists 
Miss D.M.M. Bartlett 15/8/1946 - April 1948 
Miss S.A Richardson 4/9/1948-18111/1950 
Miss B.S. Tyler 2/1011952 - 7/5/1957 
Miss E.M. Thompson 30/4/1957 - */1959 
Miss M. Fay 21/9/1959 - */1962 
3 It was not possible to be more precise about dates. The gaps could no doubt have been filled if Mr 
Mervyn Knowles's detailed listing of all trade officers between 1933 and the early 1970s had not gone 
astray. M.J.S. Knowles, letter, 4 April 1995. 
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Locally-engaged Staff (50)4 
Miss C.M.G. Allan */1952 - * 
Miss Barlow */1952 - * 
Miss C. Barnes* 
Mrs S. Baron Aug/Sept 1959 - * Clerk-Archivist 
Mrs J. Barsdorf 1112/1959- 31112/1959 Stenographer-typist (Cape Town) (Part-time) 
Miss J. Bemhardi 1/6/1960 - *Typist (Cape Town) 
Miss M. Botha * /1961 - * 
Miss C. Brenell */1961 - * 
E.R. Bruce *I - 1948 
Miss J.M. Chase 1/7 /1953 - 31/3/1956 
Miss A. Craven * /1946 - * 
A. Cupido 112/1960 - * Driver/Messenger 
Miss B.P. Cutler 1110/1959 - *Clerk-Archivist 
G. de Lange */1946 - */1948 Chauffeur (Dismissed) 
Miss L. S. du Toit * /1952 - * 
Miss E. Faller 22/7/1957 - *Clerical Assistant 
Miss M.E.S. Gnodde 1952 
Miss D.M. Hall 22/7/1957 - 17/8/1957 Clerk-Archivist 
Miss J. MacG. Hall 1/7/1959 - *Typist 2 
Miss G. Harris * /1961 - * 
E. Herman 111211957 - *Chauffeur 
Miss N.H. Hiemstra 1110/1958 - 30/6/1959 Stenographer 
Miss K.M. Kelly * /1952 - * 
Miss E. Kinder */1952 - * 
D. Lehlohonolo */1952 - * 
Miss M.J. McCraw 1112/1952 - * Typist 1 
Mrs B. McKay */1961 -/* 
Miss C.M.L. Mellor 2/411956 - 30/6/1957 Stenographer [Resigned to marry R. Swart, 
MP] 
Miss D. Mitchell */1952 - * 
A. Mnquhevu */1961 - * 
Miss Mounsey */1948 - * 
4 Despite the best efforts of Mr Chris Taylor and Ms Moira Smythe of the Historical Documents 
Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra and of Mr John Pepper of the 
Australian Archives in the same city, it was not possible either to identify all the locally-engaged staff 
who worked in the Australian High Commission/Embassy over the period 1945-61 or to pin down the 
details of those whose names could be established; that is, apart from an outline of the duties of those 
listed on part B of the half yearly return required in terms of Circular C. 23 of 6 January 194 7. It is, 
however, thanks to Messrs Taylor and Pepper and Ms Smythe, and also to Messrs H. Gilchrist and 
M.J.S. Knowles, that the names of so many could be given. Messrs Gilchrist and Knowles supplied 
information about people with whom they were acquainted. Theoretically information in respect of 
both the South African and the Australian locally-recruited or locally-engaged staff is available in the 
South African Archives but one would not know where to start looking for it. Given their importance 
to the work of the Australian and South African offices during the period in question, I regret that I 
cannot be more specific about the local staff. Even so, 'their glory shall not be blotted out'. 
(Ecclesiasticus xliv.) 
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Mrs J. Murdock 1/7/1956- 31112/1956 Stenographer-typist (Cape Town) (Part-time) 
Mrs M.C. Murray 1/3/1955 - * Archivist 
J.A. Norris */1/1947 - */1948 
W. Ntwana */1961 - * 
Miss E.J. Oakes */1961 - * 
Mrs J. Ovendale *I 194 7 - * 
Mrs P.F. Sharp */1961 - * 
S. Singh 1-30/11/1957 Chauffeur-Messenger 
Mrs V.H. Skibbe (nee Wagner, married 11/8/1956) 1/7/1954 - 29/5/1957 Clerical 
Assistant (Accounts) 
Mrs C.N.I. South */1954 - *Trade Commission, Johannesburg 
Miss M.B. Stanley 29/7/1957 - 30/9/1958 Stenographer 
Miss J. Steyn * - 30/4/1959 Clerk-Archivist 
Miss S. Stuart */12/1946 - */1959 
Mrs I.M. Tait * - 14/9/1953 
Miss S.H.A. Thomson */1961 - * 
Miss Y. Tilemann 1/5/1959 - 15/8/1959 Clerk-Archivist 
H.E. van der Walt 1/10/1948 - 31/10/1957 Chauffeur 
Mrs Wallace-Jones 1/1/1958 - 30/6/1958; 1/7/1959 - 30/11/1959 Stenographer-typist 
(Cape Town) (Part-time) 
Miss G.M. Wheaton (exact dates unknown) 
SOUTH AFRICANS (1949-1962) 
Heads of Mission 
Dr P.R. Viljoen 10/6/1949 - 13/10/1951 High Commissioner 
J.K. Uys 11/3/1954 - 10/6/1957 High Commissioner 
A.AM. Hamilton 10/9/1957 - 5/3/1961 High Commissioner 
H.H. Woodward 20/4/1961 - 8/10/1964 High Commissioner/Ambassador 
Acting Heads of Mission 
G.C. Nel 13/10/1951 - 10/3/1954 Acting High Commissioner 
D.P. Olivier 10/6/1957 - 10/9/1957 Acting High Commissioner 
P.L.T. Snyman 5/3/1961 - 20/4/1961 
No. 2s 
G.C. Nel 7/6/1949 - 13/10/1951; 11/3/1954 - 23/12/1954 Second Secretary 
D.P. Olivier 11/1/1955 - 25/10/1958 Third Secretary/Second Secretary 
P.L.T. Snyman 10/1/1959 - 28111/1962 Second Secretary 
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Third Secretaries1Second Secretaries 
P.R. Killen 7/6/1949 - 9/4/1954 Cadet/Third Secretary 
C.R. Roberts Third Secretary 28/7/1954 - 30/6/1959 (Resigned) 
J.C. Bosch Third Secretary 5/3/1960 - */1964 
Information Officerss 
C.A. Smith 31/1211953-23/11/1956 (Deceased) 
E.M. Rhoodie 1511111957 - 6/6/1960 
P.S. Joubert 4/7/1960 - */1964 
Trade Commissioner 
J.F. Brooks 30/6/1961 - */1971 
Female Clerks, Grade /!Foreign Assistants 
Miss J.M. Richards 7/6/1949 - */9/1951 
Miss C.M. Honiball 1/9/1954 - */1959 
Miss J.C. Joubert 9/1/1959 - */1962 
Locally-recruited Staff ( 17)6 
Miss G.J. Boyle Shorthand typist 27/8/1959 - * 
Miss M. Callaghan Typist/Clerk Information 1955 - * 
Mrs M.R. Duffus 1/9/1960 - at least until 30/9/1967 
Mrs S.M. Foster 5/11/1956 - * 
Mrs M.F. Forster Shorthand Typist/Clerk */1957 - * 
Mrs J. Green Shorthand Typist/Clerk 5/2/1957 - * 
Miss N. Helms Shorthand typist 151111952 - 8/12/1956 
A. Jansen Chauffeur 1/8/1958 - at least until October 1963 
Miss S.E. Jeffreys 2/2/1956 - */12/1956 
Miss B. Marshall Shorthand typist 2/7/1959 - at least until 15/8/1961 
A. Morland Messenger 8111/1954 - at least until 30/12/1964 
Miss D.J. Read 9/7/1958 - * 
Miss M. Roberts Shorthand typist 2/7/1959 - * 
A.E.J. Taylor Chauffeur 1957-1958 
Mrs J.E. Tompsett Shorthand Typist 9/2/1955 - * 
Miss V.P. Townshend Shorthand Typist 7/8/1949 - 31/1/1955 
Mrs B.J. Waters Assistant to the Information Officer 16/1/1958 - * 
5 The post was renamed Information Attache in 1961. 
6 There were also staff employed by the High Commissioner in a domestic capacity. 
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DIPLOMA TIC MEMOIRS ETC AND WORKS ON THE BRITISH FOREIGN 
OFFICE 
Diplomatic Memoirs etc 
C. Gladwyn, The Paris Embassy. London, 1986 (1976). 
RA. Cosgrove, Sir Eyre Crowe and the English Foreign Office, 1905-1914. Unpub-
lished PhD dissertation, University of Caifornia, Riverside, 1967. 
The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn. London, 1972 (Gladwyn Jebb). 
J.D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy; Rambles and Reflections, 1902-1928. 
London, 1928. 
E. Hambloch, British Consul: Memories of Thirty Years' Service in Europe and 
Brazil. London, 1938. 
Old Diplomacy: the Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. London, 1947. 
N. Henderson, Water Under the Bridges. London, 1943. 
H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War. London, 1949. 1 
J. Lees-Milne, Harold Nicolson: a biography. 2 Vols., London, 1981. 
R.H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent. New York, 1933;2 Retreat from Glory. New 
York, 1934. 
F. McLynn, Fitzroy Maclean. London, 1992. 
V. Massey, What's Past is Prologue. London, 1963. 
H. Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart: First Lord Carnock: A Study in the old di-
plomacy. London, 1930. 
1 Knatchbull-Hugessen was the victim of the 'Operation Cicero' scam in Istanbul during the Second 
World War. 
2 This had been published in England the previous year under the title Memoirs of a British Agent. A 
consular officer, not a diplomat, in Imperial Russia before and during the First World War, Lockhart 
returned to Russia after the outbreak of the 1917 revolution to establish unofficial relations with the 
Bolsheviks, thus the 'agent' of his book's title. 
Appendix II: Diplomatic memoirs etc 
M. Paleologue,3 An Ambassador's Memoirs 1914-1917, Trans by F.A. Holt. London, 
1973. 
W. Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy. London, 1955. 
N. Rose, Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat. London, 1978. 
D. Scott, Ambassador in Black and White: Thirty Years of Changing Africa. London, 
1981. 
Lord Strang, Home and Abroad. London, 1956. 
Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart. London, 1958. 
G. Waterfield, Professional Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine of Kikharle Bt., 1880-1961. 
London, 1973. 
Works on the Foreign Office 
F. T Ashton-Gwatkin, 'Foreign Service Re-organization in the United Kingdom', Inter-
national Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1, January 1946, pp. 57-74. 
S.T. Bindoff, 'The Unreformed Diplomatic Service, 1812-60', Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 4th series, Vol. XVIII, 1935, pp. 143-72. 
R. Butler, 'Beside the Point: Sir Eyre Crowe', World Review (United Klngdom), New 
Series, No. 50, April-May 1953, pp 8-13. 
E.T. Corp, 'Sir Eyre Crowe and the administration of the Foreign Office, 1906-1914', 
The Historical Journal, Vol. XXII, No. 2, 1979, pp. 443-54; 'Sir William Tyrrell: The 
Eminence Grise of the British Foreign Office, 1912-1915', The Historical Journal, 
Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1982, pp. 697-708; 'The Problem of Promotion in the Career of Sir 
Eyre Crowe 1905-1920', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 28, No. 
2, 1982, pp. 236-49. 
V. Cromwell, 'The Foreign and Commonwealth Office', in Z.S. Steiner (ed.), The 
Times Sun1ey of Foreign Ministries of the World, London, 1982, pp. 541-73. 
V. Cromwell and Z.S. Steiner, 'The Foreign Office before 1914: a study in resistance' 
in G. Sutherland (ed.) Studies in the growth of nineteenth-century government, 
London, 1972, pp. 167-94. 
F. Gosses, The Management o/British Foreign Policy before the First World War, 
especially during the period 1880-1914, Trans. E.C. Van der Graaf, Leiden, 1948. 
3 French Ambassador to Imperial Russia from January 1914 to June 1917. 
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E. Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign Office, London, 1901. 
R.A. Jones, The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914, Gerrards Cross, Bucks., 1983. 
R. Langhorne, 'The Foreign Office before 1914', The Historical Journal, Vol. XVI, 
No. 4, 1973, pp. 857-64. 
C. Larner, 'The Amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office', 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 7, Nos. 1-2, January-April 1972, pp. 107-26. 
RT, Nightingale, 'The Personnel of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, 
1851-1929', The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXIV, 1930, pp. 310-31. 
H.K. Norton, 'Foreign Office Organization', Supplement to The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. CXLIII, 1929, pp. 1-81. 
W. Selby, 'The Foreign Office', The Nineteenth Century and After, Vol. CXXXVIII, 
July-December 1945, pp. 3-12. 
Z.S. Steiner, 'The Last Years of the old Foreign Office, 1898-1905', The Historical 
Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1, 1963, pp. 59-90; 'Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 
1906-1910', The Historical Journal, Vol. X, No. 4, 1967, pp. 415-39; The Foreign 
Office and Foreign Policy 1898-1914. Cambridge 1969; with M.L. Dockrill 'The For-
eign Office Reforms, 1919-21', The Historical Journal, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1974, pp. 
131-56; 'The Foreign Office under Sir Edward Grey, 1905-1914' in F.H. Binsley (ed.) 
British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 22-70; Intro-
duction to The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, London, 1982, pp. 9-
32. 
Lord Strang, The Foreign Office. London, 1955 and The Diplomatic Career. London, 
1962. 
J. Tilley & S. Gaselee, The Foreign Office, 2nd ed., London, 1933. 
RM. Warman, 'The erosion of Foreign Office influence in the making of foreign pol-
icy, 1916-1918', The Historical Journal, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1972, pp. 133-59. 
'Changes in the organisation of the Foreign and Diplomatic Service', The British Year 
Book of International Law 1920-21, London, 1920, pp. 97-108. 
Cd. 7749, Royal Commission on the Civil Service: Appendix to Fifth Report of the 
Commissioners: Minutes of Evidence, 29th April 1914-16th July 1914, Q.36,551-
Q.43,890, with Appendices. London, 1914. 
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SMUTS AND THE PREAMBLE 
Contrary to popular belief, Smuts was not solely responsible for the Preamble 
to the United Nations Charter. Heaton Nicholls, who should have known better 
because he accompanied him to them, attributed to Smuts at the preliminary 
Commonwealth meetings the text as finally adopted in San Francisco. 1 Smuts's son and 
namesake was more accurate. He felt that a comparison between his father's original 
and the final version revealed 'how little his original draft [had] been modified'. 2 Fourie 
says that Smuts drafted the preamble though various other people 'naturally proposed 
amendments'. 3 Not that Smuts did not subsequently imply he was the sole author.4 On 
the basis of the texts given below, readers can judge for themselves. 
C.K. Webster of the United Kingdom delegation had a hand in the preamble at 
the stage of the British Commonwealth meetings5 as later at the San Francisco Confer-
ence did Virginia Gildersleeve, Dean and Professor of Literature at Barnard College, 
New York, and her assistant on the United States delegation, Elizabeth Reynard. 
Gildersleeve and Reynard, not Smuts or Webster, were the authors of the resounding 
opening 'We the Peoples of the United Nations, Determined to save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war'. 6 'We the Peoples' was inspired by the opening of the 
United States Constitution.7 Following the League Covenant, the Webster/Smuts ver-
sion had rendered this as 'The High Contracting Parties' who were 'Determined to pre-
vent a recurrence of the fratricidal strife which has twice in our generation brought 
untold sorrows and losses on mankind'. Smuts's original opening was: 'We, the United 
Nations, assembled in Conference to seek a new way of life for the nations, and to pre-
vent a recurrence of the fratricidal strife which has now twice in our generation 
brought untold sorrows and losses on mankind'. 
1 G.H. Nicholls, South Africa in My Time (London, 1961), pp. 394-95. 
2 Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts, p. 477. 
3 Fourie, Buitelandse Woelinge, p. 32. (Original in Afrikaans.) 
4 See J. van der Poel, ed., Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol. VII, Smuts/M.C. Gillett, 14 January 
194 7, p. 11 7. 'Here is the author of the great preamble of the Charter ... ' 
5 See his The Art and Practice of Diplomacy (London, 1961), pp. 10-12 and Hancock, The Fields of 
Force 1919-1950, pp. 431-33. 
6 Gildersleeve, Many a good crusade, p. 346. 
7 
'We, the People of the United States'. 
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Perhaps Smuts was entitled to claim credit for the preamble. The April 1945 
British Commonwealth meeting in London had endorsed the Webster/Smuts version, 
attributing it to Smuts8 and he introduced it personally on 26 April in Committee Ill of 
the San Francisco Conference. The committee, as RB. Russell puts it, 'obviously 
moved by the moment, agreed by acclamation to adopt in principle what inevitably 
became known as the "Smuts preamble," as the basis of its work'. Gildersleeve speaks 
of a tacit understanding to credit Smuts with the preamble 'whatever form it finally 
took'. 9 The most important aspect of the work of the South African delegate in Com-
mittee Ill, H. T. Andrews, was to prevent tinkering with Smuts's draft, particularly by 
Gildersleeve. Andrews reported later that his task was 
frequently a delicate one, to 'neutralize' the 'cooperation' of a 
number of delegations, who having acclaimed the Field Marshal's 
text in principle, thereafter attempted to 'improve' upon its form 
and substance to the ultimate extent of submitting other drafts 
based on individual ideas of what constituted a preamble perfect as 
to 'architecture', 'soul', 'literary style', and 'content•. 10 (Emphasis in 
original). 
There were already those at the Commonwealth meeting, including Evatt and 
Fraser, who thought that the Webster/Smuts draft 'lacked a little of the spontaneity and 
warmth' of Smuts's original proposal and that whatever preamble was adopted, 'the 
warmth and idealism' of Smuts's earlier draft should be preserved. 11 
In length Smuts (239 words), Webster/Smuts (234 words) and the final version 
(228 words) are much the same. Smuts's original had included a draft first chapter. 
Considerably shorter were Gildersleeve/Reynard (133 words), the preambles to the 
League Covenant (90 words) and to the Constitution of the United States (52 words). 
Thus Webster's recollection that the Smuts original was a long document which he had 
shortened and simplified with Smuts's consent, is faulty. 12 If, however, his account is 
otherwise to be accepted, it seems he contributed more to the combined version than 
Smuts. It will also be noted that if not altogether in wording then in ideas, there is a 
large measure of identity between Webster/Smuts and the final version. 
8 BCM(45), 11th Meeting, 12 April 1945, p. 2. 
9 Gildersleeve, Many a good crusade, p. 347. 
10 
'United Nations Conference on International Organization, Corllrnission I, Committee I, Preamble 
and Chapter I (Purposes and Principles of the Charter', para. 1. Attached to BTS, 136/1, Vol. 4, 
Andrews/Secretary for External Affairs, 20 July 1945. 
11 BCM (45), 11th meeting, 12 April 1945, p. 3. (Fraser and Evatt). 
12 Webster, The Art and Practice of Diplomacy, pp. 10-12 
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Although she did not have access to the minutes of the British Commonwealth 
meetings in London in early April 1945, relying instead on a New Zealand report on 
the San Francisco Conference which referred to the Commonwealth meetings, Russell 
gives a creditable account of the preamble's drafting history. 13 The Commonwealth mi-
nutes are, however, essential to an understanding of what actually happened. 14 The mi-
nutes of the 11th meeting on 12 April 1945 show that Clement Attlee, then Lord 
President of the Council, was responsible for the expression 'and to promote social 
progress'15 which appears in the Charter as adopted. 
Preamble to the United States Constitution (52 words) 
We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more 
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America. 
Preamble to the League of Nations Covenant (90 words) 
The High Contracting Parties, in order to promote international 
co-operation and to achieve international"peace and security by the 
acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription 
of open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the firm 
establishment of the understandings of international law as the 
actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the 
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty 
obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, 
agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Original Smuts Preamble16 (239 words) 
We, the United Nations, assembled in Conference to seek a new 
way of life for the nations, and to prevent a recurrence of the 
fratricidal strife which has now twice in our generation brought 
untold sorrows and losses on mankind, and to establish an 
international organisation to that end: 
13 R.B. Russell, A History of The United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-45 
(Washington, D.C., 1958), pp. 910-18. 
14 The minutes in the writer's possession were photocopied by the Australian Archives from Dr Evatt's 
copy. 
15 BCM( 45), 11th Meeting, 12 April 1945, p. 4. 
16 Ibid., 5th Meeting, 6 April 1945, pp. 11-12. 
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Do hereby declare, in this Charter of the United Nations, our 
common faith and objects, and the principles on which we seek to 
found an Organisation for the peace, progress and welfare of 
mankind. 
Chapter I. - The Common Faith. 
I. We declare our faith in basic human rights, in the sacredness, 
essential worth and integrity of the human personality, and affirm 
our resolve to establish and maintain social and legal sanctions for 
safeguarding the same. 
2. We believe in the practice of tolerance, in the equal rights of 
individuals and of individual nations large and small, as well as in 
their inherent right to govern themselves without outside 
interference, in accordance with their own customs and way of 
life. 
3. We believe in the enlargement of freedom and the promotion of 
social progress, and in raising the standards of life, so that there 
may be freedom of thought and expression and religion, as well as 
freedom from want and fear for all. 
4. We believe in nations living in peace and peaceful intercourse 
with each other as good neighbours, and in renouncing war as an 
instrument of national policy. 
Webster/Smuts Preamble17 (234 words) 
The High Contracting Parties: 
Determined to prevent a recurrence of the fratricidal strife which 
has twice in our generation brought untold sorrows and losses on 
mankind and to re-establish the faith of men and women in 
fundamental human rights, in the sacredness, essential worth and 
integrity of the human personality, in the equal rights of 
individuals and of individual nations large and small, in the 
enlargement of freedom and the promotion of social progress and 
the possibility of raising the standards of life everywhere in the 
world, and for these ends to practise tolerance and to live together 
in peace and peaceful intercourse with each other as good 
neighbours, 
In order to make possible co-operation between nations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security necessary for 
these purposes, 
By the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods to 
ensure that armed force is only used in the interests of the com-
munity of nations, and not for national ends, 
17 Ibid., I Ith Meeting, 12 April 1945, p. 2. 
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By the provision of means by which all disputes that threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be settled, 
By the establishment of conditions under which justice and respect 
for the obligations of international law and treaties, and 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, can be maintained, 
By the employment of international machinery for the promotion 
of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, 
Agree to this Charter of the United Nations. 
Gildersleeve/Reynard Preamblel 8 (133 words) 
We the Peoples of the United Nations 
Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which in our time has brought untold sorrow to mankind 
Resolved to reaffirm faith in the dignity and value of every human 
being and to maintain his right to live and work in tranquillity and 
larger freedom 
United in our common endeavour to promote social progress, to 
establish better standards of life, to secure the equal rights of men 
and of nations large and small 
Dedicated to the rule of law, the reality of justice, the sanctity and 
obligation of treaties, 
In the hope that we of all lands and creeds will practice tolerance 
towards one another and live together in peace as good neighbors, 
Through our representatives assembled in San Francisco agree to 
this Charter. 
Preamble as adopted at San Francisco (228 words) 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DETERMINED 
to save succeeding ge~erations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small, and 
18 Gildersleeve, Many a good crusade, p. 346. 
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to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained, and 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom, 
AND FOR THESE ENDS 
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as 
good neighbours, and 
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, 
and 
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of 
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest, and 
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples, 
HA VE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO 
ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS 
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives 
assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their 
full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the 
present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an 
international organization to be known as the United Nations. 
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SOUTH AFRICAN AND AUSTRALIAN INTERVENTIONS CONCERNING 
ARTICLE 2(7) 
South Africa 
T.E. Donges, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 41st meeting, 14 November 
1950, p. 247, paras. 1-6, pp. 251-52, paras. 44-55; 42nd meeting, 14 November 1950, 
pp. 253-55, paras. 1-19 (Treatment of Indians); W.C. du Plessis, Ninth Session, Ad 
Hoc Political Committee, 10th meeting, 21 October 1954, pp. 29-30, paras. 1-11 
(Treatment of Indians); 42nd meeting, 2 December 1954, pp. 201-04, paras. 13-36. 
(Apartheid); G.P. Jooste, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 13th 
meeting, 12 November 1952, pp. 65-67, paras. 1-14 (Apartheid); 20th meeting, 19 
November 1952, pp. 113-14, paras. 16-33; Eighth Session, General Committee, 87th 
meeting, 16 September 1953, p. 1, para. 7; 435th plenary meeting, 17 September 1953, 
pp. 24-27, paras. 19-48; 469th plenary meeting, 8 December 1953, pp. 432-34, paras. 
12- 37; Ad Hoc Political Committee, 32nd meeting, 23 November 1953, pp. 155-58, 
paras. 1-26 (Apartheid); Ninth Session, 476th plenary meeting, 24 September 1954, 
pp. 37-40 (Treatment of Indians and Apartheid); E.H. Louw, Third Session, Part I, 
146th plenary meeting, 28 September 1948, pp. 221-26; Third Session, Part II, First 
Committee, 263rd meeting, 9 May 1949, pp. 246-47; 265th meeting, IO May 1949, 
pp. 272-80; Third Session, Part II, 212th plenary meeting, 14 May 1949, pp. 439-49 
(Treatment oflndians); Eleventh Session, 577th plenary meeting, 15 November 1956, 
pp. 29-34, paras. 72-126 (Treatment oflndians and Apartheid); J.C. Smuts, First Ses-
sion, Second Part, General Committee, 19th meeting, 24 October 1946, pp. 69-70; 
Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committees, 1st meeting, 21 November 1946, 
pp. 3-4 (Treatment oflndians). 
Australia 
C.T. Moodie, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 42nd meeting, 14 
November 1950, pp. 256-588, paras. 37-52. (Treatment oflndians); A.H. Tange, Fifth 
Session, 315th plenary meeting, 2 December 1950, p. 531, paras. 24-28. (Treatment of 
Indians); K. Officer, Sixth Session, 360th plenary meeting, 12 January 1952, p. 329, 
paras. 17-21. (Treatment of Indians); P. Shaw, Seventh Session, Ad Hoc Political 
Committee, 16th meeting, 14 November 1952, pp. 83-85 (Apartheid); W.D. Forsyth, 
Eighth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 20th meeting, 27 October 1953, pp. 97-
98, paras. 8-12 (Treatment oflndians), 36th meeting, 30 November 1953, pp. 182-83, 
paras. 10-24;(Apartheid); Tenth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 11th meeting, 7 
November 1955, pp. 38-39, paras. 46-3). 
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AUSTRALIAN DESPATCHES FROM SOUTH AFRICA 1946-64 
1946 
Ministerial Despatches 
Sir George Knowles 
1. Untitled (Report on Arrival), 13 September 1946, 10 pages 
2. The Indian Problem in the Union of South Africa, 11 September 1946, 2 pages + 
Annexure 'The Indian in South Africa', 32 pages 
3. The Future Status of South West Africa, 10 September 1946, 2 pages + Annexure, 
66 pages 
4. Untitled (Political Developments in South Africa etc), 26 September 1946, 13 
pages 
5. Untitled (Accommodation), 26 September 1946, 6 pages 
6. Untitled (General Report), 2 October 1946, 11 pages 
7. Sentences on Nazi Leaders - Nuremberg Trial, 9 October 1946, 5 pages 
8. The Indian Question, 9 October 1946, 2 pages 
9. USA stops Transfer oflndian Jute to South Africa, 9 October 1946, 1 page 
10. The Non-European Labour Problem in South Africa, 9 October 1946, 4 pages 
11. The Indian Question in South Africa, 9 October 1946, 1 page 
12. Financial trend in South Africa, 9 October 1946, 3 pages 
13. Migration of South African nationals to Rhodesia, 9 October 1946, 3 pages 
14. Expansion in the Union of South Africa of United Kingdom Information Service, 
17 October 1946, 1 page 
15. The Nuremberg Trial and Sentences of ex-Nazi Leaders 
16. A United Africa, 15 October 1946, 1 page+ Annexures, 14 pages 
1 7. The Economic future of South Africa - being an address by the Acting Prime Min-
ister of the Union, 17 October 1946, 10 pages 
18. The Union's Asiatic Policy, 15 October 1946, 2 pages 
19. The Industrial outlook for South Africa; Union's drive for immigrants questioned, 
15 October 1946, 4 pages 
20. Resolutions adopted by the Transvaal Congress of the Nationalist Party, 22 Oct-
ober 1946, 2 pages 
21. South Africa Trade Unionism, 22 October 1946, 4 pages 
22. Plans to control Air Service in South Africa, 22 October 1946, 3 pages 
23. Imperial Defence and the Union of South Africa, 22 October 1946, 2 pages 
24. Delegation of Legislative Power, 22 October 1946, 1 page 
25. South African Labour Attache for London, 22 October 1946, 1 page 
26. Reaction of the Pirow Party to the sentences carried out at Nuremberg, 22 October 
1946, 2 pages 
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27. South African Cost of Living Index, 22 October 1946, 2 pages+ Annexure, 2 
pages 
28. A 'Buy South African First' publicity drive, 22 October 1946, 2 pages 
29. Transport of Immigrants to South Africa, 22 October 1946, 2 pages 
30. Survey of South African Political Situation, 23 October 1946, 1 page+ Annexure, 
1 page 
31. Labour Party as a potential factor at next SA Election, 28 October 1946,2 pages 
32. Next general election - South Africa, 28 October 1946, 1 page 
3 3. General Smuts in Eire, 28 October 1946, 1 page 
34. Agreement on Double Taxation, 28 October 1946, 1 page+ Annexure, 3 pages 
35. Visit of British Industrial Mission to South Africa, 29 October 1946, 3 pages 
36. International Trade Organisation, 6 November 1946, 1 page 
37. Mining Unions' Demands, 6 November 1946, 2 pages 
38. Remembrance Day in the Union of South Africa, 13 November 1946, 6 pages 
39. Impending changes in the Diplomatic Corps in the Union of South Africa, 14 Nov-
ember 1946, 2 pages 
40. A Nationalist Party 'Republican Fund', 14 November 1946, 4 pages 
41. Italian Prisoners-of-War as settlers in the Union of South Africa, 13 November 
1946, 2 pages 
42. USSR Reception, 13 November 1946, 2 pages 
43. Election of Mayor, Pretoria, 14 November 1946, 4 pages 
44. Interview with Mr Waterson, 4 November 1946, 2 pages 
45. Agreement on Double Taxation, 20 November 1946, 1 page 
46. Diplomatic Appointment, 20 November 1946, 1 page 
47. Cultural Relations with Italy, 20 November 1946, 1 page 
48. The Afrikaans Press discusses UNO action regarding South West Africa, 21 Nov-
ember 1946, 2 pages 
49. Comments of the Acting Prime Minister of South Africa on Proceedings before the 
United Nations Assembly, 20 November 1946, 3 pages 
50. Air Treaty with the United States of America, 21November1946, 2 pages 
51. African Traffic Conference. International Air Transport Association, 23 November 
1946, 1 page + Annexure, 2 pages 
52. Impending changes in the Diplomatic Corps in the Union of South Africa, 22 
November 1946, 1 page 
53. Expansion of trade between the Union of South Africa and Scandinavian countries, 
22 November 1946, 2 pages 
54. Native mine labourers and Trade Unionism, 4 December 1946, 4 pages 
55. Diamond Prospecting in South Africa, 4 December 1946, 2 pages 
56. Union Defence Force - Post-war training scheme for officers, 4 December 1946, 2 
pages 
57. Question of Devaluation of South African Currency, 4 December 1946, 5 pages 
, 58. South-West Africa's Destiny Lies with Union of South Africa, 4 December 1946, 4 
pages 
59. New motor car plants for Union of South Africa, IO December 1946, 2 pages 
60. Immigration, 10 December 1946, 2 pages 
61. Coming Session of South African Parliament, 10 December 1946, 2 pages 
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62. Union Government's Native Policy, 18 December 1946, 5 pages 
63. Compulsory Unemployment Insurance, 19 December 1946, 6 pages 
64. Agreement on Double Taxation: United States of America, 21December1946, 2 
pages 
65. South African Air Force: Additional Fighter Aircraft, 27 December 1946, 2 pages 
66. 'Colour Bar' in industry. Training of African Natives in the building trades, 30 
December 1946, 6 pages 
1947 
1. Steel Production in South Africa, 6 January 1947, 5 pages 
2. The problem of non-European labour in South Africa, 7 January 1947, 10 pages 
3. The United Nations Assembly and the South African questions dealt with thereat, 
14 January 194 7, 12 pages 
4. Compulsory Unemployment Insurance, 11January1947, 1 page 
5. Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act - not to be repealed, 11 January 
1947, 3 pages 
6. Interview with Prime Minister, 15 January 1947, 5 pages 
7. Outline of South African Labour Party's Policy, 17 January 1947, 4 pages 
8. Agreement on Double Taxation: United States of America, 17 January 1947, 1 
page + Annexure, 7 pages 
9. South Africa Oversea Representation, 20 January 1947, 4 pages 
10. New Industries for Union of South Africa, 24 January 1947, 3 pages 
11. Union Defence Forces - Organisation, 28 January 194 7, 2 pages 
12. Results ofRecent By-Elections, 29 January 1947, 6 pages 
13. General Smuts' comments on Britain's Mission in Europe and South Africa's 
problems, 3 February 194 7, 3 pages 
14. Leakage of contents of cypher message No. 86 from Canberra to South Africa, 5 
February 194 7, 3 pages + Annexures, 3 pages 
15. Immigration, 8 February 194 7, 7 pages 
16. Parliamentary debate on decisions of UNO on South West-Africa and the Indian 
question, 10 February 1947, 15 pages 
17. Political future of the Rt. Hon. J.H. Hofmeyr, 11February1947, 5 pages 
18. Invitation to Union of South Africa to exhibit at Sydney Easter Show, 12 February 
1947, 4 pages 
19. Political Situation as it affects the Coloured People in South Africa, 13 February 
1947, 7 pages 
20. Removal of controls on maize and tea, 19 February 194 7, 4 pages 
21. Establishment of Indian Advisory Board, 21 February 194 7, 4 pages 
22. General Smuts' comments on the significance of Commonwealth world leadership, 
21 February 194 7, 3 pages 
23. The Royal Family's 'v'.isit to South Africa, 26 February 1947, 10 pages 
24. Refusal by Union Government to issue Passports to enable two South African 
Indians to attend All-Asia Conference in India, 1March1947, 5 pages 
25. Budget Speech, 5 March 1947, 20 pages 
26. Labour Party Dissension, 10 March 1947, 3 pages 
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27. Immigration Policy, Parliamentary Debate on Government's Immigration Policy, 12 
March 194 7, 10 pages 
28. South African Trade Figures, 12 March 1947, 4 pages 
29. Draft Customs Agreement between the Union and Southern Rhodesia, 15 March 
1947, 6 pages 
30. Immigration, 18 March 1947, 7 pages 
31. Budget Speech, 18 March 194 7, 1 page + Annexure, 32 pages 
32. Question of fees charged by Members of Parliament for services, 21March1947, 6 
pages 
33. Untitled (Indian Question), 25 March 1947, 7 pages 
34. Future status of South-West Africa, 31March1947, 10 pages 
35. Privy Council Appeals, 1April1947, 4 pages 
36. Native's [sic] part in Union's economy and relations between English-speaking and 
Afrikaans-speaking populations, 8 April 194 7, 3 pages 
37. Cotton textiles from Germany and Japan, 22 April 1947, 3 pages 
38. Impending Changes in the Diplomatic Corps, 23 April 1947, 2 pages 
39. Visit to Eastern Province, 23 April 1947, 3 pages 
40. Future status of South-West Africa, 24 April 1947, 5 pages 
41. Boycott oflndian Traders, 25 April 1947, 5 pages 
42. Office accommodation in Pretoria, 28 April 1947, 3 pages+ Annexures, 8 pages 
43. Union's interest in International Trade Conference, 30 April 1947, 4 pages 
44. South Africa's foreign affairs and attachments to UNO, 1May1947, 7 pages 
45. The Royal Family's visit to Africa, 6 May 1947, 20 pages+ Annexure, 6 pages 
46. Review of agricultural position in the Union of South Africa, 13 May 194 7, 7 
pages 
47. South-West Africa, 20 May 1947, 6 pages 
48. Unemployment Insurance, 26 May 1947, 6 pages 
49. Royal Family's Visit to South Africa - further details concerning 'the White Train', 
3 June 1947, 2 pages 
50. Development in Mining Industry in Union, 4 June 1947, 3 pages 
51. Official residence or residences for High Commissioner in the Union of South 
Africa, 11 June 1947, 3 pages 
52. Procedure of the Union Parliament - differences from procedure of Commonwealth 
Parliament, 11 June 1947, 9 pages 
53. General Smuts on South Africa's policy, 14 June 1947, 10 pages+ Annexures, 4 
pages 
54. Military Service by Women, 25 June 1947, 6 pages 
55. Deportation of German ex-internees, 1July1947, 11 pages 
56. Immigration, 3 July 1947, 3 pages 
57. Biographical Notes: Field Marshal Jan Christiaan Smuts, and the Hon. Harry 
Gordon Lawrence, 9 July 1947, 8 pages 
58. Gold Mining Industry - Housing of Native of Native Mine Labourers' families, 9 
July 194 7, 5 pages 
59. Statement by General Smuts on Palestine Problem and Jews in South Africa, 16 
July 194 7, 4 pages 
60. Labour Party Dissension, 17 July 194 7, 6 pages 
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61. South African Oversea Representation, 22 July 194 7, 3 pages 
62. Biographical Notes: The Rt. Hon. Jan Hendrik Hofineyr, 23 July 1947, 6 pages 
63. Biographical Notes: The Rt. Hon. Jan Hendrik Hofineyr, 29 July 1947, 2 pages 
64. Biographical Notes: The Hon. Daniel Francois. Malan, MA, DD, 30 July 1947, 7 
pages 
65. Delville Day Commemoration Service, 30 July 1947, 3 pages 
66. Canadian Trade Mission to South Africa, 5 August 1947, 2 pages 
67. Future status of South West Africa, 5 August 1947, 8 pages 
68. The United Nations Assembly and the South African questions dealt with thereat, 
21 August 194 7, 2 pages + Annexures, 13 pages 
69. Kruger National Park, 21August1947, 3 pages 
70. Portuguese East Africa, 21 August 1947, 3 pages 
71. Untitled (Crocodile River Citrus Estates Pty. Ltd.), August 1947, 8 pages 
72. Native farm labour - Betha! district, 21August1947, 5 pages 
73. Visit to the Union by Mr A.G. Bottomley, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Relations, 21August1947, 5 pages 
74. South Africa's Policy on Aid to Britain, 28 August 1947, 7 pages 
75. Belgian honour conferred on General Smuts, 3 September 1947, 4 pages+ 
Annexure, 10 pages (H.L.T. Taswell, 'Short memorandum on the Belgian Congo', 
23 July 194 7) 
76. General Smuts' statements on Union's industrial policy, 3 September 1947, 5 pages 
77. Biographical Notes. The Hon. F.C. Sturrock, 9 September 1947, 4 pages 
78. South Africa's problems ofrace relationship, 11 September 1947, 10 pages 
79. Diplomatic representation of the Union of South Africa, 11 October 194 7, 2 pages 
80. Deportation of German Ex-Internees, 11 October 1947, 3 pages 
81. Indian Trade sanctions against the Union of South Africa, 14 October 194 7, 6 
pages 
82. Local Reaction to Opening Debates at UNO, 21 October 1947, 4 pages 
83. South Africa's Policy on Aid to Britain, 21 October 1947, 6 pages+ Annexure, 4 
pages 
84. Reference to Policy of Union Government in speech by General Smuts, 26 October 
1947, 5 pages 
85. Impending Changes in the Diplomatic Corps, 12 November 1947, 2 pages 
M.H. Marshall 
86. South Africa's problem of race relationship, 25 November 1947, 16 Pages+ 
Annexure, 20 pages 
87. Pretoria University Rectorship Issue, 27 November 1947, 4 pages 
88. Diplomatic representation in the Union of South Africa, 1December1947, 2 pages 
89. State Funeral of Sir George Knowles, 2 December 1947, 2 December 1947, 3 
, pages + Annexures, 9 pages 
90. The Political Set-up in the Union of South Africa, 15 December 1947, 11 pages 
91. Reference to International Situation in Speech by General Smuts, 18 December 
1947, 5 pages 
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1948 
Ministerial Despatches 
1. Untitled (Political), 21 January 1948, 6 pages + Annexure, 4 pages 
2. Untitled (Native and Indian Representation), 3 February 1948, 7 pages 
3. Untitled (Supreme Empire Council), 1March1948, 6 pages 
4. Untitled (Czechoslovakia), 5 March 1948, 4 pages 
5. Untitled (South African representation abroad), 10 March 1948, 3 pages 
6. Untitled (Defence), 6 April 1948, 3 pages 
7. Untitled (South African - Indian Relations), 6 April 1948, 5 pages 
8. Untitled (Native Policy), 14 April 1948, 7 pages 
9. Untitled (Dissolution of Parliament), 15 April 1948, 2 pages 
10. Untitled (Communism), 21 April 1948, 2 pages 
11. Untitled (Election propaganda), 21 April 1948, 4 pages 
12. Untitled (Indian-South African Dispute), 12 May 1948, 5 pages 
13. Untitled (Election campaign enters intensive phase), 18 May 1948, 6 pages 
14. Untitled (Victory of the Nationalist Party), 2 June 1948, 8 pages 
15. Untitled (New Cabinet), 5 June 1948, 4 pages+ Annexures, 3 pages 
16. Untitled (Biographies ofMinisters), 5 June 1948, 11 pages 
17. Untitled (Dr Malan's Speech), 9 June 1948, 1 page 
18. Untitled (Release ofLeibbrandt, Visser, Van Blerk, Strauss and Pienaar), 16 June 
1948, 3 pages 
19. Untitled (South African internal and oversea information services), 28 June 1948, 2 
pages 
20. Untitled (Repeal of sections of National Security Regulations, 1941 ), 29 June 
1948, 2 pages + Annexure, 3 pages 
21. Untitled (New government's immigration policy), 29 June 1948, 2 pages 
22. Untitled (F.C. Erasmus's defence plans), 30 June 1948, 30 June 1948, 2 pages 
23. Untitled (Smuts's campaign against the government), 2 July 1948, 3 pages 
24. Untitled (United Party's native policy to be based on Fagan Commission Report), 5 
July 1948, 3 pages 
25. Untitled (Steps to implement government's racial policy), 8 July 1948, 3 pages 
26. Untitled (Draft Republican Constitution), 31 July 1948, 2 pages + Annexure, 5 
pages 
27. Untitled (New government's immigration policy), 19 August 1948, 4 pages 
A.T. Stirling 
28. The Malan Government, 14 September 1948, 6 pages 
29. First Session of the Tenth Parliament of the Union of South Africa, (6th August-
2nd October 1948), 25 October 1948, 4 pages 
30. van der Hum, 15 November 1948, 5 pages + Annexures, 2 pages 
31. Australia-South African Survey Flight, 30 November 1948, 5 pages + Annexure, 1 
page 
32. Death of the Rt. Hon. J.H. Hofineyr, 6 December 1948, 3 pages 
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33. British Commonwealth High Commissioners in the Union, 20 December 1948, 1 
page + Annexures, 3 pages 
Departmental Despatches 
M.H. Marshall 
1. Changes in Diplomatic Corps, 19 January 1948, 1 page 
2. Proposed Visit to Australia - South African Members of Parliament, 19 February 
1948, 2 pages + Annexures, 3 pages 
3. Price Controls in the Union of South Africa, 25 February 1948, 7 pages 
4. South African gold loan to Britain, 3 March 1948, 2 pages 
5. Occupation by the Government of South Africa of the Prince Edward and Marion 
Islands, 23 March 1948, 3 pages 
6. Sixth report of Public Service Enquiry Commission, 5 April 1948, 3 pages 
7. Report on Sir Earle Page's statement concerning trade potentialities with South 
Africa, 16 April 1948, 3 pages + Annexure, 2 pages 
8. Empire Day broadcast by General Smuts and Union Government's recognition of 
new State of Israel, 26 May 1948, 1 page 
9. Dissolution of Senate, 16 July 1948, 5 pages 
10. Indian-South African Dispute, 17 July 1948, 5 pages 
11. Appointment of Mr Charles te Water as Union Ambassador-Extraordinary-at-
Large, 21 July 1948, 2 pages + Annexures, 6 pages 
12. Opening of Union Parliament, and Budget Speech, 10 August 1948, 2 pages+ 
Annexure, 3 pages 
A.T. Stirling 
13. Young South Africa League, 20 September 1948 
14. Royal Society of South Africa Presentation to Field Marshal Smuts, 6 October 
1948, 2 pages 
15. Union Government's Attitude in the Event ofWar, 13 October 1948, 2 pages 
16. University of the Witwatersrand: Visit of Students to Australia, 13 October 1948, 
2 pages 
17. University of Natal Opening Ceremonies, 22 October 1948, 2 pages 
18. The Issue of the Republic and the Crown, 25 October 1948, 3 pages 
19. Appointment of Administrator of the Transvaal, 25 October 1948, 3 pages 
20. Imposition oflmport Restrictions in South Africa, 2 November 1948, 5 pages 
(signed by K. Desmond on behalf of A. Stirling) 
21. Mr Havenga's Position, 2 December 1948, 4 pages 
1949 
Ministerial Despatches 
1. Dr Evatt's Visit, 4 January 1949, 4 pages 
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2. The Forthcoming Session, 12 January 1949, 6 pages 
3. Australia Day - 1949, 27 January 1949, 3 pages 
4. The Session January-February, 1949, 25 February 1949, 9 pages 
5. Anzac Day, 27 April 1949, 2 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
6. Departure of South African High Commissioner in Canberra, 25 May 1949, 2 pages 
7. Second Session of the Tenth Parliament 21st January - 30th June, 1 July 1949, 5 
pages 
8. Arrival of Australian Cricket Team, 18 October 1949, 2 pages 
9. The Political Situation in South Africa, 21December1949, 4 pages 
Departmental Despatches 
1. House of Assembly: Additional Estimates, 3 February 1949, 2 pages 
2. Untitled (Books requested for South African Library), 15 February 1949, 1 page+ 
Annexure, 1 page 
3. The Issue of the Republic, 25 February 1949, 3 pages 
4. Credentials of High Commissioners, 3 March 1949, 2 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
5. The Issue of the Republic, 19 April 1949, 3 pages 
6. Mission Abroad of Mr Charles te Water, South African Ambassador-at-large, 2 
pages 
7. South African Branch, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, 28 April 1949, 1 
page 
8. The Issue of the Republic, 3 May 1949, 4 pages 
9. The Issue of the Republic, 14 May 1949, 8 pages 
10. Visit of Australian Terinis Team, 25 May 1949, 3 pages 
11. The Political Situation - The Issue of the Republic, 27 May 1949, 5 pages 
12. The Issue of the Republic, 8 June 1949, 4 pages 
13. Union Day, 22 June 1949, 1 page 
14. South African Diplomatic Service, 22 June 1949, 2 pages 
15. Nationality Legislation - South Africa, 23 June 1949, 5 pages 
16. Nationality and Citizenship Bill, 25 June 1949, 5 pages 
17. Death of Deputy Leader of Labour Party: Dr T.W.B. Osborn, 27 June 1949, 2 
pages 
18. South African Embassy - Washington, 27 June 1949, 2 pages 
19. South African High Commissioner to Canada, 28 June 1949, 2 pages 
20. Seretse Khama, 8 July 1949, 5 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
M.H. Marshall 
21. South African Diplomatic Service, 26 July 1949, 1 page 
22. Second Mission Abroad of Mr Charles te Water, South African Ambassador-at-
Large, 26 July 1949, 2 pages 
23. Possible Merger of Nationalist and Afrikaner Parties, 12 August 1949, 3 pages 
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A. T. Stirling 
24. The Issue of the Republic, 26 August 1949, 3 pages 
25. The Victorian Railways Commission, 18 October 1949, 1 page 
26. The Issue of the Republic, 22 October 1949, 3 pages 
27. South West Africa and the Reverend Michael Scott, 14 November 1949, 1 page 
28. The General Political Situation and the Issue of the Republic, 22 November 1949, 
5 pages 
29. Victorian Railways Mission, 28 November 1949, 1 page 
Unnumbered. Official Residences in Cape Town and Pretoria, 15 November 1949, 5 
pages 
1950 
Ministerial Despatches 
1. Policy Speech, 11 January 1950, 2 pages 
2. The forthcoming Session, 14 January 1950, 6 pages 
3. Communism, 15 January 1950, 9 pages 
4. Australia Day, South Africa, 1950, 27 January 1950, 2 pages+ Annexure, 3 pages 
5. Abolition of Appeal to Privy Council, 8 February 1950,2 pages 
6. The Issue of the Republic, 23 February 1950, 5 pages 
7. Seretse Khama, 15 March 1950, 6 pages 
8. Departure of Australia Cricket Team, 3 April 1950, 3 pages 
9. ANZAC Day, 27 April 1950, 2 pages+ Annexure, 2 pages 
10. The Issue of the Republic, 24 April 1950, 5 pages 
M.H. Marshall 
11. Untitled (Retirement of General Smuts and succession of the J.G.N. Strauss as 
leader of the United Party), 15 June 1950, 3 pages 
12. Afrikaner Party Congress, 3 August 1950, 4 pages 
13. Death ofField-Marshal Smuts, 19 September 1950, 19 September 1950, 4 pages 
14. Untitled (Appointment of Dr Jansen as Governor-General), 26 September 1950, 3 
pages 
15. Removal of Coloured Voters from Common Roll, 17 October 1950, 5 pages 
16. The Republican Issue, 21November1950, 8 pages 
Departmental Despatches 
A.T. Stirling 
1. Australian Books, 21 February 1950, 2 pages 
2. Australian Books and South African Library, 27 February 1950, 1 pages+ 
Annexure, 2 pages 
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3. Appointment of Dr A.L. Geyer as Union High Commissioner in London, 27 
February 1950, 4 pages 
4. Untitled (Draft Bill on measures to combat Communism), 3 March 1950, 1 page+ 
Annexure, I 0 pages 
5. South Africa - Southern Rhodesia, 17 March 1950, 5 pages 
6. Visit of Professor F. Alexander, University of Western Australia, 5 April 1950, 1 
page + Annexure, 4 pages 
7. City of Durban - Protection of Bathers from Sharks, 11 April 1950, 2 pages 
8. Visit of Professor F. Alexander, University of Western Australia, 18 April 1950, 2 
pages + Annexure, 1 page 
9. Peace-time Military training in South Africa, 18 April 1950, 1 page 
10. Death ofMr A.G. Hard, 16 May 1950, 2 pages 
M.H. Marshall 
11. Third Session of the Tenth Union Parliament - 20th January - 24th June, 1950, 6 
pages 
12. Indian Question in South Africa, 18 July 1950, 3 pages 
13. Visit of the Australian Soccer T earn, 8 August 1950, 2 pages 
14. South-West Africa Elections, 9 August 1950, 4 pages 
15. South-West African Elections, 4 September 1950, 5 pages 
16. Cabinet Changes, 6 September 1950, 2 pages 
17. Address by Prime Minister, 12 September 1950, 4 pages 
18. Three New Cabinet Ministers Appointed, 23 October 1950, 5 pages 
19. Press Inquiry, 27 October 1950, 5 pages 
20. Election of new Speaker, 11November1950, 3 pages 
21. The Policy of 'Apartheid', 28 October 1950, 11 pages 
22. Defence Organisation, 5 December 1950, 2 pages 
19511 
Ministerial Despatches 
1. The Fourth Session of the Tenth Union Parliament, 4 January 1951, 7 pages 
2. Australia Day and Jubilee Celebrations, 1951, 30 January 1951, 3 pages + 
Annexures, 16 pages 
3. Matters Arising out of the Visit of the Right Honourable Mr Gordon Walker -
Commonwealth Relations and the Position Regarding the Protectorate, 12 Feb-
ruary 1951, 5 pages + Annexures, 12 pages 
4. Untitled (Dr Malan on British Colonial Policy), 27 February 1951, 4 pages+ 
Annexure, 5 pages 
1 The last year a distinction was officially drawn between ministerial and departmental despatches. 
Presumably unaware of this, the High Commission headed its first four despatches from South Africa 
in 1952 departmental despatches. 
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Departmental Despatches 
I. British Minister to Visit Union, 12 January 1951, 2 pages 
2. South Africa's Participation in Korean War, 8 February 1951,4 pages 
3. Industry Prepares to Help Defence, 8 February 1951, 3 pages 
4. New Minister of Health and Social Welfare, 12 February 1951, 2 pages 
5. Coloured Franchise Issue, 21February1951, 4 pages+ Annexure, 5 pages 
6. South Africa and the United Nations, 16 March 1951, 4 pages 
7. Coloured Franchise Bill Debate, 21March1951, 5 pages 
8. Central Africa Talks, 3 April 1951, 3 pages 
J.P. Quinn 
9. Anzac Day Ceremony - 25 April 1951, 26 April 1951, 1 page 
10. Coloured Franchise Bill Debate, 3 May 1951, 9 pages 
11. Separate Representation of Voters Bill, 23 May 1951, 6 pages 
12. Separate Representation of Voters Bill, 1June1951, IO pages 
13. Separate Representation of Voters Bill, 6 June 1951, 5 pages 
14. Separate Representation of Voters Bill, 19 June 1951, 9 pages 
1952 
1. Separate Representation of Voters Act: The Appellate Court Judgment, 24 March 
1952, 5 pages 
. 2. Brigadier Durrant's Resignation from the Union Defence Force, 26 March 1952, 8 
pages (signed E.A. Warren on behalf of J.P. Quinn) 
3. The South African Budget, 1952-53, 7 April 1952, 7 pages (signed E.A. Warren on 
behalf of J.P. Quinn) 
4. Separate Representation of Voters Act. Repercussions of the judgment of the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court, 15 April 1952, IO pages 
5. Possibility of Visit to Australia of Hon. Paul Sauer, 25 April 1952, 3 pages+ An-
nexure, 1 page 
W.R. Hodgson 
6. The South African Apartheid Policy, 2 September 1952, 6 pages 
7. South Africa: The Republican Question, 19 September 1952, 3 pages 
8. South Africa: The Constitutional Crisis, 19 September 1952, 7 pages 
9. The High Commission Territories, 16 October 1952, 4 pages 
10. The Riots at New Brighton, 29 October 1952, 5 pages 
11. Untitled (Relations between black and white in South Africa), 24 November 1952, 
4 pages 
12. Untitled (Lessening of tension throughout the Union), 10 December 1952, 3 pages 
+ Annexure, 1 page 
13. Untitled (Statement by the Minister of) Native Affairs, 23 December 1952, 1 page 
+ Annexure, 2 pages 
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14. United Kingdom and South African White Papers on Negotiations Between 1913 
and 1939 on the Transfer to South Africa of the High Commission Territories, 23 
December 1952, 4 pages 
19532 
1. South African Labour Party, 3 February 1953,4 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
2. South Africa: The Government's Emergency Legislation, 17 February 1953, 4 
pages 
3. The Union Parliament 1948-1953, 1April1953, 8 pages 
4. South Africa: The Passive Resistance Movement, 11 April 1953, 3 pages 
5. South Africa: General Elections at 15th April, 1953, 27 April 1953, 6 pages 
6. South Africa: Afrikaner Nationalism and the Nationalist Party, 8 October 1953, 2 
pages 
7. South Africa: The Constitutional Crisis, 12 October 1953, 7 pages 
8. South Africa: Federalism in Natal, 13 October 1953, 6 pages 
9. South Africa: The Republican Tradition, 20 October 1953, 5 pages 
10. South Africa: The Liberal Party, 6 November 1953, 5 pages 
11. Indians in South Africa: The Immigrants Regulation Amendment Act 1953, 23 
November 1953, 6 pages 
12. Untitled (Army dismissals), 22 December 1953, 5 pages 
1954 
1. South Africa: The Growth of the Afrikaans Press, 16 February 1954, 2 pages 
2. South Africa: Integration and Apartheid, 15 March 1954, 4 pages,+ Annexures, 13 
pages 
3. Untitled (The national flag), 15 March 1954, 4 pages 
4. The Budget, 29 March 1954, 4 pages 
5. South Africa: The rural native community in European South Africa, 30 March 
1954, 5 pages 
6. South Africa: The urban native, 14 April 1954, 6 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
7. South Africa: Eclipse of the Union Federal Party at the Natal Provincial Elections, 
1954, 5 pages 
8. South Africa: The Coloured vote in the Cape Province, 23 June 1954, 5 pages 
K.T. Kelly 
9. South Africa: The provincial election campaign in the Cape Province, the Orange 
Free State and the Transvaal, 5 August 1954, 5 pages 
W.R. Hodgson 
10. Untitled (Celebration of the Kruger anniversary), undated, 5 pages 
2 Hodgson did not report on Menzies's 1953 visit to South Africa in this series. He did so in a letter 
addressed to the Minster. See AA, Al838/2, 201110/1111, 3/7/1/6020, 4 August 1953. 
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11. Speculation on Dr Malan's Successor, 19 November 1954, 4 pages (drafter's 
initials RAW) 
12. United Party Congress and Native Policy, 30 November 1954, 4 pages 
13. South Africa's Fifth Prime Minister, 1December1954, 3 pages 
14. Mr Strijdom's New Cabinet, 3 December 1954, 3 pages (drafter's initials 
WRH/RAW) 
15. Important Developments in Native Education, 8 December 1954, 5 pages (drafter's 
initials RAW) 
16. The British Protectorates, 15 December 1954, 2 pages 
1955 
1. The Foreign Service of the Union of South Africa, 28 January 1955, 3 pages+ 
Annexure, 2 pages 
2. Commencement of Western Areas Native Removal, 24 February 1955, 4 pages 
(drafter's initials RAW) 
3. South Africa: Native representation in the Union Parliament, 1March1955, 6 
pages (drafter's initials KTK) 
4. South Africa: Appellate Division Quorum Bill, 5 April 1955, 5 pages (drafter's 
initials KTK) 
5. South Africa, India and Unesco, 7 April 1955, 4 pages (drafter's initials KTK) 
6. South Africa: The Senate Bill, 1955, 18 May 1955, 4 pages (drafter's initials KTK) 
7. The Senate Act, 1955, 17 June 1955, 5 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
8. Oil from South African Coal, 27 June 1955, 5 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
9. South African Legislation: 1955, 29 June 1955, 4 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
10. Recent Developments in Native Education, 9 August 1955, 4 pages (drafter's 
initials RAW) 
11. Trade Unions in South Africa, 26 August 1955, 6 pages 
12. The Economic Problems of South Africa's Apartheid Policy, 7 pages+ Annexure, 
3 pages 
13. South African Attitude Towards African States, 19 October 1955, 8 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
H. Gilchrist 
14. The Uranium Industry and Nuclear Energy in South Africa, 29 November 1955, 8 
pages, + Annexures, 3 pages (drafter's initials RW) 
W.R. Hodgson 
15. The New Senate, 15 December 1955, 5 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
1956 
1. Untitled (New parliamentary session), 27 January 1956, 3 pages + Annexure, 1 
page 
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2. Untitled (Closure of Soviet consular offices in South Africa), 10 February 1956, 7 
pages + Annexure, 4 pages 
3. The African National Congress and Native Political Activities, 23 February 1956, 9 
pages+ Annexure, 4 pages (drafter's initials RW) 
4. Amendment of the South Africa Act, 10 March 1956, 4 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
5. Political Movements of the Colored Population, 22 March 1956, 6 pages (drafter's 
initials WRH/R W) 
6. The Tomlinson Report on Development of the Bantu Areas, 7 April 1956, 7 pages 
7. Cape Court Hearing of the Senate Act Case, 5 May 1956, 6 pages (drafters' initials 
WRH/HG) 
8. The Political Activities of South Africa's Indian Population, 17 May 1956, 7 pages 
(drafter's initials R W) 
9. South African Approach to the Prime Ministers' London Conference, 19 May 1956, 
4 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
10. South Africa and the United States, 20 June 1956, 2 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
11. South Africa and the Commonwealth of Nations, 20 June 1956, 7 pages (drafter's 
initials HG) 12: South African relations with African States, 20 June 1956, 5 pages (drafter's initials 
HG) 
13. Prime Ministers' Conference 1956, 21June1956, 2 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
14. Mr Strijdom's record and prospects, 21June1956, 3 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
15. South African Policy for Africa, 21 June 1956, 7 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
16. Parliamentary Session - 1956, 13 July 1956, 5 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
17. The Volkskongres on the Future of the Bantu, 20 July 1956, 6 pages 
18. South Africa and the Suez Canal Crisis, 10 August 1956, 4 pages + Annexures, 2 
pages (drafter's initials HG) 
19. South Africa - Changes in Defence Command, 21 September 1956, 3 pages 
20. The Return of Seretse Khama, 6 October 1956, 4 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
21. The End of the 'Constitutional Crisis', 16 November 1956, 5 pages (drafter's initials 
HG) 
22. Leadership of the United Party, 30 November 1956, 6 pages+ Annexures, 3 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
23. Apartheid in Sport, 12 December 1956, 10 pages+ Annexure, 2 pages (drafter's 
initials HG) 
24. The Mass Arrest of Treason Suspects, 13 December 1956, 8 pages+ Annexure, 3 
pages (drafters' initials RW/HG) 
1957 
1. South Africa: The Road to Totalitarian Rule, 15 March 195 7, 7 pages (drafter's 
initials HG) 
2. South Africa: ILO Membership, 17 April 1957, 3 pages+ Annexures, 11 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
3. South Africa: Road to Totalitarian Rule, 30 May 1957, 7 pages (drafter's initials 
HG) 
4. Untitled (Visit of Prime Minister), 14 June 1957, 4 pages (drafter's initials WRH) 
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5. Parliamentary debate on Foreign Affairs, 22 June 1957, 7 pages (drafter's initials 
HG) 
H. Gilchrist 
6. The 'Oppenheimer proposals' for constitutional reform, 3 September 1957, 4 pages 
+ Annexures, 18 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
7. The United Party's Bloemfontein Congress, 3 September 1957, 5 pages+ Annex-
ure, 3 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
8. Untitled (Impressions of the Rhodesias), 5 October 1957, 1 page+ Annexure, 5 
pages (drafter's initials HG) 
9. South Africa: General election 1958, 14 November 1957, 3 pages (drafter's initials 
HG) 
10. Oil from South African coal, 16 November 1957, 1 page+ Annexure, 4 pages 
(report dated 15 November by Ian E. Nicholson on 'Oil from South African coal) 
1958 
1. The end of the eleventh parliament, 17 March 1958, 8 pages+ Annexure, 29 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
2. South African general elections: (2) factors and prospects, 3 April 1958, 6 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
3. South Africa: general elections: (3) The Coloureds' representatives, 3 April 1958, 6 
pages (drafter's initials HG) 
4. South Africa: general election: (4) factors and prospects, 10 April 1958, 5 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
5. South Africa: general election: (5) factors and prospects, 10 April 1958, 7 pages+ 
Annexure, 2 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
6. South Africa: general election: the political issues, 12 April 1958, 6 pages (drafter's 
initials HG) 
7. South African general election: Nationalist victory, 19 April 1958, 5 pages 
8. South Africa: visit of the UN Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, 26 
June 1958, 4 pages+ Annexures (records of conversations Gilchrist\Sir Charles 
Arden-Clarke~ Gilchrist/Heinz Wieschoff), 7 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
9. South Africa: The Prime Minister, 26 July 1958, 2 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
(drafter's initials HG) 
10. South Africa: The Prime Minister, 8 August 1958, 3 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
(drafter's initials HG) 
11. The immediate political situation in the Union, 12 September 1958, 2 pages+ 
Annexure, I page (drafter's initials HG) 
12. Problems of South Africa's National Propaganda, 16 September 1958, 8 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
13. Division in the African National Congress, 3 October 1958, 4 pages+ Annexure, 2 
pages (drafter's initials HG) 
14. Southern Rhodesia: Accommodating the Urban African, 21 September 1958, 7 
pages + Annexure, 8 pages 
489 
Appendix V: Australian despatches from South Africa 1946-64 
15. Parliamentary Discussion of External Affairs, 9 October 1958, 8 pages+ Annex-
ure, 4 pages (drafter's initials HG) 
16. Thoughts on constitutional revision in South Africa, 22 December 1958, 6 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
17. The significance of Dr Verwoerd (Part 1), 29 December 1958, 5 pages (drafter's 
initials HG) 
18. South Africa: Significance of the Bantu languages, 30 December 1958, 7 pages 
(drafter's initials HG) 
1959 
O.L. Davis 
1. Formal Calls on Cabinet Ministers, 16 May 1959, 3 pages 
2. Cato Manor riots, 24 July 1959, 4 pages 
3. The Union's Parliamentary Session - 1959, 8 August 1959, 5 pages 
4. The split in the United Party, 21 September 1959, 4 pages 
5. Bantustan, 5 October 1959, 5 pages 
6. The Progressive Party, 30 November 1959, 3 pages 
1960 
1. Macmillan's address to the South African parliament, 6 February 1960, 4 pages + 
Annexures, 18 pages 
2. South Africa: the republic and the Commonwealth, 8 February 1960, 3 pages 
3. The short-term effects of Mr Macmillan's speech, 22 February 1960, 4 pages 
4. Australia's concern with the future of South Africa, 21 April 1960, 6 pages 
5. The rudderless ship, 24 May 1960, 4 pages 
6. The referendum campaign, 25 August 1960, 5 pages 
7. The referendum and after, 3 October 1960, 6 pages 
1961 
1. South Africa and the Prime Ministers' Conference, 9 February 1961, 4 pages 
2. The prospects for South Africa's economy, 21March1961, 4 pages 
3. South Africa isolated, 23 March 1961, 3 pages + Annexures, 4 pages 
4. Parliamentary debate on Commonwealth issue, 27 March 1961, 5 pages 
5. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1May1961, 8 pages+ summary 2 pages 
6. Racial troubles in May, 15 May 1961, 3 pages 
7. South Africa's economic problems, 16 May 1961, 3 pages 
8. Post-mortem on the strike, 8 June 1961, 4 pages+ summary, 1 page 
9. The practical effects of apartheid in South Africa, 31 July 1961, 10 pages 
10. South African general elections 1961, 16 August 1961, 5 pages+ summary, 1 page 
11. South West Africa (Part I), 4 October 1961, 6 pages+ Annexure (South West 
Africa (Part II)), 9 October 1961, 8 pages 
12. South Africa: 1961 General Election, 20 October 1961, 3 pages 
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13. Swaziland, 24 October 1961, 6 pages+ Annexure, 1 page 
14. The next five years, 31 October 1961, 4 pages + summary, 1 page 
1962 
1. The Transkei (Part I), 8 February 1962, 7 pages 
2. The Transkei (Part II), 9 February 1962, 4 pages 
3. South Africa: A Review, 15 March 1962, 4 pages+ summary, 1 page 
4. South Africa: Defence, 29 March 1962, 6 pages+ summary, 1 page+ Annexures, 8 
pages 
5. Kenya 1962, 25 May 1962, 15 pages+ summary, 1 page+ Annexure, 1 page 
6. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1 June 1962, 8 pages,+ summary, 1 
page + Annexure, 1 page 
J.C.G. Kevin 
7. The race problem: some early impressions, 7 December 1962, 9 pages 
8. The white groups: some early impressions, 14 December 1962, 4 pages 
9. Developments in the Federation, 21December1962, 4 pages+ summary, 9 lines 
10. The South African image, 28 December 1962, 6 pages+ summary, 6 lines+ 
Annexure, 2 pages 
1963 
1. Economics of the Bantustans, 17 January 1963, 7 pages+ summary, 16 lines 
2. The Coloureds, 23 January 1963, 3 pages 
3. Sport and the South African government, 7 February 1963, 5 pages+ summary, 4 
lines 
4. South African defence, 14 February 1963, 6 pages 
5. Southern African developments, 5 June 1963, 5 pages+ summary, 17 lines 
6. Changing trends in white opinion, 7 June 1963, 3 pages+ summary, 9 lines 
7. The South African stance, 5 July 1963; 5 pages+ summary, 10 lines 
8. Race federation: The United Party's policy, 16 July 1963, 5 pages+ summary, 10 
lines 
9. Policy of the Progressive Party, 26 July 1963, 4 pages+ summary, 10 lines 
10. Partition of South Africa, 7 August 1963, 4 pages+ summary, 3 paragraphs 
11. The police power, 23 August 1963, 5 pages+ summary, 3 paragraphs 
12. Economic integration of the Bantu, 30 August 1963, 3 pages+ summary, 12 lines 
13. The white heartland: The Orange River scheme, 14 November 1963, 5 pages+ 
summary, 10 lines 
14. The Broederbond, 22 December 1963, 7 pages+ summary, 3 paragraphs 
1964 
1. South Africa: The Year Ahead, 23 January 1964, 6 pages+ summary, 16 lines 
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2. South-West Africa: Papua and New Guinea, 13 February 1964, 4 pages+ 
summary, 21 lines 
3. Indians in South Africa, 13 March 1964, 7 pages + summary, 1 paragraph 
4. Political future of the Coloureds, 2 April 1964, 6 pages+ summary, 22 lines 
5. The Opposition and South-West Africa: The Odendaal Proposals, 3 April 1964, 5 
pages+ summary, 3 paragraphs 
6. The press and the South African image, 14 May 1964, 6 pages + summary, 2 para-
graphs 
7. The Myrdal report, 3 June 1964, 7 pages+ summary, 3 paragraphs 
8. The Bantu as a partner in government, 10 July 1964, 7 pages+ summary, 1 para-
graph 
9. South Africa: The present mood, 4 August 1964, 5 pages+ summary, 2 paragraphs 
10. South Africa as a moral issue, 20 August 1964, 8 pages+ summary, 8 lines 
11. This week in Southern Rhodesia, 29 October 1964, 5 pages+ summary, 14 lines 
12. The Simonstown Agreement, 20 November 1964, 4 pages+ summary, 9 lines 
13. South Africa: economics and the race problem, 11December1964, 5 pages+ 
summary, 15 lines 
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